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Alternative futures of a
      comprehensive approach to EU
                security

                   FOCUS Mid-Term
                   Symposium
                   Hotel Sacher
                   Vienna/Austria

                   Foresight Security Scenarios

                    Alexander Siedschlag/
13 March 2012       Andrea Jerković
FOCUS project structure




2                     FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
Conceptual starting points
       The comprehensive approach reflects the cross-border and cross-
        sector nature of security threats and challenges as well as the
        complexity of instruments and objectives in security policy.
       The comprehensive approach addresses the internal-external
        continuum.
       Nowadays it focuses on the holistic nature and broad trade-offs in
        increasing the security of the EU and its citizenry as a whole.
       The comprehensive approach still lacks an overarching definition, but
        there is at least broad agreement that in its external dimension, it
        implies integrating the political, security, development, rule of law,
        human rights and humanitarian dimensions of the EU’s
        international missions and operations.
       However, the concept is not limited to the external dimension.

3                                              FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
Scenario level addressed (“level 2”)


                                Alternative futures
                               of the comprehensive
                                      approach




4                       FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
FOCUS conceptual analysis
       For improved understanding of the prospective conceptual context
        where the EU may seek to deliver a comprehensive approach to
        security, FOCUS performed an analysis of approx. 50 forward-
        looking policy, strategy, and security research definitions of this
        concept. Analyzed documents include the following:
       NATO Strategic concept 2010;
       EU Internal Security Strategy 2010;
       Final Report, European Security Research and Innovation Forum
        (ESRIF);
       Several selected national security strategies that concentrate on
        the comprehensive approach;
       FP7 Work Programme “Security” (2010 and 2011);
       Etc.
5                                               FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
Conceptual evolution
       The comprehensive approach was originally used by NATO (cf. RAND
        study 1992), both as an operational approach and a strategic concept. It
        involved the coordination of different actors and strategies, with all trying to
        achieve political objectives in an increasingly complex environment. The
        concept has since undergone a significant expansion of scope.
       The EU first referred to the “comprehensive approach” as a concept for
        international crisis management (harmonized deployment of resources,
        capabilities and capacities throughout all the crisis management cycle
        phases from primary prevention to reconstruction).
       Later, the EU started to apply the term also to the field of civil security and
        civil security research, including the description of methodological
        requirements for civil security research projects to meet.
       Based on analysis of (approx. 50) pertinent forward-looking definitions,
        FOCUS identified a set of possible future definitional components.

6                                                    FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
Core ingredients of conceptual definitons of comprehensive approach in
    Core ingredients offorward-looking documents
                              conceptual definitions of
    “comprehensive approach” in forward-looking
    policy, strategy, and security research documents

                                               Knowledge/anticipation/foresight;
                                                           1,4%

                                             Internal-external threat/security
                                                     continuum; 2,1%

                                 Common operational picture ; 2,1%
                             Review of systems (overarching
                            state-of analysis of currently used
                                      systems); 3,5%

                         Resilience/ownership; 4,2%                                      Coordination between autonomous
                                                                                                   actors ; 11,9%
                   Effects-based approach to
                       operations ; 4,9%                                                                      Division of labour between all actors
                                                                                                                         involved; 10,5%
               Information sharing; 4,9%




     Acceptance/ acceptability (ethical
                                                                                                                  International combination of
             aspects); 5,6%
                                                                                                                  capabilities/pooling ; 10,5%
                 Civil-military
                                                                                                          Integrated assessment and
      cooperation/coordination/interaction
                                                                                                          decision making (systemic
                    ; 5,6%
                                                                                                                approach); 9,8%
               All-societal outreach and transfer of
                                                                                     Intervention-based approach (top-
                         knowledge; 6,3%
                                                                                       down/transfer of solutions, as

7
                                  Developement of capabilities,                        opposed to bottom-up); 9,1%
                               including cross-cutting capabilties;                FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
                                              7,7%
Top-5 and bottom-5 conceptual elements of
    “comprehensive approach” in forward-looking
    policy, strategy, and security research documents


                        Top 5                                     Bottom 5

    Coordination between autonomous               Resilience/ownership
                                          11.9%                                    4.2%
    actors
                                                  Review of systems
    Division of labour between all                (overarching state-of analysis
                                          10.5%                                    3.5%
    actors involved                               of currently used systems)

    International combination of                  Common operational picture
                                          10.5%                                    2.1%
    capabilities/pooling
    Integrated assessment/                        Internal-external
    decision making                       9.8%    threat/security continuum        2.1%
    (systemic approach)
    Intervention-based approach                   Knowledge/anticipation/
    (top-down/transfer of solutions, as   9.1%    foresight                        1.4%
    opposed to bottom-up)

8                                                    FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
FOCUS scenario workshop: Percentage of the assessment
    “very important” per suggested dimension of a
    comprehensive approach to be developed and applied by the
    EU as a civil security provider


    Transversality: Consideration of security implications in other policies,
             including use of capabilities in a cross-cutting way                  20%

                                               Integrated decision-making
                                                                                                  42%

      Holistic approach to capability development, use of capabilities and
                              citizen acceptance                                          31%

            EU co-ordination of Member States contributions/capabilities                        38%

                       Combination of EU response and citizen resilience                    35%

                                                              Building trust
                                                                                                          54%

                   Development of capabilities based on standardisation             23%

                   Coordination between Member States/involved actors
                                                                                                        50%

                                       Internal-external security continuum
                                                                                                38%

                          Integrated situational picture/information sharing                                          81%

9                       Intelligence and comprehensive threat anticipation
                                                                                FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
                                                                                                                62%
Results from the FOCUS scenario workshop and
     from the analysis of definitions from forward-
     looking strategic/programmatic documents
     compared

                                                                                                                                       13%
           Knowledge/anticipation/foresight                1%

             Internal-external threat/security                                                           8%
                        continuum                               2%

                                                                                                   7%
                      Resilience/ownership                                     4%

                                                                                                   7%
     Effects-based approach to operations                                           5%

                                                                                                                                                         17%
                         Information sharing                                        5%

        All-societal outreach and transfer of                               4%
                      knowledge                                                               6%

     Developement of capabilities, including                                        5%
           cross-cutting capabilties                                                                    8%

       Integrated assessment and decision                                                                     9%
           making (systemic approach)                                                                              10%

                International combination of                                                             8%
                     capabilities/pooling                                                                                10%

        Coordination between autonomous                                                                                    11%
                      actors                                                                                                     12%

                                                 0%          2%           4%             6%             8%         10%         12%           14%   16%         18%

                                                  FOCUS General Expert Questionnaire results
10                                                                                                      FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
                                                  Analysis of definitions of "comprehensive approach" in forward-looking strategic documents
Key drivers for alternative futures
     of the “comprehensive approach”
        Political and/or religious radicalism
        Organized crime, including piracy, illegal finance transactions, and trafficking of drugs, arms, and humans
        Demographics, with resulting global migration and increasing conflict over natural resources
        Severe political crisis and (civil) war in EU neighbouring or in close countries
        Growing interconnectedness of the internal and the external dimensions of security
        Failed states
        Illegal immigration
        Infectious diseases and health crises
        Disasters, either of human or natural origin, including industrial accidents
        Natural resources and energy transition
        Aggression against national territory or violation of sovereignty territories
        Proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD)
        Terrorism as a strategy of action and political influence
        Cyberattacks and attacks against telecommunication and information systems
        Economic instability, with resulting reduced resources to address external security threats
        Climate change and environmental changes/hazards
        Interruption of essential resource supplies, mainly in the energy sector
        Increasing reliance/dependency on information and communication technologies, with increasing vulnerability

11      Abuse or inadequate use of emerging technologies and newFOCUSknowledge
                                                                          scientific – Foresight Security Scenarios
Eight alternative futures of the
     EU comprehensive approach
        Conceptual trend scenario: Assumes that practical ways to efficiently address emerging challenges will be
         explored, with no clear-cut roles or strategic processes of capability development.
        Policy strategies consensus scenario: Rests on the assumption that politically agreed/desired futures of
         comprehensiveness are going to materialize as foreseen in relevant strategic documents.
        Policy strategies leftovers scenario: Assumption that initiatives will emerge to complete what has not been
         achieved so far but remains essential for a true comprehensive approach of the EU as a security provider, following
         interdisciplinary assessments and policy advice from experts.
        Field experts scenario: The aim is not only to implement a comprehensive approach to actors, strategies and
         capabilities but to ensure indivisible and comprehensive security. Various kinds of resources are mobilized by the
         EU to support this process.
        Young academics/new generation scenario: Distinguished by a focus on comprehensive security in terms of
         cross-cutting policies and internal consolidation of the EU as a collective actor, engaging with society and
         stakeholders.
        Multinationalism scenario: Essentially assumes that the comprehensive approach will be dominated by a couple
         of leading Member States and represent a menu of pragmatic choice, characterized by continuous adaptation to
         reality.
        Materialism scenario: Foresees a common pragmatic practice of comprehensive security along the security-safety
         continuum. This pragmatic practice is largely determined by temporarily prevalent concepts for civil-military
         interaction.
        Goal vs. ambition scenario: Is marked by a tension between the comprehensive approach as a common strategic
         goal and the actual level(s) of ambition of the EU and its Member States. Limited shared assumptions about threats
         and differing views on strategies constrain the EU’s ability to act as a comprehensive security provider.

12                                                                        FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
Foreseen core of concept of the EU
     comprehensive approach

        A comprehensive approach addresses the range of
         threats by the full menu of instruments in order to
         realize overarching security.
        A comprehensive approach aims to find and implement
         overarching solutions to problems, with broad effects
         and based on complementarity of actors, while
         considering all available options and capabilities, as
         well as the normative end-state of the security of
         society as a whole.
        A comprehensive approach also entails the tackling of
         cross-cutting issues in home affairs.
13                                       FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
Foreseen general research needs
        Balanced, flexible, and effective civilian and military capabilities for domestic
         ( solidarity clause) and external use;
        Comparative assessment of national policies in crisis management;
        Cybercrime as a global phenomenon causing significant damage to the EU
         internal market;
        New technologies for collecting and integrating data from various different
         sources;
        Intelligent, knowledge based focusing and filtering functions for new social
         media and other open information source monitoring;
        Training schemes for technology use including new social network
         technologies;
        Advancement and integration of approaches to foresight, with special
         consideration of the following: use driven shifts, user experience as a
         dominant influence in the technology trend, identification, and analysis of
         disruptors from normative end states.
14                                                     FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
Foreseen EU role requirements
        Full recognition of the realities in a variety of countries and regions;
        Permanent screening of risk factors with technical and
         analytical/intelligence tools;
        Clear decision-making mechanisms at various stages of the
         escalation of threats and risks;
        Diverse capacities for prevention and early action against threats;
        Close communication with supporting players in the specific
         situation, with relevant international organizations and NGOs;
        Operational strategy based on the principle of approaching the crisis
         as soon as possible, as far from the Union’s border as possible, as
         supportive/communal as possible, as peacefully as possible;
        Closer interaction of civilian and military instruments.

15                                               FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
Indicative emergent research themes
     related to foreseen EU roles

        Addressing of implementation challenges by the development of indicators for a
         net assessment of the effects of a comprehensive approach. This should include
         “societal indicators”;
        Dependency on information and communication technology, and technology in
         general (address cascading breakdown of systems);
        New methodologies for collecting and integrating data from various different
         sources;
        Integrated situational pictures as facilitation for networked operation command
         structures;
        Strategies and tools for information exchange among civilian and military actors
         in order to provide common, timely and relevant situational awareness;
        Decision-making tools based on joined-up situation analyses, including their use to
         secure public acceptance and support;
        Standardized skills development and integrated information systems for a
         effective coordination of resources as well as to cooperation between EU Member
         States.
16                                                      FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
http://www.focusproject.eu

     FOCUS is co-funded by the European
     Commission under the 7th Framework
     Programme, theme "security", call
     FP7-SEC-2010-1, work programme topic 6.3-2
     "Fore sighting the contribution of security
     research to meet the future EU roles“, Grant
     Agreement no. 261633.



17                                FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios

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Sfu ceuss focus-mid-term symposium_ca

  • 1. Alternative futures of a comprehensive approach to EU security FOCUS Mid-Term Symposium Hotel Sacher Vienna/Austria Foresight Security Scenarios Alexander Siedschlag/ 13 March 2012 Andrea Jerković
  • 2. FOCUS project structure 2 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 3. Conceptual starting points  The comprehensive approach reflects the cross-border and cross- sector nature of security threats and challenges as well as the complexity of instruments and objectives in security policy.  The comprehensive approach addresses the internal-external continuum.  Nowadays it focuses on the holistic nature and broad trade-offs in increasing the security of the EU and its citizenry as a whole.  The comprehensive approach still lacks an overarching definition, but there is at least broad agreement that in its external dimension, it implies integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of the EU’s international missions and operations.  However, the concept is not limited to the external dimension. 3 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 4. Scenario level addressed (“level 2”) Alternative futures of the comprehensive approach 4 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 5. FOCUS conceptual analysis  For improved understanding of the prospective conceptual context where the EU may seek to deliver a comprehensive approach to security, FOCUS performed an analysis of approx. 50 forward- looking policy, strategy, and security research definitions of this concept. Analyzed documents include the following:  NATO Strategic concept 2010;  EU Internal Security Strategy 2010;  Final Report, European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF);  Several selected national security strategies that concentrate on the comprehensive approach;  FP7 Work Programme “Security” (2010 and 2011);  Etc. 5 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 6. Conceptual evolution  The comprehensive approach was originally used by NATO (cf. RAND study 1992), both as an operational approach and a strategic concept. It involved the coordination of different actors and strategies, with all trying to achieve political objectives in an increasingly complex environment. The concept has since undergone a significant expansion of scope.  The EU first referred to the “comprehensive approach” as a concept for international crisis management (harmonized deployment of resources, capabilities and capacities throughout all the crisis management cycle phases from primary prevention to reconstruction).  Later, the EU started to apply the term also to the field of civil security and civil security research, including the description of methodological requirements for civil security research projects to meet.  Based on analysis of (approx. 50) pertinent forward-looking definitions, FOCUS identified a set of possible future definitional components. 6 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 7. Core ingredients of conceptual definitons of comprehensive approach in Core ingredients offorward-looking documents conceptual definitions of “comprehensive approach” in forward-looking policy, strategy, and security research documents Knowledge/anticipation/foresight; 1,4% Internal-external threat/security continuum; 2,1% Common operational picture ; 2,1% Review of systems (overarching state-of analysis of currently used systems); 3,5% Resilience/ownership; 4,2% Coordination between autonomous actors ; 11,9% Effects-based approach to operations ; 4,9% Division of labour between all actors involved; 10,5% Information sharing; 4,9% Acceptance/ acceptability (ethical International combination of aspects); 5,6% capabilities/pooling ; 10,5% Civil-military Integrated assessment and cooperation/coordination/interaction decision making (systemic ; 5,6% approach); 9,8% All-societal outreach and transfer of Intervention-based approach (top- knowledge; 6,3% down/transfer of solutions, as 7 Developement of capabilities, opposed to bottom-up); 9,1% including cross-cutting capabilties; FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios 7,7%
  • 8. Top-5 and bottom-5 conceptual elements of “comprehensive approach” in forward-looking policy, strategy, and security research documents Top 5 Bottom 5 Coordination between autonomous Resilience/ownership 11.9% 4.2% actors Review of systems Division of labour between all (overarching state-of analysis 10.5% 3.5% actors involved of currently used systems) International combination of Common operational picture 10.5% 2.1% capabilities/pooling Integrated assessment/ Internal-external decision making 9.8% threat/security continuum 2.1% (systemic approach) Intervention-based approach Knowledge/anticipation/ (top-down/transfer of solutions, as 9.1% foresight 1.4% opposed to bottom-up) 8 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 9. FOCUS scenario workshop: Percentage of the assessment “very important” per suggested dimension of a comprehensive approach to be developed and applied by the EU as a civil security provider Transversality: Consideration of security implications in other policies, including use of capabilities in a cross-cutting way 20% Integrated decision-making 42% Holistic approach to capability development, use of capabilities and citizen acceptance 31% EU co-ordination of Member States contributions/capabilities 38% Combination of EU response and citizen resilience 35% Building trust 54% Development of capabilities based on standardisation 23% Coordination between Member States/involved actors 50% Internal-external security continuum 38% Integrated situational picture/information sharing 81% 9 Intelligence and comprehensive threat anticipation FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios 62%
  • 10. Results from the FOCUS scenario workshop and from the analysis of definitions from forward- looking strategic/programmatic documents compared 13% Knowledge/anticipation/foresight 1% Internal-external threat/security 8% continuum 2% 7% Resilience/ownership 4% 7% Effects-based approach to operations 5% 17% Information sharing 5% All-societal outreach and transfer of 4% knowledge 6% Developement of capabilities, including 5% cross-cutting capabilties 8% Integrated assessment and decision 9% making (systemic approach) 10% International combination of 8% capabilities/pooling 10% Coordination between autonomous 11% actors 12% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% FOCUS General Expert Questionnaire results 10 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios Analysis of definitions of "comprehensive approach" in forward-looking strategic documents
  • 11. Key drivers for alternative futures of the “comprehensive approach”  Political and/or religious radicalism  Organized crime, including piracy, illegal finance transactions, and trafficking of drugs, arms, and humans  Demographics, with resulting global migration and increasing conflict over natural resources  Severe political crisis and (civil) war in EU neighbouring or in close countries  Growing interconnectedness of the internal and the external dimensions of security  Failed states  Illegal immigration  Infectious diseases and health crises  Disasters, either of human or natural origin, including industrial accidents  Natural resources and energy transition  Aggression against national territory or violation of sovereignty territories  Proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD)  Terrorism as a strategy of action and political influence  Cyberattacks and attacks against telecommunication and information systems  Economic instability, with resulting reduced resources to address external security threats  Climate change and environmental changes/hazards  Interruption of essential resource supplies, mainly in the energy sector  Increasing reliance/dependency on information and communication technologies, with increasing vulnerability 11  Abuse or inadequate use of emerging technologies and newFOCUSknowledge scientific – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 12. Eight alternative futures of the EU comprehensive approach  Conceptual trend scenario: Assumes that practical ways to efficiently address emerging challenges will be explored, with no clear-cut roles or strategic processes of capability development.  Policy strategies consensus scenario: Rests on the assumption that politically agreed/desired futures of comprehensiveness are going to materialize as foreseen in relevant strategic documents.  Policy strategies leftovers scenario: Assumption that initiatives will emerge to complete what has not been achieved so far but remains essential for a true comprehensive approach of the EU as a security provider, following interdisciplinary assessments and policy advice from experts.  Field experts scenario: The aim is not only to implement a comprehensive approach to actors, strategies and capabilities but to ensure indivisible and comprehensive security. Various kinds of resources are mobilized by the EU to support this process.  Young academics/new generation scenario: Distinguished by a focus on comprehensive security in terms of cross-cutting policies and internal consolidation of the EU as a collective actor, engaging with society and stakeholders.  Multinationalism scenario: Essentially assumes that the comprehensive approach will be dominated by a couple of leading Member States and represent a menu of pragmatic choice, characterized by continuous adaptation to reality.  Materialism scenario: Foresees a common pragmatic practice of comprehensive security along the security-safety continuum. This pragmatic practice is largely determined by temporarily prevalent concepts for civil-military interaction.  Goal vs. ambition scenario: Is marked by a tension between the comprehensive approach as a common strategic goal and the actual level(s) of ambition of the EU and its Member States. Limited shared assumptions about threats and differing views on strategies constrain the EU’s ability to act as a comprehensive security provider. 12 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 13. Foreseen core of concept of the EU comprehensive approach  A comprehensive approach addresses the range of threats by the full menu of instruments in order to realize overarching security.  A comprehensive approach aims to find and implement overarching solutions to problems, with broad effects and based on complementarity of actors, while considering all available options and capabilities, as well as the normative end-state of the security of society as a whole.  A comprehensive approach also entails the tackling of cross-cutting issues in home affairs. 13 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 14. Foreseen general research needs  Balanced, flexible, and effective civilian and military capabilities for domestic ( solidarity clause) and external use;  Comparative assessment of national policies in crisis management;  Cybercrime as a global phenomenon causing significant damage to the EU internal market;  New technologies for collecting and integrating data from various different sources;  Intelligent, knowledge based focusing and filtering functions for new social media and other open information source monitoring;  Training schemes for technology use including new social network technologies;  Advancement and integration of approaches to foresight, with special consideration of the following: use driven shifts, user experience as a dominant influence in the technology trend, identification, and analysis of disruptors from normative end states. 14 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 15. Foreseen EU role requirements  Full recognition of the realities in a variety of countries and regions;  Permanent screening of risk factors with technical and analytical/intelligence tools;  Clear decision-making mechanisms at various stages of the escalation of threats and risks;  Diverse capacities for prevention and early action against threats;  Close communication with supporting players in the specific situation, with relevant international organizations and NGOs;  Operational strategy based on the principle of approaching the crisis as soon as possible, as far from the Union’s border as possible, as supportive/communal as possible, as peacefully as possible;  Closer interaction of civilian and military instruments. 15 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 16. Indicative emergent research themes related to foreseen EU roles  Addressing of implementation challenges by the development of indicators for a net assessment of the effects of a comprehensive approach. This should include “societal indicators”;  Dependency on information and communication technology, and technology in general (address cascading breakdown of systems);  New methodologies for collecting and integrating data from various different sources;  Integrated situational pictures as facilitation for networked operation command structures;  Strategies and tools for information exchange among civilian and military actors in order to provide common, timely and relevant situational awareness;  Decision-making tools based on joined-up situation analyses, including their use to secure public acceptance and support;  Standardized skills development and integrated information systems for a effective coordination of resources as well as to cooperation between EU Member States. 16 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios
  • 17. http://www.focusproject.eu FOCUS is co-funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme, theme "security", call FP7-SEC-2010-1, work programme topic 6.3-2 "Fore sighting the contribution of security research to meet the future EU roles“, Grant Agreement no. 261633. 17 FOCUS – Foresight Security Scenarios