Catherine Fuss (National Bank of Belgium). Firm dynamics and employment adjustment: the role of multinationals

Firm dynamics and employment
adjustment: the role of multinationals
Eesti Pank seminar, Tallinn, January 23 2013

P. Blanchard (U.Paris Est Créteil, ERUDITE), E. Dhyne (BNB, U. Mons)
C. Fuss (BNB, ULB), C. Mathieu (U. Paris Est Créteil, ERUDITE)

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium.

Introduction: the role of multinational firms (MNFs)
 Importance of MNFs for Belgium
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Inwards FDI flows/GDP

Belgium 84 88 91 113 129 100 120 177 169 201 192
EU 27 29 32 34 36 34 41 44 36 45 45
US 28 25 19 22 23 22 25 25 17 21 23
Source: UNCTAD (2009)

 MNFs are large employment providers ...
...
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Domestic firms
employment(x1000) 1087 1116 1137 995 983 967 987 1030 1051 1088 1118 1123
average per firm 9 9 9 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8
MNFs
employment(x1000) 508 522 539 714 707 713 710 689 706 709 688 657
average per firm 261 270 266 267 252 238 239 249 264 270 273 267
Notes: sample of firms with at least once: average number of employees>0, tangible fixed assets>100,
with main activity in the manufacturing, construction or market services sectors.

INTRODUCTION EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS PROBABILITY OF EXIT LABOUR ADJUSTMENT COSTS CONCLUSION

 Importance of MNFs for Belgium
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Inwards FDI flows/GDP

Belgium 84 88 91 113 129 100 120 177 169 201 192
EU 27 29 32 34 36 34 41 44 36 45 45
US 28 25 19 22 23 22 25 25 17 21 23
Source: UNCTAD (2009)

...
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Domestic firms
employment (x1000) 1087 1116 1137 995 983 967 987 1030 1051 1088 1118 1123
average per firm 9 9 9 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8
MNFs
employment (x1000) 508 522 539 714 707 713 710 689 706 709 688 657
average per firm 261 270 266 267 252 238 239 249 264 270 273 267
Notes: sample of firms with at least once: average number of employees>0, tangible fixed assets>100,
with main activity in the manufacturing, construction or market services sectors.



… but MNFs may be characterised by higher employment volatility
 international reallocation is easier

 home bias in adverse time

 Two reasons of employment losses
 firm exit

 labour adjustment by incumbents

→ outline of the talk

 Employment dynamics during the crisis : firm exit vs incumbents adjustment

 The footlose nature of multinationals

 Labour adjustment costs


Employment dynamics during the crisis
 Job creation - job destruction (Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996)

 Dataset and variables definition
 sources: Survey on FDI + (annualised) annual accounts
 sample: manufacturing, construction and market services over 1997-2010
 exit in t if in t+1 no employment, no total assets, tangible fixed assets<100.
 MNF if owned by at least 50% by a foreign company, or having outwards FDI of at
least 10%



(in thousands) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Domestic firms
∆L Incumbents 48 41 37 31 6 4 16 23 31 43 38 -8
(# firms) 106.83 114.26 119.00 122.27 125.72 129.29 132.07 135.32 137.70 139.42 140.82 141.36
∆L exiters -22 -31 -26 -31 -27 -21 -19 -19 -21 -23 -27 -29
(# firms)
2.28 3.02 3.65 3.68 3.64 3.58 3.92 3.56 4.14 4.49 4.81 5.51
MNFs
∆L Incumbents 4 -3 12 17 -10 -12 -2 -2 10 4 -8 -36
(# firms) 1.90 1.90 1.99 2.63 2.76 2.95 2.93 2.72 2.62 2.59 2.50 2.41
∆L exiters -6 -4 -14 -7 -6 -8 -4 -5 -4 -5 -3 -12
(# firms)
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08
Notes: Exit year = last year the firm is observed and no employment, no positive total assets, no tangible fixed assets>100.
Incumbents are firms observed in t and t-1



(in thousands) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Domestic firms
∆L Incumbents 48 41 37 31 6 4 16 23 31 43 38 -8
(# firms) 106.83 114.26 119.00 122.27 125.72 129.29 132.07 135.32 137.70 139.42 140.82 141.36
∆L exiters -22 -31 -26 -31 -27 -21 -19 -19 -21 -23 -27 -29
(# firms)
2.28 3.02 3.65 3.68 3.64 3.58 3.92 3.56 4.14 4.49 4.81 5.51
MNFs
∆L Incumbents 4 -3 12 17 -10 -12 -2 -2 10 4 -8 -36
(# firms) 1.90 1.90 1.99 2.63 2.76 2.95 2.93 2.72 2.62 2.59 2.50 2.41
∆L exiters -6 -4 -14 -7 -6 -8 -4 -5 -4 -5 -3 -12
(# firms)
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08

 more domestic firms have exited in 2008



(in thousands) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Domestic firms
∆L Incumbents 48 41 37 31 6 4 16 23 31 43 38 -8
(# firms) 106.83 114.26 119.00 122.27 125.72 129.29 132.07 135.32 137.70 139.42 140.82 141.36
∆L exiters -22 -31 -26 -31 -27 -21 -19 -19 -21 -23 -27 -29
(# firms)
2.28 3.02 3.65 3.68 3.64 3.58 3.92 3.56 4.14 4.49 4.81 5.51
MNFs
∆L Incumbents 4 -3 12 17 -10 -12 -2 -2 10 4 -8 -36
(# firms) 1.90 1.90 1.99 2.63 2.76 2.95 2.93 2.72 2.62 2.59 2.50 2.41
∆L exiters -6 -4 -14 -7 -6 -8 -4 -5 -4 -5 -3 -12
(# firms)
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08


 incumbent MNFs start downsizing in 2008



(in thousands) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Domestic firms
∆L Incumbents 48 41 37 31 6 4 16 23 31 43 38 -8
(# firms) 106.83 114.26 119.00 122.27 125.72 129.29 132.07 135.32 137.70 139.42 140.82 141.36
∆L exiters -22 -31 -26 -31 -27 -21 -19 -19 -21 -23 -27 -29
(# firms)
2.28 3.02 3.65 3.68 3.64 3.58 3.92 3.56 4.14 4.49 4.81 5.51
MNFs
∆L Incumbents 4 -3 12 17 -10 -12 -2 -2 10 4 -8 -36
(# firms) 1.90 1.90 1.99 2.63 2.76 2.95 2.93 2.72 2.62 2.59 2.50 2.41
∆L exiters -6 -4 -14 -7 -6 -8 -4 -5 -4 -5 -3 -12
(# firms)
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08



 domestic incumbents start downsizing in 2009, and exits remain substantial



(in thousands) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Domestic firms
∆L Incumbents 48 41 37 31 6 4 16 23 31 43 38 -8
(# firms) 106.83 114.26 119.00 122.27 125.72 129.29 132.07 135.32 137.70 139.42 140.82 141.36
∆L exiters -22 -31 -26 -31 -27 -21 -19 -19 -21 -23 -27 -29
(# firms)
2.28 3.02 3.65 3.68 3.64 3.58 3.92 3.56 4.14 4.49 4.81 5.51
MNFs
∆L Incumbents 4 -3 12 17 -10 -12 -2 -2 10 4 -8 -36
(# firms) 1.90 1.90 1.99 2.63 2.76 2.95 2.93 2.72 2.62 2.59 2.50 2.41
∆L exiters -6 -4 -14 -7 -6 -8 -4 -5 -4 -5 -3 -12
(# firms)
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08



 domestic incumbents start downsizing in 2009, and exits remain substantial

 MNFs exits increased in 2009 and incumbent MNFs downsizing increased in 2009


The probability of firm exit
 The footlose nature of multinationals

 Conclusions from previous studies

 Van Beveren (2007), for Belgium, Alvarez & Görg (2009); Bernard & Jensen (2009);
Bernard & Sjoholm (2003); Görg & Strobl (2003)

 MNFs have a smaller unconditional probability of exit than domestic firms

 Controlling for firm and sector-level characteristics, MNFs have a similar or even
higher exit probability than domestic firms

→ random effects Probit model for the probability of exit
 including sunk costs in addition to traditional variables

 taking two sources of endogeneity into account


 Firm-level variables
 size (measured by employment) and age
 TFP estimated using Ackerberg et al. procedure extended to account for firm exit
 sunk costs = fraction of investment (in tangible and intangible capital) that is not
leased and cannot be resold on second-hand market
I I leased K K leased
sunkit = (P itIit - P itI it) + (1-δit)(1-γit).(P it-1Kit-1 -Pit-1K it-1)

δ : depreciation rate measured by the yearly sector-level mean
γ : resale rate, approximated by the average sector-level ratio of sales and disposals
over the capital stock.
sunk costs represent barriers to entry and are lost in case of exit → barriers to exit in
the case re-entry is likely.

 Sector-level variables
 sector growth of value added
 competition: Herfindahl index of firm' turnover

→ MNFs are larger, older, more productive and bear larger sunk costs
they operate in sectors with higher growth and lower competition



 Random effects Probit model

 Endogeneity into account endogeneity wrt individual effects (Mundlak)

 Endogeneity wrt decision to exit (Rivers-Vuong IV two-step procedure)
 e.g. "the shadow of death" (Griliches and Regev, 1995)
→ TFP, sunk costs and size potentially endogenous
 step 1: regress endogenous variables on one lag of the enodgenous varable and
MNF, age, competition, sector growth, sector dummies
 step 2: include teh fitted value and residual of step 1 in the Probit
 test of endogeneity: t-stat of step 1 residual
 instruments: one lag of endogenous variable, MNF dummy, competition, sector
growth, scetor dummies


Probit models for the probability of exit - marginal effects
(1) (2)

MNFit -0.028*** 0.058***

log(TFPit) -0.037***

Ageit 0.050***

log(Sunkit) -0.015***

log(Sizeit) -0.046***

Competitionst -0.019*

Sector growthst 0.004

log L -152155 -116413

Notes: Estimation over 1998-2008.
All equations include year and nace 1-digit sector dummies;
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.

MNFs have a higher (unconditional) probability of exit than domestic firms


Probit models for the probability of exit - marginal effects
(1) (2)

MNFit -0.028*** 0.058***

log(TFPit) -0.037***

Ageit 0.050***

log(Sunkit) -0.015***

log(Sizeit) -0.046***

Competitionst -0.019*

Sector growthst 0.004

log L -152155 -116413

Notes: Estimation over 1998-2008.
All equations include year and nace 1-digit sector dummies;
*** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.

• conditional on firm an sector char., MNFs are more likely to exit (5.8 pp)
• sunk costs act as barriers to exit


Labour adjustment costs of incumbents
 Labour adjustment of incumbents

 Barba Navarretti, Checci, Turini (2003) estimate labour demand equations

and find that MNFs adjust employment faster than domestic firms

→ suggests lower adjustment costs

 Why would adjustment costs be different?

 all firms operating in Belgium face the same labour market legislation and institutions?

 economies of scale in human resources management, no labour indivisibility issues

 use of flexible contracts and procedures

 higher bargaining power wrt governments and unions (Haskel et al. 2007)

 international production scope allows for employment reallocation

→ reallocation threat that reinforces bargaining power


Labour adjustment costs of incumbents
 Dataset

 1998-2007

 Survey on FDI + (annualised) annual accounts

+ Social Security Data (remuneration and employment by type of worker)

 firms with at least 10 employees and that report detailed annual accounts

 maufacturing, construction, trade, market services

 Estimation of labour adjustment costs

 dynamic labour demand equation based on structural Euler equation for net employment
flows (Pfann and Palm, 1993, Alonso-Borrego, 1996, Mathieu and Nicolas, 2006)

 cubic labour adjustment costs function (Alonso-Borrego, 1998)

 differences between blue-collar and white-collar workers (Bresson et al., 1992, Abowd and
Kramarz, 2003, Kramarz and Michaud, 2010)

 differences between employment downsizing and employment upsizing (Goux et al. 2001;
Lundgren and Sjöstom, 2001, Mathieu and Nicolas, 2006)

 differences between MNFs and domestic firms


Labour adjustment costs of incumbents: derivation
 Adjustment costs function (Alonso-Borrego, 1998)

 differences between blue-collar workers and white-collar workers
 convexity: aB and aW
 asymmetry: when dB, dW<0 downsizing cost are larger than upsizing costs
 cross adjustment term: when g<0,
adjusting both LB and LW in the same direction reduces costs
but substitution between LB and LW increases costs

 Euler equation for worker-type j
 assuming Cobb-Douglas production function and Cournot competition:

 β is the discount factor
 αj is the Cobb Douglas coefficient of type j labour
 µ is the markup


Labour adjustment costs of incumbents: estimation

 Euler equation for worker-type j

 Differences between domestic firms and MNFs
α j Qit
Pst
µ Litj
− Witj = (a + a
j j
MNF
j
[
MNFit )(∆Lit − βEt ∆Lij,t +1 ) + ]
(d + d
j j
MNF (
MNFit ) ∆Lit − βEt ∆Lij,t +1 +
j 2
[ 2
])
(g + g [
MNF MNFit )(∆Lit − β Et ∆Li ,t +1 )
k k
]
 Estimation by System GMM
 i.e. firms form rational expectations
 the discount factor is set to β = 0.97 (robustness β = 0.95, 0.99)
 αj/µ obtained from estimates of production function

 TFP estimated by Ackerberg et al. (2006) procedure


Labour adjustment costs of incumbents:
Estimates of production function coefficients
 Allowing for market power
 → estimates of αK/µ, αB/µ, αW/µ (Griliches - Mairesse, 1995)

 Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006)
 assuming that capital, blue-collar workers and white-collar workers are fixed inputs

αK/µ αB/µ αW /µ

Food and textile 0.178 0.424 0.388
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016)

Wood, paper, chemicals, metal and non metal products, machinery 0.161 0.358 0.437
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009)

Equipment and recycling 0.138 0.354 0.433
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018)

Energy and construction 0.106 0.502 0.338
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)

Trade and hotels and restaurants 0.126 0.176 0.561
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)

Communication and financial intermediation 0.163 0.268 0.361
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)

Real estate and business activities 0.179 0.071 0.612
(0.013) (0.018) (0.034)

Note: Estimates based on the 1997-2005 period; 58594 observations and 8688 firms;
Bootstrap-standard errors in brackets.

Labour adjustment costs of incumbents: estimates
baseline

aB 291.84***

aBMNF -93.67

dB -7.99**

dBMNF 7.98**

aW 1191.58***

aWMNF -692.26***

dW -20.98**

dWMNF 14.40

g -283.13***

gMNF 185.13

Sargan 30.41

Notes: 37553 observations and 5544 firms over the period 1998-2006.
Joint estimation for blue-collar workers and white-collar workers by SGMM estimation.
All equations include year and sector dummies.
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.


baseline Total adjustment costs for a net
employment increase of 1
aB 291.84*** 700
aBMNF -93.67
600
dB -7.99**
500
dBMNF 7.98**
400
aW 1191.58***
300
aWMNF -692.26***

dW -20.98** 200

dWMNF 14.40 100

g -283.13*** 0
∆LB = +1 ∆LW = 0 ∆LB = 0 ∆LW = +1
gMNF 185.13
domestic firms multinational firms
Sargan 30.41



Labour adjustment costs of incumbents: explanations
 Home bias
MNFs protect home employment, and downsize abroad → Belgian MNF dummy:

 More intensive/efficient use of labor flexibility tools
 fixed-term contract turnover
 early retirement dummy

α j Qit
Pst
µ Litj
− Witj = (a + a
j j
MNF
j j
[ ]
MNFit + a proxy proxyit )(∆Lit − βEt ∆Lij,t +1 ) +

(d + d
j j
MNF
j
(j
[
MNFit + d proxy proxyit ) ∆Lit − βEt ∆Lij,t +1 +
2 2
])
(g + g MNF [
MNFit + g proxy proxyit )(∆Lk − βEt ∆Lk,t +1 )
it i ]

 Higher bargaining power wrt unions
 sample split according to compulsory union representation at the firm level (employees>=50)

 Firm size
 alternative specification (see later)



baseline Bel. MNF turn ftc early ret. no unions unions
aBMNF -93.67 -96.21 -12.17 48.54 248.15 -64.50

aBproxy -24.72 -166.36* -456.12***

dBMNF 7.98** 7.85** 4.91 4.53* 8.31* 8.22**

dBproxy 0.36 2.37 17.13***

aWMNF -692.26*** -704.23** -691.96*** -564.39** -952.03 -498.99*

aWproxy 285.21 -518.61** 179.24

dWMNF 14.40 12.07 14.95* 7.76 -54.76** -11.47

dWproxy -8.30 5.79 5.23

gMNF 185.13 159.24 223.70** 257.46*** -454.82 182.96

gproxy 166.12 -276.51 -55.03

Sargan 30.41 34.77 38.12 42.26 22.07 32.07
aB, aW dB, dW, g not reported.



Bel. MNF turn ftc early ret. no unions unions
aBMNF -93.67 -96.21 -12.17 48.54 248.15 -64.50

aBproxy -24.72 -166.36* -456.12***

dBMNF 7.98** 7.85** 4.91 4.53* 8.31* 8.22**

dBproxy 0.36 2.37 17.13***

aWMNF -692.26*** -704.23** -691.96*** -564.39** -952.03 -498.99*

aWproxy 285.21 -518.61** 179.24

dWMNF 14.40 12.07 14.95* 7.76 -54.76** -11.47

dWproxy -8.30 5.79 5.23

gMNF 185.13 159.24 223.70** 257.46*** -454.82 182.96

gproxy 166.12 -276.51 -55.03

Sargan 30.41 34.77 38.12 42.26 22.07 32.07



Bel. MNF turn ftc early ret. no unions unions
aBMNF -93.67 -96.21 -12.17 48.54 248.15 -64.50

aBproxy -24.72 -166.36* -456.12***

dBMNF 7.98** 7.85** 4.91 4.53* 8.31* 8.22**

dBproxy 0.36 2.37 17.13***

aWMNF -692.26*** -704.23** -691.96*** -564.39** -952.03 -498.99*

aWproxy 285.21 -518.61** 179.24

dWMNF 14.40 12.07 14.95* 7.76 -54.76** -11.47

dWproxy -8.30 5.79 5.23

gMNF 185.13 159.24 223.70** 257.46*** -454.82 182.96

gproxy 166.12 -276.51 -55.03
Sargan 30.41 34.77 38.12 42.26 22.07 32.07


Total adjustment costs for alternative specifications, ∆LW = +1
700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
base turn. ftc = 0.44 early ret. unions

domestic firms multinational firms


Labour adjustment costs of incumbents : the role of size
 Meghir, Ryan, Van Reenen (1996) specification for quadratic adjustment costs

(
AC L it ;L it −1 ) =
c ∆L it 2
(
2 L it −1
) L it −1

 Cubic adjustment cost function without size

AC(∆L )
B W aB B2 dB B3 aW W2 dW 3
it ; ∆L it = ∆L it + ∆L it + ∆L it + ∆LW + g∆LB ∆LW
it it it
2 3 2 3

 Cubic adjustment costs function à la Meghir et al. → L it-1-1, Lit-1-2

AC (
∆LB ; ∆LW ;L it −1
it it ) =
aB
2
B 2 −1
∆L it L it −1 +
dB
3
B 3 −2
∆L it L it −1 +
aW
2
W 2 −1
∆L it L it −1 +
dW
3
it
3
∆LW L− 2−1 + g∆LB ∆LWL−1−1
it it it it

 Generalised adjustment cost function → θ1, θB2 θB3, θW2, θW3

AC(∆L )
B W aB B 2 θB 2 dB B 3 θB 3 aW W 2 θW 2 dW 3 W3
it ; ∆L it ; L it −1 = ∆L it L it −1 + ∆L it L it −1 + ∆L it L it −1 + ∆LW Lθ −1 + g∆LB ∆LW Lθ1
it it it it
2 3 2 3 it −1

 + allowing for differences in aB, aW, dB, dW, g between MNFs and domestic
firms


Labour adjustment costs of incumbents : the role of size
 Generalised adjustment cost function → θ1, θB2 θB3, θW2, θW3

AC (
∆LB ; ∆LW ;L it −1
it it ) =
aB
2
B 2 θB 2
∆L it L it −1 +
dB
3
B 3 θB 3
∆L it L it −1 +
aW
2
W 2 θW 2
∆L it L it −1 +
dW
3
it
3 W3
∆LW Lθ −1 + g∆LB ∆LW Lθ1
it it it
it −1

 Estimation of θj by random grid search.

 Model and Moment Selection Criterion based on Hansen-J statistics

 θ<0 → lower adjustment costs for larger firms, but the impact is limited

 reduction in adjustment costs for ∆LB=1

 -1.9% for domestic firms with L=10

 0.001% for domestic firms with L=200


no control controlling Meghir
for size for size specification

aB 291.84*** 782.19*** 16333.13***
aBMNF -93.67 -14.42 205.19**

dB -7.99** -12.70** -2862.81***

dBMNF 7.98** 11.17** -11550.40

aW 1191.58*** 1470.24*** 59616.48***

aWMNF -692.26*** -685.85*** 161.80
dW -20.98** -37.95*** -38557.80***

dWMNF 14.40 27.99** 179522.00

g -283.13*** -5700.69 -7415.29*
gMNF 185.13 -8836.83* 2958.09
Sargan 30.41 24.68 30.32



no control controlling Meghir Total adjustment
for size for size specification
costs for ∆LW=1
700
aB 291.84*** 782.19*** 16333.13***
aBMNF -93.67 -14.42 205.19** 600

dB -7.99** -12.70** -2862.81***
500
dB MNF 7.98** 11.17** -11550.40

aW 1191.58*** 1470.24*** 59616.48*** 400

aWMNF -692.26*** -685.85*** 161.80 300
dW -20.98** -37.95*** -38557.80***
200
dWMNF 14.40 27.99** 179522.00
100
g -283.13*** -5700.69 -7415.29*
gMNF 185.13 -8836.83* 2958.09 0
no control control for
Sargan 30.41 24.68 30.32
for size size; L=200
Notes: 37553 observations and 5544 firms over the period 1998-2006. domestic firms multinational firms

Conclusion
1. MNFs are large emplyoment providers --- but ajust more and differently
e.g. during 2008-2009
 most employment losses in domestic firms were due to exits
 most employment losses in MNFs due to employment cuts by incumbents

2. Differences in exit probabilities
 MNFs have a smaller unconditional probability of exit than domestic firms
 Controlling for firm and sector-level characteristics, MNFs have a significantly higher
probability of exit than domestic firms, but the difference is small (5.8 pp)

3. Differences in labour adjustment costs
 adjustment costs are smaller for MNFs, especially for white-collar workers
 not (or only very partially )explained by flexible labour management practices or firm size
 → possible interpretation stronger bargaining power vis-à-vis unions and governements
 thanks to threat of closure/delocalisation?


Catherine Fuss (National Bank of Belgium). Firm dynamics and employment adjustment: the role of multinationals

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