2. Hudson / Owens / Flannes: Drone Warfare
successful drone attacks on high-profile In total, we argue that drone warfare
targets seem to have mobilized existing has created five distinct, yet overlapping,
networks of followers to conduct symbolic forms of blowback: (1) the purposeful
revenge attacks of comparable magnitude, retaliation against the United States, (2)
like the December 2009 Khost bombing, the creation of new insurgents, referred to
which sought to avenge the drone killing as the “accidental guerrilla” syndrome, (3)
of Beitullah Mehsud in Waziristan earlier the further complication of U.S. strategic
that year. By coordination
extension, The success of the drone program during and inter-
non-militants its infancy, as defined by the ability to ests in what
victimized by kill high-value targets, gave the Bush the Bush
drone attacks and Obama
directly or administration the impression that if administra-
indirectly far limited drone strikes were successful, tions have
outnumber more strikes would be even better. designated
targeted mili- the Afghan/
tants. Thus, a stream of new adversaries is Pakistan (Af/Pak) theatre, (4) the further
produced in what is called the “accidental destabilization of Pakistan and (5) the
guerrilla” phenomenon. 5
deterioration of the U.S.-Pakistani relation-
On a different level, the erosion of ship. As the drone policy is adapted for
trust and lack of clarity in drone policy use in post-Saleh Yemen, it is important to
produces strategic and tactical confusion address these forms of blowback.
within the U.S. defense and intelligence
agencies. This confusion proves unhelp- DRONE WARFARE 101
ful as exit strategies for the Afghan war Drones were first used for battlefield
are debated and continuing evaluation reconnaissance, but over the last 10 years
of U.S.-Pakistani relations are assessed have evolved into America’s preferred kill-
behind closed doors. By the same token, ing machines for locations where the U.S.
the ongoing ambivalence of the Pakistani military does not operate openly on the
civilian and military leadership on the ground. The evolution of drone technology
topic of U.S. drone strikes has fanned the has been quick, with new developments al-
flames of popular discontent in the coun- lowing for longer flight, heavier payloads,
try’s fragile political system, revealing the vertical takeoff from ships, and deploy-
infrastructure of contradictions in the roles ment to more areas of the world. While the
of its military-intelligence sectors that si- Predator MQ-1 and Predator B (Reaper)
multaneously work with the United States MQ-9 have carried out most surveillance
and promote militant organizations. All and attacks, new platforms have been de-
these forms of blowback — the unintend- ployed that will likely be engaging targets
ed consequences of policies not subjected in the near future. The most recent evolu-
to the scrutiny of the American public — tion of UAVs are the RQ-4 Global Hawk
complicate U.S. policy in the region and (designed and used for surveillance only)
should be considered before drone warfare and the MQ-8B Fire Scout. The latter is
is expanded into the Arabian Peninsula currently deployed on ships off the Horn of
and Africa.6 Africa and in the Caribbean.7 With basic
123
3. Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2011
Figure 1: Types of Drones 8
Make Model/Name Use Payload*
General Atomics Predator/MQ-1 Surveillance/ Armed Strikes 450 lbs.
General Atomics Predator B/Reaper/MQ-9 Surveillance/ Armed Strikes 850 lbs.
Northrop Grumman Global Hawk Surveillance 2,000 lbs.
Northrop Grumman Fire Scout MQ-8B Surveillance/ Armed Strikes 800 lbs.
* Approximate
models starting at $4.5 million, these air- The third phase of drone warfare took
craft are cost efficient and carry little risk place during the end of the Bush adminis-
burden, especially since human pilots are tration and consisted of an acceleration of
removed from the equation. attack frequency: 37 during 2008, com-
The use of armed drones by the United pared to a total of nine in the first two pe-
States has developed over nearly a decade. riods.11 The success of the drone program
The program’s evolution can be broken during its infancy, as defined by the ability
into four phases. Phase one, roughly 2002- to kill high-value targets like Harethi and
04, served as a testing period of limited Nek Mohammad, gave the Bush adminis-
strikes on high-value targets. The first tration the impression that if limited drone
use of remotely piloted drones for missile strikes were successful, more strikes would
attacks outside identified war zones took be even better.
place in 2002. This attack, in northeastern The Bush administration’s increased
Yemen, killed al-Qaeda member Salim reliance on the program started in 2008;
Sinan al-Harethi, who was suspected of however, it is with the Obama adminis-
masterminding the 2000 USS Cole bomb- tration that we see the most rapid prolif-
ing in Aden. The next attack, in 2004, tar- eration of attacks. The final phase of the
geted Nek Mohammad, a former mujahed drone program is characterized by an even
who became an influential member of the greater increase in attack frequency and
Taliban and fled to Pakistan after the 2001 an expansion of the target list to include
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. 9 targets of opportunity and unidentified
The second phase, 2005-07, consisted militants of dubious rank — and funer-
of a slight increase in strikes but retained als.12 As of May 2011, the CIA under the
the same target set: high-value terrorist Obama administration has conducted
suspects. These attacks were conducted nearly 200 drone strikes. This suggests
exclusively in Pakistan and followed the that the drone target list now includes
initial success of the program, defined by targets of opportunity, likely including
eliminating high-value targets. In 2005, the some selected in consultation with the
United States claimed it killed al-Qaeda’s Pakistani authorities in order to facilitate
number three, Hamza Rabia, but conflict- the increasingly unpopular program. This
ing reports cast doubts on Rabia’s actual development, in turn, has now decreased
position and foreshadowed the ambiguity the effectiveness of the program when as-
involved in targeting and identifying high- sessed in terms of the ratio of high-value
value targets.10 to accidental kills.
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4. Hudson / Owens / Flannes: Drone Warfare
Figure 2 - Drone Strikes by Phase16
Phase Strikes High Value Total Deaths HVT-to-Total-
Targets Killed Deaths Ratio
1 (2002-2004) 2 2 11 1:5
2 (2005-2007) 6 2 53 1:26
3 (2008-2009) 48 5 333 1:66
End of Bush’s Term
4 (2009-2010) 161 7 1029 1:147
Obama Administration
As Figure 2 shows, the steady increase Over time, these more deadly drone
in drone attacks conducted in Pakistan attacks have failed to effectively de-
between 2004 and 2010 has resulted in a capitate the leadership of anti-U.S. or-
far higher number of deaths overall, but a ganizations but have killed hundreds of
lower rate of successful killings of high- other people subsequently alleged to be
value militant leaders who command, con- militants; many were civilians.15 The
trol and inspire organizations. If we define rapidly growing population of survivors
a high-value target as an organizational and witnesses of these brutal attacks have
leader known to intelligence sources and emotional and social needs and incentives
the international media prior to attack and to join the ranks of groups that access and
not someone whose death is justified with attack U.S. targets in Afghanistan across
a posthumous militant status, we see fewer the porous border.
and fewer such hits — the alleged killing Drone attacks themselves deliver a po-
of al-Qaeda commander Ilyas al-Kashmiri litically satisfying short-term “bang for the
in 2009 and again in June 2011 notwith- buck” for U.S. constituencies ignorant of
standing.13 and indifferent to those affected by drone
Data analysis shows that at the begin- warfare or the phenomenon of blowback.
ning of the drone program (2002-04), five In the Pakistani and Afghan contexts, they
or six people were killed for each defined inflame the populations and destabilize the
high-value target. As part of that high- institutions that drive regional develop-
value target’s immediate entourage, they ment. In addition to taking on an unaccept-
were much more likely to be militants able and extrajudicial toll in human life, the
than civilians. By 2010, one high-value drone strikes in unintended ways compli-
target was killed per 147 total deaths. The cate the U.S. strategic mission in Afghani-
increased lethality of each attack is due to stan, as well as the fragile relationship with
larger payloads, broader target sets such Pakistan. As a result, the U.S. military’s
as funeral processions, and probable new counterinsurgency project in Afghanistan
targeting guidelines (including targets of becomes a victim of the first two forms of
opportunity).14 blowback.
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5. Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2011
1. PURPOSEFUL RETALIATION number of drone strikes and the increasing
The Khost Bombing, December 2009 number of retaliation attacks.
The Khost bombing exemplifies the For every high-profile, purposeful
dynamic of drone provocation in Pakistan attack like the Khost bombing, many
and terrorist retaliation in Afghanistan. In more low-profile attacks take place. These
late December 2009, Humam Khalil Abu types of attacks can be explained by what
Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian national, military strategist David Kilcullen calls the
entered the CIA compound within Camp accidental-guerrilla phenomenon, a local
Chapman, located just outside of Khost, rejection of external forces.19 By using
Afghanistan. Shortly after entering the drone warfare as the only policy tool in the
compound, al-Balawi detonated an ex- FATA without any local political engage-
plosive vest, killing himself, seven CIA ment, the United States is almost certainly
officers including the station chief, and a creating accidental guerrillas. These new
Jordanian intelligence officer. Before this combatants, unable to retaliate against the
incident, U.S. and Jordanian intelligence United States within FATA, will likely
services had recruited al-Balawi, a medical cross the border into Afghanistan, where
doctor, to gather information on al-Qaeda’s U.S. troops and NATO and Afghan secu-
then number two, Ayman al-Zawahri. rity forces are concentrated and present
In a video released after the bombing at easily identifiable targets. Or they may
Camp Chapman, al-Balawi states, “This join the ranks of groups like the Pakistani
attack will be the first of revenge opera- Taliban, whose attacks within Pakistan
tions against the Americans and their drone destabilize the U.S.-Pakistani alliance. The
teams outside the Pakistani borders.”17 last days of June 2011 illustrated the worst
Al-Balawi’s video testimony makes extremes of this phenomenon: a married
clear that he was motivated to avenge couple carrying out a suicide attack in
the death of Beitullah Mehsud, killed in Pakistan, and an eight-year-old duped (not
August 2009 by a drone strike in Zengara, recruited) into an Afghan suicide attack.20
South Waziristan. Ironically, in the case It should be emphasized that only a
of the Khost bombing, it was the United small minority of those affected by drone
States that was subject to a decapitation attacks become the kinds of radicals en-
attack aimed at a strategic intelligence visioned by Kilcullen. However, with the
center. average frequency of a drone strike every
three days in 2010, this would be enough
2. THE ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA to provide a steady stream of new recruits
Radicalization and Recruitment and destabilize the region through direct
Between 2004 and 2009, our research violence. The less direct effect of steady
and databases compiled by others docu- drone attacks and militant counterattacks is
ment a dramatic spike in deaths by suicide a smoldering dissatisfaction with dead-end
bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan.18 policy. On the U.S. military, intelligence
While it is impossible to prove direct cau- and policy side, this results in division in
sality from data analysis alone, it is prob- the ranks, preventing a unified effort.21
able that drone strikes provide motivation In Afghanistan and Pakistan, this cycle
for retaliation, and that there is a substan- results in anti-government agitation and
tive relationship between the increasing anti-American sentiment, which may force
126
6. Hudson / Owens / Flannes: Drone Warfare
sudden policy adjustments by political and are cheaper, less risky to U.S. personnel
military actors. and easy to run with minimal accountabil-
ity.23 The same lack of accountability that
3. U.S. COMPLICATIONS makes them a favorite of covert intel-
Strategic Confusion ligence programs disguises the long-term
In Afghanistan, the U.S. military is and local effects of regularly, but unpre-
using newly codified counterinsurgency dictably, unleashing violence from the
doctrine distilled from Iraq. It focuses on skies. However, if and when a high-value
diminishing the political, social and eco- target is killed, the death is celebrated in
nomic conditions that create and bolster Western media. The first example of this
the armed resistance seen as insurgency. was Harethi’s death in 2002, which has
The rules governing the use of force in been followed by a handful of successful
U.S. counterinsurgency theory have been attacks, such as the alleged but unproven
designed to reduce deaths generally and killing of Ilyas al-Kashmiri in 2011.
thus prevent creating new insurgents.22 Debate over the drone program con-
This type of strategy was long sidelined in tinues within the U.S. policy and strategic
favor of a counterterrorism policy targeting community. The CIA wants to continue its
militants. However, the U.S. military has mission in Pakistan unabated; the Depart-
been forced to acknowledge the centrality ment of State and the Pentagon would like
of this strategy in stabilizing Iraq, as indi- more restrictions on the program. No one
cated by the massive decrease in civilian is willing to argue that the program needs
and coalition casualties. be cut completely, but many within State
Ironically, the initial success of drone and the Pentagon believe that the current
killings in disrupting strategic organiza- pace of drone strikes risks destabilizing a
tions has bred its own downfall. The nuclear-armed ally and makes the task of
further down the militant hierarchy drone U.S. diplomats more difficult.24
strikes aim and hit, the fewer the high-val-
ue targets and the less critical the disrup- 4. DESTABILIZING PAKISTAN
tion to the organization. On the other hand, Exposing the Contradictions
due to counterinsurgency policy across the Loss of life from drone strikes is an
border in Afghanistan — which relies on emotional and enormously volatile public
“hearts and minds” and troops living on issue in Pakistan. Drone attacks on Paki-
the ground side by side with civilians — stani territory killing Pakistani citizens
the damage to the high-cost campaign is every two to three days are a constant chal-
even more palpable. lenge to established ideas of sovereignty
The strategic disconnect between coun- by a putative ally and patron. The notion
terinsurgency and counterterrorism is only of attack from the skies, without direct
exacerbated by the remote-control nature agency or accountability, may in theory be
of the covert drone program, which allows an attractive vehicle for U.S. counterter-
the U.S. public to turn a blind eye. Drone rorism, but it comes at a high price. Drone
strikes, launched from bases within Paki- attacks compound the feeling of those on
stan but directed from sites as far away as the ground in the target area of their asym-
the American Southwest, are popular with metrical vulnerability and the necessity of
their proponents for several reasons. They fighting back smartly.25
127
7. Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2011
In a country whose political structure secured through traditional blood-money
is ambiguous, Pakistanis who hope to payments.27 During the first half of Davis’s
petition their government with grievances imprisonment through February 20, drone
regarding the drone program, or report strikes within Pakistan stopped altogether.
critically on Islamabad’s relationship with As a deal between the two governments
the United States and militants, are met took shape, drone strikes resumed, as if the
with stiff resistance and sometimes vio- incident had never occurred. While negoti-
lence. A recent attack resulted in the death ations were taking place, Pakistan was able
of the prominent Pakistani journalist Syed to call for a reduction of actions by the
Saleem Shahzad, bureau chief for The Asia CIA and U.S. Special Operations within
Times. Shahzad was reporting on links be- their territory and for a reduction of drone
tween al-Qaeda and the Pakistani security strikes, but this demand was not perma-
apparatus, which may have facilitated the nently realized.28 The incident illustrates
attack on Pakistan’s Mehran Naval Base the precarious position of the Pakistani
late in May 2011. Internal reporting on the government, torn between local popular
Pakistani military and Inter Services Intel- opposition and its overbearing U.S. patron.
ligence (ISI) is often self-censored because While Pakistanis have protested drone
of its inherent dangers; those bold enough strikes in the past, most of these protests
to report on it often face physical danger. have gone unnoticed in the U.S. media. It
Shahzad’s body was found in a ditch south took what was presented in the Western
of Islamabad two days after he missed press as a human-interest story about an
a scheduled television appearance. The American citizen engaging in self-defense
ISI claims no knowledge of, and takes no to remind the U.S. population what the
responsibility for, the abduction and death Obama administration is doing in Pakistan
of Shahzad, but other journalists reject that and bring Washington’s strategy to the
claim.26 In sum, the drone program serves forefront. But what, if anything, has been
to further destabilize an already fragile learned from the Raymond Davis incident?
system by deepening divides between a The United States continues to conduct
citizenry that abhors the attacks and gov- drone attacks without apparent regard for
ernment institutions that tolerate or facili- even the acute anger created in the wake of
tate them and brook no critical oversight. the Davis negotiations.
In the early hours of May 2, 2011, U.S.
5. PRECARIOUS ALLIANCE Navy SEALs raided a compound in Abbot-
U.S.-Pakistani Tensions tabad, Pakistan, killing Osama bin Laden.
On January 27, 2011, American citi- The fact that soldiers, not drones, con-
zen Raymond Davis shot and killed two ducted the raid is telling. It is clear that the
Pakistanis in the streets of Lahore. Davis, U.S. administration and military command
a CIA contract employee gathering intel- at least recognize that the use of drones is
ligence on the Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed not a silver bullet, and that human discre-
the two men were attempting to rob him tion and judgment are needed when com-
when he fired upon them. Davis spent a bating an elusive and fluid network. Again,
total of seven weeks incarcerated while it took a sensational U.S. media story —
the United States and Pakistan worked on the story of the decade, no less — to focus
the conditions of his release, ultimately American public opinion and congressio-
128
8. Hudson / Owens / Flannes: Drone Warfare
nal oversight briefly on the decline of U.S.- It is possible that the exchange of per-
Pakistani relations. These two incidents, sonnel among the military, the intelligence
the Raymond Davis negotiations and the community and the Department of Defense
Bin Laden raid, reveal that drone warfare will clear up the confusion over com-
has brought the U.S.-Pakistani marriage to mand and targeting, though this is far from
a volatile nadir. And yet the drone policy, given. The more serious forms of blow-
like the drones themselves, remains out of back stemming directly from the effects of
the limelight. extrajudicial killing, however, do not seem
to have been addressed. If the Pakistani
YEMEN campaign spawned purposeful vengeance,
Lessons for the Future like the Khost bombing, and opportunities
The first lethal drone strike outside a for recruitment of noncombatants for re-
war zone took place in Yemen in 2002; and taliatory attacks, then the same purposeful
in 2011, the Obama administration an- and accidental escalation will most likely
nounced plans to begin an aggressive new occur in the Arabian Peninsula and the
drone-warfare campaign in Yemen directed Horn of Africa, compounding Yemen’s and
against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Somalia’s volatility.
(AQAP).29 Yemen is currently in turmoil In many ways, Yemen resembles both
as the various opposition movements Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the unde-
to strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh jostle clared drone war there will share the most
against remnants of the regime and one dysfunctional characteristics of both sides
another after months of a long and incon- of the Af/Pak theatre. Like Afghanistan,
clusive Arab Spring uprising.30 Yemen is a fragmented tribal society
The new Yemeni drone campaign ideally suited for harboring pockets of
comes at the very moment former CIA di- militancy in a de-centered system with
rector Leon Panetta replaces Robert Gates strong social ties.33 Like Pakistan, Yemen’s
as secretary of defense and General David military and the other institutions of a fail-
Petraeus, former CENTCOM and Interna- ing state may still function well enough to
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) both channel counterterror funds from the
Afghanistan commander and a counterin- United States and apply them according
surgency proponent transitions into a civil- to its own interests and criteria.34 Another
ian role: head of the CIA. During 2010, whisky-swilling military steeped in hypoc-
the Joint Special Operations Command risy and addicted to counterterror as a way
(JSOC) was central to the design of the to make a living is hardly the ideal local
new Yemeni drone program and this year spotter for U.S. attacks from the skies.35
has brought about increased cooperation.31 Drone warfare as it has evolved in the Af/
In June 2011, the CIA returned to the Horn Pak theatre is not the answer to Yemen’s
of Africa to work with JSOC on the drone unrest.
program, and outside observers have noted The lessons of drone warfare in
that the strategic confusion of divided Pakistan are clear. First, if extrajudicial
command (drone counterterror in Pakistan dispatching of high-value targets is a goal,
vs. boots-on-the-ground counterinsurgency such targets are best dealt with as Osama
in Afghanistan) is an issue that may be bin Laden was — through face-to-face
mitigated by the high-level reshuffle.32 assaults by crack JSOC troops based on re-
129
9. Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2011
liable intelligence. Second, chronic testing which thousands of noncombatants may
of national sovereignty through an unde- be extrajudicially killed, traumatized and
clared war of drone attacks puts fragile materially damaged — fuels instability and
governing structures in the target country escalates violent retaliation against con-
under enormous pressure while exacerbat- venient targets. With Yemen and Somalia
ing social volatility, a recipe for unpredict- as the east-west axis of a maritime system
able outcomes.36 Third, the complacency that unites South Asia with the Horn of
engendered in the American public, which Africa through one of the world’s most
is largely blind to the costs and conse- sensitive and pirate-infested shipping
quences of, and anesthetized to, the legal channels, counterterror measures must
and moral issues of drone warfare, pre- be both precise and well-reasoned. The
cludes recognition, let alone discussion of Pakistani model is neither. Drone strikes
this new form of warfare. Finally, a trend leave little scope for the civic reform that
in increasing “collateral damage” — in
the Arab Spring in Yemen demands.37
1
In his address to the nation on June 22, 2011, President Obama announced a planned withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Only 10,000 troops are slated for withdrawal by the end of 2011 and another 23,000 by the
end of 2012. “President Obama on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” accessed June 26, 2011, http://www.
whitehouse.gov.blog/2011/06/22/president-obama-way-forward-afghanistan; and “Obama to Cut Afghanistan
‘Surge’ Troops,” Al Jazeera, June 23, 2011, accessed June 26, 2011, https://docs.google.com/a/email.arizona.
edu/document/d/1Off1hZ-qjkdfwcPcg5Klm41PUWllEGnnf65zbZ7lYUI/edit?hl=en_US.
2
Drone strikes are announced in the media, but neither the United States nor the Pakistani governments admit
their roles in conducting these strikes. The covert nature of the drone program refers to the inability to clearly
identify the agencies responsible for the missions.
3
Muhammad Idress Ahmad, “The Magical Realism of Body Counts,” Al Jazeera, June 13, 2011, accessed
June 15, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011613931606455.html.
4
Ronald Sokol, “Can the U.S. Assassinate an American Citizen Living in Yemen?” The Christian Science
Monitor, September 29, 2010, accessed June 10, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opin-
ion/2010/0929/Can-the-US-assassinate-an-American-citizen-living-in-Yemen; and “A Better Way to Get
Awlaki,” Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2010, accessed June 10, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/
sep/20/opinion/la-ed-awlaki-20100920.
5
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009).
6
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (Metropolitan Books,
2000).
7
Nathan Hodge, “Robo-Copters Eye Enemies,” The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2011, accessed
May 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704281504576327602503154790.
html?KEYWORDS=Robo-Copters+Eye+Enemies; and “Unmanned Fire Scout Helicopter to Begin Military
Service,” The Telegraph, August 29, 2009, accessed May 13, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-
news/northamerica/usa/6092244/Unmanned-Fire-Scout-helicopter-to-begin-military-service.html.
8
“MQ-1 Predator,” General Atomics Aeronautical, accessed January 17, 2011, http://www.ga-asi.com/
products/aircraft/pdf/MQ-1_Predator.pdf; “Predator B/MQ-9 Reaper,” General Atomics Aeronautical, ac-
cessed January 17, 2011, http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/pdf/Predator_B.pdf; “RQ-4 Global Hawk,”
Northrop Grumman, accessed May 15, 2011, http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/ghrq4a/assets/
GHMD-New-Brochure.pdf; and “MQ-8B Fire Scout,” Northrop Grumman, accessed May 28, 2011, http://
www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/firescout-new-brochure.pdf.
130
10. Hudson / Owens / Flannes: Drone Warfare
9
Syed Saleem Shahzad, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11 (Pluto, 2011); Ahmed
Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 2nd Edition (Yale University
Press, 2010).
10
Gretchen Peters, “Drone Said to Have Killed Al Qaeda’s No. 3,” The Christian Science Monitor, December
5, 2005, accessed February 20, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1205/p04s02-wosc.html.
11
The Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle Eastern Conflicts (SISMEC), housed in the School of
Middle East and North African Studies at the University of Arizona, has compiled a drone database to track
all U.S. drone attacks outside identified war zones.
12
“‘U.S. Drone’ Hits Pakistan Funeral,” Al Jazeera, June 24, 2009, accessed December 12, 2010, http://eng-
lish.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/06/20096244230395712.html; and Pir Zubair Shah and, Salman Masood,
“U.S. Drone Strike Said to Kill 60 in Pakistan,” The New York Times, June 23, 2009, accessed December 12,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/world/asia/24pstan.html.
13
Daud Khattak, “The Mysterious Death of Ilyas Kashmiri,” Foreign Policy, June 8, 2011, accessed June 10,
2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/08/the_mysterious_death_of_ilyas_kashmiri.
14
Saeed Shah, “U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan Claiming Many Civilian Victims, Says Campaigner,” The
Guardian, July 17, 2011, accessed July 20, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/17/us-drone-
strikes-pakistan-waziristan.
15
Ahmad, “The Magical Realism of Body Counts.”
16
The numbers of deaths in Figure 2 have been taken from the SISMEC’s drone database and represents the
most conservative death toll. We have used the lowest death toll reported in any newspaper. We chose to use
the lowest numbers to highlight the increasingly inaccurate nature of the drone program without embellish-
ment.
17
Balawi believed the CIA used Camp Chapman to locate targets in the FATA for drone assassination. For
more on al-Balawi, see: “CIA Bomber Vowing Revenge for Baitullah Mehsud’s Death,” YouTube, January
9, 2010, accessed May 10, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HB1NJ8zOOso; and Joby Warrick, The
Triple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA (Random House, 2011).
18
“Suicide Attack Database,” Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST), University of Chicago,
accessed January 12, 2011, http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php; and “Database of Worldwide Terrorism In-
cidents,” The RAND Corporation, accessed January 14, 2011, http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php.
19
Kilcullen divides the accidental guerrilla syndrome into four phases: infection, contagion, intervention, and
rejection. Infection is aided by lack of governance in a specific region or country (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ye-
men, Somalia) and allows violent movements the space to establish themselves. Contagion takes place when
the movement spreads their ideals and increases violence to continue growing. Intervention is spurred by
local or international forces trying to curb the movement, which leads to rejection. During the rejection phase
the local population reacts negatively to the intervention, often bolstering recruitment and popularity of the
movement.
20
Declan Walsh, “Taliban Use Girl, 8, as Bomb Mule in Attack on Afghan Police Post,” The Guardian, June
26, 2011, accessed June 26, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/26/afghanistan-taliban-girl-
bomb-police.
21
Warren Chin, “Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in
Iraq,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2007): 1.
22
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (University of Chicago Press, 2007).
23
“Pakistan Tells U.S. to Leave Secret Base,” Press TV, June 29, 2011, accessed June 29, 2011, http://www.
presstv.ir/detail/186804.html; and “Shamsi Air Base under UAE Control: Air Chief,” The Nation, May 13,
2011, accessed June 30, 2011, http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Regional/
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