2. 344 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
interchanging process. The most important characteristic of the interrelationships
between the individual and his/her environment is their peculiar bidirectionality.
Moreover, the active construction of reality by the individual does not take place in
a world of objects, but within the perimeters of social interaction: human sociality
comes before any physiological needs such as those of protection and food
(Bowlby, 1969). For these reasons, there is a continuous relationship between
cognitive development and social interaction.
Nowadays it is generally acknowledged that the construction of reality is
in no way simply a linear process where only achievement of new acquisitions can
be registered: there may be times when the developmental process will stop and
others when a regression to former levels may be registered. The non linearity of
development has been recognised by several authors (Mounoud, 1992b; Mounoud,
1993b; Mounoud, 1994; Mounoud, 1995; Rutter & Rutter, 1992) and in diverse
fields of research: developmental psychology (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Van Geert,
1994, 2001; Bonino, 2002) as well as neuropsychology (Bell & Fox, 1992; Houdé,
1995a). At the same time, the non linearity of development requires more than
anything else a capacity to block old acquisitions in order to elaborate new ones.
Indeed, during the last years there was renewed interest in studying the inhibition
of automatism during development and also in the role played by flexibility in
thinking. Development does not come about only through new acquisitions, it also
requires the inhibition of formerly acquired modes of response which become
automatic with habit, or rather, the coordination and integration of those habits in a
completely different structure (Mounoud, 1992a; Mounoud, 1993a; Bosma &
Kunnen, 2001). It was stressed how this process occurs several times during
cognitive development: in the case of object permanence, perservation, acquisition
of the concept of number and in the case of categorisation (Houdé, 1995a).
Back in 1970 Mounoud 1 noted how several times in the history of
psychology there had been attempts to approach the characteristic of thinking
known as flexibility. The human capacity to inhibit automatic responses in the
setting up of complex cognitive processes already interested Cattel as long ago as
1886, while the role of flexibility as opposed to functional fixity in the resolution
of problems was investigated by the Gestalt psychology, which introduced the
concept of cognitive restructuration. Lewin also defined flexibility as the capacity
to face changes in the cognitive structure of given a situation, assuming the
presence of noteworthy individual differences in this performance. In 1950 within
the theoretical framework of the factorial model of intelligence, Guilford
distinguished between convergent and divergent thinking: the former moving
toward a fixed solution and the latter sorting different from already known
directions and yielding new responses. More recently, flexibility was defined as the
necessary precursor of high level intellectual performance (Sternberg, 1985), and
1
The authors would like to thank Prof. Pierre Monoud of the University of Geneve who
made many helpful suggestions; his contribution with this paper was really invaluable.
3. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 345
then as the possibility of changing tactic when the information is of little use
(Sternberg, 1988).
Several studies individuated in the injuries to some areas of the frontal lobe
and the prefrontal cortex (Diamond, 1988), the loss or damage of the cognitive
flexibility that permits us freedom in the choice and control of our own actions.
Besides, the importance of connections among different areas of the brain was
shown (Baron-Cohen & Ring, 1994) and in the neurophysiological field several
hypotheses were advanced about the role that some cerebral areas play in the
acquisition and development of this ability. However, finally the main role of the
frontal and prefrontal cortex was underlined (Diamond, 1988; Houdé, 1995a,
Houdé, 1995b).
In fact the frontal and prefrontal cortex let us put into practice behaviour
which is different from that simply determined by automatisms. Diamond (1988)
underlined that the capacity to avoid overbearing responses is developed late both
philogenetically and ontogenetically: with regard to human individual
development, the emergence of this capacity was identified about the end of the
first year through the classic piagetian task of the hidden object (A not B
experiment or error of the IV stage). Several other studies (Perret, 1974, Koenig,
1986, Koenig, 1989) revealed a certain incapacity of inhibition in individuals
affected by pathologies of the frontal lobe.
Specifically with regard to human behaviour, the presence of an "executive
of central control" was discovered, perhaps located in the frontal section of the
brain's anatomy (Dubois, 1995), that should allow the successful use of social
skills in many fields of everyday life. The frontal cortex could be, then, the
anatomic support for the executive functions (Houdé, 1995a; Houdé, 1995b;
Sevino, 1995). On their turn, these executive functions are necessary to control and
realise the complex human behaviour that answers the double need of guaranteeing
homeostasis within the individual, and at the same time allowing for his/her
adaptation to the external environment (Dubois, 1995). Seen from this perspective,
cognitive flexibility - or the capacity to avoid automatism - is a characteristic of
human thinking made possible by the presence of particular neurophysiological
precursors.
On the basis of these reflections, the authors hypothesise that the flexibility
is used, above all, to produce and regulate adequate behaviours in order to face a
complex social life and to achieve relatively peaceful cohabitation with our likes.
As a matter of fact, the complexity of the social relations requires the use of
flexible ways of thinking. To face social life with adequacy and efficacy the
individual should possess extremely flexible mental strategies, and must be able to
build with others an adaptive relationship, which is never wholly predictable. The
complexity of social relations is just one of the concerns central to contemporary
developmental psychology, which recently underlined children's competence in
dealing with it (Dunn, 1988; Fonzi, 1991; Fonzi, 1993). Moreover, some studies on
the theory of the mind noted the precocious competence of the child in cognitive
4. 346 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
decentralisation and the capacity to represent mental states different from its own’
(Battistelli, 1992, 1995; Camaioni, 1995; Flavell, 1988; Lewis & Mitchell, 1994).
On the basis of these considerations we think that there is an important link
between the cognitive capacity for flexibility in thinking and social interaction,
particularly cooperative social relations. We expect that the subjects more able to
avoid automatism (from a cognitive point of view) are also more able to find
cooperative solutions within the sphere of social relations. Indeed, to adequately
deal with the complexity of social relationships, the individual requires both the
capacity to avoid automatic and primitive responses, such as aggression, and the
ability to modify one's own initial plans in order to taking into account the
presence of the others and their requirements (Bonino, 1982; Bonino & Tani, 1994;
Smorti, 1993; Tani, 1993).
Our hypothesis is supported by the results of previous studies that
underlined a positive relation between competence in using symbols in play of
pretending and the elaboration of interactive cooperative strategies with peers from
18 to 36 months (Bonino, 1991) and 3 to 5 years (Bonino, 1991; Fonzi & Tassi,
1991). The child who is more able to overcome the constraint of reality is also
more competent in solving problems of social relations by showing a decreased use
of prejudicial aggression towards the other, which leads to a better cooperative
performance with him/her (Fonzi & Tassi, 1991). The ability to use a ludic symbol
(Bonino, 1985) implies an ability to inhibit the objective reality of things (a stick is
a stick) and to give them instead a flexible, personal meaning (the stick is a horse).
We already investigated the relationship between cognitive flexibility and
the ability to cooperate in another research and a positive relationship was found in
children aged from 7 to 9 years (Bonino & Cattelino, 1997, 1999). In that study
cognitive flexibility was proven by means of a categorisation test (the Wisconsin
Cards Sorting Test) and ability to cooperate was measured by a task involving
"linked pencils " (Fonzi & Tassi, 1991; Rey, 1934). The task concerned a clearly
structured situation where the child had to choose different social strategies,
particularly between cooperative or competitive options.
The present study, however, is based upon a different situation. The
cognitive flexibility of each subject has been measured by means of the Stroop
Effect (Stroop, 1935), designed to reveal the competence in avoiding automatism
without the need of a categorisation task, which might be very complex for young
children. The Stroop task simultaneously presents the subjects with two conflicting
pieces of information for the same stimulus: the name of a given colour is printed
on a card in ink of a different colour. The interference of the information contained
in the word on the naming of the actual colour is measured. The only requirement
so that this interference can take place is that the child has already learned to read:
it is possible, therefore, to administer this task already from the second grade of the
elementary school, at around 7 years of age (Comalli, Wapner & Werner, 1962;
Schiller, 1966; Bonino & Ciairano, 1997). Many previous studies (Koenig, 1986,
1989; Mac Leod, 1991, 1992; Schiller, 1966) showed that the Stroop Effect
5. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 347
measures the capacity of the subject to disengage himself/herself from a more
automatic answer, that is, in this specific case, the information contained in the
word. Houdé (1995a) quoted the Stroop Effect as an example of a task requiring
exactly this inhibition of routines and the introduction of discontinuity in already
acquired knowledge, because it requires that the subject should have the capacity
to select the information obtained from the stimulus, within a situation which tends
to lead to an inappropriate answer.
The purpose of our research is to examine the relation between cognitive
flexibility and competence in employing cooperative strategies of action in three
different age groups from 7 to 11 years. The objective of the study is to verify
whether or not greater flexibility in thinking measured by the capacity to avoid
automatism would correspond to an increased capacity to cooperate in social
relations with peers. To measure the capacity of each child to cooperate with a peer
we have created a situation as near as possible to ecological conditions: two
children were asked to play together with only one game, namely a puzzle.
Situations in which there is competition over the same object or resource naturally
arise in people’s everyday life. This may be due to a real scarcity of resources or it
may appear in a situation such as one in which a group of children has several
games at their disposal, only one of which, however, elicits the whole group's
attention. In such a case there are at least three possible strategies that can be
adopted: the subjects fight among themselves for exclusive possession of the
object; such a competition does not occur because someone in the group renounces
possession; the group decides to play all together. Our proposed situation does not
require that the child should choose between cooperative and competitive
strategies: the conflict may dissolve due to mutual indifference. A cooperative
attitude may be revealed by the capacity to offer the playing partner the chance to
be involved in one's own sequence of actions and reciprocally, the partner's ability
may be measured as the capacity to allow the child become involved in the other's
play sequence.
Our objective does not take only actions into account. On the basis of what
was asserted by Vygotskij (1934) about the important role of the word in
expressing the balance of action, we expect that the difference between pairs of
children demonstrating high and low flexibility will also be a question of language.
Indeed, the language used by the children during the game can also be categorised
as neutral, cooperative and not-cooperative. Besides the verbalisations strictly
inherent to the course of the task (suggesting, giving or denying any information to
the game partner) it is possible that during the interaction the children will engage
in dialogues of a more general nature. The language produced during the
interaction, in fact, allows the subjects to go beyond the limits of the actual
situation and establish a dialogue with the partner about topics far removed from
the task at hand (Bruner, 1957). In the last case we could talk of a language which
is "not task-centered" that demonstrates how the goal of finishing the game does
not attract all the available attention of the subjects and does not circumscribe all
6. 348 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
their linguistic interactions. However, it is equally possible that problems in the
management of the pair game will become the only topic of debate: in this case we
could talk of a language exclusively "task-centered".
Another aspect we take into account during the interaction regards the
success or the failure of the approach towards the partner by one child in the pair.
In order to cooperate, the partners have to take turns in the general sequence of the
interaction where both make their contribution and accept that of the other (Doise
& Mugny, 1981; Fonzi & Tassi, 1991). The attempts at social approach addressed
by one child to his/her playing partner can turn out to be be successful or not both
on the level of action and that of language production.
With regard to the issue of know-how, namely the practical ability of the
children to finish the puzzle, we argue that it has no important relation with
flexibility in thinking. The knowledge of how to do could be one of the possible
mediators of the pair interaction (Fonzi, Tassi & Tomada, 1991). But the subjects
more gifted in flexibility of thinking should be able to face also a scarce
competence of the partner, as they should equally be able to face also their own
incompetence without effectuating non-cooperative behaviour towards the partner.
Finally, with regard to gender differences, we retain that flexibility in thinking
plays a role big enough to easily outweigh any differences linked to the gender of
the members of each pair, which in any case we believe would turn out to be
negligible.
In summary, we advanced the following hypotheses:
1. the pairs of children with high cognitive flexibility produce a greater
number of cooperative actions and also a smaller number of non-
cooperative and neutral actions and verbalisations compared to pairs of
children with low cognitive flexibility; besides, the children with medium
flexibility produce an intermediate type of behaviour compared to the
subjects located at the two opposite ends of the continuum;
2. the pairs of children with high cognitive flexibility produce more language
not centred on the task than the pairs of children with low cognitive
flexibility; and on the contrary the pairs of children with low flexibility
produce more language specifically centred on the task at hand;
3. the children in pairs of high cognitive flexibility produce a greater number
of successes in attempts at social approach towards the other (successful
interactions), while the children belonging to couples at low flexibility
should produce a greater number of failures (unsuccessful interactions).
4. gender is not related to the performance and the high or low flexibility is
not related to the practical ability to finish the task.
The present research is a cross-sectional study that takes into account an
age range running from childhood to early adolescence (7, 9 and 11 years).
Therefore it allows to reveal differences in cognitive flexibility and social
strategies at different ages, though the authors are aware that longitudinal studies
are also needed.
7. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 349
Method
Sample
The sample consisted of 174 children of three different age groups: 7 years
old, 34 males and 28 females; 9 years old, 36 males and 26 females; 11 years old,
24 males and 26 females. These subjects attended the II and the IV grades of the
elementary school, the I grade of the middle school respectively in a large city in
Northern Italy. The study consisted of two parts.
Procedure I part
The cognitive flexibility of each subject was measured by the Stroop
Effect 2 (Stroop, 1935) that measures the strenght of the habit of reading words on
the activity of naming colours. The subjects were asked to name the colour in
which the words were printed, ignoring the information contained in the word: i.e.
the word red was printed in blue and the subject had to say blue. According to the
literature (Dubois, 1995; Houdé, 1995a; Koenig, 1986, 1989) the interference of
the Stroop Effect can be considered as the measure of the capacity of the subject to
avoid automatism (e.g., the information contained in the word) and, thus of his/her
cognitive flexibility: higher interference would mean lesser flexibility of the
subject and vice versa.
The method we used in order to locate the temporal difference between the
NC and the NCWd conditions and to extract the value of word interference on the
naming of colours is the same that was used by Stroop: the request to the subjects
was to finish the task as soon as possible and to correct any errors they made. As
regards the two conditions NC and NCWd, in the first condition the instruction
given to the subjects was: "Tell me the colour of the patch", and in the second it
was: "Tell me the colour of the ink in which the word is printed". In order to
calculate the errors, we adopted the same procedure by Stroop: the double of the
average time taken by the child to name the colour of one patch - in the case of
NC- or for naming the ink colour of one word - in the case of NCWd- was added to
the total time for each test. Taking into account the ability of contemporary
children to deal with a greater number of colours than the children of 1935
investigated by Stroop, in our experiment we used 9 colours: brown, red, green,
blue, violet, orange, pale blue and black. With regard to the NCWd condition, we
respected the Stroop procedure of elimination of the congruent colour: the nine
colour names were printed in ink of a different colour, in each of the other colours
except the colour identified by the word and in black, since it is a neutral colour
2
This experiment consisted of two distinct conditions (Stroop, 1935): the NC "Naming
color test": some colours (red, blue, green, brown) were stamped on a sheet as patches of
colour: the subjects were asked to name them; the NCWd, " Naming color of word test
where the color of the print and the word are different": the name of each of the five colors
was printed on a sheet the same number of times with ink of the other four colours. From
the difference between the two times for NC and NCWd was extracted the value of the
interference of the word information on the naming of the ink color.
8. 350 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
and is used in normal writing. Finally, 64 cards were used for each task. The results
are shown in Table 1: the interference drops from the value of 88 seconds at 7
years, to 61 seconds at 9 years, and finally to 41 seconds at 11 years.
Table 1 Means and standard deviation of Stroop interference by age group
Age Group N Mean (seconds) standard deviation
7 years 62 88.30 43.83
9 years 62 60.64 24.71
11 years 50 41.40 23.02
Total sample 174 64.97 37.36
On the basis of our hypothesis we divided the subjects into groups at High,
Medium and Low cognitive flexibility for each age group: 1) Low flexibility: a
subject who showed an interference value above the mean with at least half of the
standard deviation: these are the least flexible children; 2) Medium flexibility: a
subject who showed an interference value above/below the mean that lies between
the mean value and the value defined by the mean plus/minus half of the standard
deviation; 3) High flexibility in thinking: a subject who has showed an interference
value below the mean with at least half of the standard deviation: these are the
most flexible children.
We put children of the same flexibility category in pairs; once these pairs
were formed, we moved onto the second part of the study, a social interaction
situation. Three different types of pairs were constituted based on the three levels
of flexibility in thinking: 1) LLFF pairs: comprised of LF subjects (minimum level
of cognitive flexibility); 2) MMFF pairs: constituted of MF subjects (medium
level); 3) HHFF pairs: comprised of HF subjects (maximum cognitive flexibility).
The homogeneous pairs to whom we proposed the interaction game were 87 in all,
subdivided into three different ages (Table 2).
Table 2 Number of pairs according to type of flexibility and age
7 years 9 years 11years ROW TOTAL
LLFF 7 11 5 23
MMFF 16 12 9 37
HHFF 8 8 11 27
Column total 31 31 25 87
Procedure II part
During the second part, each pair of children was requested to play with a
puzzle for a pre-established time period (ten minutes). For the three different ages
(7, 9 and 11 years) puzzles with a different number of pieces were used, because
9. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 351
the difficulty of the task should be related to the age of the children: 7 years: 49
piece; 9 years: 60 pieces; 11 years: 70 pieces 3 .
Each pair of children was invited by the researcher to go with him/her to a
room in the school near their classroom. Here, seated around a little table, the
researcher put in front of each pair of children two puzzles, which contained the
same number of pieces for each age, but were different in the image the children
had to construct and invited them to choose the one they wanted to play with
together. It was from here that the observation of each couple began. The exact
instruction given by the researcher to the children was: "Here, there are two
puzzles. You have to choose which one you want to play with together." After the
children had chosen the puzzle, the researcher gave them the next instruction:
"Now, you have to try to finish the puzzle. You will have ten minutes". We did not
give any other information about how to finish the task.
The game of the puzzle enabled us to observe children’s behaviour in a
natural environment, the school, and within a very roughly structured situation. For
the registration of the behavioural data we chose the paper and pencil technique.
Then, we arranged an as-complete-as-possible check-list of the behaviour that
should occur 4 . The different behaviours were grouped in three main categories.
The behaviours directed towards reaching a common goal with the partner were
defined as cooperative and the behaviours directed explicitly against reaching a
common goal with the partner were defined as non-cooperative. Finally the
behaviour not involving any attempts to share something with the partner was
defined as neutral: by this last term we refer to some categories of solitary play
carried out within a sequence of social interaction.
As regards to the actions, the following categories are individuated: 1)
Cooperative actions: showing a piece, showing a place, offering a piece, accepting
a piece, accepting a piece stopping a moment to take a glance at it, leaving a piece
in the middle - that is between oneself and the playing partner - taking a piece from
the other's pile when the latter child does not oppose, assigning a piece, facilitating
the work of the other by raising an arm, changing one's place to let the other come
near the game, trying to attach two large puzzle parts which have been built by
3
A preliminary inquiry was made to verify the time required to solve puzzles with a certain
number of pieces at a specific age, to make sure that the test is of equal difficulty for the
three different ages. Furthermore, this test had to respect two conditions: the puzzle should
not be too easy that it would be finished quickly and thus not give the children adequate
opportunity to interact; but neither should it be too difficult because the time available for
each pair, aside from the preliminary phase, was only ten minutes. The sample used for the
preliminary phases of the inquiry (to individualize the number of puzzle pieces, and
afterwards, the categories to insert in the observation check-list) was comprised of other 42
children aged from 8 to 11 years (30 males and 12 females) who attended the III, the IV
and the V grades respectively of another elementary school.
4
The check-list was arranged on the basis of our preliminary inquiry with the sample of 42
subjects
10. 352 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
each of the two partners, attaching a piece to the part being built by the other,
letting the other attach one of his/her pieces to the part one is oneself building,
trying together to make some joints; 2) Non cooperative actions: wrenching a piece
from the hands of the partner, stealing a piece from the pile in front of the other
child or from the part of the picture that the other child has just built without
his/her agreement, denying a piece to the other child, removing from the partner
the puzzle part that he/she has just built, not offering the partner a piece even if this
belongs to the part of the picture that the partner is building, not facilitating the
work of the other even when it only means a slight shift of place, actively
obstructing the other child; 3) Neutral actions: turning the puzzle pieces over in an
orderly way, turning the puzzle pieces over in a disorderly way, looking for a piece
in the pile by turning everything upside down, dropping pieces, looking for a piece,
not finding a piece, looking for and finding a piece, watching the other child
playing, working while the other child is watching without doing anything.
Regarding language, the following categories of verbalisations task-
centered are individuated: 1) Cooperative verbalisations with the purpose of:
offering help, asking for help, providing information, providing instructions,
asking for information, thanking, suggesting, providing the partner the reason for a
suggestion, asking the partner to connect two parts, accepting the connection of
two pieces; 2) Non cooperative verbalisations: refusing to help, refusing to accept
help, cursing, sighing, contradicting the partner, boasting, shouting at the partner,
not answering the partner's question , inciting the partner to do something, ordering
the partner to do something, complaining to the partner because he/she works too
slowly or too little and that time is running out, complaining in general,
complaining to the partner about his/her lack of ability, puffing; 3) Neutral
verbalisations: asking the partner to wait, singing softly, talking to yourself,
whispering to oneself, expressing some doubts, still related to the task.
We also individuated some specific categories of language not task-
centred, such as: jokes, talking about something not related to the task, talking to
the partner about something else then the game at hand.
Finally, we defined the attempts of social approach by one of the partners
toward the other, at the behavioural and linguistic level, as: 1) Successful
interaction: the number of physical or verbal exchanges involving the approach of
one and the response of the other during the play time (in all the ten temporal units
of one minute); 2) Unsuccessful interaction: the number of physical or verbal
exchanges where the approach of one does not lead to the response of the other or
leads to an explicit refusal by the other during the play time.
During the ten minutes of the game with the puzzle, one observer noted
with a check-list all the physical behaviour produced by each partner of the pair
within the ten temporal unit of one minute and registered the talks with a voice-
recorder. The check-list contains the temporal information in the columns, while
the rows identify the behavioural categories.
11. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 353
The actions neutral, cooperative and non cooperative were registered
immediately during the observation. The verbalisations, neutral, cooperative and
non cooperative, task-centered or not task-centered were transcribed afterwards.
Attempts at social approach made by one child towards the other were registered
on the basis of the same check-list filled in for each pair. Every time we
encountered an action or a verbalisation such as "offering a piece", "asking for a
piece" the response of the partner was checked. If the partner answered positively,
the interaction was considered successful. On some occasions the other child did
not answer at all, pretending he/she heard nothing, or explicitly contradicted the
request of the partner: in both cases the attempt of one child was not followed by
an adequate response from the other and the interaction was therefore considered
unsuccessful. The success or failure of the interactions was registered both at the
level of action (i.e. one child tried to take a piece of the puzzle that the other child
either handed or did not hand over) and at the one of language (i.e. one child asked
for information and the other either gave or declared his/her intention of not giving
or in the worst case did not answer).
Finally, regarding their practical ability, reflected by each pair's capacity to
finish the task within the ten minutes of the game, the observer also registered the
number of the pieces that remained to be put in place, while for pairs who managed
to finish the task before the end of the ten minutes the final time was recorded. So
the measure of know-how was the time in seconds in the case of pairs who finished
the task and the number of pieces still to be inserted in the puzzle in the case of
pairs who did not finish.
Results
The puzzle game: analysis of actions
Analysis of variance and mean comparisons were used to analyse the data.
The relationships among types of action (neutral, cooperative and non-cooperative)
and cognitive flexibility, age and gender were considered. The results confirmed
our hypothesis: the flexibility was highly significant in regard to neutral actions
[F(2, 69) = 6.06, p= .00,], cooperative actions [F(2, 69)= 86.38, p = .000,], and
non-cooperative actions [F (2, 69) =52.37, p = 000]. Moreover, the interaction
between flexibility and age was almost significant regarding neutral actions [F (4,
69)=3.10, p= .020] and non-cooperative actions [F (4, 69)=2.26, p= .071]. It is
possible to exclude a strong relation among types of actions and age {the F-values
for neutral, cooperative and non-cooperative actions are respectively: [F (2,
69)=.15, p=.855]; [F (2, 69)=.63, p= .532]; [F (2, 69)=.01, p= .984]} and gender
{the F-values for neutral, cooperative and non-cooperative actions are respectively:
[F (1, 69)=2.83, p= .096]; [F (1, 69)=2.78, p=.0999]; [F (1, 69)=1.38, p= .243]}.
The η2 is .32 for neutral actions, .73 for cooperative actions and .64 for non-
cooperative actions.
12. 354 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
The comparisons between means were made by the Duncan's Multiple
Range Test (p<.05). The HHFF pairs put in act the smallest number of neutral
actions (Graph 1).
Neutral Cooperative Non-cooperative
70 65.96 a
60
50
c
41.39
40 36.02 b
36.88 b
30 34.1 b
20 26.67 a
21.58 b
10 13.29 c
9.87 a
0
HHFF MMFF LLFF
Graph 1 Means of the actions by type of pairs
Note: the means with the same letter are not significantly different from each other (p<.05).
The maximum number of cooperative actions were realised by the HHFF
pairs (64% of their actions were cooperative) and the minimum by the LLFF pairs.
Conversely, the maximum number of non-cooperative actions were realised by the
LLFF pairs (40% of their actions were non-cooperative) and the minimum by the
HHFF pairs. In general, the distribution was quite predictable, as we hypothesised,
on the basis of the Stroop Effect interference registered for the subjects. The
MMFF pairs were comprised of subjects who registered an interference smaller
than that of the subjects forming the LLFF pairs and greater than that of the
subjects forming the LLFF pairs. In the interaction task the MMFF pairs
cooperated more than the LLFF pairs and less than the HHFF pairs. All the
comparisons among different types of pair were significant.
The strategies used by different kinds of pairs at the three ages were
consistent (Graph 2). The pairs with high flexibility produced always the greatest
number of cooperative actions and the least number of neutral and non-cooperative
ones. On the contrary, the pairs at low flexibility produced always the greatest
number of non-cooperative actions and the least number of cooperative ones. The
greatest number of neutral actions was produced at 7 years and 11 years by the
MMFF pairs, and at 9 years by the LLFF pairs.
13. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 355
80 Neutral Cooperative Non-cooperative
72
70 69
60
57
49
50
38 39 39 44
40
35 36
37 33
35 32
30 31
31
24
23 24
20 22
18 18
12 11
10 11
11
6
0
HHFF MMFF LLFF HHFF MMFF LLFF HHFF MMFF LLFF
year 7 year 7 year 7 year 9 year 9 year 9 year 11 year 11 year 11
Graph 2 Means of the actions by age and type of pairs
Therefore, the role of flexibility in thinking is further confirmed: the
children with low flexibility seem to be unable to halt non-cooperative actions. The
results underline that the most popular social strategy used by a certain type of pair
is the same, considering different age groups. Besides, it is interesting to notice that
the differences between high and low flexibility children were more evident for the
age of 9 years: here, pairs with high flexibility produced a greater number of
cooperative actions than the same pairs of the lower age and a lesser number of
non-cooperative ones than the same pairs at both the younger and elder age groups;
pairs with low flexibility, on the other hand, produce a greater number of non-
cooperative actions and a lesser number of cooperative ones than similar pairs of 7
and 11 years.
The puzzle game: analysis of verbalisations
Flexibility had a great relationship with neutral verbalisations [F (2, 69)=
15.83, p=.000], cooperative [F (2, 69)=37.80, p=.000] and non-cooperative
verbalisations [F(2, 69)=12.83, p=.000]. Nevertheless, as concerns neutral and non-
cooperative verbalisations, it has also to be taken into account the relationships
14. 356 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
with age that was almost significant in the first case [F (2, 69)=2.51, p=.088], and
significant in the second [F (2, 69) =4.04, p=.021]. There were no gender
differences; the F values for neutral, cooperative and non-cooperative
verbalisations are respectively: {[F (1, 69)=.28, p=.598]; [F (1, 69)=.00, p=.970];
2
[F (1, 69)= .14, p=.706]}. The η is .40 for both neutral and non-cooperative, and
.55 for cooperative verbalisations.
The minimum of neutral verbalisations was registered by the HHFF pairs
(Graph 3) and the maximum was scored by the LLFF pairs (50 % of their
verbalizations were non-cooperative): all the comparisons among the HHFF pairs
and the other types of pairs were significant. The maximum of cooperative
verbalisations was registered by the HHFF pairs (82% of their verbalizations were
cooperative): the comparisons between this type of pair and the others were all
significant.
Neutral Cooperative Non-cooperative
40
35.23 a
35
30
25
19.38 c
20 17.48 b
15 15.63 b
10 12.07 b 11.45 b
4.24 a
5 6.95 c
3.26 a
0
HHFF MMFF LLFF
Graph 3 Means of the verbalisations by type of pairs
Note: the means with the same letter are not significantly different from each other (p<.05).
The HHFF pairs also scored the minimum of non-cooperative
verbalisations: the only comparison not significant is that between them and
MMFF pairs.
The production of neutral, cooperative and non-cooperative verbalisations
by different types of pairs was analysed in the three age groups (Graph 4). The two
main elements underlined by the analysis of actions (a particular shape of the
interactive strategies used by each type of pair and the consistency of such a shape
in different age groups) were confirmed by the analysis of the language. For both
levels of behaviour considered (actions, language), the cognitive flexibility showed
to be extremely important in the choice of certain strategies rather than others.
However, with respect to the action there were also some differences. In fact,
regarding the production of not cooperative verbalisations the LLFF pairs were
15. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 357
slightly surpassed by the MMFF pairs at both 7 and 11 years. However, at 9 years
the production of non-cooperative verbalisations by the LLFF pairs was much
higher than that of the other types of pair, and this difference is even higher than
that scored at the action level. Furthermore, there was a breakdown of non-
cooperative verbalisations produced by pairs at low flexibility (LLFF) of 11 years.
Neutral Cooperative Non-cooperative
40
38 38
35
32
30
30
25
20
20
17 17 17 17
16
15 15
15
13 13 12
12
10 10 11
10
9
5 5
4
3 4 4
3 3
0
HHFF HHFF HHFF MMFF MMFF MMFF LLFF LLFF LLFF
year 7 year 9 year 11 year 7 year 9 year 11 year 7 year 9 year 11
Graph 4 Means of the verbalisations by age and type of pairs
The language: moving beyond the given situation
Flexibility also turned out to be important in relation to the production of
2
not task-centered language [F (2, 69)=55.11, p=.000, η = .64]. Neither gender
differences nor age were significant. There were no significant relation between
total amount of task-centered language and flexibility [F (2, 69)=.91, p=.40], while
2
there was a significant relation with age [F (2, 69)=3.20, p=.04, η = .22]. The
results of the mean comparisons confirmed that the highest mean of not task-
centered language was produced by the pairs with high flexibility. All the
comparisons among the HHFF pairs and the others were significant.
16. 358 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
Not task-centered Task-centered
50 45.19 a
45 42.73 a
37.79 a
40
35
30
25
20
15.18 a
15
10 5.71 b
5 1.47 c
0
HHFF MMFF LLFF
Graph 5 Means of the task-centered and not task-centered verbalisations by type of pairs
Note: the means with the same letter are not significantly different from each other (p<.05).
Only the pairs with high flexibility in thinking were able to use language to
go beyond the given situation. The percentage of not task-centered verbalisations
produced by the LLFF pairs is so low as to be irrelevant (4%). On the other hand
the quota of not task-centered language produced by the HHFF pairs is quite
appreciable (26 %). The importance of flexibility in the production of not task-
centered language was also confirmed at different ages: the HHFF pairs always
scored the maximum (Graph 6). Besides the not task-centered verbalisations
produced by the LLFF pairs was the lowest by 11 years.
Successful and unsuccessful interactions
The four analyses of variance carried out on the 87 pairs, which take into
account the relationships among cognitive flexibility, gender, age and the
production of successful and unsuccessful interactions, underlined a parallel shape
for the behavioural and the linguistic level. The flexibility was highly significant
2
both in relation to successful interactive actions [F 2, 69)= 68.16, p =.000, η = .71]
2
and language [F (2, 69)= 49.87, p=.000, η = .63]. Regarding successful actions,
the age [F (2,69)= 4.02, p=.02] and the interaction between flexibility and age
[F (4, 69) =2.44, p=.05] were also significant. Regarding failures, only the
2
flexibility was significant: in the case of actions [F (2, 69) = 35.65, p=.000, η =
2
.56], and for language [F (2, 69)= 13.34, p=000, η = .37]. The HHFF pairs scored
the maximum of successful interactions (their succesful interactions represented
almost the total of those attempted), both for actions and language (Graph 7). The
comparisons among different types of pairs were all significant. The maximum
number of unsuccessful interactions was realised by the LLFF pairs (their
17. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 359
unsuccesful interactions represented the 63% of those attempted) both for action
and language
60 Not task-centered Task-centered
55
50 48
46 46 46
42
40
35
32
30
27
20 18
13 14
10
6 6 5
2 2 1
0
HHFF HHFF HHFF MMFF MMFF MMFF LLFF LLFF LLFF
year 7 year 9 year 11 year 7 year 9 year 11 year 7 year 9 year 11
Graph 6 Means of the task-centered and not task-centered verbalisations by age and type
of pairs
Successful actions Unsuccessful actions Successful language Unsuccessful language
50
47.53 a
45
40
35
30 29.97 a 27.14 b
25
21.86 c
20
17.56 c
15 10.74 b
10 10.42 b
9.46 b
5 7.67 b
0.4 a 1.22 c
0 0.1 a
HHFF MMFF LLFF
18. 360 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
Graph 7 Means of interactions by type of pairs
Note: the means with the same letter are not significantly different from each other (p<.05).
and language, but the comparison between this group and the MMFF pairs was not
significant for language. However, the lowest number of unsuccessful interactions
was always realised by the HHFF pairs.
This general pattern did not change considering different age groups and
for this reason the complete results are not reported here: the HHFF pairs were
always the most competent in effectuating successful interactions. However, at a
behavioral level the successes were higher than the failures also for the LLFF pairs
of 11 years.
Cooperation: beyond ability
The relationships among flexibility, gender, age and the number of pieces
not used at the end of the game or the total time taken to finish the puzzle were also
investigated. The cognitive flexibility had a significant relation with the number of
pieces [F (2, 69)=3.24, p=.04] and the total time to finish [F (2, 69)= 5.0, p = .009].
However, there were also significant relations with age; for the number of pieces
[F (2, 69)= 6.71, p=.002] and for the time taken to finish [F (2, 69)= 4.65, p=.01].
2
The η is .27 for the pieces and .30 for the time.
Pieces not used Time used (seconds)
700
599 600 595 600
600 567 577
558
508
500 466
400
300
200
100
22 27 22 32
5 10 11 17 17
0
HHFF HHFF HHFF MMFF MMFF MMFF LLFF LLFF LLFF
year 7 year 9 year 11 year 7 year 9 year 11 year 7 year 9 year 11
Graph 8 Time used and pieces not used by age and type of pairs
19. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 361
Regarding the mean comparisons for the number of pieces (Graph 8) only
those among the HHFF and the LLFF pairs were significant: at all the ages, the
HHFF pairs left the least number of pieces. The HHFF pairs used a mean of
45.69 5 pieces against 37.94 used by the LLFF pairs. Concerning the mean time to
finish the task (expressed in seconds), that of the HHFF pairs was always the least.
The comparisons among HHFF and LLFF pairs were significant, as were those
among HHFF and MMFF, while the comparisons among MMFF and LLFF pairs
were not.
Discussion
Our hypotheses were substantially confirmed. With respect to the first
hypothesis, a greater cognitive flexibility seems to correspond indeed to a greater
competence in social relations with peers, for all the ages taken into account. The
children with high flexibility in thinking, identified by means of the Stroop Effect,
were more likely to use strategies aimed at realising a shared goal with the partner,
both at the behavioural and at the linguistic level. In pairs with high cognitive
flexibility we also saw a lower production of those strategies not useful in reaching
a shared goal with the partner even if they do not represent a clear attempt to
obstruct him/her. Conversely, the children we identified as having low cognitive
flexibility proved their incapacity to decentralise themselves from a strictly
individual point of view and abandon an immediate advantage. Even a small
difference in flexibility marks a difference in the ability to interact with peers in the
social situation we analysed: children at medium flexibility managed a social
situation in an intermediate way compared to children at high and low flexibility in
thinking.
Furthermore with respect to the second hypothesis, the difference between
pairs with high and low cognitive flexibility was also evident in the production of
language not task-centred and in the fulfillment of interactions. Pairs with high
flexibility produced verbalisations that in some way digress from or go beyond the
realisation of the goal (to finish the task). Their minds were not entirely occupied
by reaching the prefixed goal and by what they are doing: this seems to us a good
indicator of their capacity to leave the present situation aside for a moment and
assume a certain distance towards it.
Besides, with respect to the third hypothesis almost all the social attempts
of the high flexibility pairs were successful, demonstrating the ability of the
5
The mean value of the pieces that the pair were not able to use at the end of the 10
minutes of play: they are 13.97 for the pairs with high flexibility (HHFF) and 21.72 for
those with low flexibility in thinking (LLFF). For the three ages the mean number of the
puzzle pieces is 59.66 where 49,60,70 is the number of puzzle pieces respectively for 7, 9
and 11 years.
20. 362 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
partners to think and act reciprocally, whereas low flexibility pairs collected a great
number of failures.
However the hypothesised lack of differences between pairs with high and
low flexibility regarding their practical ability to finish the task was not confirmed:
children with high flexibility were also faster in finishing the task. Finally, as we
have hypothesised (fourth hypothesis) no significant difference in competence to
interact linked to gender was identified.
The results offer some important indications regarding the possible role of
cognitive flexibility in social relations: the cognitive processes used by an
individual contribute in determining the type of social strategies that he/she is able
to carry out in playing with peers. The cognitive flexibility is strictly linked to the
ability to cooperate with another individual and to reach a goal which is shared by
both partners, working not against him/her but together with him/her.
Flexibility allows the individual to elaborate a more complex
representation of the task taking into account the importance of all the elements at
stake. To solve the interactive situation of the puzzle in a cooperative way, each
child in the pair has to put the general structure of the task before his/her individual
interest in the possession of a single piece: the pieces of the puzzle may become a
meaningful object only if the two children put them together. Children with high
cognitive flexibility are more able to share a goal with the playing partners: their
actions and verbalisations are organised in a common project. Each of the children
at high flexibility demonstrated their ability to represent the whole situation in a
more global and complex way compared with children in low flexibility pairs.
Moreover children with high cognitive flexibility showed their competence to take
into account the presence of another individual and his/her point of view. They
used actions and verbalisations adequate to help their partner and themselves
progress towards the common goal. The ability of children with high flexibility to
manage a social situation is so well developed that they can allow themselves to go
beyond the present situation in their use of language: not only are they able to work
together but they can also enjoy themselves.
The abilities to elaborate a more complex representation of a certain
situation, sharing a goal with others, building one’s common project, acting
together and taking into account the existence of points of view different from their
own are all necessary in successfully facing the complexity of social relationships.
Children with low flexibility were less capable of taking the whole
situation into account. Their behaviour was more impulsive and fragmentary: they
worked without a common project and fighted for the personal possession of a
puzzle’ piece that have to be assembled a few minutes later. They seemed not to be
able to consider the presence of another individual and his/her point of view and
they resorted to less adaptive social strategies, such as aggressive behaviour. Often
they did not use language as an efficient instrument for communication and sharing
of ideas, but rather to denigrate the work of the other and his/her ability to
complete the puzzle. The incapacity of children with low flexibility in thinking to
21. S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366 363
elaborate a complex representation of the whole situation, refraining from their
tendency to resort automatically to non-cooperative behaviour, decentralising
themselves from a strictly individual point of view, not being wholly dependent on
the present and immediate situation, seems to indicate interaction strategies which
are less capable of positively dealing with social relationships. Automatic
responses acquired during former events and stored in the mind are not always able
to deal adequately with requests made by other individuals or situations different
from that in which these responses were originally used. The development of the
ability to inhibit automatic responses may lead more suitable strategies.
Despite the limitation due to the cross-sectional design, the present
research underline that the particular interactive strategies used by pairs of children
at high and low cognitive flexibility are similar at different ages. We think that a
longitudinal continuation of the same research may unearth further knowledge
about this topic. Another possible further investigation concerns the relation
between social competence and use of language. In our research we underlined
how the difference between low and high flexibility pairs is more evident at the
linguistic level. Language, in fact, offers individuals the fundamental possibility to
coordinate their different points of view.
Conclusion
In the present study we argue that the higher the cognitive flexibility,
measured by the way of the Stroop Effect, the higher also the social competence of
the children aged from 7 to 11 years, and particularly cooperation. Our hypotheses
seem to be supported by the results obtained in a situation that was structured as
near as posible to ecological conditions. Besides, different aspects of social
interactions with peers were considered: action, language (both task-oriented and
not task-oriented), successful or not successful interactions, performance. All of
them were showed strongly related to the children’s capacity inhibit an automatic
process, that is reading instead of naming.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the possession of a mind
permits human beings to make the qualitative leap to cooperation. Competence in
cooperating was analysed here in relation to cognitive flexibility - an “internal
factor”. Fonzi already underlined (1991) that there are many factors involved in the
competence to cooperate and that they may interact in a non linear manner. Some
of these factors, such as individual characteristics, are internal, while others, such
as the parental or teacher style, are external. More detailed knowledge of the
processes by which the competence to cooperate is developed may prove
extremely useful to the social projects of the human beings. From an applied
perspective, it would be very useful to investigate further the processes that
underpin the development of cooperative strategies and the forms and modalities
that these assume in different life phases. A wider knowledge of the processes
involved in cooperation may lead to the individuation of strategies and the creation
22. 364 S. Ciairano, S. Bonino, R. Miceli/ Cognition, Brain, Behavior 10 (2006) 343-366
of more cooperative environments and situations to propose to children at school
age. We are thinking here of an educational environment which not only provides
knowledge but also helps to shape cognitive and social processes.
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