Common Pool Theory

1. Garrett Hardin (1968) Professor of Biology University of California, Santa Barbara The Tragedy of the Commons

9. A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES John Baden wrote

15. Issues in Managing Common Pool Assets Why Recourse to Political Organization ? Public Goods or Public Bads Private Solutions The Free Rider Problem Potential for B ureaucratic Performance The Political Economy of Bureaucracies Decision-Making or Bargaining Costs The Potential for Bureaucratic Performance in a common Pool Situation A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

16. Political Recourse Why Recourse to Political Organization ? Public Goods or Public Bads Private Solutions The Free Rider Problem A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

17. Why Recourse to Political Organization ? A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

18. people ignore social impact of private behavior private behavior always affects the community, for good or for bad A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

19. government involves coercion rather than willing consent even the few surviving classical anarchists acknowledge the necessity for occasionally relaxing the rule of willing consent. A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

20. government is needed to serve as an arbiter among parties to protect the weak, to prevent market forces, to enforce property rights and maintain a context of law and order A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

21. Public GOODS or Public BADS ? A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

22. a public good is one which, if available for ANYone , is available for EVERYone A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

23. a similar definition applies for a PUBLIC BAD A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES if not available for ANYone , it’s not available for NO one

24. If there is no incentive for the public to contribute , there will be no public contribution. A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES rule

25. A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES the government will just TAX If there is no public contribution…

26. exception #1 social pressure can induce contribution for public goods the grass is always greener on the other side A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

27. exception #2 if private benefit from providing a public good is greater than its private cost then the good will be provided privately for example when a company maintains a public road A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

28. a common pool resource is a resource for which there are multiple owners A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

29. common pool resource where one, or a set of users, can have adverse effects upon the interests of other users A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES If there is no agency with the power to manage, it can be collectively disastrous

30. The damage done by the smelters is greater than the cost of cleaning the AIR A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES humans are also users of the AIR resource, as the smelters

31. the self- incentive to maximize sales might make resources unsustainable limits and regulations are needed A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

32. Unnecessary depletion of resources Imagine if all the timber were suddenly put up for grabs… A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

33. private SOLUTIONS A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

34. establishing AGENCIES assigning them responsibilities and power A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

35. the free-rider problem A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

36. in general, the world is taking on an ever-greater resemblance to a common pool A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES oma

38. What do we do? Decision-Making or Bargaining Costs The Potential for Bureaucratic Performance in a common Pool Situation A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES

41. Action Potential for B ureaucratic Performance The Political Economy of Bureaucracies A Primer for the Management of COMMON POOL RESOURCES