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BIGBASKET.COM1
Arpita Agnihotri and Saurabh Bhattacharya wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend
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other identifying information to protect confidentiality.
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Copyright © 2015, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2015-06-30
In a country such as India, customers were used to the idea of selecting their own tomatoes and bananas.
BigBasket.com (henceforth referred to as BigBasket), India’s first online grocery retailer, was ready to
break this mind-set. In 2013, the two-year-old online grocery retailer had a customer base of over 100,000
and was growing. Customers were signing up at an aggressive rate of 20 per cent per year, based on
word-of-mouth marketing.2
As the customer base increased, so did customer loyalty, with an astounding
65 per cent retention rate. With a commitment to providing a top-quality product assortment at
competitive prices, BigBasket successfully provided last-mile delivery to customers across three cities in
India — Bangalore, Hyderabad and Mumbai. While traditional brick and mortar grocery retailers were
struggling with losses, even after several years of operations, BigBasket became the first online grocery
retailer to report breakeven in March 2014 in one of the cities where it operated.3
On the other hand, brick
and mortar grocery retailers had started using a hybrid model and critics believed that hybrid models had
more profit potential than pure online grocery retailers. Even venture capitalists showed a herd mentality
— they did not mind funding, for example, a fifth or sixth baby product or discount deal site, but
remained skeptical about the profitability of online grocery retailing.4
Despite these challenges, BigBasket had managed to arrange funding from venture capitalists. It had
received the largest amount of Series A funding amongst the entire online retail industry in India. It came
up with innovative, customer-centric policies, which not only boosted customer confidence but also
enhanced overall profit margins. Venture capitalists and critics were watching BigBasket and wondering
whether this new idea had a future. Could BigBasket permanently change the shopping habits of
customers? Was the breakeven a short-term phenomenon for BigBasket or would it achieve similar
performance in other cities? Was online grocery retail going to be profitable in the long run?
COMPANY BEGINNINGS
Encouraged by angel investors K. Ganesh and Meena Ganesh, BigBasket.com was founded in September
2011 by five individuals, namely V.S. Sudhakar, Hari Menon, Vipul Parekh, V.S. Ramesh and Abhinay
Choudhary. The team of five was not new to the business, as each had ample experience in managing
both online and offline retail. In 1999, they had launched Fabmart.com, India’s first e-commerce website.
Its primary area of business included music, books, toys and jewellery. However, the company failed due
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to inadequate Internet penetration in India in the early 2000s. In 2003, the team rebranded Fabmart into
Fabmall, an offline grocery supermarket. Within two years of operations, Fabmall was acquired by the
Hyderabad-based retail brand Trinethra Super Retail,5
which was acquired and finally integrated into
Aditya Birla Group’s More brand in 2007.6
Menon, the CEO and founding member of BigBasket, was upbeat about the novel business concept and
hopeful that the team’s second attempt at retail would succeed. This was because, firstly, the Internet in
India was maturing, with faster speeds and more people adapting to Internet transactions. By the end of
2013, there were approximately 213 million Internet users in India.7
Secondly, the online grocery space
was completely vacant. Following the entry of Flipkart (the most successful e-retailer in India), new
players were making inroads into online retail, but not into online grocery retail. Clearly, shoppers were
ready for and interested in online grocery retail, as revealed by the fact that a lot of Google-searching was
being done with the keyword “online grocery” (see Exhibit 1). The online grocery sector also showed
potential because grocery shopping was monotonous and working people did not want to physically go to
grocery stores to make purchases.8
Thirdly, the BigBasket team’s past experience in the retail sector
encouraged it to venture into the unoccupied online grocery space. Finally, the team at BigBasket did not
believe in “me-too” ideas. K. Ganesh, one of the co-founders and seed funders of BigBasket, said, “We
are fans of Greenfield ideas that address big pain points and basic needs of the common man. We don’t
like me-too ideas such as the fifth deal site or the eighth baby product or the tenth apparel site.”9
ONLINE DRIVERS AND TARGET SEGMENTS
Most grocery items such as pulses, grains and rice are repeat purchases for consumers, who naturally find
it a tedious exercise to visit stores to buy these mundane products. Consumers do not find excitement in
purchasing them. In addition, other factors push people away from grocery shopping. It is physically
tiring; customers have to struggle to find parking; they have to wander store aisles in search of the right
items; they have to queue to pay; they have to carry heavy groceries back to their cars; and they have to
unload them at home. This irritates them.10
For other customers, especially working couples, scarcity of
time is also an issue. Instead of enjoying weekends with their families and children, working couples end
up spending much of their days in department stores making weekly grocery purchases. Thus, for this
segment of consumers, the presence of an online grocery store like BigBasket was a boon. Most of the
time, it was a tech-savvy11
male who ordered groceries on behalf of the family. At times, working women
also participated in ordering groceries online. Apart from working couples, BigBasket also focused on
women who were involved either in weekly purchases or party purchases.
In terms of income, although India’s middle-class segment consisted of only 5 per cent of the total
population, it was growing at a rate of 7 per cent on average.12
Although price-sensitive, this class was
willing to pay more for convenience. Abhinay, a co-founder of BigBasket, said that almost 30 per cent of
the firm’s customers were double-income postgraduates who had at some point lived abroad.13
In terms of
attitude towards shopping, BigBasket focused on customers who planned their grocery purchases for one
or two weeks and were not impulse buyers. This was because delivery costs were high and delivering
individual items to impulse purchasers would not be profitable for BigBasket. This was also the reason
why BigBasket fixed a minimum order size of US$16.1514
for free home delivery.
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INDUSTRY AND COMPETITION
Market Potential
The market size of online grocery retail in India in 2013 was $1 billion, representing only 2 per cent of
the total grocery market, but it was expected to reach $17 billion by 2017.15
Trends were visible not only
in India but also across different countries. For example, in North America and the United Kingdom, the
online grocery retail market size was expected to be $15.4 billion and $0.99 billion, respectively, in 2013
(see Exhibit 2). But at the same time, online grocery retail was equally as challenging as traditional
grocery retail. The online grocery retail industry was capital-intensive in nature and the economics of e-
retailing in general were not applicable to grocery retailing. This is because groceries are perishables and
same day or next day delivery has to be assured, unlike in other retailing, where even a weeks’ time can
be taken to make deliveries. Thus, a city-specific model, unlike region specific model in non-grocery e-
retailing, had to be followed in online grocery retail.
The presence of perishables made online grocery retail capital-intensive, as more investments were
required in a) warehouses or distribution centres (DCs) for storing groceries, b) logistics for home
delivery services and c) managing technology, which enabled the smooth functioning of these processes.
In the long run, it was more efficient for online grocery retailers to have their own DCs, rather than
picking customer orders from organized retail stores, as space utilization was high in DCs and products
were laid out in a more efficient manner to reduce time.16
Similarly, if an online grocery retailer opted for
complete automation of the picking process, it could further save on labour costs and increase its speed.
Nevertheless, compared to a non-automated warehouse, which usually required investments of $4 million,
an automated warehouse required investments of around $35 million.17
This was one of the primary
reasons why e-commerce retailers or traditional retailers failed to successfully venture into the online
grocery retailing business. Furthermore, same-day or quick delivery was also critical. “Timely and fast
delivery is very important for consumers especially when it comes to food or groceries, since it’s an
immediate need,” explained Pragya Singh, associate vice-president at retail consultancy Technopak.18
This further complicated the logistics issues. Moreover, the success rate of online grocery retailers across
different countries was also not promising. It was supposed to be the “next big thing” during the dot-com
boom, but failed to take off. For example, Webvan, the poster child of the dot-com bubble, proved to be
one of the biggest failures in the online grocery retail industry. Critics believed that most of the failures in
this industry could be attributed to aggressive expansion, complex infrastructure and the logistics models
adopted by companies, which still remained a great challenge.19
Competition
BigBasket faced competition from different types of players. In the grocery retail segment in India,
traditional Kirana stores,20
modern stores (organized retail), online grocery stores and hybrid stores all co-
existed. Traditional Kirana shops (neighbourhood stores) had theadvantage of trust and rapport with
customers. Hence, consumers were able to get groceries on credit. Compared to modern stores, online
retailers were at an advantage, since their expenses for the rental of retail space, utilities (e.g., power bills)
and employing store staff were minimal. “We do not have overheads such as rents, power, etc. In places
such as Mumbai, rents will kill you. We need just two to three warehouses to cover the entire city,”
explained Vipul Parekh, co-founder and chief marketing officer at BigBasket.21
However, the firm had to incur logistics costs, particularly for last-mile delivery. Nevertheless, even after
incurring these costs, its overall margins were three to four percentage points more than traditional or
modern retailers (see Exhibit 3). As Sudhakar, a co-founder of BigBasket, said: “Head to head with
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modern retailers, I figure we can save 10 per cent in costs because things like rent, utilities, staff and
shrinkage simply don’t exist at the last mile for us. And compared to their 3 per cent net profit margins, I
think we can get to 6 to 7 per cent.”22
However, critics believed that overall profit margins could not
exceed 2 to 3 per cent, as gross margins were reportedly around 12 to 15 per cent. Fruits and vegetables
had higher margins, at around 16 per cent, but their shelf life wasshorter. Thus, many online grocery
retailers did not enter this segment. But BigBasket did not find shelf life to be a problem. Menon
explained, “Fruit and vegetables are procured only on order, except for those with a longer shelf life, such
as potatoes and onions. This reduces loss of stock by 3 to 4 per cent.”23
Among pure online players (see Exhibit 4), BigBasket was the biggest in India by virtue of its size and
market share. This happened because, in the Indian e-commerce market, where other e-grocers found it
difficult to expand and some like Shopveg.in had even shut down due to a lack of funds to continue
operations, BigBasket had not only grown in other cities such as Hyderabad and Mumbai but had also
become the first Indian online grocery retailer to get seed money and several rounds of funding from
venture capitalists.24
In the first round of funding, BigBasket received $10 million. “No venture capitalist
(VC) can write a ‘Series A’ cheque of that size. And we were clear this isn’t a $2 million or $3 million
investment business,”25
said K. Ganesh. The past experience of the team in this business, especially
Menon’s eight or nine years of experience in grocery retailing, as well as the vested confidence and trust
of angel investors, had all contributed towards securing the Series A funding. According to K. Ganesh,
“One of the reasons we got into this business is because it isn’t ‘VC-able.’ It means two pony-tailed
youngsters out of college can’t enter it. It’s our competitive barrier to entry!”26
However, Sudhakar
believed that more than competition, customer experience was important in this business. He said, “The
issue is not how many online players are competing, but how many transactions you can do, while
maintaining customer experience.”27
Other pure online e-retailers included LocalBanya and EkStop. However, compared to BigBasket, their
product range and registered base of customers was far less. For example, while the number of registered
users of BigBasket was over 100,000, there were only 17,000 users of LocalBanya (see Exhibit 5).
EkStop, Zopnow and MyGrahak were other online grocery retailers, and all of them including
LocalBanya were limited to a single-city model. To begin with, only BigBasket had offered same-day
delivery. However, gradually, other players had also offered same-day delivery (see Exhibit 4). Similarly,
a few online grocery retailers dealt with only organic and imported products. For example,
Farm2Kitchen.com offered only organic food products. BigBasket, on the other hand, offered both
organic, imported (gourmet) and day-to-day food products.
One more category of online retailers existed, who served as an Internet face of the traditional Kirana
stores of India. AaramShop belonged to this category. Customers who logged on to AaramShop.com
selected the nearest Kirana store from their home and ordered items, and AaramShop relayed the
information to the store via text messages and emails. Within two to three hours, the order was delivered
to the customer. Though this model provided the advantage of shopping from a nearby store, it also
suffered from the flaw of inconsistencies in last-mile delivery, as AaramShop had little control over
delivery. In online grocery retailing, one of the critical success factors is to keep tight control over
warehouse and transport operations.28
Consistency in performance cannot be reached if the retailer does
not have control over last-mile delivery. To assure complete control and consistent delivery, BigBasket
did not even rely on third-party logistics. It had its own fleet and warehouses. According to analysts, the
threat to e-tailers like BigBasket was mostly from hybrid retailers like the Future Group, which provided
groceries both directly, as a door-to-door service (Big Bazaar Direct), and through a brick and mortar
format (Big Bazaar, the largest brick and mortar modern retailer in India). Tesco, a successful retailer in
the United Kingdom, also operated both online and offline retail formats.
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CHALLENGES IN ONLINE GROCERY RETAIL IN INDIA
The biggest challenge in the online grocery retail space was the complex nature of the supply chain.29
Complexity arose from various sources. First, margins were low and products had to be delivered the very
same day, as customers could not wait two to three days for the delivery of groceries. Secondly, a huge
variety of products had to be kept, and processes needed to be such that perishables could be managed
with minimum spoilage. Thirdly, an individual city-based model had to be followed and last-mile
delivery had to be planned, which made logistics very difficult. Thus, the entire supply chain became
complex in nature.30
Hence, unlike other e-retailers who followed a standard hub and spoke model, in
grocery e-retailing a hub and spoke model was followed in every city of operation. This implied that
warehouses (hubs) had to be established in each city individually, unlike in the traditional model, where
several cities (spokes) shared one large warehouse, which was usually located in a major city. In India,
the major cities are Kolkata in the east, Chennai and Bangalore in the south, Ahmedabad and Mumbai in
the west and Delhi in the north. Furthermore, to combat wafer-thin margins, BigBasket focused on
weekly purchasers rather than impulse buyers, so that the minimum order size exceeded a particular level.
Similarly, apart from regular groceries, BigBasket offered high-margin products to buyers, such as pet
food. Margins in this segment were of the order of 30 per cent. BigBasket also focused on private-label
brands, which improved the margins by 20 to 25 per cent. Menon explained, “We sell 10,000 SKUs, of
which 300 are our own branded staples.”31
LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY
BigBasket used technology to its advantage in the front-end, which was the customer, and in the back-
end, which was streamlining operations. Because of its home delivery facility, BigBasket had
comparatively better access to personal and purchase information related to customers. A brick and
mortar retailer could access this data only if the customer had a loyalty card for the store, which was not
common in India. Consumer information helped BigBasket manage its inventory at almost a zero level.
“The ability to gauge demand is the key to success in this business as you do not want to end up with too
much inventory,” said Menon.32
Thus, unlike traditional retailers who stocked inventory for almost two to
three weeks, BigBasket maintained inventory for only one to two days, thus saving inventory costs.
Realizing the criticality of technology, BigBasket had also developed its data analytics software
completely in-house. Its team of 20 engineers had indigenously developed real-time analytic software,
which made sourcing almost automatic, i.e., the process of ordering goods from suppliers did not require
any human interface.33
Similarly, they had developed software algorithms that sent triggers to the head of
operations when orders began to overshoot capacity so that more delivery vans could be arranged. For
using Global Positioning System (GPS) devices to track delivery vans, BigBasket allied with
AssetTrackr, a Bangalore-based company. Thus, when a customer placed an order, the customer’s
geocode34
and delivery slot information were fed into the AssetTrackr system, which then created virtual
maps of delivery zones and also recorded the time of delivery. It delivered goods on time 99.3 per cent of
the time.35
BigBasket also allied with Ezetap, a mobile point-of-sale solution provider, so that the
customer could also pay using credit card upon receipt of groceries. Thus, the firm offered the customer
the convenience of using either cash or credit card upon the delivery of their order.
ADVANCING SUPPLY CHAIN TOWARDS PROFITABILITY
BigBasket believed in a flexible supply chain. Thus, it first started with a just-in-time philosophy in a
particular city. This implied that after getting orders from customers, “pickers” picked the orders from
organized brick and mortar stores and then delivered them to the customers. Once a particular level of
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orders that justified investments in warehouses was reached, BigBasket developed its own warehouses,
which Menon referred to as the “warehouse stocking model.”36
By 2013, BigBasket had warehouses in
Bangalore and Mumbai and was planning to open a warehouse in Hyderabad by the middle of 2014.
Having its own warehouses had several advantages in terms of better control as well as better margins,
according to Menon.37
When BigBasket first built a warehouse in a city, it initially procured from
wholesalers like METRO Cash & Carry, but gradually started eliminating all the intermediaries in the
value chain of grocery retail and moved towards direct procurement from companies. By the end of 2013,
BigBasket was directly procuring from 150 suppliers and was in the process of adding 40 to 50 more such
suppliers. Direct procurement led to an increase in gross margins by 20 to 23 per cent.38
Furthermore,
within the first month of its existence, BigBasket also launched private-label brands, as these had higher
profit margins. Thus, it tied up with suppliers who picked rice, pulses and spices from mandis39
and
packed them on behalf of BigBasket. As BigBasket moved towards direct procurement, it planned to
further eliminate these vendors by procuring directly from the mandis. Additionally, BigBasket had a
special sourcing route for perishables. As quality with perishables was an issue, BigBasket procured fruits
and vegetables directly from farmers. It called this the “farm-to-home” philosophy.40
OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
BigBasket’s Bangalore warehouse was 10,000 square feet in size in 2012, and was gradually being
upgraded to 80,000 square feet.41
BigBasket’s warehouses consisted of around 10,000 stock-keeping units
(SKUs) and 1,000 brands. BigBasket employed pickers and packers, who picked and packed
approximately 2,000 orders per day during weekends and 1,500 to 1,600 orders per day during weekdays.
The average order amounted to approximately $21.65.42
Since the pickers dealt with the sensitive task of
picking the orders, BigBasket took all precautions to avoid problems. Hence, pickers were not allowed to
receive or make phone calls during picking in the warehouse. A scanner was tied on their wrist, which
scanned the orders being picked and also informed them about real-time orders.43
DELIVERY MANAGEMENT
BigBasket developed a business model which assured “on-time delivery.” BigBasket relied on a hub and
spoke distribution model for efficient, fast delivery. It had warehouses in each city where it operated.
From these warehouses, products were transported to three main hubs in the city from where the final
delivery of groceries took place. Fruits and vegetables were procured just a few hours before, according to
BigBasket’s “farm-to-home” model.44
At BigBasket, route planning was completely automated. When a customer placed an order, based on
location and direction, route-planning software clustered all the orders on the same route together. Based
on several parameters like van capacity and the number of available vans (which were 50 to begin with),
slots were offered to customers. BigBasket, by owning a fleet of vans, had complete control over logistics
and delivery, thus raising customer satisfaction. Nevertheless, if a delivery was not made within the
stipulated time, then consumers were given a 50 per cent discount on the total order value.
SALES AND MARKETING
BigBasket followed a city-specific model for marketing. “We will be doing city-specific marketing as we
are not operating nationally,” explained Menon.45
He elaborated, “We will focus on below-the-line (BTL)
activities in malls and apartments besides poster and banner campaigns, radio ads and some print ads in
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local newspapers.”46
Thus, BigBasket partnered with local media, such as radio, and put advertisements in
print media. Nevertheless, it was word-of-mouth by customers that helped BigBasket most in gaining
customers.47
For example, in educational institutes like Indian Institute of Management-Bangalore and
IBS-Hyderabad, if someone commented positively on an alumni website about BigBasket’s services and
products, this won more buyers. Word-of-mouth marketing was important and approximately 45 per cent
of customers came through references, while 20 to 30 per cent came through online searches.48
Thus, the
customer acquisition cost49
was very low compared to other online grocery retailers or e-retailers. Taking
advantage of low acquisition costs, BigBasket was able to offer timely price promotions and discounts,
which were the most important promotional tools for modern grocery retailers. Thus, BigBasket’s
customer acquisition strategies were on par with those of modern grocery retailers.
CUSTOMER CENTRISM
BigBasket had a customer-centric philosophy. Hence, it operated seven days a week and accepted orders
from customers 24 hours per day. Delivery was made in four time slots — Slot 1: 7-9:30 a.m. (Mumbai,
Bangalore and Hyderabad); Slot 2: 10-12:30 p.m. (Mumbai, Bangalore and Hyderabad); Slot 3: 4.30-7
p.m. (Mumbai), 5-7.30 p.m. (Bangalore), 4-6.30 p.m. (Hyderabad); and Slot 4: 7:30-10 p.m. (Mumbai
and Bangalore) and 7-9.30 pm (Hyderabad). Customers had the option of choosing one of the slots. Also,
if the order bill exceeded $16.15, then shipping was made free for customers; otherwise a nominal home
delivery charge of $0.35 was levied.50
BigBasket made special logistics arrangements to cater to spikes in demand. For example, orders booked
on weekend days were 10 per cent more compared to weekdays, so delivery provisions were made
accordingly. Likewise, the first and last weeks of a month received more orders compared to the second
and third weeks. These trends were observed because most of the customers of BigBasket were working
couples belonging to Generation Y.51
BigBasket’s product categories and SKUs were twice as many as those of any normal brick and mortar
retailer, making it a “one-stop shop” service provider.52
For example, it offered cut and peeled vegetables,
stationery, and gourmet and organic products, apart from normal groceries. A few ranges of products,
such as the gourmet or organic categories, were rarely available in modern and traditional retail stores of
India. Since the grocery business was socio-culturally sensitive, the products also varied from city to city.
Furthermore, to woo and retain customers, BigBasket provided a repeat-purchase option on its website,
where registered customers could buy the items they had ordered in their last purchase. This made
shopping even faster for customers.
The website was also user-friendly, as recognized by customers.53
Customers who were registering with
BigBasket for the first time had to pin their addresses on Google Maps and in case they were unable to do
so, the customer-friendly call centre executives, who operated between 7 a.m. and 10 p.m., guided them
through the process. In addition, the customer care representative gave complete details to the customer
regarding money-back policies in case of spoilage, breakage, leakage, missing items, late delivery, etc.
Since grocery purchases were mostly repetitive in nature, the website offered customers an option of
saving their grocery list and using it for subsequent orders. This also helped busy customers to quickly
complete the mundane task of buying groceries. One of the biggest challenges of online grocery shopping
was that it was virtual shopping and consumers were not able to physically touch and assess the quality of
products before purchasing them. In order to counter these problems, firstly, BigBasket provided
complete product details with nutritional facts, the quantity in which the product was available (e.g., a
500-gram or 1,000-gram packet), an image of the product, etc. to make the purchase easier for the
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customer. Secondly, for fruits and vegetables, which formed 20 per cent of online consumers’ shopping
baskets,54
BigBasket realized the significance of emphasizing the quality of these products and initiated
the “farm-to-home” concept. Fruits and vegetables were procured directly from farmers, rather than from
the mandis. Thus, perishables were warehoused only for a few hours. Because of this philosophy, not
only was BigBasket’s shrinkage rate very low (0.2 percent), but it was observed that on average there was
an increase of seven percentage points in a consumer’s perishable purchases. Finally, BigBasket also
ensured same-day or, at a maximum, next-day delivery. This was important, as consumers disliked
waiting for groceries. BigBasket was, in fact, so fixated on increasing its delivery speed that the delivery
boys were instructed to wear flat sandals instead of shoes, so that they could quickly take them off and
wear them again when entering and exiting the customer’s home during the delivery.
PRICING STRATEGY
The prices of vegetables and private-label brands were very competitive in comparison to those offered
by modern retail stores (see Exhibit 6). Furthermore, BigBasket wanted to provide the best-quality
products at the most competitive prices.The farm-to-home model, where fruits and vegetables were
sourced directly from farmers, assured the best quality at reasonable prices. Repeat customers of
BigBasket ordered goods on average 35 to 40 times in 2013, despite the fact that these consumers had
several other options for shopping.55
This reflected how price-sensitive consumers were loyal to
BigBasket. Like organized brick and mortar retailers, BigBasket also provided timely discounts and
coupons. For example, it accepted Sodexo coupons along with credit cards and cash as a method of
payment.
FUTURE OF BIGBASKET
According to K. Ganesh, the success of online grocery retail lay in the “effective marrying of technology,
Internet, domain knowledge and logistics.”56
It was due to this integration that BigBasket finally broke
even in Bangalore in March 2014. This breakeven in Bangalore happened when BigBasket was earning a
gross margin of 20 per cent. In this city, BigBasket registered a compound annual growth rate of 30 to 40
percent and its repeat customers made up 65 percent of its business.57
Furthermore, the average customer
bill size was $21.65, compared to $15 for a typical supermarket. This not only reflected customers’
satisfaction with BigBasket’s services, but also how efficiently it managed its operations, so that required
products were available all the time. Furthermore, amongst online e-grocery retailers, BigBasket was the
market leader with estimated revenues of $4 million, followed by Zopnow, whose revenue was
approximately $2 million, and finally by MyGrahak.58
Although BigBasket led the pure online grocery category, competitors like AaramShop, who were not
pure online retailers and had alliances with traditional Kirana stores, were expanding at a much faster rate.
Thus, AaramShop had already made its presence felt in 36 cities, while BigBasket was still struggling
with expansion in cities such as Delhi in the north and Pune in the west.59
Furthermore, as Big Bazaar, the
largest brick and mortar retailer in India, was expanding its online channel, Big Bazaar Direct, critics
were of the opinion that soon, hybrid retailers like BigBazaar would outperform pure online retailers like
BigBasket. Analysts also felt that the future of grocery retail belonged to those who had hybrid models
rather than pure online models. In international markets, hybrid players like Tesco had been more
successful. But trends were the reverse in the United States (see Exhibit 7).60
Lastly, given the thin
margins of the online grocery business, even venture capitalists remained skeptical about its profitability
in the long run. Despite these challenges and with complete optimism, BigBasket planned to expand to
other cities in India including metropolises like Delhi and Chennai by the end of 2014. It also aimed to
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earn revenues of around $56 million in fiscal year 2014–2015.61
According to Menon, such a fast
expansion was not risky, as the learning cost was zero. “You can do things at far cheaper cost in the new
city as there’s no cost of learning,” Menon said.62
He added, “The first city took up a huge amount of the
US$10 million [Series A funding], and a good chunk went into learning and trying a few things, but none
of that is required in each new city.”63
In order to accomplish its plans, in September 2014 BigBasket raised $33 million in its Series B round of
funding from Helion Advisors and Zodius Capital along with its existing investors Ascent Capital and
Lion Rock Capital.64
Would BigBasket remain ahead of the competition by growing rapidly in other
Indian cities and reporting profits across all cities of its operations, thus becoming the future of online
grocery retail in India? This was yet to be seen.
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EXHIBIT 1: AVERAGE SEARCH VOLUME FOR KEYWORDS RELATED TO ONLINE SHOPPING AND
GROCERIES IN INDIA
Source: Developed by the authors using P. Hans, “Virtual Grocer,” MoneyToday, August 2013,
http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/online-grocery-shopping-vegetables-new-trend-in-india/1/197141.html, accessed April
6, 2014.
EXHIBIT 2: CROSS-COUNTRY INTERNET PENETRATION AND ONLINE GROCERY PENETRATION
(2013)
3600
1900
1600
130013001300
1000 880 720 590 480 480 390 390 390
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
AVERAGE
SEARCH
VOLUME
KEYWORDS
84 84 86
94
91
14
9 9 11
22
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
US France Germany Holland UK
Percentage
Country
Internet Penetration (% of Total
Population)
Online Grocery Penetration (% of
Total Population)
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EXHIBIT 2 (CONTINUED): CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF OVERALL GROCERY RETAIL
MARKET AND ONLINE GROCERY RETAIL MARKET (2013)
Source:Developed by the authors using “The State of Online Grocery Retail in Europe,” SyndicatePlus, May 21, 2014,
http://syndicateplus.com/the-state-of-online-grocery-retail-in-europe, accessed October 27, 2014.
EXHIBIT 3: APPROXIMATE COST AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COST
Activity Traditional retailing (%)
Online grocery
(%)
Cost of goods sold 75 72
Operating cost 17 13
Distribution 4 6
Corporate overhead 3 3
Net profit potential 1 6
Source: J.D. Macht, “Errand Boy,” Inc., www.inc.com/magazine/19961101/1863.html, accessed May 22, 2014.
984.5
266.89 297.01
43.46
259.3
15.4 8.51 1.84 0.36 0.99
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
US France Germany Holland UK
$ Billion
Country
Overall Grocery Retail Market Size
($ Billion)
Online Grocery Retail Market Size
($ Billion)
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EXHIBIT 4: COMPARISON OF ONLINE GROCERY PLAYERS IN INDIA
Company
City/Cities
of
Operation
(India)
Type of Player
Delivery
Type
Free
Shipping
Payment Options SKUs
Available
Food
Products
LocalBanya.
com
Mumbai,
Domestic (Pure
Online)
Same
Day/
Next Day
Only for
Orders
above
$8.17
Internet Banking, Cash
on Delivery (COD), Credit
or Debit Card on
Delivery, Credit and Debit
Card Payment at
Checkout, Food Coupons
>7,000
Domestic
(Normal)
Zopnow Bangalore
Local (Pure
Online)
3 Hr. Free
Internet Banking, COD,
Credit and Debit Card
Payment at Checkout,
Food Coupons
>8,500
Domestic
(Normal;)
MyGrahak.in Delhi/NCR
Local (Pure
Online)
24Hr
(Next
Day)
Only for
Orders
above
$16.15
Internet Banking for Any
Value, COD for Orders
above $817
N/A
Domestic &
Imported
(Normal)
naturesbasket.
co.in
Mumbai,
Delhi/NCR,
Bangalore,
Hyderabad
Domestic
(Hybrid)
3 Hr/
Next Day
Only for
Orders
above
$16.15
Internet Banking, COD,
Credit and Debit Card
Payment at Checkout
N/A
Domestic
(Gourmet)
Farm2Kitchen.
com
Across the
Country
Domestic
(Hybrid)
N/A
Only for
Orders
above
$8.17
Internet Banking, Credit
and Debit Card Payment
at Checkout, Cash Cards
N/A
Domestic
(Only
Organic)
AaramShop.
com
Across the
Country (52
Cities)
Domestic
(Market-place)
Same
Day
Depends
on the
Local
Retailer
Depends on the Local
Retailer
N/A
Domestic &
Imported
(Normal)
BigBasket.
com
Mumbai,
Bangalore
Hyderabad,
Domestic (Pure
Online)
Same
Day/Next
Day
Only for
Orders
above
$16.15
COD and Card on
Delivery, Credit and Debit
Card Payment at
Checkout, Food Coupons
>10,000
Domestic &
Imported
(Normal,
Organic,
Gourmet, i.e.,
All Types of
Food)
Source: Developed by the authors from:
www.localbanya.com/delivery-details; www.localbanya.com/faq; www.localbanya.com/about-us; www.localbanya.com/;
www.zopnow.com/delivery.php#list; www.zopnow.com/delivery.php#3hour; www.zopnow.com/payments.php#delivery;
www.zopnow.com/payments.php#howdoi; http://inc42.com/buzz/hyperlocal-delivery-startups-gains-momentum-after-
zopnow-grofers-peppertap-gets-funded/; www.zopnow.com/;www.weareopen.in/Contact-Us; www.weareopen.in/24-Hours-
Dispatch; www.weareopen.in/Free-Shipping; www.weareopen.in/Cash-on-Delivery; www.weareopen.in/;
www.naturesbasket.co.in/HTML/AboutUs.aspx; www.naturesbasket.co.in/HTML/PaymentPolicy.aspx;
www.naturesbasket.co.in/index.aspx; www.farm2kitchen.com/index.php/organic-food-home-delivery-cities-
india?___store=default#.VW7DI9KqpHw; www.farm2kitchen.com/index.php/shipping-delivery?___store=default;
www.farm2kitchen.com/index.php/secure-payment-pricing?___store=default; www.farm2kitchen.com/index.php/;
https://www.aaramshop.com/aaram-shop/store-locator; www.aaramshoppro.com/2012/07/amazon-says-it-cant-scale-same-
day.html; https://www.aaramshop.com/faqs#; https://www.aaramshop.com/; http://bigbasket.com/about-us/;
http://bigbasket.com/?next=%2F, accessed May 22, 2014.
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EXHIBIT 5: USER BASE AND AVERAGE ORDER SIZE
Company City of Operation User Base
Average Order Size
($)
BigBasket.com Bangalore, Mumbai, Hyderabad 100,000 21.65
LocalBanya.com Mumbai 17,000 21.20
Zopnow.com Bangalore 25,000 21.20
Note: Data is as of April 30, 2013.
Source: Developed by the authors from http://techcircle.vccircle.com/2013/05/29/how-bigbasket-is-breaking-out-of-the-pack-
in-grocery-e-tailing-and-whats-next-on-cards/; http://bigbasket.com/in-media/in-media-11Nov13/; http://vyapaari.in/knowing-
customer-better-customer-service/; http://yourstory.com/2014/05/grocery-veggies-e-tailer-localbanya-processes-600-orders-
daily-raise-5m-soon/; http://forbesindia.com/printcontent/35899; http://retailview.in/blog/tag/zopnow/, accessed June 1, 2014.
EXHIBIT 6: PRODUCT PRICE COMPARISON OF BIGBASKET.COM WITH ORGANIZED BRICK AND
MORTAR RETAIL STORES (HYDERABAD, INDIA)
Category Item Weight/pc
Price in $ at
Organized Retail
Stores*
Price in $ at
BigBasket.com**
Fruits
Apples (Shimla) 3pc 1.96 1.60
Bananas (Robusta)Large 1kg 0.41 0.46
Oranges (Kinnow) 1 kg 0.98 0.75
Guavas 1 kg 0.65 0.65
Grapes (Bangalore) 1 kg 1.09 0.82
Figs 10 pc 1.06 0.82
Pomegranates 1 kg 3.26 2.77
Kiwis 3 pc 1.96 1.86
Strawberries 1kg 3.52 3.13
Vegetables
French Beans 1kg 0.98 0.62
Lemons 6 pc 0.29 0.34
Cucumbers 1kg 0.52 0.42
Coriander 1kg 3.43 3.43
Cauliflower 3 pc 1.57 1.22
Potatoes 1 kg 0.46 0.36
Tomatoes 1kg 0.33 0.23
Onions 1 kg 0.33 0.36
Capsicum 1kg 0.73 0.64
Cabbage 3pc 1.11 0.98
Peas 1kg 0.39 0.47
Button Mushrooms 1kg 3.26 3.26
Sweet Corn 3 pc 0.78 0.69
Carrots 1kg 0.82 0.82
Dry Fruits
Peanuts 1kg 1.96 1.89
Almonds 1kg 16.15 15.01
Cashews 1kg 14.19 12.23
Resins 1kg 7.41 7.01
Meat
Fresh Chicken 1kg 3.69 3.30
Mutton 1kg 7.88 7.81
Note: *Average price of items across three organized retail stores (Big Bazaar, Spencer and More) in Hyderabad, for a
period of seven days from May 1, 2014 to November 1, 2014.
** Average price of items atBigBasket.com (Hyderabad website), for a period of seven days from May 1, 2014 to November
1, 2014.
Source: Developed by the authors.
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EXHIBIT 7: PERFOMANCE OF HYBRID AND PURE ONLINE GROCERY RETAILERS ACROSS THE
GLOBE (2013)
Country Total
Grocery
Retail
Revenue
($
Millions)
Total
Online
Grocery
Retail
Revenue
($
Millions)
% of Online
Grocery
Retail
Revenue as
Compared to
Total
Grocery
Retail
Revenue
Total
Grocery
Retail
Revenue
(Excluding
Online
Grocery
Retail
Revenue)
($ Millions)
Grocery Retailer Type
U.S.A.
AmazonFresh 60 60 100 0 Pure Online Player
Peapod 525 525 100 0 Pure Online Player
FreshDirect 400 400 100 0 Pure Online Player
Safeway 36,139 200 0.55 35,939 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)
France
Carrefour 35,438 775 2.20 34,663 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)
GroupeAuchan 20,200 1,025 5.07 19,175 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)
U.K.
Tesco 43,579 2,500 5.74 41,079 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)
Sainsbury’s 24,632 1,000 4.06 23,632 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)
Ocado 852 852 100 0 Pure Online Player
Source: Developed by the authors using “The State of Online Grocery Retail in Europe,” SyndicatePlus, May 21, 2014,
http://syndicateplus.com/the-state-of-online-grocery-retail-in-europe, accessed October 27, 2014.
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ENDNOTES
1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in this case are not necessarily those of BigBasket.com or any of its employees.
2
D. Ganguly and D. Gupta, “Online Grocers Like Bigbasket, Satvikshop and Ekstop All Set to Make the Big Leap Home,”
The Economic Times, April 17, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-04-17/news/38616471_1_grocery-
indiatimes-shopping-bigbasket-com, accessed March 28, 2014.
3
“Chasing Profits, Kishore Biyani’s Future Group Shut 40% of Food Bazaar Stores In 2013,” The Financial Express, April 5,
2014, www.financialexpress.com/news/chasing-profits-kishore-biyanis-future-group-shut-40-of-food-bazaar-stores-in-
2013/1238493, accessed March 28, 2014.
4
R. Dharmakumar, “Groceries Online, Will It Click?” Forbes India, June 16, 2012, http://forbesindia.com/article/work-in-
progress/groceries-online-will-it-click/33064/1, accessed March 28, 2014.
5
“Trinethra Acquires Grocery Retail Chain Fabmall,” Business Line, December 22, 2004,
www.thehindubusinessline.in/2004/12/23/stories/2004122302630400.htm, accessed April 10, 2014.
6
“Trinethra: Birla’s First Retail Takeover,” The Economic Times, January 3, 2007,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-01-03/news/28401908_1_trinethra-food-retailing-retail-foray, accessed
January 31, 2015.
7
S. Srivastava, “E-Commerce Blooms with Rising Internet Penetration,” The Indian Express, December 28, 2013,
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/ecommerce-blooms-with-rising-internet-penetration/1212632, accessed April 2, 2014.
8
“Study Finds Factors That Have Changed Consumer Buying Behaviour in India,” The Times of India, February 6, 2014,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Study-finds-factors-that-have-changed-consumer-buying-
behaviour-in-India/articleshow/29962568.cms, accessed April 12, 2014.
9
“K Ganesh Invests in Local Services Delivery Platform Delyver.Com,” Reuters, June 14, 2012,
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/k-ganesh-invests-in-local-services-deliv-idINDEE85D0CN20120614, accessed April
15, 2014.
10
S. Ganguly, “E-Buying Picks Up as Indians Now Shop for Breads and Butter Online,” The Economic Times, July 4, 2013,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-07-04/news/40371791_1_indian-shopper-retailers-struggle-retail-space,
accessed April 2, 2014.
11
Tech-savvy refers to a segment of people who have a lot of knowledge about modern technology, especially computers.
Such people are highly proficient in using computers and especially the Internet. Cambridge Dictionaries Online,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/tech-savvy, accessed April15, 2014.
12
P. Bhattacharya, “The Rise of India’s ‘Neo Middle Class,’” Live Mint, December 31, 2012,
www.livemint.com/Opinion/1bdWFKo9ImvhFySfrCI3aJ/The-rise-of-Indias-neo-middle-class.html, accessed March 29, 2014.
13
“Click on That Shopping Cart,” The Hindu, January 20, 2013, www.thehindu.com/features/metroplus/click-on-that-
shopping-cart/article4323209.ece, accessed April 8, 2014.
14
All currencies are in US$ unless otherwise stated. On January 31, 2015, US$1 = INR62.10.
15
“Technology Driving Growth In Grocery E-Retailing in India,” The Economic Times, April 24, 2012,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-04-24/news/31392612_1_online-retailers-grocery-customer, accessed
March 26, 2014.
16
L.H. Harps, “Best Practices in Today’s Distribution Centre,” inbound logistics, May 2005,
www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/best-practices-in-todays-distribution-center, accessed April 9, 2014.
17
C., Guglielmo, “Can Webvan Deliver the Goods?” Inter@ctive Week, February 7, 2000, www.zdnet.com/article/can-
webvan-deliver, accessed April 16, 2014;
Both the cost of a non-automated warehouse ($4 million) and the cost of an automated warehouse ($35 million) in 2000, if
adjusted for inflation,were around $5.5 million and $48 million, respectively, in 2014 (“Inflation Calculator,” DaveManuel.com,
www.davemanuel.com/inflation-calculator.php, accesssed July 12, 2014).
18
A. Shrivastava, “Online Grocery Stores Set Their Clocks Faster,” ETRetail.com, June 5, 2014,
http://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/e-commerce/e-tailing/online-grocery-stores-set-their-clocks-
faster/36101323, accessed June 25, 2014.
19
P. Relan, “Where Webvan Failed and How Home Delivery 2.0 Could Succeed,” TechCrunch, September 27, 2013,
http://techcrunch.com/2013/09/27/why-webvan-failed-and-how-home-delivery-2-0-is-addressing-the-problems,accessed
April 23, 2014.
20
Kirana stores are small, usually family-owned shops selling groceries and other goods. Many Kirana shops sell products
other than food, such as clothing, household items, stationery, toys, tools and medicines. Small Kirana stores, which are
generally located on the corners of streets and known as katta or tapri, sell cigarettes, tobacco and tea. See
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/kirana, accessed April 20, 2014.
21
R. Kamath, “Spurred by Amazon Model, Online Supermarkets Push Ahead,” Business Standard, July 20, 2013,
www.business-standard.com/article/companies/spurred-by-amazon-model-online-supermarkets-push-ahead-
113071900746_1.html, accessed April 28, 2014.
22
Forbes India, op. cit.
23
T. Khan, “Wafer-Thin Margins,” Business Today, May 13, 2012, http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/e-grocery-start-up-
funding-in-india/1/24338.html, accessed April 18, 2014.
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24
S. Gulati, “How Bigbasket Is Breaking Out of the Pack in Grocery E-Tailing and What’s Next on Cards,” techcircle.in, May
29, 2013, http://techcircle.vccircle.com/2013/05/29/how-bigbasket-is-breaking-out-of-the-pack-in-grocery-e-tailing-and-
whats-next-on-cards, accessed April 17, 2014.
25
Forbes India, op. cit.
26
Ibid.
27
P. Abrar, “Grocery E-Tailer Bigbasket in Talks to Raise Rs 300 Crore,” The Economic Times, April 21, 2014,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-04-21/news/49290932_1_grocery-300-crore-talks, accessed June 12,
2014.
28
“Retail Operations: Six Success Factors for a Tough Market,” Ernst and Young LLP, 2013,
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Retail_Operations_-
_Six_success_factors_for_a_tough_market/$FILE/EY_Retail_Operations_-_Six_success_factors_for_a_tough_market.pdf,
accessed May 18, 2014.
29
Business Today, op. cit.
30
S. Sengupta, “Hari Menon on Taking Bigbasket to Rs 100 Crore Revenues,” BigBasket.com, July 4, 2013,
http://bigbasket.com/in-media/in-media-04jul13, accessed April 11, 2014.
31
32
V. Krishna, “Now, Add to Online Cart: Groceries,” Business World, September 29, 2012,
www.businessworld.in/news/business/internet/now-add-to-online-cart-groceries/553224/page-1.html,accessed May 23,
2014.
33
K.V. Kurmanath, “E-Commerce Site Bigbasket Bets on Technology to Cut Costs,” Business Line, May 27, 2013,
www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/info-tech/ecommerce-site-bigbasket-bets-on-technology-to-cut-
costs/article4756748.ece, accessed January 5, 2014.
34
A geocode refers to the geographic code or pin code of a city or area. Geocoding can be defined as the process of
locating points on the surface of the Earth from alphanumeric address data. See “A Flexible Addressing System for
Approximate Geocoding,”www.geoinfo.info/geoinfo2003/papers/geoinfo2003-25.pdf, accessed January 9, 2014.
35
“Interview with Hari Menon, CEO and Founder Bigbasket.Com,” Retail Angle, January 21, 2013,
www.wwww.retailangle.com/Newsdetail.asp?Newsid=4665&Newstitle=Interview_with_Hari_Menon,_CEO_and_founder_Big
basket.com, accessed April 10, 2014.
36
According to Hari Menon, CEO of BigBasket.com, “When you reach a particular volume, you move from the just-in-time
model to what is called the warehouse stocking model. That is where we are as far as Bangalore is concerned. We buy
products directly from the supplies, like Unilever and Procter & Gamble, we buy from farmers and mills and stock the
products in the warehouse. We stock a certain number of days of sales, depending on the product and sales. We are able to
set initial inventory levels and then decide what the re-ordering levels are. So it is all completely automated.” See, “Hari
Menon on taking BigBasket to Rs 100 crore revenues,” BigBasket.com, July 4, 2013, http://bigbasket.com/in-media/in-
media-04jul13/, accessed April 20, 2014.
37
“Read More on: Start-up Corner | Vipul Parekh | Hari Menon | Sushanto Mitra | Abhinay Choudhari | V S Ramesh | V S
Sudhakar,” BigBasket.com, http://bigbasket.com/in-media/in-media-11Nov13, accessed March 21, 2014.
38
M.A. Chanchani, “We Want to Scale Up Profitably: Hari Menon, CEO, BigBasket.com,” techcircle.in, March 7, 2012,
http://techcircle.vccircle.com/2012/03/07/we-want-to-scale-up-profitably-bigbasket-com-ceo-hari-menon, accessed May 10,
2014.
39
In South Asia, a mandi or sabzimandi is the name given to a wholesale market dealing with fresh fruits and vegetables.
Most towns and cities of India have one or more than mandi.
40
“Hari Menon on Taking Bigbasket to Rs 100 Crore Revenues,” BigBasket.com, op. cit.
41
R. Kamath and A. Soni, “Meet the New- Age Grocers,” The Economic Times, March 17, 2014, www.business-
standard.com/article/companies/meet-the-new-age-grocers-114031700051_1.html, accessed January 31, 2015.
42
“Grocery E-Tailer Bigbasket in Talks to Raise Rs 300 Crore,” The Economic Times, op. cit.
43
Ibid.
44
V. Minda, “BigBasket Uses AssetTrackr’s Vehicle Tracking Solution to Optimize ‘on-time’ Delivery,” AssetTrackr, July 15,
2013, www.assettrackr.com/blog/case-study/bigbasket-uses-assettrackrs-tracking-solution-to-optimize-on-time-delivery,
accessed April 24, 2014.
45
“Bangalore-Based E-Grocery Store Bigbasket.Com to Expand to Mumbai and Hyderabad,” Buzzom, July 25, 2012,
www.buzzom.com/2012/07/bangalore-based-e-grocery-store-bigbasket-com-to-expand-to-mumbai-and-hyderabad,
accessed June 14, 2014.
46
Ibid.
47
“Online Grocers Like Big Basket, Satvikshop and Ekstop All Set to Make the Big Leap Home,” The Economic Times, op.
cit.
48
“A Basket for One and All,” Business Standard, November 11, 2013, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/a-
basket-for-one-and-all-113111100012_1.html, accessed April 10, 2014.
49
The customer acquisition cost is made up of the resources that a business needs to acquire one more additional
customer. The CAC approximates all the sales and marketing communication costs to acquire an individual customer. See
www.forentrepreneurs.com/startup-killer/, accessed April 20, 2014.
50
BigBasket.com, http://bigbasket.com, accessed April 20, 2014.
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51
Millennials, or the Millennial Generation, also known as Generation Y, are a demographic cohort. There are no precise
dates for when the generation starts and ends. Commentators use beginning birth years from the early 1980s to the early
2000s. See www.generationy.com/definition/, accessed April 20, 2014.
52
“Grocery E-tailer BigBasket.com Raises $10M from Ascent Capital,” techcircle.in, March 5, 2012,
http://techcircle.vccircle.com/2012/03/05/grocery-e-tailer-bigbasket-com-raises-10m-from-ascent-capital,accessedMay10,
2014.
53
“Testimonials from Our Customers,” BigBasket.com, http://bigbasket.com/customer-speak, accessed April 12, 2014.
54
A. Chandr, “Reliving a Bigger, Better Dream,” The Indian Express, May 25, 2013,
www.newindianexpress.com/cities/bangalore/Reliving-a-bigger-Better-dream/2013/05/25/article1605148.ece, accessed April
12, 2014.
55
“Just One Click to Fill the Fridge,” The Times of India, November 8, 2012,
http://mobilepaper.timesofindia.com/mobile.aspx?article=yes&pageid=8&sectid=edid=&edlabel=BGMIR&mydateHid=02-11-
2012&pubname=Mirror+-+Bangalore&edname=&articleid=Ar00800&publabel=MM, accessed May 31, 2014.
56
“Tutorvista Founders to Invest in Bigbasket.Com and 3 Other Ecommerce Verticals,” IndiaDigitalReview.com, January 16,
2012, www.indiadigitalreview.com/news/k-ganesh-meena-ganesh-invest-bigbasketcom-and-3-other-ecommerce-verticals,
accessed May 22, 2014.
57
58
“Zopnow Takes a Crack at Online Grocery,” IBN Live, August 30, 2013, http://ibnlive.in.com/news/zopnow-takes-a-crack-
at-online-grocery/418386-55.html, accessed July 1, 2014.
59
“Big Basket Approaching Break Even in Bangalore; Looking to Raise INR 200 Cr; Awaiting PM’s Approval,” iamwire, June
17, 2014, www.iamwire.com/2014/06/big-basket-approaching-break-bangalore-raise-inr-200-cr-awaiting-pms-approval,
accessed July 1, 2014.
60
M. Raskino, “Safeway to Adopt British Tesco’s Successful E-Grocery Model,” Gartner, July 3, 2001,
https://www.gartner.com/doc/334191/safeway-adopt-british-tescos-successful, accessed April 14, 2014.
61
R. Kamath and A. Soni, “Meet the New-Age Grocers,” Business Standard, March 17, 2014, www.business-
standard.com/article/companies/meet-the-new-age-grocers-114031700051_1.html, accessed June 12, 2014.
62
M. Sharma, “Indian Online Grocery Startup Plans $15M Expansion across Nation,” ZDNet, April 26, 2013,
www.zdnet.com/in/indian-online-grocery-startup-plans-15m-expansion-across-nation-7000014504, accessed May 7, 2014.
63
Ibid.
64
“Bigbasket Raises Rs 200 Cr,” Business Standard, September 15, 2014, www.business-
standard.com/article/companies/bigbasket-raises-rs-200-cr-114091400782_1.html, accessed September 16, 2014.
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