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APIDays Paris 2019
2019/12/10
RASP for APIS and Microservices
Who am I?
Jean-Baptiste Aviat
CTO & CO-FOUNDER AT SQREEN
EX APPLE RED TEAM
Email jb@sqreen.com
Twitter @JbAviat
The world is moving towards
microservices
Monoliths
4
Monolith
DB1
DB2
• Huge
• Complex
• Highly coupled
Hard to scale:
• Distribute work across teams
• Evolve
Microservices
5
DB
DB
DB
Stream
DB
Ingestion
Monitoring
Auth
Configuration
Worker
Analytics
• Lightweights
• Independents
• Simplers
• Specialized
• 1 team = 1 service
Many things change:
• Logging
• Monitoring
• Debugging
• …
Monoliths: how to protect?
6
Monolith
DB1
DB2
W
A
F
• 1 entry point.
• Perimeter protection is
possible.
Security on a microservice
architecture
In-App WAF
User Monitoring
Content Security Policy
Driver specific protections
What is RASP?
8
Sits inside the application
Combines several protection layers
Usable at scale:
• Self configures
• Automatically updates
• Actionable, developer friendly
reports
Business logic monitoring
Business logic monitoring
Ingestion
Monitoring Auth
Configuration
Worker
Analytics
Legacy WAF
Limited to the perimeter.
• The protection is applied to
each service
• Each service provides
insights about the whole
architecture
Ingestion
Monitoring Auth
Configuration
Worker
AnalyticsRASP
Ingestion
Monitoring Auth
Configuration
Worker
AnalyticsRASP
• The protection is applied to
each service
• Each service provides
insights about the whole
architecture
• Decisions can be made
about any part of the whole
Microservices security checklist
Single Microservice
• Each has the same security challenges
than a monolith
• No input should be trusted
• Check client authentication &
authorisation for each action
(= zero trust)
• Monitor vulnerabilities and attacks
12
Microservice Infrastructure
• Cryptographically secure service to
service communications
• Trace requests origins towards the
network’s edge
• Leverage your business logic when
blocking attacks
• Consolidate security logs & monitoring
Security: zoom on a single
microservice
Risks on one microservice
• TL; DR: Same than monoliths.
• OWASP Top 10 (top 10 most common vulnerabilities)
• Business logic issues
• Remember: we broke a monolith apart.
• Trust mutual communications.
14
One service security = as critical as the whole
2 key characteristics of a microservice:
• Low coupling
• Reusability (by other teams = services)
Consequences:
• Inputs shouldn’t be trusted
• Security controls need to happen at
each service level
15
Microservice
Async workers matter too!
16
DB
DB
Stream
Ingestion
Monitoring
Auth
Configuration
Async
worker
Analytics
DB
DB
They can be exploited
in several ways.
Exploited flaws can
allow to query other
services in the
network.
Microservice observability
The code
• Vulnerable packages
• New routes
• Vulnerable functions
The business logic
• Who are my clients / my servers
• Am I performing business sensitive operations?
• Personal information flowing in my code
The users
• Account theft attacks
• User performing attacks
17
New route detected: /user/:user_id/export
users.rb:88
Committed by jon.hopkins on 01.03.2018
SQL injection blocked
authorization.mycompany.com
Framework: Gin 1.5.0
Databases: PostgreSQL, MongoDB
New Go 1.13 service detected: “Authorization”
Security: the whole
infrastructure
Monitor what’s deployed
19
Attacks: trace them back to the attacker
20
DB
DB
DB
Stream
DB
Ingestion
Monitoring
Auth
Configuration
Worker
Analytics• Attack blocked on a
nested service
• Need to be traced
back to the external
attacker
21
•Apply cryptography
•Mutual authentication
Bound to a channel:
✅ Analytics → Auth
❌ Analytics → Configuration
Zero trust:
Authentication & authorisation
per service
Service to service communications
DB
DB
DB
Stream
DB
Ingestion
Monitoring
Auth
Configuration
Worker
Analytics
How to respond to attacks in
a microservice architecture?
Block the actor at the edge
23
DB
DB
DB
Stream
DB
Ingestion
Monitoring
Auth
Configuration
Worker
Analytics
Blocked actors are fully
isolated
But errors are
dramatics
❌
❌
❌
Block only sensitive services
24
Bad actor detected:

hacker@somedomain.com
Prevent access to services:
Analytics, Auth
• Some sensitive
services are denied
• Best effort to keep
providing functionality
to the blocked actor
DB
DB
DB
Stream
DB
Monitoring
Auth
Configuration
Worker
Analytics
❌❌
❌
❌
Decrease rights of a given actor
25
DB
DB
DB
Stream
DB
Monitoring
Auth
Configuration
Worker
Analytics
Bad actor detected:

hacker@somedomain.com
—> Deny all further

authorisations
• Fine grained approach
• Depends on business logic
• Prevent only some
business sensitive actions
• Best to keep providing
some level of service
Questions?
Lexicon
SSRF: vulnerability that can allow to query internal micro services
RCE: outcome of some vulnerabilities exploitation. Allows to query
internal micro services.
East/West: service to service communications
North/West: external world to service communications
OWASP top 10: top 10 most common vulnerabilities
mTLS: two ways cryptographic authentication
Micro Perimeter: perimeter of 1 micro service
ALTS: Application Layer Transport Security
27

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APIdays Paris 2019 - RASP for APIs and Microservices by Jean-Baptiste Aviat, Sqreen.io

  • 1. APIDays Paris 2019 2019/12/10 RASP for APIS and Microservices
  • 2. Who am I? Jean-Baptiste Aviat CTO & CO-FOUNDER AT SQREEN EX APPLE RED TEAM Email jb@sqreen.com Twitter @JbAviat
  • 3. The world is moving towards microservices
  • 4. Monoliths 4 Monolith DB1 DB2 • Huge • Complex • Highly coupled Hard to scale: • Distribute work across teams • Evolve
  • 5. Microservices 5 DB DB DB Stream DB Ingestion Monitoring Auth Configuration Worker Analytics • Lightweights • Independents • Simplers • Specialized • 1 team = 1 service Many things change: • Logging • Monitoring • Debugging • …
  • 6. Monoliths: how to protect? 6 Monolith DB1 DB2 W A F • 1 entry point. • Perimeter protection is possible.
  • 7. Security on a microservice architecture
  • 8. In-App WAF User Monitoring Content Security Policy Driver specific protections What is RASP? 8 Sits inside the application Combines several protection layers Usable at scale: • Self configures • Automatically updates • Actionable, developer friendly reports Business logic monitoring Business logic monitoring
  • 10. • The protection is applied to each service • Each service provides insights about the whole architecture Ingestion Monitoring Auth Configuration Worker AnalyticsRASP
  • 11. Ingestion Monitoring Auth Configuration Worker AnalyticsRASP • The protection is applied to each service • Each service provides insights about the whole architecture • Decisions can be made about any part of the whole
  • 12. Microservices security checklist Single Microservice • Each has the same security challenges than a monolith • No input should be trusted • Check client authentication & authorisation for each action (= zero trust) • Monitor vulnerabilities and attacks 12 Microservice Infrastructure • Cryptographically secure service to service communications • Trace requests origins towards the network’s edge • Leverage your business logic when blocking attacks • Consolidate security logs & monitoring
  • 13. Security: zoom on a single microservice
  • 14. Risks on one microservice • TL; DR: Same than monoliths. • OWASP Top 10 (top 10 most common vulnerabilities) • Business logic issues • Remember: we broke a monolith apart. • Trust mutual communications. 14
  • 15. One service security = as critical as the whole 2 key characteristics of a microservice: • Low coupling • Reusability (by other teams = services) Consequences: • Inputs shouldn’t be trusted • Security controls need to happen at each service level 15 Microservice
  • 16. Async workers matter too! 16 DB DB Stream Ingestion Monitoring Auth Configuration Async worker Analytics DB DB They can be exploited in several ways. Exploited flaws can allow to query other services in the network.
  • 17. Microservice observability The code • Vulnerable packages • New routes • Vulnerable functions The business logic • Who are my clients / my servers • Am I performing business sensitive operations? • Personal information flowing in my code The users • Account theft attacks • User performing attacks 17 New route detected: /user/:user_id/export users.rb:88 Committed by jon.hopkins on 01.03.2018 SQL injection blocked authorization.mycompany.com Framework: Gin 1.5.0 Databases: PostgreSQL, MongoDB New Go 1.13 service detected: “Authorization”
  • 20. Attacks: trace them back to the attacker 20 DB DB DB Stream DB Ingestion Monitoring Auth Configuration Worker Analytics• Attack blocked on a nested service • Need to be traced back to the external attacker
  • 21. 21 •Apply cryptography •Mutual authentication Bound to a channel: ✅ Analytics → Auth ❌ Analytics → Configuration Zero trust: Authentication & authorisation per service Service to service communications DB DB DB Stream DB Ingestion Monitoring Auth Configuration Worker Analytics
  • 22. How to respond to attacks in a microservice architecture?
  • 23. Block the actor at the edge 23 DB DB DB Stream DB Ingestion Monitoring Auth Configuration Worker Analytics Blocked actors are fully isolated But errors are dramatics ❌ ❌ ❌
  • 24. Block only sensitive services 24 Bad actor detected:
 hacker@somedomain.com Prevent access to services: Analytics, Auth • Some sensitive services are denied • Best effort to keep providing functionality to the blocked actor DB DB DB Stream DB Monitoring Auth Configuration Worker Analytics ❌❌ ❌ ❌
  • 25. Decrease rights of a given actor 25 DB DB DB Stream DB Monitoring Auth Configuration Worker Analytics Bad actor detected:
 hacker@somedomain.com —> Deny all further
 authorisations • Fine grained approach • Depends on business logic • Prevent only some business sensitive actions • Best to keep providing some level of service
  • 27. Lexicon SSRF: vulnerability that can allow to query internal micro services RCE: outcome of some vulnerabilities exploitation. Allows to query internal micro services. East/West: service to service communications North/West: external world to service communications OWASP top 10: top 10 most common vulnerabilities mTLS: two ways cryptographic authentication Micro Perimeter: perimeter of 1 micro service ALTS: Application Layer Transport Security 27