This order grants various defendants' motions to dismiss a relator's amended complaint alleging violations of the Indiana False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act. The court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the relator's claims under the public disclosure bar of the act because the allegations are based on information disclosed in responses to the relator's public records requests, which qualify as "reports" under the act. The court also finds that the relator has not established that he has direct and independent knowledge of the information independent of the public disclosures. Therefore, the relator's claims are dismissed.

1. STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
)SS: CIVIL DIVISION NUMBER FIVE
COUNTY OF MARION ) CAUSE NUMBER 49D05-2007-PL-022005
STATE OF INDIANA, ex rel. )
JAMES HOLDEN, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v )
)
ICE MILLER, LLC, OLD NATIONAL )
BANCORP, BMO HARRIS BANK, N.A., )
FIFTH THIRD BANK, INDIANA, )
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., )
PNC BANK, N.A., BANK OF NEW )
YORK MELLON CORP., WELLS )
FARGO BANK, N.A., HUNTINGTON )
NATIONAL BANK, PUBLIC TRUST )
ADVISORS, LLC, KELLY MITCHELL, )
In her individual capacity, JILLEAN )
BATTLE, in her individual capacity, )
CAITLIN LARSON, in her individual )
Capacity, RYAN LOCKE, in his individual )
Capacity, MICHAEL FRICK, in his )
Individual capacity, KIMBERLY LOGAN, )
In her individual capacity, and CYNTHIA )
BARGER, in her individual capacity, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IND. TRIAL RULES
12(B)(1) AND 12(B)(6)
On January 21, 2022, the Defendants filed various joint and individual motions to dismiss
the Relator’s Amended Complaint. On May 16, 2022, the Relator, James Holden, filed his
consolidated response to the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. On June 30 and July 1, 2022, the
Defendants filed joint, individual and supplemental reply briefs in support of their motions to
dismiss. On July 22, 2022, the Court convened a hearing on the motions and took the matter
under advisement. The parties stipulated that the time limits imposed upon the Court to rule

2. shall not apply pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 53.1(B)(2). The Court then ordered the parties to
submit proposed orders within 45 days of the date of the hearing.
The Court, after having received and reviewed the submissions of and hearing arguments
from the parties and being duly advised in the premises, now issues the following order.
I. BACKGROUND
Relator James Holden worked for the Indiana Treasurer of State (“Treasurer”) until
November 2014, when Defendant Kelly Mitchell took office as Treasurer. Am. Compl. ¶ 24.
After being let go, Relator filed a wrongful termination lawsuit against the Treasurer. Id. ¶¶ 25-
27. In discovery in that case, Relator obtained a copy of a services contract between the
Treasurer and Defendant Ice Miller that did not appear to have been approved by the State
Budget Agency, the Indiana Department of Administration, and the Indiana Attorney General’s
Office. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. According to Relator, the services contract thus ran afoul of Indiana’s
Financial Reorganization Act (“FRA”), Ind. Code § 4-13-2-14.1(a). Id. ¶ 29.
After settling his employment action, Relator examined the Indiana Transparency Portal
and then submitted public records requests to the Treasurer under the Indiana Access to Public
Records Act (“IAPRA”) for all contracts executed during Treasurer Mitchell’s term. Id. ¶¶ 34-
35. In written responses to the IAPRA requests, Relator obtained copies of the “Business
Defendants’”1
various services contracts with the Treasurer. Id. ¶ 35. He contends these
documents showed that the Business Defendants’ contracts with the Treasurer were executed
without “the approval of the State Budget Agency, the Indiana Department of Administration
and the Indiana Attorney General’s Office, as required by Ind. Code § 4-13-2-14.1(a).” Id.
1
The Business Defendants include law firm Ice Miller LLP (“Ice Miller”); banking institutions BMO Harris Bank,
N.A. (“BMO Harris”), Fifth Third Bank, Indiana (“Fifth Third”), JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMorgan”), PNC
Bank, N.A. (“PNC”), Bank of New York Mellon (“BNYM”), Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), The
Huntington National Bank (“Huntington”); Old National Bank (“Old National”, which filed separately but joined in
the Business Defendants’ briefing); and investment advisor Public Trust Advisors LLC (“PTA”).

3. Relator alleges that these contracts are therefore void, and that every payment claim submitted to
the State in conjunction with these contacts was a false claim under the Indiana False Claims and
Whistleblower Protection Act (“IFCA”), Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 638-39.
Relator filed his Complaint in this action on July 2, 2020, and an Amended Complaint on
December 15, 2021. He asserts that the Business Defendants violated Ind. Code §§ 5-11-5.5-
2(b)(1), (2) by submitting false records or statements to obtain payment of false or fraudulent
claims. Relator also contends that the Individual Defendants2
violated the IFCA by causing the
Business Defendants to submit false claims. And, he asserts a claim under the IFCA’s
conspiracy provision, Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-2(b)(6), alleging that the Business Defendants
conspired with the Individual Defendants in submitting purportedly false claims.
The Business Defendants jointly moved to dismiss Relator’s claims under Ind. Trial Rule
12(B)(1) for lack of jurisdiction under the public disclosure bar of the IFCA and for failure to
state a claim under Ind. Trial Rules 12(B)(6) and 9(B). Certain Business Defendants filed
separate motions to dismiss and/or supplemental briefs addressing discrete issues.3
The
Individual Defendants joined in the Business Defendants’ motion and also filed a separate
motion to dismiss under Ind. Trial Rules 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6).
2
The Individual Defendants include Kelly Mitchell, Jillean Battle, Ryan Locke, Michael Frick, Kimberly Logan,
and Cynthia Barger. Relator named Caitlin Larson as an additional defendant but never served her with the
Complaint or Amended Complaint.
3
Old National Bank joined in the Business Defendants’ motion but also filed a separate motion to dismiss; JP
Morgan joined in the Business Defendants’ motion and filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the
Business Defendants’ motion, focusing principally on the inapplicability of the FRA under these circumstances,
including that any alleged payments made by the Treasurer to JPMorgan with respect to deposit accounts were in
accordance with law; and Huntington National Bank filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the Business
Defendants’ motion. Each of the preceding Business Defendants filed supplemental reply briefs. Fifth Third Bank,
Indiana also filed a supplemental reply brief. These motions are premised upon the same legal theories discussed
herein and are granted on the same grounds.

4. II. ANALYSIS
A. Relator’s claims against all Defendants fail as a matter of law
1. The IFCA
The IFCA permits citizens to bring civil false claims lawsuits on behalf of the state in
exchange for a percentage of any recovery. See Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-1 et seq.; United States ex
rel. Martinez v. Rosenberg, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97763, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2016); State
ex rel. Harmeyer v. Kroger Co., 114 N.E.3d 488, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“Harmeyer II”). In
relevant part, the IFCA imposes liability on any “person who knowingly or intentionally: (1)
presents a false claim to the state for payment or approval; (2) makes or uses a false record or
statement to obtain payment or approval of a false claim from the state;” or (3) conspires with
another to violate the statute. Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-2(b)(1), (2), (7).
The IFCA is based upon the Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), codified at 31 U.S.C. §§
3729 – 3733. Because the IFCA mirrors the FCA “in all material respects,” courts assess
liability under the IFCA the same way they do under the federal law. Kuhn v. Laporte Cty.
Comprehensive Mental Health Council, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68737, at *7-8 n.1 (N.D. Ind.
Sep. 4, 2008); see also Harmeyer II, 114 N.E.3d at 492; O’Shell v. Cline, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
192776, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 20, 2013); Doe v. Houchens Indus., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2403,
at *4-5 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2015).
2. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Relator’s Claims
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction here because Relator’s claims run afoul of the
IFCA’s “public disclosure bar,” which states in relevant part:
A court does not have jurisdiction over an action brought under section 4 of this
chapter [providing for qui tam claims by private relators on behalf of the State] if
the action is based upon information contained in:

5. (1) a transcript of a criminal, a civil, or an administrative hearing;
(2) a legislative, an administrative, or another public report,
hearing, audit, or investigation; or
(3) a news media report;
unless the person bringing the action has direct and independent knowledge of the
information that is the basis of the action, and the person bringing the action has
voluntarily provided this information to the state.
Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-7(f).4
This provision plainly states that the Court “does not have
jurisdiction” if Relator’s claims are based on certain sources of information and do not arise from
the Relator’s “direct and independent knowledge.” See id.5
The application of the public disclosure bar under the IFCA is a matter of first
impression. Federal courts apply the FCA’s analogous public disclosure bar by determining (1)
whether there was a disclosure of information through one of the categories of sources specified
in the statute, (2) whether the allegations in the complaint are based upon the information
disclosed, and (3) whether the relator is an original source. See, e.g., Bellevue v. Universal
4
The IFCA’s public disclosure bar is virtually identical to a prior version of the FCA’s public disclosure bar. Until
2010, the FCA provided that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the
public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government [sic] Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)
(2009). “Original source” was in relevant part defined as an “individual who has direct and independent knowledge
of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action.” Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B). The FCA’s public disclosure bar was amended in 2010.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2020). The IFCA has not been modified and still tracks the prior version of the FCA.
For this reason, the Court finds federal law construing this earlier version of the FCA’s public disclosure bar
persuasive.
5
The public disclosure bar prohibits “parasitic” lawsuits based, even in part, on information or transactions that are
already in the public domain. See United States ex rel. J. Cooper & Assocs., Inc. v. Bernard Hodes Grp., Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 2d 225, 235 n.10 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The FCA’s [public disclosure bar] precludes suits by ‘individuals who base
any part of their allegations on publicly disclosed allegations.’”) (quoting United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning
Research Corp., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 28, 34 (D.D.C. 1999)). “The public disclosure bar is designed to prevent
lawsuits by private citizens in such situations because ‘[w]here a public disclosure has occurred, [the government]
authority is already in a position to vindicate society’s interest, and a qui tam action would serve no purpose.’”
Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 913 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States ex rel. Feingold
v. Administar Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2003)).

6. Health Servs. of Hartgrove, Inc., 867 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1284
(2018). [R]elator bears the burden of proof at each step of the analysis.” Id. (quotations omitted).
The Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction because Relator’s claims fall within the public
disclosure bar. Relator’s allegations are based upon information that has been disclosed in a
manner that triggers the bar. Consistent with the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court, the
government’s written responses to a public records act request, along with the records produced
in conjunction therewith, qualify as “reports” in accordance with the plain meaning of that term
as used in both the FCA and the IFCA. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk,
563 U.S. 401, 410-11 (2011); see also United States ex rel. Green v. Serv. Cont. Educ. &
Training Tr. Fund, 843 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[R]eadily accessible websites” also
constitute public disclosures under the FCA).6
First, under Indiana law (like federal law), the ordinary meaning of the word “report”
controls, and that meaning encompasses the response to Relator’s IAPRA requests. Compare
NIPSCO Indus. Grp. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 100 N.E.3d, 234, 242 (Ind. 2018) (“When
interpreting a statute, we presume the legislature uses undefined terms in their common and
ordinary meaning.”) (citation omitted) with Schindler, 563 U.S. at 407 (“ʻWhen terms used in a
statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.’”) (quoting Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995)). A “report” is “‘something that gives information,’”
Schindler, 563 U.S. at 407, and a response to an IAPRA request falls within this definition.
6
In briefing, Relator argued that the public disclosure bar did not apply since he learned of the Ice Miller agreement
through a deposition, not through a public records request. As noted herein, claims based even partly on public
disclosures are jurisdictionally barred, and Relator here admits that his allegations are based in part (if not in full) on
information he obtained through public records requests. Regardless, information learned in a deposition is also
considered to be publicly disclosed for FCA purposes. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1157 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that “hearing” should be
defined broadly under the public disclosure bar to include information disclosed in depositions); United States ex
rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamente, P.A. v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990, at *11 (E.D.
La. May 22, 1992) (holding that information obtained in discovery was publicly disclosed “because there is a
presumption of public access to discovered materials”).

7. Second, Relator bases his allegations on the information that he received in response to
public records requests under the IAPRA.7
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-35; see also Opposition at 6.
Further, the Court has reviewed the responses and documents Relator claims he received through
his IAPRA requests, and which are attached to the Business Defendants’ Memorandum of Law
in Support of their Motion to Dismiss. The Court finds that these documents constitute “reports”
under Schindler and operate as public disclosures that bar Relator’s claims.8
Third, Relator has not established that he “has direct and independent knowledge of the
information that is the basis of the action” and “has voluntarily provided this information to the
state.” Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-7(f). Relator does not claim any direct or independent knowledge
here, and his allegations concern events that occurred after he left the State’s employ. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 34-35. Thus, Relator is not an original source. See United States ex rel. Atkinson v.
Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[R]eliance solely on ‘public
disclosures’ . . . is always insufficient . . . to confer original source status . . . .”); see also
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 475 (2007) (finding that a relator who was
no longer employed at the time in question could not have direct and independent knowledge of
the information that was the basis of his claims).
Relator’s claims are therefore dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction under Ind.
Trial Rule 12(B)(1).9
7
The public disclosure bar only applies to private causes of action where, like here, both the State Attorney General
and Inspector General investigate the claim and decline to intervene. Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-7(a), (f) (detailing the
public disclosure bar’s application to qui tam claims by private relators on behalf of the State).
8
Relator asks this Court to ignore the Supreme Court’s holding in Schindler, citing to minor differences in the
statutory wording of the IFCA and FCA’s public disclosure bars. But these differences are immaterial to the present
analysis, and do not warrant a different analysis of the IFCA than the one performed by the Supreme Court in
Schindler with respect to the FCA.
9
Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-7(d) provides an alternate basis to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to the Individual
Defendants. This provision denies jurisdiction over “an action” brought against state officers or employees “if the
action is based on information known to the state at the time the action was brought.” Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-7(d).

8. 3. Relators Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
Even if the Court had jurisdiction over Relator’s claims, they still would be dismissed
under Ind. Trial Rule 9(B) and 12(B)(6). Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) requires dismissal if Relator
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court is obligated to “view the
pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every reasonable inference
construed in the nonmovant’s favor.” Ankeny v. Governor of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d 678, 680 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009). But the “court need not accept as true any conclusory, non-factual assertions or
legal conclusions.” Id. at 681.
Ind. Trial Rule 9(B) requires that fraud claims under the IFCA be pled with particularity.
Harmeyer II, 114 N.E.3d at 492. “In order to allege fraud sufficiently, the pleadings must state
the time, the place, the substance of the false representations, the facts misrepresented, and
identification of what was procured by fraud. . . . A pleading which fails to comply with the
special requirements of Ind. Trial Rule 9(B) does not state a claim upon which relief can be
granted . . . .” Kapoor v. Dybwad, 49 N.E.3d 108, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
a. The Office of Treasurer of State is not an agency of the Executive Branch
that subjects it to the Financial Reorganization Act.
Relator fails to state a claim that arises under the IFCA. Relator’s IFCA claim is
premised on Relator’s assumption that the Financial Reorganization Act of 1947 (the “FRA”)
binds the Treasurer in the exercise of her constitutional and statutory duties. He contends that all
invoices submitted by the Business Defendants for payment pursuant to agreements for banking,
investment, and legal and consultation services are false claims because the Treasurer failed to
obtain signatures of the Indiana Department of Administration (“IDOA”) and the State Budget
Director before engaging the services of the Business Defendants. Relator’s assumption is
Because this action is based on information in State reports in response to Relator’s IAPRA requests, and not on his
direct and independent knowledge, Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-7(d) also precludes jurisdiction.

9. wrong. As a matter of law, the Court holds that the Treasurer is not bound by the FRA when
conducting the State’s banking business.
Issues related to the applicability of a statute are purely legal and appropriate for
resolution on a motion to dismiss. The power, right, and duty of the Treasurer to enter into
agreements for depository and custodial services with the State’s monies and investment assets is
a legal matter. It is indisputably within the Treasurer of State’s constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction to obtain the services provided by each of the Business Defendants. The dispositive
issue concerns whether the contracts entered into by Treasurer of State with the Business
Defendants are void and can form the ground for a false claims act complaint. The Court
determines that the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Individual Defendants, which sets out the
contentions of the Treasurer of State by her and for the collective benefit of her current and
former employees in the Office of Treasurer of State, resolves all claims against all parties as a
matter of law
Ind. Code § 4-13-2 et seq., the Financial Reorganization of 1947 (“FRA”), does not apply
to the Treasurer of State. Executive power resides exclusively in the Governor. The Secretary,
Auditor, and Treasurer of State are “ministerial officers” who do not have executive power, but
who perform executive functions. Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 666-674, 35 N.E.2d 270, 289-
293 (1941). As a separately elected officer, the Treasurer operates independently of the Governor
to perform duties enjoined on her by the Legislature.
“The treasurer of state is responsible for the safekeeping and investment of moneys and
securities paid into the state treasury.” Ind. Code § 4-8.1-2-1. “The treasurer of state shall
receive, account for, and pay over all moneys which are required by law to be paid into the state
treasury.” Ind. Code § 4-8.1-2-2. In addition, the legal custodian of securities owned by the State

10. or quasi-State entities is the Treasurer. Ind. Code § 5-13-10.5-5. The Treasurer is subject to
investigation and arrest by the Governor and Auditor. Ind. Code § 4-8.1-2-13. The Treasurer
must report to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Budget Director, the Legislative Council, and
Legislative Services Agency every year. Ind. Code § 4-8.1-2-14. The Treasurer is solely
responsible for the performance of duties that enjoined to her by law. The Treasurer must be able
to perform her duties without interference by an officer under the Governor’s control.
The definition of “agency” specifically exempts the Treasurer and other separately
elected officers from by Ind. Code § 4-3-6-2(1). Exemption of the separately elected officers
from the definition of “agency” is explicit, so there is no need to specifically reference it within
the FRA. It is fundamental to statutory construction “to give a statute practical application by
construing [a statute] in a way favoring public convenience and avoiding absurdity , hardship,
and injustice,” and “statutes concerning the same subject matter must be read together to
harmonize and give effect to each. ” Merritt v. State, 829 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ind. 2005). Tucker
stands for the principle that there cannot be a reading of the FRA that includes the power to
transfer, abolish, consolidate or coordinate, or authorize a delegation of any of the separately
elected state officers or their functions (See, Ind. Code § 4-3-6-2(2)). It, therefore, follows that
neither do FRA provisions requiring signatures from officials outside the Treasurer’s direct
control. Relator’s claims rely on the Court holding that Treasurer of State is an agency. Such a
reading of Indiana law would be incorrect.
In addition, more specific and more recent statutes vest power to make contracts like the
ones at issue exclusively in the Treasurer. 10
Cf. Houtchens v. Lane, 206 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ind.
10
See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 4-8.1-2-1, 4-8.1-2-2 (“The treasurer of state is responsible for the safekeeping and
investment of moneys and securities paid into the state treasury”; and [t]he treasurer of state shall receive, account
for, and pay over all moneys which are required by law to be paid into the state treasury.”) (emphasis added); Ind.
Code § 5-13-6-1(b) (stating that funds collected by state officers “shall be deposited with the treasurer of state, or an

11. 1965) (“Where there is a conflict between statutes, the more recent statute is controlling and a
specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter.”). The
Indiana Attorney General has opined that other state agencies have no power over banking, and
that “the authority to contract for banking services for state agencies rests exclusively with the
treasurer of the state.”11
Ind. Op. Atty. Gen. 2004-5, at 7 (May 7, 2004) (emphasis added),
https://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/files/2004-05.pdf. More generally, the Attorney General
explained that “the general procurement statutes do not ‘apply to . . . an investment of public
funds’” because “the legislature has reserved that activity to the constitutionally created office of
the treasurer of state.” Id. at 6-7 (quoting Ind. Code § 5-22-1-3(a)(5)).
The Court holds that the underlying contracts are valid, not void, because they are within
the statutory powers enjoined to the Treasurer of State. Because the underlying contracts are
valid, all of Realtor’s IFCA claims against all of the defendants fail as a matter of law.
approved depository selected by the treasurer of state” and “[t]he treasurer of state shall deposit daily on business
days of the depository all public funds deposited with the treasurer of state”) (emphasis added); Ind. Code § 5-13-
10-1 (“Upon determination by the treasurer of state that cash of the state on deposit is in excess of its anticipated
daily cash requirements, the treasurer of state may deposit the excess funds in deposit accounts of designated
depositories.”) (emphasis added); Ind. Code § 5-13-6-1(a) (explaining that to ensure the “safekeeping” of state
funds, “[a]ll public funds paid into the treasury of the state … shall be deposited not later than the business day
following the receipt of funds on business days of the depository in one (1) or more depositories in the name of the
state … by the officer having control of the funds.”); Ind. Code § 5-13-10.5-17 (permitting payments of “a service
charge to the depository in which the funds are deposited” and the “service charge may be paid by direct charge to
the deposit or other account or in any other manner mutually agreed upon by the investing officer and the
depository”); Ind. Code § 5-13-9-11 (establishing a local government investment pool (TrustINdiana) “within the
office and custody” of the Treasurer and authorizing the Treasurer to “administer the investment pool,” “contract
with . . . attorneys . . . and other finance and investment professionals” and establish policies “to ensure the efficient
administration of and accounting for the investment pool”).
11
Defendant JPMorgan’s supplemental briefs discuss the relevant statutes and guidance in the context of the specific
claims for payment discussed in and incorporated into the Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 227-87, 294.
Relator failed to respond meaningfully to any of JPMorgan’s arguments in its opening supplemental brief and
waived any future argument on those issues. See Essroc Cement Corp. v. Clark Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 122
N.E.3d 881, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (failure to cite relevant authority and develop argument results in waiver).
Moreover, the Court agrees with JPMorgan’s arguments as stated in its supplemental briefs and at oral argument that
the banking service charges Relator alleges were incurred and paid by the Treasurer were made in accordance with
the law. The alleged charges were made in connection with deposit accounts pursuant to Ind. Code § 5-13-10.5-17
and thus fall outside of the FRA’s contract approval requirements.

12. b. Relator Fails to Allege Falsity
Even if FRA did apply to the Treasurer so as to require the signature requirement,
Relator’s claims still fail as a matter of law. Under Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-2(b)(1), Relator must
identify a “false claim” and explain how the claim is false. See United States ex rel. Kelly v.
Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 333 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he FCA ‘attaches liability, not to the
underlying fraudulent activity or to the government’s wrongful payment, but to the ‘claim for
payment.’” (quoting Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir.
2011)). Under Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-2(b)(2), Relator must additionally identify a false record or
statement that is made or used to obtain payment or approval of the false claim. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Kester v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3d 242, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(explaining that “the plaintiff must plead both a false statement and a corresponding false claim”
for the federal FCA’s equivalent provision); United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15754, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (same). Furthermore, Ind. Trial Rule
9(B) requires a relator to allege “the substance of the false representations [and] the facts
misrepresented.” Harmeyer II, 114 N.E.3d at 493 (quoting Cont’l Basketball Ass’n v. Ellenstein
Enters., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 134, 138 (Ind. 1996)).
Relator fails to allege that any of the Defendants made, or caused to be made, any false
statements or false claims, which are “the sine qua non of a False Claims Act violation.” United
States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). Relator
appears to assert an “implied certification theory” of liability, as discussed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex. rel. Escobar, but he has failed to adequately
plead such a theory. See 579 U.S. 176, 187, 190 (2016) (requiring that a defendant make
“specific representations” that omit “its violations of statutory, regulatory, or contractual

13. requirements,” thereby rendering its “representations misleading with respect to the goods or
services provided”).
Relator fails to allege any “specific representations” made by any Business Defendant
about its services and merely identifies the dates and amounts of invoices or account statements,
analyses, or summaries. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48-107, 121-39, 153-79, 193-216, 227-87, 294,
308-22, 330-37, 348-98, 415-60, 475-92. The lack of any allegations that any of the Business
Defendants made any specific representations about the services provided is alone fatal to
Relator’s clams. Escobar, 579 U.S. at 190 (a defendant must do more than “merely request
payment”; rather, he must make “specific representations about the goods or services provided”).
In addition, Relator does not allege that the Business Defendants failed to provide
valuable services to the State, and Relator takes no issue with the amounts the Business
Defendants billed for those services. Instead, Relator’s claims rest on his allegations that the
contracts giving rise to those charges did not comply with the FRA.
The Business Defendants have no duty under the FRA to inquire, much less to ensure,
that the Treasurer complies with the FRA to obtain whatever internal State contract approvals are
necessary under the law. Thus, the Business Defendants did not make impliedly false statements
by submitting claims for payment. See United States v. Boston Sci. Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 152765, at *29-30 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 2021) (because relator failed to identify any “legal
authority that imposed a duty on [the defendant] to report,” there “could not have been a
misrepresentation by omission”); United States ex rel. McGinnis v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89167, at *22-23 (C.D. Ill. July 1, 2014) (“[F]alse claims theories—premised
upon implicit certification without a citation to a duty to certify or affirmatively state compliance
with an applicable rule or regulation—have been squarely rejected by several Courts of

14. Appeals.”); see also United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818, 824
n.4 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a statutory violation does not give rise to FCA liability in the
absence of a legally false certification).
Relator fails to identify a violation of law, much less any actual false statement or claim
(implied or otherwise) necessary to support his claims.12
Relator has therefore failed to allege
the required element of falsity as to any Defendant, and his claims must be dismissed.
c. Relator’s Claims Fail for Lack of Scienter
Even if Relator could point to some false statement, he has identified no facts sufficient
to suggest that any Defendant acted with scienter. A defendant violates the IFCA only when its
conduct is “knowing,” meaning it had “actual knowledge” of the falsity of the claim or statement
in issue, or acted in “deliberate ignorance” or with “reckless disregard” of the truth or falsity of
the claim or statement. Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-1(4); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1). The IFCA “is not a
strict liability statute,” nor is it enough for Relator to assert that Defendants were negligent or
made mistakes; rather, he is “required to ‘allege some factual basis from which scienter could be
established.’” State ex rel. Harmeyer v. Kroger Co., No. 49D05-1405-PL-016895, slip op. at 9
(Marion Cnty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 22, 2018) (“Harmeyer I”) (quoting United States ex rel. Roberts v.
Lutheran Hosp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15791, at *26-29 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 1998)).
Here, Relator contends that Defendants “acted with reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the claims based on non-compliance with the FRA,” Opposition at 17, but he fails to
allege facts describing any Defendant’s knowledge of a purported false claim or statement.13
12
Ind. Trial Rule 9(B) provides an alternate basis for dismissing under T.R. 12(B)(6) as the Amended Complaint
does not otherwise satisfy the level of specificity required to bring a false claim cause of action against the
Defendants. See Harmeyer II, 114 N.E. 3d at 494.
13
Relator refers to unnamed subsidiary(ies) of Old National allegedly making contracts with unnamed state agencies
that are not at issue in this case. This allegation has no nexus to any knowledge of Old National as it pertains to this
case. A subsidiary’s knowledge cannot be imputed to a parent, and Relator has not specified the nature of those
contracts or the parties to them, giving the Court no basis to reach any other conclusion.

15. Even if he had, he still fails to allege reckless disregard because “[a] defendant who acted under
an incorrect interpretation of the relevant statute or regulation did not act with reckless disregard
if (1) the interpretation was objectively reasonable and (2) no authoritative guidance cautioned
defendants against it.” United States ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc., 9 F.4th 455, 464 (7th Cir.
2021) (stating that “[t]he objectively reasonable inquiry hinges on the text of the statute or
regulation that the defendant allegedly violated and as such is a question of law.”) (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Allergan, Inc., 746 F. App’x 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2018); Lupinetti
v. Exeltis USA, Inc., 2021 WL 5407424, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2021) (applying objectively
reasonable analysis on a motion to dismiss). The statutory provisions discussed above can be
reasonably construed to provide the Treasurer with exclusive authority to enter into the contracts
at issue, and the Attorney General’s opinion states that “the general procurement statutes do not
‘apply to . . . an investment of public funds’” because “the legislature has reserved that activity to
the constitutionally created office of the treasurer of state.” Ind. Op. Atty. Gen. 2004-5, at 6-7.
Relator identifies no contrary guidance, and as a matter of law, he cannot satisfy the standard for
reckless disregard. See Schutte, 9 F.4th at 468 (explaining that it is not “possible for defendants
to actually know that they submitted a false claim” when “the defendant has a permissible
interpretation of the relevant provision” and no “authoritative guidance . . . warned it away from
that reading.”).14
Finally, Relator necessarily alleges the Individual Defendants “knowingly induced” the
Business Defendants to enter into contracts that did not comply with the FRA. E.g., Am. Compl.
¶ 638. In other words, Relator contends the Treasurer knew about the contracts at issue and the
absence of FRA approvals before it paid any claims. “If the government knows and approves of
14
Relator has failed to respond substantively to the Treasurer’s constitutional defense and separation of powers
argument. The fact that the Treasurer has presented an objectively reasonable interpretation would also negate the
scienter required for liability under the IFCA.

16. the particulars of a claim for payment before that claim is presented, the presenter cannot be said
to have knowingly presented a fraudulent or false claim.” See United States ex rel. Durcholz v.
FKW Inc., 189 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 1999); Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795,
809-10 (D. Utah 1988) (“Liability under the FCA is based on the concept of fraud. . . . [I]f the
complaint itself alleges that the government knew of those very facts or characteristics which
allegedly make the claim false, no claim has been stated.”). Thus, Relator has failed to allege the
falsity or scienter necessary under the IFCA to state claims.
d. Relator’s Conspiracy Claims Fail
In the absence of viable underlying IFCA claims, Relator’s conspiracy count necessarily
fails as well. See United States ex rel. Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP v. BASF Corp., 929 F.3d
721, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining that an FCA conspiracy claim cannot stand alone; it
requires a viable substantive FCA claim); Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228,
1234 (Ind. 1994) (Under Indiana law, “civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action.”).
III. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, and upon review of the parties’ briefs and the oral argument
regarding same, the Court GRANTS the Business Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Ind. Trial Rules 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6); GRANTS Old National’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Ind. Trial Rules 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6); and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Relator’s
Amended Complaint by the Individual Defendants under Ind. Trial Rules 12(B)(1) and
12(B)(6).15
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Relator’s claims
are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
15
It is unnecessary for the Court to address any other issues raised by the parties in their submissions as the Court
has provided ample basis upon which Relator’s claims against the Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice.

17. SO ORDERED this 19th
day of October 2022.
John M. T. Chavis, II
John M. T. Chavis, II, Judge
Marion Superior Court
Civil Division Number Five
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