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Modern DDoS and
DDoS SSL Attacks


Michael Soukonnik
Radware FSU

November 2012
DDoS – regular service ?




                    Slide 2
Legends vs. Reality
Size does not matter!
• Reality:
   – Most organization may never experience an intense attack
   – Less intensive application attacks can cause more damage than network
     attacks




            76 percent of the
         attacks surveyed were
              under 1Gbps




                                                                             Slide 4
Are we really protected from DDoS?



                                        30%
         27%
                24%



Internet link
                Stateful devices are
is saturated
                vulnerable to DDoS
(27% of the              8%
                (36% of the attacks)           5%
  attacks)                      4%




                                                     Slide 5
1 fail is enough!



                                     Large-volume network flood attacks
                                                           Network scan
                                                                Intrusion
                                                                Port scan
Radware security incidents report 2011:                 SYN flood attack
• More than 70% of Radware reported cases in 2011 (e.g., Sockstress)
                              “Low & Slow” DoS attacks
  involved at least 3 attack vectors
                                        Application vulnerability, malware
• Attackers use multi-vulnerability attack campaigns
  making mitigation nearly impossible and slow Application DoS attacks
                                   High
                                          Web attacks: XSS, Brute force
                                             Web attacks: SQL Injection




                                                                    Slide 6
Network Attack and Application Attack Coexist




                                          Slide 7
Mapping Security Protection Tools

DoS Protection
Behavioral Analysis         Large volume network flood attacks
IPS
IP Rep.                                          Network scan
WAF                                                    Intrusion
                                                      Port scan
                                              SYN flood attack
                      “Low & Slow” DoS attacks (e.g.Sockstress)
                              Application vulnerability, malware
                         High and slow Application DoS attacks
                                 Web attacks: XSS, Brute force
                                    Web attacks: SQL Injection




                                                           Slide 8
Radware answers
                -
Attack Mitigation System (AMS)
Network & data center security: mapping the
                                                                   technologies

DefensePro
 Dynamic signature in 18 sek !!!
 IPS
 DoS Protection
 NBA
 Anti Trojan, Anti Phishing



         IPS         DoS Protection            NBA            Reputation
                       Signature                               Engine
      Signature        Detection              User
      Detection                             Behavioral
                       Behavioral            Analysis          Anti Trojan,
        Stateful        Analysis                              Anti Phishing
      Inspection                            Application
                       Rate-based           Behavioral
      Rate-based                             Analysis
                      SYN Cookies
AMS Protection Set

DoS Protection
• Prevent all type of       Reputation Engine
  network DDoS attacks      • Financial fraud
                              protection
                            • Anti Trojan & Phishing




IPS
• Prevent application
  vulnerability exploits


                           NBA
WAF
                           • Prevent application
• Mitigating Web             resource misuse
  application threats
                           • Prevent zero-minute
  and zero-day attacks
                             malware


                                               Slide 11
The Competitive Advantage: Performance Under Attack



                  Attack traffic does    Device handles attack
12 Million        not impact             traffic at the expense
   PPS            legitimate traffic     of legitimate traffic!
  Attack
  Traffic


                                           Attack
                                           Attack
Multi-Gbps                               Multi-Gbps
 Capacity                                 Capacity
                                           Attack
Legitimate                               Legitimate
                                           Traffic
  Traffic                                  Traffic
                                          + Attack




DefensePro                    Other Network Security Solutions

                                                            Slide 12
NY Stock Exchange Under Attack – Multi Vector Attack
                               Uniquely capable to withstand the sophistication and scale of recent attacks




Attack Vector            Dates (~)                              Attack Peak   Protection Mechanisms

Fragmented UDP Flood     Low & slow 11/10/2011 1 AM
                         10/10/2011 11PM-                       95 Mbps       BDoS
                                                                10K PPS       DoSS
LOIC UDP
                       And Intrusions…
                         10/10/2011 4 AM                        50 Mbps       BDoS
                         10/10/2011 8 PM- 11 PM                 5K PPS        Signatures
                                                                              DoSS
TCP SYN Flood            11/10/2011 1:40 PM                     13.6 Mbps     BDoS
                                                                24K PPS       DoSS
R.U.D.Y                  10/10/2011 4 PM                        2.1 Mbps      Signature
                                                                0.7K PPS
LOIC TCP                 10/10/2011 11 PM- 11/10/2011 3:30 AM   500 Kbps      Signatures
                                                                0.2K PPS
Mobile LOIC              10/10/2011 6 PM- 8:30 PM               86 Kbps       Signature
                                                                13 PPS
#RefRef                  10/10/2011 9:45 PM                     Few packets   Signature

                                                                                                      Slide 13
Network Attack and Application Attack Coexist




                                         Slide 14
SSL Attacks


SSL services are extremely vulnerable to DDoS attacks
• SSL Handshake Flood
  Establishing a secure connection requires 15 times more processing on the
  server than on the client, opening multiple sessions quickly exhaust the server’s
  resources


• SSL Renegotiation Flood
  Client asks for key replacement during existing session, similar effect on the
  server, could be blocked on the server side.
  Popular since the release of THC-SSL-DOS last October


• HTTPS Flood
  Exhausting the web application running on top of the secure session




                                                                                   Slide 15
Leading Israeli bank under attack
           December 11, 2011
Israeli Bank: Course of Events


15:05 PM- Attack Starts
HTTPS Flood
• 167 attackers open up to 70 SSL sessions per second
• Established sessions contains HTTP requests for the secure login page
    GET /InternalSite/CustomUpdate/eBank_Login.asp
•   Constant User-Agent: wget
                                                     Attack Peak Measurements
•   Service became unavailable in seconds
                                                     •200 Mbps
                                                     •360K Concurrent Connections
15:22 PM- ERT Initiated                              •1100 CPS


16:10PM- Attack blocked, service revived
• ODS-3 deployed on-site, no SSL protection
• High rate allows easy identification of attackers
• Custom Signature suspend sources sending more than 5 “SSL Client
   Hello” per second


                                                                              Slide 17
AMS Encrypted Attack Mitigation
          Solution
AMS Encrypted Attacks Mitigation

                                                                     Application “cookie”   L7 ASIC Regex
                                                                           engines              engine


   Once anTraffic Anomalies
            attack is detectedNetwork-Based 3 main security actions that are done on each
                               there are DoS        Application-Based DoS “Directed” Application DoS

   client who tries to connect to the protected server(s): and SSL) Attacks (Clear and SSL)
                Floods             Attacks         Attacks (Clear



  Clear Attack Protection – DefensePro “authenticates” the source through a “safe-reset
     SYN                                                                           Clear
        cookie” mechanism, verifying the validity of the source IP and its TCP/IP stack.
      HTTP Signature– DefensePro receives the decrypted 1st HTTP client request from the
                                                                “Authenticated”
Encrypted engine and applies application layer signatures. This is done in order to Encrypted
        SSL                                                         clients
        remove the “Directed HTTP DoS attacks” that can only be mitigated by pre-defined
        or custom signatures.
                   Packet anomalies, Behavioral DoS &




                                                                     Encrypted
                      Black & white lists   TCP cookie engines




                                                                                 Clear
     Web Cookie Challenge – In case the client “passes” the HTTP filter check, DefensePro
      generates a Web cookie challenge (302 or JS challenge) that is encrypted and
      returned to the client by the Alteon SSL engine. Client responses are decrypted
                                   Client-side
                                termination point
      and sent to the DefensePro, which validates the response. A client that responds
      correctly is “authenticated” (application level “authentication”) and forced to open
                                                        Alteon’s SSL    SSL certificates,
      a new connection directly to the protected server.
                                                    Acceleration Engine not used for legal sessions




                                                                                                            Slide 19
AMS Encrypted Attacks Mitigation


   AMS- Protecting the HTTPS service

    Attack                Target          Protection
    Network Floods        TCP Service     SYN Cookies
                                          BDoS
    SSL Floods            SSL Service     Signatures
                                          SSL Mitigation*
    Application Floods    Web Service     SSL Mitigation
                                          Signatures

* SSL Mitigation expands the resources- Alteon can handle up to 45K
  SSL sessions
• Banks and other financial institutions not able to export certificate
  (MSSP and such)
• Unique solution that requires two devices, will be merged in the future
  to 1 box


                                                                        Slide 20
Sample of AMS Security Customers
        Financial Services                          Retail Services




Government, Healthcare & Education           Carrier & Technology Services




                                                                             Slide 22
Summary




• Radware AMS protects against all types of DDoS attacks and application attacks

• Radware AMS first of all enables legal users to work under attack

• AMS can protect against SSL DDoS without using legal SSL certificates

• AMS works automatically – within 18 seconds from an attack raise dynamic signature
starts to work against the attack. No human interference usually required

• In case of very complicated attack Radware Emergency Response Team
can be involved on line

• ERT enables counter attack against DDoS sources




                                                                               Slide 23
Thank You
www.radware.com

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DSS ITSEC Conference 2012 - Radware - Protection from SSL DDOS Attacks

  • 1. Modern DDoS and DDoS SSL Attacks Michael Soukonnik Radware FSU November 2012
  • 2. DDoS – regular service ? Slide 2
  • 4. Size does not matter! • Reality: – Most organization may never experience an intense attack – Less intensive application attacks can cause more damage than network attacks 76 percent of the attacks surveyed were under 1Gbps Slide 4
  • 5. Are we really protected from DDoS? 30% 27% 24% Internet link Stateful devices are is saturated vulnerable to DDoS (27% of the 8% (36% of the attacks) 5% attacks) 4% Slide 5
  • 6. 1 fail is enough! Large-volume network flood attacks Network scan Intrusion Port scan Radware security incidents report 2011: SYN flood attack • More than 70% of Radware reported cases in 2011 (e.g., Sockstress) “Low & Slow” DoS attacks involved at least 3 attack vectors Application vulnerability, malware • Attackers use multi-vulnerability attack campaigns making mitigation nearly impossible and slow Application DoS attacks High Web attacks: XSS, Brute force Web attacks: SQL Injection Slide 6
  • 7. Network Attack and Application Attack Coexist Slide 7
  • 8. Mapping Security Protection Tools DoS Protection Behavioral Analysis Large volume network flood attacks IPS IP Rep. Network scan WAF Intrusion Port scan SYN flood attack “Low & Slow” DoS attacks (e.g.Sockstress) Application vulnerability, malware High and slow Application DoS attacks Web attacks: XSS, Brute force Web attacks: SQL Injection Slide 8
  • 9. Radware answers - Attack Mitigation System (AMS)
  • 10. Network & data center security: mapping the technologies DefensePro  Dynamic signature in 18 sek !!!  IPS  DoS Protection  NBA  Anti Trojan, Anti Phishing IPS DoS Protection NBA Reputation Signature Engine Signature Detection User Detection Behavioral Behavioral Analysis Anti Trojan, Stateful Analysis Anti Phishing Inspection Application Rate-based Behavioral Rate-based Analysis SYN Cookies
  • 11. AMS Protection Set DoS Protection • Prevent all type of Reputation Engine network DDoS attacks • Financial fraud protection • Anti Trojan & Phishing IPS • Prevent application vulnerability exploits NBA WAF • Prevent application • Mitigating Web resource misuse application threats • Prevent zero-minute and zero-day attacks malware Slide 11
  • 12. The Competitive Advantage: Performance Under Attack Attack traffic does Device handles attack 12 Million not impact traffic at the expense PPS legitimate traffic of legitimate traffic! Attack Traffic Attack Attack Multi-Gbps Multi-Gbps Capacity Capacity Attack Legitimate Legitimate Traffic Traffic Traffic + Attack DefensePro Other Network Security Solutions Slide 12
  • 13. NY Stock Exchange Under Attack – Multi Vector Attack Uniquely capable to withstand the sophistication and scale of recent attacks Attack Vector Dates (~) Attack Peak Protection Mechanisms Fragmented UDP Flood Low & slow 11/10/2011 1 AM 10/10/2011 11PM- 95 Mbps BDoS 10K PPS DoSS LOIC UDP And Intrusions… 10/10/2011 4 AM 50 Mbps BDoS 10/10/2011 8 PM- 11 PM 5K PPS Signatures DoSS TCP SYN Flood 11/10/2011 1:40 PM 13.6 Mbps BDoS 24K PPS DoSS R.U.D.Y 10/10/2011 4 PM 2.1 Mbps Signature 0.7K PPS LOIC TCP 10/10/2011 11 PM- 11/10/2011 3:30 AM 500 Kbps Signatures 0.2K PPS Mobile LOIC 10/10/2011 6 PM- 8:30 PM 86 Kbps Signature 13 PPS #RefRef 10/10/2011 9:45 PM Few packets Signature Slide 13
  • 14. Network Attack and Application Attack Coexist Slide 14
  • 15. SSL Attacks SSL services are extremely vulnerable to DDoS attacks • SSL Handshake Flood Establishing a secure connection requires 15 times more processing on the server than on the client, opening multiple sessions quickly exhaust the server’s resources • SSL Renegotiation Flood Client asks for key replacement during existing session, similar effect on the server, could be blocked on the server side. Popular since the release of THC-SSL-DOS last October • HTTPS Flood Exhausting the web application running on top of the secure session Slide 15
  • 16. Leading Israeli bank under attack December 11, 2011
  • 17. Israeli Bank: Course of Events 15:05 PM- Attack Starts HTTPS Flood • 167 attackers open up to 70 SSL sessions per second • Established sessions contains HTTP requests for the secure login page GET /InternalSite/CustomUpdate/eBank_Login.asp • Constant User-Agent: wget Attack Peak Measurements • Service became unavailable in seconds •200 Mbps •360K Concurrent Connections 15:22 PM- ERT Initiated •1100 CPS 16:10PM- Attack blocked, service revived • ODS-3 deployed on-site, no SSL protection • High rate allows easy identification of attackers • Custom Signature suspend sources sending more than 5 “SSL Client Hello” per second Slide 17
  • 18. AMS Encrypted Attack Mitigation Solution
  • 19. AMS Encrypted Attacks Mitigation Application “cookie” L7 ASIC Regex engines engine Once anTraffic Anomalies attack is detectedNetwork-Based 3 main security actions that are done on each there are DoS Application-Based DoS “Directed” Application DoS client who tries to connect to the protected server(s): and SSL) Attacks (Clear and SSL) Floods Attacks Attacks (Clear Clear Attack Protection – DefensePro “authenticates” the source through a “safe-reset SYN Clear cookie” mechanism, verifying the validity of the source IP and its TCP/IP stack. HTTP Signature– DefensePro receives the decrypted 1st HTTP client request from the “Authenticated” Encrypted engine and applies application layer signatures. This is done in order to Encrypted SSL clients remove the “Directed HTTP DoS attacks” that can only be mitigated by pre-defined or custom signatures. Packet anomalies, Behavioral DoS & Encrypted Black & white lists TCP cookie engines Clear Web Cookie Challenge – In case the client “passes” the HTTP filter check, DefensePro generates a Web cookie challenge (302 or JS challenge) that is encrypted and returned to the client by the Alteon SSL engine. Client responses are decrypted Client-side termination point and sent to the DefensePro, which validates the response. A client that responds correctly is “authenticated” (application level “authentication”) and forced to open Alteon’s SSL SSL certificates, a new connection directly to the protected server. Acceleration Engine not used for legal sessions Slide 19
  • 20. AMS Encrypted Attacks Mitigation AMS- Protecting the HTTPS service Attack Target Protection Network Floods TCP Service SYN Cookies BDoS SSL Floods SSL Service Signatures SSL Mitigation* Application Floods Web Service SSL Mitigation Signatures * SSL Mitigation expands the resources- Alteon can handle up to 45K SSL sessions • Banks and other financial institutions not able to export certificate (MSSP and such) • Unique solution that requires two devices, will be merged in the future to 1 box Slide 20
  • 21. Sample of AMS Security Customers Financial Services Retail Services Government, Healthcare & Education Carrier & Technology Services Slide 22
  • 22. Summary • Radware AMS protects against all types of DDoS attacks and application attacks • Radware AMS first of all enables legal users to work under attack • AMS can protect against SSL DDoS without using legal SSL certificates • AMS works automatically – within 18 seconds from an attack raise dynamic signature starts to work against the attack. No human interference usually required • In case of very complicated attack Radware Emergency Response Team can be involved on line • ERT enables counter attack against DDoS sources Slide 23