This document summarizes a lecture given by Attila Antal on nationalist populism and illiberalism in Hungary. The lecture covered: 1. The historical and political context behind nationalist-populist regimes in Eastern Europe, including failures of liberal democracy and neoliberalism. 2. The political theories that inform Viktor Orbán's regime in Hungary, drawing from Carl Schmitt's work on the political and concepts like leader democracy. 3. How Orbán established and stabilized an "illiberal democracy" system in Hungary from 2010 onward through constitutional changes, new electoral laws, and the creation of permanent enemies. 4. Potential responses from the EU through mechanisms like the EU Rule

1. May 9, 2018 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM | Lecture at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
Centre for European Studies | Discovery Centre, Room 482 MacOdrum Library
NATIONALIST POPULISM AND
ILLIBERALISM IN HUNGARY
Historical Origins, Current Trajectories
Attila Antal
Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Law Institute of Political Science
and
Institute of Political History Social Theory Research Group
antal.attila@ajk.elte.hu
antal.attila@polhist.hu

2. Overview
1. The Situation Behind the
Nationalist-Populist Regimes in
Eastern Europe
2. The Political Theories of the
Orbán’s Regime
3. The System of “National
Cooperation” (from 2010)
4. What Is to Be Done?

3. 1. THE SITUATION BEHIND THE NATIONALIST-
POPULIST REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE

4. 1. The Situation Behind the Nationalist-Populist
Regimes in Eastern Europe
1.1 The Tradition of Right-wing Nationalism and
Authoritarianism
• Interwar Christian-nationalist era, illiberal and neo-
feudal
• Horthy’s regency: authoritarian democracy
• Functioning multi-party parliament, significant
restrictions on civil liberties and political pluralism
• Permanent political enemies
• Biopolitical attributes
• Racist and chauvinist character

5. 1. The Situation Behind the Nationalist-Populist
Regimes in Eastern Europe
1.2 The Collapse of “Hyper-Liberal” Democracy
The Failure of Legal Constitutionalism
• 1990s: strong consensus about the
liberal democracy
• Legal constitutionalism as the main
paradigm
• Constitution of 1989 and the
jurisdiction of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court
• Rule of law (prevailing over the
politics)
• Courts can overrule the will of the
people incorporated in parliamentary
decision-making processes
The Failure of Neoliberalism: The
Politics of Anger
• 2000s: radical critique of liberal
democracy
• Reformist anger
• Losers of democracy
• The fundament of liberal democracy is
the (neoliberal) capitalism
• Béla Greskovits (1998): “the end of
patience” in Eastern Europe
• David Ost (2005): the anger of
“wrathful people” and the populist
turn

6. 1. The Situation Behind the Nationalist-Populist
Regimes in Eastern Europe
1.3 The New Era of Populism
• The historical-theoretical
complex of populism and
nationalism
• Radical and to centrist populist
parties
• Populist entrepreneurs (Stanley,
2017)
• On the demand-side (Inglehart–
Norris, 2016)
• Economic inequality perspective
• Cultural backlash thesis

7. 1. The Situation Behind the Nationalist-Populist
Regimes in Eastern Europe
1.3 The New Era of Populism
• The historical-theoretical
complex of populism and
nationalism
• Radical and to centrist populist
parties
• Populist entrepreneurs (Stanley,
2017)
• On the demand-side (Inglehart–
Norris, 2016)
• Economic inequality perspective
• Cultural backlash thesis
(Inglehart–Norris, 2016)

8. 1. The Situation Behind the Nationalist-Populist
Regimes in Eastern Europe
1.3 The New Era of Populism
• The historical-theoretical
complex of populism and
nationalism
• Radical and to centrist populist
parties
• Populist entrepreneurs (Stanley,
2017)
• On the demand-side (Inglehart–
Norris, 2016)
• Economic inequality perspective
• Cultural backlash thesis

9. 1. The Situation Behind the Nationalist-Populist
Regimes in Eastern Europe
1.3 The New Era of Populism
(Inglehart–Norris, 2016)

10. 2. THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE ORBÁN’S
REGIME

11. 2. The Political Theories of the Orbán’s Regime
Leader
democracy
Political
constitutionalism
Carl
Schmitt

12. 2. The Political Theories of the Orbán’s Regime
2.1 The Renaissance of Carl Schmitt
• The dangers of depolitization
• The Concept of the Political
• Liberalism denies the relevance of the political and the
concept of the enemy
• Depoliticize and neutralize all the political conflicts and
turn political battles towards legal and economical fields
• Sovereign is he who decides on the exception

13. 2. The Political Theories of the Orbán’s Regime
2.2 Leader Democracy
• An elitist political theory (Körösényi, 2005)
• Leadership and representative government
• Political leaders are active political representatives
• The executive power, especially the Prime Minister
represents

14. 2. The Political Theories of the Orbán’s Regime
2.3 Political Constitutionalism
• Constitution can only exist in the circumstances of
politics
• Democracy needs to be defended against judicial review
(Bellamy–Beaher, 1993)
• Recognize the core element of the concept of the
Political
• The rule of the politics, rule by law

15. 3. THE SYSTEM OF “NATIONAL COOPERATION”
(FROM 2010)

16. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.1 The Creation of a New System: Making a Political
Constitution
• Election in 2010: the Fidesz-KDNP gained two-
thirds majority
• The program of Orbán’s government: The Program
of National Cooperation
• Destroying the former constitutional system: the
main target is the Constitutional Court
• New Constitution: Fundamental Law (adopted
April 2011)
• Six Amendments
• Highly debated: Fourth Amendment (criminalizing
homelessness, enable the government to ban
campaign ads, university restrictions)
2010

17. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.1 The Creation of a New System: Making a
Political Constitution
• Critiques by Venice Commission and European
Union
• The European Parliament adopted Tavares
Report (2013)
• Hungary violated the fundamental European
precepts of liberty, democracy and the rule of
law
• Copenhagen dilemma: lacks effective
monitoring and sanctioning tools concerning
fundamental European values
2010

18. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.2 The Stabilization of the Regime Under the New
Electoral Law
• A new two-third majority: Fidesz–KDNP won
66.8 percent of the 199 seats
• Because of the new Electoral Law: (1) the
strengthening the individual electoral-districts;
(2) „super-majority” because of the fragmentary
votes; (3) right to vote Hungarian minorities in
neighboring countries
• Pre-dominant party system: only a strong-
central party can realize the advantages ensured
by the system
2014
2010

19. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.3 How can the Orbán-regime Be Characterized?
Elitist Nationalist Populism
Populism and
Repoliticisation/
The Theoretical
Pillars
Populism as
Political
Communication
and Strategy
Populism
as Political
Logic and
Discourse
Populism
as an
Ideology
Populism as
a Form of
Democracy
Need for
Repoliticisation
Elitism
Carl Schmitt’s
Theory + - - - + +/-
Leader Democracy - - - - + +
Political
Constitutionalism + + - - + -

20. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.3 How can the Orbán-regime Be Characterized?
Illiberal Democracy
• „Trademark” of the Orbán regime
• Danger: discredit liberal democracy (Zakaria,
1997)
• Populism and illiberalism goes hand in hand
(Krastev, 2007)
• The Orbán’s regime can be described with one
of the degraded concepts of democracy,
(illiberal democracy) (Bozóki–Hegedűs, 2018)
• Hungary belongs in the category of non-
democratic regimes, to hybrid regimes
2014
2010

21. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.3 How can the Orbán-regime Be Characterized?
Hybrid Regimes
• Ever-widening grey zone between liberal
democracy and dictatorship
• Adjectives to describe forms of authoritarianism
• Populism pushes increases the likelihood that
fragile democracies (Levitsky , 2017)
• Populism in power has significant impact on the
hybridity of political systems
2014
2010

22. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.4 The Election of 2018 and its Consequences:
The Politics of Permanent Hate
• Fidesz- KDNP alliance won its third-consecutive
two-thirds majority in 2018
Main characters
• The constant enemy creation
• Governing in the state of exception
• Nationalism as biopolitics and civilizationism
2014
2010
2018

23. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.4 The Election of 2018 and its Consequences:
The Politics of Permanent Hate
The Constant Enemy Creation
• Anti-refugee campaign in 2015
• Biopolitical campaign
• The system requires new enemies: the
biopolitical weapon turned against Brussels,
Hungarian NGOs concerning human rights,
George Soros, and other inner enemies
2014
2010
2018

24. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.4 The Election of 2018 and its Consequences:
The Politics of Permanent Hate
Governing in the State of Exception
• The government started to use the concept
nationalist-populism to regulate the human life,
create a permanent state of exceptions
(Agamben, 2014)
• The populist hybrid regimes started to manage
the effects of the crisis made by them
2014
2010
2018

25. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.4 The Election of 2018 and its Consequences:
The Politics of Permanent Hate
Nationalism as Biopolitics and Civilizationism
• Reconfiguration of nationalism as biopolitics
and civilizationsim
• From biological racism to a “neo-racism”
(Balibar, 1991)
• State racism
• Bionationalism (Kelly, 2004)
• Nationalism shifts to »civilizationism« driven by
the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam
(Brubaker, 2017)
2014
2010
2018

26. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.4 The Election of 2018 and its Consequences:
The Politics of Permanent Hate
Nationalism as Biopolitics and Civilizationism
2014
2010
2018

27. 3. The System of “National Cooperation” (from 2010)
3.4 The Election of 2018 and its Consequences:
The Politics of Permanent Hate
Nationalism as Biopolitics and Civilizationism
2014
2010
2018

28. 4. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

29. 4. What Is to Be Done?
4.1 The Declining Hungarian
Democracy
• The Hungarian democracy has
damaged unprecedently in the
last 8 years
• Freedom House (2017)
• Transparency International
(2018)
(Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2016)

30. 4. What Is to Be Done?
4.2 What Can the EU Do?
• The EU was not capable of standing up effectively
• Very similar illiberal and unconstitutional processes have
been reinforced in Poland
• Hungary and Poland caused an internal crisis in the EU
• Lack of effective monitoring and sanctioning tools
concerning the rule of law and human rights in the case
when a state has already joined to the EU

31. 4. What Is to Be Done?
4.2 What Can the EU Do?
The Theory of Externally Constrained Hybrid Regimes
• Bozóki–Hegedűs, 2018
• The EU functions as a regime sustaining, a regime
constraining, and, last but not least, as a regime legitimizing
factor for Hungary
• The EU is not just an environment but rather as a part of
those systems
• Not enough: infringement proceedings
• Slow down and prevent the undermining of liberal
constitutionalism and the concomitant curbing of human
rights and liberties

32. 4. What Is to Be Done?
4.2 What Can the EU Do?
The Draft of the Sargentini Report
• 12 April 2018: the LIBE first exchange of views on the
situation in Hungary
• Serious concerns
• “There is a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of
the values on which the Union is founded.”

33. 4. What Is to Be Done?
4.2 What Can the EU Do?
The EU Rule of Law Mechanisms (RLM)
• “Nuclear bomb”
• Article 7(1) Treaty on the European Union
• Preventive mechanism: the Council may determine that there
is a clear risk of a serious breach of the EU values
• Sanctions procedure
• Council can suspend certain membership rights
• What kind of rights?

34. 4. What Is to Be Done?
4.3. How Can a New Democracy in Hungary Be Achieved?
• “Institutional constructions, however, will never succeed when
there is a lack of political will.” (Sargentini Report)
• The Hungarian government has already put the draft Report into its
permanent hate campaign
• A regime based on “rule of politics” cannot be defeated by “rule of
law”
• A totally redesigned political and intellectual opposition
• Anti-hegemonic structure which reveals the organic crisis of the
Orbán’s system (Gramsci, 2000)
• The responsibility of organic intellectuals

35. References
Agamben, Giorgio (2014): From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power. ROAR
Magazine, February 4, 2014. https://roarmag.org/essays/agamben-destituent-
power-democracy/
Balibar, Étienne (1991): Is There a “Neo-Racism”? In: Balibar, Étienne – Immanuel
Wallerstein (1991): Race, Nation Class: Ambiguous Identities. Translated by Chris
Turner. London: Verso.
Bellamy, Richard (2007): Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the
Constitutionality of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bellamy, Richard–Baehr, Peter (1993): Carl Schmitt and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy.
European Journal of Political Research, 23 163–185. The manuscript is available at
SSRN. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2543335
Bozóki, András – Hegedűs, Dániel (2018): An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary
in the European Union. Democratization.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1455664
Brubaker, Rogers (2017): Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist
moment in comparative perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2017
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700

36. References
European Parliament (2016): Understanding the EU Rule of Law mechanisms. Briefing,
January 2016.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573922/EPRS_BRI(20
16)573922_EN.pdf
Freedom House (2017): Country Report. Hungary. Edited by Dániel Hegedűs.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/hungary
Gramsci, Antonio (2000): The Antonio Gramsci reader: selected writings, 1916-1935. Edited
by Forgacs, David. New York: NYU Press.
Greskovits, Béla (1998): The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and
Latin American Transformations. Central European University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald - Norris, Pippa (2016): Trump, Brexit, and the rise of Populism: Economic
have-nots and cultural backlash. Paper for the presidential plenary panel on
“Legitimacy of Political Systems: System Support from Comparative Perspective”,
11.00-12.30 on Monday 25 July 2016, 24th World Congress of the International
Political Science Association, Poznan, Poland.
Kelly, Mark (2004): Racism, Nationalism and Biopolitics: Foucaultʼs Society Must Be
Defended, 2003. Contretemps 4, September 2004.
https://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/4september2004/Kelly.pdf

37. References
Krastev, Ivan (2007): The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus. Journal of Democracy, vol.
18, no. 4. 56–63.
Körösényi András (2005): Political Representation in Leader Democracy. Government and
Opposition, Summer 2005, Volume 40, Issue 3. 358–378.
Levitsky, S. (2017): Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism, Memo Prepared for “Global
Populisms as a Threat to Democracy” Conference, Stanford University, November
3-4, 2017.
On the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the
European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI)) Available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2013-0229+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
Ost, David (2005): Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe. Cornell
University Press. Ithaca, NY.
Zakaria, Fareed (1997): The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6, 22–43.

38. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!