PhD thesis comparing hydrogen and electric vehicles as competing options for the long-term decarbonisation of transport.

1.
Competing Pathways for the Decarbonisation of Road Transport:
A Comparative Analysis of Electric and Hydrogen Vehicles
A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, University of London
by
Alexandre Beaudet
July 2010
Imperial College Business School
Imperial Centre for Energy Policy and Technology
Imperial College London

2.
History suggests that the road to a firm research consensus is extraordinarily arduous.
Thomas Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962
2

3. Abstract
Both hydrogen and electric vehicles (HVs and EVs) have received widespread attention as
key options for decoupling road transport from the environmental and energy security risks
posed by climate change and oil dependency. However, considerable uncertainty remains as
to which of these technologies will succeed in the long term. This study contributes to policy
debates surrounding technological change and decarbonisation in road transport by focusing
on the role of evolutionary change processes in the development and commercialisation of
new vehicle/fuel configurations, such as technological learning effects captured in niche
markets and technology spillovers arising from unrelated sectors such as consumer
electronics and power generation.
The study draws on a mix of patent analysis, field research and extensive literature surveys
to confirm the hypothesis that EVs have greater potential to achieve market dominance, not
because of any inherent technical or environmental advantage, but because of their wider
scope to link up to such evolutionary change processes. For instance, EV infrastructure can
be expanded and optimised incrementally as the number of EVs grows, starting with the
large number of households with adequate off‐street charging facilities. In contrast, HVs
require major ‘initiating’ investments in refuelling networks with few opportunities to
leverage existing hydrogen infrastructure. The development of EVs also has greater potential
to benefit from technological linkages to power source markets such as consumer
electronics, which share a similar requirement for high energy density electricity storage,
and from niche and hybrid applications such as ‘commuter’ BEVs and PHEVs, which
incentivise market‐driven R&D and investments in the EV mobility chain. In summary, the
main factor differentiating EVs from HVs is the possibility to realise a systemic transition
through small incremental steps, without the need for major decisions or infrastructure and
technology developments to be made prior to commercialisation.
3

4. Acknowledgments
This study was made possible by generous financial support from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
A number of friends and colleagues also supported this study at various levels, such as
providing data and useful feedback on early drafts. I am especially thankful to Dr Eric
Archambeault and his team at Science‐Metrix and to Dr Jon Gibbins for their support and
advice over the past few years. Many others could be named; I am particularly grateful to:
Simon Bennett Dr Jean‐Guy Loranger
Peter Beynon Dr Karen MacDonald
Mark Bilton Patrick Maio
Dr Jim Brown Dr Zen Makuch
David Campbell Fabio Montemurro
Chiara Candelise Dr Gregory Nemet
Hannah Chalmers Dr Toshihiro Nishiguchi
Dr Ralph Clague Dr Ritsuko Ozaki
Marcello Contestabile Dr Peter Pearson
Dr Robert Gross Dr Paul Rutter
Isabelle Hanlon Paul Schnabl
Dr Srikantha Herath Yuichiro Shimura
David Joffe Jamie Speirs
Dr Takeshi Kaneda Eliane Tadros‐Rizk
Dr Michael Lampérth Hideo Takeshita
Dr Phillippe Larrue Dr Tsuyoshi Tsuru
Dr Matthew Leach Lizzy Williams
Above all, I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisors David Hart and
Andrew Davies for their extensive feedback and invaluable advice on both the structure and
contents of this thesis.
Last but not least, I want to thank my parents and (growing) extended family for their
encouragement and moral support.
4

5. Contents
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................9
1.1 Road transport and the challenge of decarbonisation ................................................ 9
1.2 Hydrogen and electric vehicles as competing options .............................................. 13
1.3 Comparing hydrogen and electric vehicles................................................................ 16
1.4 Aims and objectives of the study............................................................................... 20
1.5 Hypothesis and thesis overview ................................................................................ 21
1.6 Main data sources, methods and potential contributions ........................................ 27
2 Comparing options for road transport: Prior art .........................................................30
2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 30
2.2 Competing options for decarbonisation.................................................................... 31
2.2.1 Background......................................................................................................... 31
2.2.2 Well‐to‐wheels emissions of hydrogen and electric vehicles ............................. 37
2.3 Competing options for energy security ..................................................................... 43
2.3.1 Background......................................................................................................... 43
2.3.2 Oil supply shocks and the threat of ‘peak oil’..................................................... 44
2.3.3 Energy security impacts of hydrogen and electric vehicles ................................ 48
2.4 Competing options for market dominance ............................................................... 54
2.4.1 Technology and infrastructure requirements of hydrogen vehicles .................. 54
2.4.1.1 PEM fuel cells...................................................................................................... 54
2.4.1.2 Hydrogen storage ............................................................................................... 56
2.4.1.3 Infrastructure...................................................................................................... 59
2.4.1.4 Hydrogen vehicle futures ................................................................................... 64
2.4.2 Technology and infrastructure requirements of electric vehicles...................... 64
2.4.2.1 Batteries ............................................................................................................. 65
2.4.2.2 Infrastructure...................................................................................................... 70
2.4.2.3 Electric vehicle futures ....................................................................................... 72
2.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 74
3 Conceptual framework ...............................................................................................77
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 77
3.2 Road transport as a system ....................................................................................... 78
3.3 Key patterns in technology and infrastructure transitions........................................ 86
3.3.1 Technology ......................................................................................................... 86
3.3.2 Infrastructure...................................................................................................... 96
3.4 Evolutionary and revolutionary pathways in road transport .................................. 101
3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 105
4 Infrastructure pathways ...........................................................................................107
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 107
4.2 Hydrogen ................................................................................................................. 108
4.2.1 Hydrogen production ....................................................................................... 108
4.2.2 Decarbonisation ............................................................................................... 110
4.2.3 Hydrogen distribution....................................................................................... 113
4.2.4 Refuelling.......................................................................................................... 116
4.2.5 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 122
4.3 Electric power.......................................................................................................... 123
4.3.1 Power generation and distribution................................................................... 124
5

6. 4.3.2 Decarbonisation ............................................................................................... 127
4.3.3 Charging............................................................................................................ 129
4.3.4 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 135
4.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 137
5 Technology pathways ...............................................................................................140
5.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 140
5.2 Pathways to hydrogen vehicles ............................................................................... 142
5.2.1 Context ............................................................................................................. 142
5.2.2 Historical background....................................................................................... 144
5.2.3 Key actors in fuel cell R&D................................................................................ 147
5.2.4 Potential sources of technology spillovers ....................................................... 152
5.2.5 Potential niche and hybrid applications within road transport........................ 166
5.2.6 Summary and discussion .................................................................................. 171
5.3 Pathways to electric vehicles................................................................................... 178
5.3.1 Context ............................................................................................................. 178
5.3.2 Historical background....................................................................................... 181
5.3.3 Key actors in lithium battery R&D .................................................................... 186
5.3.4 Potential sources of technology spillovers ....................................................... 192
5.3.5 Potential niche and hybrid applications within road transport........................ 199
5.3.6 Summary and discussion .................................................................................. 210
5.4 Bibliometric analysis ................................................................................................ 217
5.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 222
6 General discussion and policy implications ...............................................................228
6.1 Introduction............................................................................................................. 228
6.2 Evolution or revolution? .......................................................................................... 229
6.3 Policies for electric vehicles..................................................................................... 237
6.4 Policies for hydrogen vehicles ................................................................................. 246
6.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 249
7 General conclusion ...................................................................................................252
7.1 Thesis overview ....................................................................................................... 252
7.2 Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research................................. 257
Appendix 1 Acronyms ....................................................................................................... 261
Appendix 2 Main characteristics of electric and hydrogen vehicles ................................. 262
Appendix 3 Definitions of Industrial sectors ..................................................................... 263
Appendix 4 List of persons interviewed ............................................................................ 264
Appendix 5 Patent research methods............................................................................... 266
References ............................................................................................................................ 279
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7. Tables
Table 1: Recent EV and HV models and prototypes of major OEMs ................................. 10
Table 2: Source and impact of ICEV tailpipe emissions ..................................................... 37
Table 3: Summary of environmental and energy security impacts of EVs and HVs .......... 75
Table 4: Summary of technical and infrastructural issues for EVs and HVs ...................... 76
Table 5: Summary of EV and HV infrastructure development pathways ........................ 138
Table 6: Leading fuel cell developers............................................................................... 151
Table 7: Potential sources of fuel cell technology spillovers ........................................... 172
Table 8: Leading battery developers ............................................................................... 189
Table 9: Potential sources of lithium battery technology spillovers ............................... 210
Table 10: Summary of HV and EV infrastructure, technology and market dynamics........ 230
Figures
Figure 1: Key components of EV and HV based mobility systems ..................................... 13
Figure 2: Dominant designs in road transport................................................................... 16
Figure 3: CO2 emissions from fuel combustion (2005) ...................................................... 32
Figure 4: Total distance travelled by automobiles............................................................. 32
Figure 5: Decarbonisation pathways compared ................................................................ 35
Figure 6: CO2 emissions of BEVs compared to FCVs under current conditions ................. 39
Figure 7: Global supply of liquid hydrocarbons from all fossil resources .......................... 47
Figure 8: The global electricity mix (2005)......................................................................... 50
Figure 9: Cost comparison of hydrogen production pathways.......................................... 60
Figure 10: Historical evolution of NiCD, NiMH and lithium‐ion batteries ........................... 66
Figure 11: Road transport as a system ................................................................................ 79
Figure 12: Geel’s multi‐level perspective on technological transitions............................... 81
Figure 13: Degrees of change in road transport.................................................................. 83
Figure 14: Experience curve for steam turbine generators................................................. 87
Figure 15: The virtuous cycle of innovation ........................................................................ 89
Figure 16: Spillovers and synergies in technology development......................................... 94
Figure 17: Exogenous and endogenous factors of technological change............................ 96
Figure 18: The evolution of gasoline distribution.............................................................. 101
Figure 19: The evolutionary trajectory of ICEVs ................................................................ 103
Figure 20: Hydrogen fuel cost as a function of station utilisation ..................................... 118
Figure 21: UK electric load profile (2007‐08)..................................................................... 125
Figure 22: Incremental build‐up scenario for EV infrastructure........................................ 136
Figure 23: Scale economies for FCV components.............................................................. 143
Figure 24: Annual public spending on hydrogen and fuel cells (2008).............................. 147
Figure 25: Fuel cell patent applications (USPTO, 2002‐2009) ........................................... 148
Figure 26: Fuel cell patents (USPTO, 1980‐2007) .............................................................. 149
Figure 27: Sectoral shares of active fuel cell patents ........................................................ 150
Figure 28: Fuel cell patent portfolios of major automotive alliances................................ 152
Figure 29: Fuel cell cost and market trajectory ................................................................. 153
Figure 30: Fuel cell CHP system suppliers in Japan (2005‐2007) ....................................... 159
Figure 31: Lithium battery module cost projections ......................................................... 180
Figure 32: Historical evolution of standard ‘18650’ lithium‐ion cells................................ 184
Figure 33: Market shares of main battery types (Japan only) ........................................... 184
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8. Figure 34: Lithium battery patent applications (USPTO, 2002‐2009)................................ 187
Figure 35: Patenting trends in battery technology (1980‐2007) ....................................... 188
Figure 36: Sectoral shares of active battery patents ......................................................... 188
Figure 37: Key relationships between OEMs and lithium battery suppliers...................... 190
Figure 38: Leading suppliers in the global lithium‐ion battery market (2009) .................. 191
Figure 39: Lithium battery market shares by application (2006, by volume).................... 193
Figure 40: Typical pack or module capacity for select battery applications...................... 195
Figure 41: Ownership cost of ICEVs and BEVs (before incentives) .................................... 207
Figure 42: On‐going and potential migration trajectories for lithium batteries................ 212
Figure 43: Fuel cells vs. batteries in terms of automotive industry patents ..................... 214
Figure 44: Sectoral shares of fuel cell and battery related patents................................... 217
Figure 45: Relative specialisation of the automotive industry in fuel cells and batteries . 219
Figure 46: Relative specialisation of select industrial sectors in fuel cells and batteries .. 219
Figure 47: Relative specialisation of select OEMs in fuel cells and batteries .................... 220
Figure 48: Positioning of leading countries in fuel cell technology ................................... 221
Figure 49: Positioning of leading countries in battery technology .................................... 222
Figure 50: Potential sources of spillovers for FCVs and BEVs ............................................ 223
Figure 51: Fuel cells vs. batteries in terms of share of USPTO .......................................... 226
Figure 52: EV and HV pathways compared ....................................................................... 231
Figure 53: Gasoline prices in the US and Europe............................................................... 241
Figure 54: Inflation adjusted historical crude oil prices..................................................... 242
Figure 55: Potential migration pathway for PEM fuel cells ............................................... 247
Figure 56: National shares of patent applications at various patent offices ..................... 269
Figure 57: False negatives and positives in patent research ............................................. 272
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9. 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Road transport and the challenge of decarbonisation
Both hydrogen and electric vehicles are widely recognised as key technological vectors for
decoupling road transport from the long‐term environmental and energy security risks
posed by climate change and oil dependency. Despite the recent economic crisis and
subsequent fall in oil prices, all of the major car manufacturers are involved in related
research, development and demonstration activity, and many are already planning to
introduce variants of these options within the next five years (Table 1). In parallel, a number
of energy suppliers, including international oil companies, industrial gas suppliers and
established power utilities, are building or planning to build hydrogen supply and/or
recharging infrastructure in collaboration with governments and other stakeholders.
Although observers disagree as to the significance of these still tentative technology and
infrastructure deployment efforts, there is increasing expectation that a major technology
transition is underway in road transport. If successful, this transition could end the long
reign of the internal‐combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) and its associated petroleum energy
infrastructure within the next few decades. Indeed, without major transformational changes
to the way motor vehicles are designed and fuelled, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from
road transport could double by 2050 (IEA, 2008a), effectively destroying any hope of
reaching the widely accepted goal of stabilising atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450‐
550ppm of CO2‐equivalent.
The objective of this thesis is to assess the relative merits of hydrogen and electric vehicles
(henceforth HVs and EVs) as competing pathways toward the goal of decarbonised mobility.1
It addresses a number of questions relating to the technical viability of these options, but
focuses on investigating technology, market and industry dynamics that could support the
development and commercialisation of EVs and HVs over a long period of time (toward
2050), such as technological learning effects captured in niche markets and technology
1
In this study, the term ‘electric vehicle’ is used an umbrella term to cover all vehicles powered fully
or partly by electricity, including battery‐electric vehicles (BEVs) and ‘plug‐in’ hybrids (PHEVs). Current
hybrids (HEVs) such as the Toyota Prius, which unlike EVs are not recharged from the grid or other
external sources, are treated as a separate category. ‘Hydrogen vehicles’ include both fuel cell
vehicles (FCVs) and hydrogen‐fuelled ICEVs, although in practice they refer to FCVs unless specified
otherwise. See Appendix 2 for a diagram explaining the different types of EVs and HVs.
9

10. spillovers arising from unrelated sectors such as consumer electronics and power
generation. Failure to understand these dynamics may have contributed to the failed
attempts to promote EVs during the 1980s and 1990s (Åhman, 2006; Calef and Goble, 2005;
Cowan and Hultén, 1996; Kirsch, 2000) and the more recent disappointments surrounding
the promotion of hydrogen and FCVs since the late 1990s (Farrell, et al., 2003; Haeseldonckx
and D’haeseleer, 2007; Victor et al., 2003).
Table 1: Recent EV and HV models and prototypes of major OEMs2
OEM group Electric vehicles Hydrogen vehicles
Toyota/Subaru Prius Plug‐in (PHEV), FT‐EV (BEV), Subaru Toyota FCHV‐adv (FCV), Daihatsu Tanto
R1e (BEV), Subaru Stella (PHEV) FCHV (FCV)
General Motors Chevrolet Volt (PHEV), Opel Ampera Chevrolet Equinox (FCV), Cadillac Provoq
(PHEV) (FCV)
Ford/Mazda/ Ford Transit Connect (BEV), Ford Escape Ford Focus (FCV), Ford Explorer (FCV),
Volvo Cars (PHEV), Volvo ReCharge (PHEV) Mazda RX‐8 Hydrogen RE (ICEV)
Volkswagen E‐Up! (BEV), Audi e‐tron (BEV), Golf Touran HyMotion (FCV), Audi Hydrogen
TwinDrive (PHEV), A1 Sportback (PHEV) A2H2 (FCV)
Renault/Nissan Nissan Leaf (BEV), Renault Z.E. (BEV) Nissan X‐TRAIL (FCV), Renault Scenic ZEV
H2 (FCV)
FIAT/Chrysler Chrysler Town & Country (BEV), Sprinter Chrysler ecoVoyager (plug‐in FCV), Fiat
(PHEV) Panda Hydrogen (FCV)
Hyundai/Kia Hyundai i10 Electric (BEV), Blue‐Will Hyundai i‐Blue (FCV), Kia Borrego (FCV)
(PHEV)
Honda Honda EV‐N (BEV) Honda FCX Clarity (FCV)
PSA Peugeot iOn (BEV), Citroën C‐ZERO (BEV) Peugeot 207 EPure (FCV), H2Origin (FCV)
Suzuki Swift (PHEV) SX4 (FCV)
Daimler Smart Fortwo EV (BEV), Blue Zero E‐Cell B‐Class F‐CELL (FCV), Citaro FuelCELL‐
Plus (PHEV) Hybrid (FCV)
BMW Mini E (BEV), BMW Vision BMW Hydrogen 7 (ICEV)
Efficientdynamics (PHEV)
Mitsubishi iMIEV (BEV), PX‐MiEV (PHEV) ‐‐‐
Motors
Source: Company press releases, motor show reports
Of course, EVs and HVs are not the only pathways available for decarbonising road transport
and/or reducing its dependence on crude oil supplies. For example, most car manufacturers
have invested considerable resources in hybrid‐electric vehicle (HEV) powertrains, which
reduce fuel consumption and per‐kilometre GHG emissions by combining electric drives with
conventional IC engines. Several OEMs are also implementing more modest changes to
2
Only the most recent and/or representative vehicles from automotive manufacturers and alliances
with over one million vehicles produced in 2008 are listed.
10

11. ICEVs such as ‘micro’ (or ‘stop/start’) hybrid systems and various improvements to
conventional gasoline and diesel engines, which can cumulatively offer significant gains in
fuel economy. However, these solutions offer only limited potential for decarbonisation due
to their continued reliance on hydrocarbon fuels as the primary source of motive power. For
example, even the most advanced hybrids only reduce per‐kilometre GHG emissions by 30‐
40%, which may not be enough to meet long‐term decarbonisation goals. What is more, the
International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that the current global car fleet of 650 million
vehicles could grow to about 1.4 billion vehicles by 2030 (IEA, 2008b), resulting in dramatic
increases in vehicle‐kilometres travelled (VKT) worldwide and offsetting any gains in fuel
economy and GHG emission reduction made through hybridisation and incremental change
pathways (Chalk and Miller, 2006; Hart et al., 2003).
Another option is to retain the basic architecture of ICEVs (and/or HEVs) while transitioning
to biofuels, which can be produced and consumed in a carbon‐neutral cycle. Technology
developments relating to cellulosic ethanol and other advanced biofuels could plausibly
support a large increase in biofuel production, eventually supplying some 30% of global fuel
demand (Koonin, 2006). However, a number of studies suggest that further expanding
biofuel production is likely to be constrained by a number of factors including competing
demands on land (Gallagher et al., 2008). Other hydrocarbon routes, such as liquid fuels
based on coal or natural gas, are hardly more promising. These fuels could help lessen and
perhaps avoid the economic and geopolitical impact of ‘peak oil’, but their high carbon
intensity makes them incompatible with climate change abatement goals (Farrell and
Brandt, 2006).
More radical options are therefore needed – solutions that make it possible to completely
disconnect road transport from its 100‐year old reliance on hydrocarbon fuels. EVs and HVs
are the most promising in this regard, as electricity and hydrogen can both be produced
from a wide range of primary energy sources including fossil fuels but also solar, wind,
biomass and nuclear energy. It is true that in most countries, HEVs and advanced diesel
engines provide similar or greater environmental and efficiency benefits due to the
relatively high carbon intensity of current hydrogen and especially power generation
infrastructure. The latter two options also cost less and have the great advantage of not
requiring any new energy supply infrastructure. However, a key point is that policy
frameworks and technology are already being implemented to decarbonise energy
11

12. infrastructure over the next few decades or sooner through a mix of non‐carbon energy
technology and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) processes (Committee on Climate
Change, 2008; IEA, 2008a; Jaccard, 2005). Decarbonised electricity and hydrogen supplies
would in turn make it possible to rely on EVs and HVs to reduce the lifecycle GHG emissions
of motorised travel to essentially zero while greatly reducing global oil demand.
Despite the promises offered by hydrogen and electricity powered vehicles, many are
sceptical that costs can fall down sufficiently to allow for widespread acceptance among
consumers. The low volumetric energy density of electricity and hydrogen storage
technologies also poses a number of difficulties, such as limited driving range, particularly in
all‐electric EVs, and high storage and distribution costs, particularly for hydrogen. Other
potential problems include a high reliance on expensive metals such as lithium, platinum,
neodymium and/or dysprosium, which tend to be concentrated in a few countries.
Nevertheless, the prevailing sentiment is that these and other problems will be resolved in
time through technological change, and that current technology is already sufficiently
advanced to allow for initial market introduction in select market niches (e.g. vehicles used
mainly for commuting or commercial deliveries). Proponents point to previous cases of
technology transitions in transport, energy and communications, which also started with
technologies that were initially expensive and/or unsuitable for mainstream consumers
(such as the first ICEVs).
A critical point in this regard is that governments, which are generally (if unequally)
supportive of long‐term decarbonisation and energy security goals, can and will support the
initial commercialisation process through various financial instruments, such as tax credits
and subsidies for vehicle purchasers. This will help overcome initial cost and infrastructure
hurdles while encouraging long‐term technical improvements (e.g. the development of more
sustainable materials). A strong case can be made for government intervention of this sort
due to the high potential for EVs and HVs to generate future societal benefits in the form of
improved air quality, lower climate change risks, increased energy security, improved
balance of trade and possibly increased local employment and tax revenue.
Moreover, EVs and HVs offer more than just societal benefits; under certain conditions, their
lower running and especially energy costs could more than offset the high initial cost of
batteries and fuel cells, even without government incentives (e.g. see Hensley et al., 2009).
12

13. EVs and HVs also offer a number of performance improvements over ICEVs including faster
acceleration and lower noise, vibration and maintenance costs, and could be designed to
offer new functionalities such as off‐board electric power supplies (Burns et al., 2002;
Fischer et al., 2009; Kurani et al., 1996; Kurani et al., 2004; Sperling, 1995).
1.2 Hydrogen and electric vehicles as competing options
The economic, political and geopolitical trends briefly reviewed above give confidence that
electric‐drive vehicles will eventually play a major if not dominant role in the quest to
decarbonise road transport. However, as noted by Sperling and Gordon (2008), “what is less
certain is exactly which electric‐drive technology will triumph and when”. While many
project the continued growth of HEVs, the relative prospects of EVs and HVs are seen as far
more uncertain (Kalhammer et al., 2007; Kromer and Heywood, 2007). Hydrogen and
electric vehicles are effectively rival options, each offering their own advantages and
disadvantages and requiring distinct R&D and infrastructure investment approaches (see
Figure 1).
Figure 1: Key components of EV and HV based mobility systems
Electric Vehicles Hydrogen Vehicles
Batteries Electric motors/generators Fuel cells
BMS Power electronics & controls Fuel cell BOP
Chargers Advanced body materials Hydrogen storage
Charging network Renewables Refuelling network
Rapid chargers Nuclear energy Bulk hydrogen storage
Electricity storage CCS Cryogenic transport
Smart metering Conventional fossils Pipelines
Smart grid & V2G SMR
For instance, while both options rely on electric motors and associated power electronics for
propulsion, EVs require high‐energy battery technology with little relevance to FCVs, and
FCVs alone require fuel cell and hydrogen storage technology. Environmental and energy
security impacts are also likely to differ, especially in the near term, due to important
differences in the way electricity and hydrogen are produced, distributed and converted into
motive power. For example, a number of studies argue that hydrogen production
13

14. infrastructure is too reliant on natural gas, and that low‐carbon hydrogen will be costly and
inefficient due to the need for multiple energy conversion steps such as electrolysis (e.g.
Bossel, et al., 2005; Hammerschlag and Mazza, 2005; Kendall, 2008; Langlois, 2008; Mazza
and Hammerschlag, 2004; Romm, 2004; 2006; Shinnar, 2003; Van Mierlo, et al., 2006).
Others have highlighted the large scope for developing advanced low‐carbon hydrogen
production technologies, such as coal gasification combined with CCS and methods to
extract hydrogen directly from renewable energy sources (i.e. bypassing electricity), through
thermal, photo‐biological, photo‐chemical, and thin‐film processes (Adamson, 2004; Clark
and Rifkin, 2006; Joffe, 2006; Marchetti, 2006; Ogden, 2004; Ogden et al., 2004).
The relative advantages and disadvantages of EVs and HVs (and their significance) have been
extensively debated recently, particularly in countries where large government grants and
subsidies are at stake – such as the US. Indeed, one stakeholder has noted the “ideological,
[almost] theological, debate” between proponents of each option.3 For example, hydrogen
advocates have argued that “a scenario in which hydrogen‐powered fuel cell vehicles
dominate the marketplace is the best scenario for America” (National Hydrogen Association,
2009) and that “the deepest cuts in oil use and GHGs [will] come from fuel cell vehicles”
(PATH, 2009). EV proponents have in turn called for the US federal government to select EVs
as “a dominant national strategy for improving energy security” (Electrification Coalition,
2009).
While particularly prevalent in the US, similar debates occur in Europe, Asia and the rest of
the world. Generally speaking, promoters of low‐carbon technology usually need
government support during the early stages of commercialisation (and often in later stages
as well), and must therefore compete with alternative agendas for public funding. Budgetary
constraints also affect technology selection and product planning processes in private
industry, leading to internal rivalries over resource allocation. Finally, the success or demise
of a technological agenda typically has major financial and other implications for a wide
array of stakeholders, including individuals who have committed time and resources to a
particular option, leading to further politicisation of technology debates (Latour, 1986).
Given the strategic importance of road transport as a leading source of GHG emissions but
3
Comment made by Mary Nichols, Chairman of the California Air Resources Board during a keynote
address to the third annual UC Berkeley Energy Symposium, reported by Green Cars Congress. See
http://www.greencarcongress.com/2009/02/arb‐chairman‐ch.html#comments (last accessed 12
August 2009).
14

15. also economic opportunities, the still emerging technological rivalry between EVs and HVs is
therefore likely to remain a subject of vital significance for some time.
While the origins of this technological rivalry are relatively clear, its outcome remains the
subject of considerable speculation. In fact, it may be argued that far from being mutually
exclusive options, EVs and HVs could offer complementary pathways toward decarbonised
mobility, e.g. with EVs used primarily in urban areas and HVs in most other market
segments. Others see a natural progression from hybrid‐electric to hydrogen vehicles, with
EVs as an interim technology (e.g. USCAR, 2009). Yet another possibility is that electricity
and hydrogen storage are ultimately combined into ‘plug‐in’ FCVs that would exploit the
relative advantages of both options (Kalhammer et al., 2007; Offer et al., 2009; Suppes et al.,
2004). A ‘hybrid’ transport system drawing on a variety of technologies and energy sources
would move road transport away from what Brooks (1986) called a “technological
monoculture”, i.e. dependence on a single technological paradigm, and would thus be
desirable from both economic and environmental perspectives (see also Kirsch, 2000).4
However, a range of historical evidence suggests that technological rivalries are often settled
in favour of a single technology, particularly in markets characterised by scale economies,
network externalities and other types of increasing returns to adoption (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Arthur, 1988; David, 1985; Suarez, 2004;
Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992).5 A good example of this is the early auto industry, where a
diversity of options (including ICEVs, BEVs and ‘steamers’) competed in the marketplace
until a dominant design based on IC engines and petroleum eventually emerged around
1910 – even in the niches where EVs had distinct competitive advantages (Abernathy, 1978;
Flink, 1988; Kirsch, 2000; Foreman‐Peck, 1996; 2000). 6 Other examples of technological
rivalries of this sort include the cases of AC/DC current, VHS/Betamax, Macintosh/’Wintel’
and so on.
4
As noted by Robert “Bob” Lutz, the veteran automotive executive and current Vice Chairman of
Global Product Development at General Motors, “The real issue is petroleum and the real objective is
electric drive, whether it's powered with a fuel cell or a lithium‐ion battery. Hell, we just want to get
out from under the oil companies” (quoted in English, 2006).
5
Network externalities occur when the consumer value of a product depends on the scale of the
network supporting this product. For example, the value of an electric or hydrogen vehicle depends
on the scale of networks for recharging or refuelling, as well as after‐sale service. See Chapter 3 for
more details.
6
After initially leading automobile sales in the US, the share of BEVs in this market fell from 38% in
1900 to less than 1% just 14 years later (United States Censuses, compiled by Foreman‐Peck, 2000).
15

16. A similar process could be repeated in road transport, with or without government
intervention (see Figure 2). For instance, if one of the main options (e.g. EVs) is able to
gather enough momentum in terms of market growth, even if only in niche markets, energy
suppliers will be encouraged to invest in complementary infrastructure (e.g. charging
networks) and OEMs will be able to lower costs through economies of scale and learning‐by‐
doing. The interplay of these effects could in turn further widen the gap with technological
rivals and lead to a virtuous cycle of expanding markets, manufacturing volumes and
infrastructure investments, leading to market dominance of the sort enjoyed by ICEVs since
the 1920s.
Figure 2: Dominant designs in road transport
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1.3 Comparing hydrogen and electric vehicles
The co‐existence of two main competing pathways toward decarbonised mobility and the
spectre of a new dominant design emerging in road transport raise a number of questions
for policymakers, OEM strategists and others interested in the global shift to low‐carbon
vehicles. Which option, if any, is most likely to achieve widespread consumer acceptance
and replace the ICEV as the dominant technical configuration in road transport? How will
this market dominance be achieved? What are the implications for OEMs, component
suppliers, energy suppliers and other industries in the mobility chain? What role can
government play in this process? These are some of the key questions this thesis will seek to
address.
The research would be greatly facilitated if one option could be shown to offer significant
and definite advantages over the other. For example, identifying the most promising
alternative, whether in terms of diffusion potential or environmental impact, implies the
16

17. possibility of focusing scarce financial and human resources on this option. As will be shown
in Chapter 2, however, technical and cost comparisons are far from straightforward. While
EV proponents highlight the lesser technical and infrastructural barriers faced by BEVs and
especially PHEVs, and the low maturity of fuel cell and hydrogen storage technology, HV
advocates argue that the (still) low energy density and high costs of advanced traction
batteries currently preclude anything more than small, limited‐range BEVs (typically with
less than 200km driving range) or PHEVs with limited electric range capability (and hence
limited decarbonisation and oil substitution potential). For example, Kromer and Heywood
(2007) estimate that a BEV with 322km (200 miles) of driving range, which is well below
typical driving ranges of FCVs, let alone ICEVs, will cost US$10,200 more than an advanced
gasoline ICEV. This assumes a 48kWh battery pack costing US$250/kWh, an aggressive
assumption. According to the same study, FCVs would cost only US$5,100 more than
advanced ICEVs under the assumption of US$75/kW fuel cell cost and US$15/kWh hydrogen
storage cost. Naturally, proponents of each option will question these assumptions,
providing evidence of higher or lower costs, or arguing over the necessity of long driving
range, but it is certainly difficult to argue that EVs are the inherently superior alternative.
After all, previous efforts to revive the EV during periods of oil shortages (e.g. the Second
World War and 1970s oil shocks) and most recently during the 1990s were largely
unsuccessful (Calef and Goble, 2005; Griset and Larroque, 2006). Many believe these failures
played a big part in encouraging policymakers to focus on other solutions toward the end of
the 1990s. For example, a report from the European Commission noted in 2001 that “unless
a breakthrough in battery technology changes the scenario, the Commission sees little
prospect in maintaining the electric car on the list of candidates for high‐volume marketable
alternative vehicles” (European Commission, 2001). In California, authorities were convinced
to delay implementation of the Zero Emission Vehicle (ZEV) mandate, originally intended to
spur the commercialisation of EVs, at least partly to allow more time for the development of
FCVs. This option had gained tremendous momentum in the preceding decade as OEMs
including Daimler, GM and Toyota rapidly increased spending on fuel cell and HV R&D
activity. Hydrogen fuel cells were increasingly seen as the ‘ultimate’ powertrain solution,
with HEVs as an interim technology and EVs as a technological dead‐end (Åhman, 2006; van
den Hoed, 2005). Moreover, there was growing interest in hydrogen as a universal energy
vector that would link renewable and nuclear energy sources to a wide range of energy
services (Dunn, 2001; Hoffman, 2002; Lovins, 2005; Rifkin, 2002; Schwartz and Randall,
17

18. 2003; Scott, 2004). In fact, many studies of alternative fuels and powertrains conducted
after 2000 completely excluded EVs from their research scope, presumably because they
were seen as unlikely to overcome range and other limitations (e.g. Brinkman et al., 2005;
EUCAR et al., 2004; Ogden et al., 2004; Sustainable Mobility Project, 2004; Toyota Motor
Corporation and Mizuho Information & Research Institute, 2004).7
In spite of this global mobilisation of resources, the view of hydrogen and FCVs as the ‘holy
grail’ of sustainable mobility began to be questioned almost immediately after it was first
proposed. First, several analysts questioned the bias of some governments toward FCVs,
arguing that options including HEVs and EVs were more likely to enable near‐term
reductions in CO2 emissions and oil demand and should thus receive equal or more attention
(Bullis, 2006a; Keith and Farrell, 2003; Service, 2004; The Economist, 2008c). Second,
advances in lithium‐ion batteries along with a growing recognition of the technical viability
of PHEVs, which overcome the driving range limitations of BEVs, have in recent years
contributed to a revival of interest toward EVs within the automotive industry and beyond
(EPRI, 2004; 2007; Hillebrand, 2006; Hori, 2007; Ito, 2006; Kendall, 2008; Kliesch, 2006;
Lache and Nolan, 2008; Sanna, 2005; Steinmetz, 2008). This encouraged one British study to
note that “battery‐powered vehicles – if using zero or low‐carbon electricity – offer the most
direct opportunity to decarbonise road transport over the longer term” (King, 2007, p. 50).
A group of mainly medium‐sized OEMs, including Mitsubishi Motors and Fuji Heavy
Industries (owner of the Subaru brand), and new companies such as Tesla Motors were the
pioneers of this latest, ‘post‐hydrogen’ wave of EVs. By the time of the completion of this
thesis (December 2009), all of the major OEMs had either a PHEV or BEV under development
(sometimes both), and battery technology was (again) seen as a top priority within the
automotive industry (KPMG International, 2008). Governments responded positively to
these trends; for example, President Obama announced his intention to put one million
PHEVs on American roads by 2015, promising $2.4 billion in grants to help reach this goal.
The governments of Canada, China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have
announced similar policies, which (if successful) could lead to several million EVs being sold
by 2015‐2020.8
7
For example, EUCAR et al. (2004) specified a driving range of 600km as one of their minimum vehicle
performance criteria, effectively excluding BEVs.
8
See Electrification Coalition (2009), Appendix 1 and IEA (2009) for overviews of recent government
initiatives relating to EVs.
18

19.
Although the significance of these announcements may be debated (similarly ambitious
targets have also been proposed for FCVs), they clearly suggest that policymaker attitudes
toward EVs have changed dramatically in just a few years, and that the prospect of a
hydrogen and fuel cell transition may already be receding. Just as previous coalitions around
fuel cells and hydrogen largely denied (some would say ‘killed’) the possibility of a viable
electric car, the hydrogen option is now the one that is increasingly seen as a distant
prospect. For instance, Obama’s Secretary of Energy, Steven Chu, recently attempted to cut
funding for HVs arguing that their development required a number of unlikely “miracles”
(Bullis, 2009a).
However, the continued involvement of OEMs and other powerful industrial actors in the
development of HVs and related technology, combined with the still uncertain future of
PHEVs and limited‐range BEVs, suggest that the technological rivalry between these various
options is far from settled. For example, OEMs including Daimler, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai,
Renault‐Nissan and General Motors recently stated their “strong” anticipation that a
“significant” number of FCVs will be commercialised from 2015 (Daimler AG, 2009), while
USCAR, an organisation representing the US ‘Big 3’, argued that “regardless of their
individual strategies, [our] members are firm in their belief that hydrogen‐FCVs will be an
important powertrain option in our future of sustainable transportation” (USCAR, 2009). A
wide range of stakeholders also continue to invest into R&D and demonstration activity
around hydrogen infrastructure, notably Linde, Shell and Total, which recently announced
their commitment to establish a hydrogen infrastructure in Germany starting in 2011.9
Similar initiatives have been announced in Japan and other countries.10
It is the prospect for low‐carbon, zero‐emission mobility without compromises in vehicle
size, driving range, functionality or refuelling time that arguably sets HVs apart from EVs.
And unlike PHEVs, HVs achieve this without resorting to conventional fuels or IC engine
based ‘range extenders’. Barring any major technical breakthroughs in electricity storage, or
changes to consumer expectations of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ driving range and
charging time, it may therefore be argued that HVs offer a more effective decarbonisation
9
http://www.marketwire.com/press‐release/Linde‐Ag‐frankfurt‐LIN‐1042573.html (last accessed 12
August 2009).
10
http://fccj.jp/pdf/20080704sks1e.pdf (last accessed October 9, 2009).
19

20. and energy diversification pathway than EVs (e.g. see National Hydrogen Association, 2009;
Thomas, 2008).11
Thus, while it is now clear that EVs will have a head start in terms of market introduction,
the broader question of which option is most likely to replace ICEVs as the dominant design
of the ‘post‐carbon’ economy remains largely unanswered. By 2050, the current surge in EV
activity might be remembered as yet another failed start in the history of alternative fuels,
or as an interim chapter on the way to hydrogen. Alternatively, technology and market
dynamics might favour electrification as the long‐term strategy for decarbonising transport,
with PHEVs and limited‐range BEVs bridging the way to more powerful, long‐range BEVs
supported by large‐scale charging infrastructure, and HVs relegated to small niche markets –
if at all.
1.4 Aims and objectives of the study
As already suggested, the primary objective of this thesis is to assess and compare hydrogen
and electric vehicles in view of identifying the option most likely to replace ICEVs as the
dominant configuration in road transport. By doing so, the study aims to contribute to policy
debates regarding the decarbonisation of road transport and associated technology and
infrastructure strategies. Policymakers and other stakeholders need a clearer view of how
this rivalry might unfold over time, as its outcome will determine whether a wide array of
complementary technologies and infrastructure prospers or decays, and could also have a
determining impact on decarbonisation prospects in road transport.
The understanding gained through this comparative analysis could be used to focus
resources on the more promising option, or alternatively to address gaps in the
development and commercialisation pathways associated to the lesser promising option,
e.g. in view of maintaining a balanced portfolio of low‐carbon solutions. While some of the
aspects of the current ‘lock in’ around ICEVs are not easily addressed by policy (e.g. the high
energy density and low distribution cost of liquid fuels), a range of studies have
11
This argument is well captured by a statement from the former CEO of Ballard Power, a leading
developer of fuel cell technology, who argued that “the only thing that could change the game is if
someone invented a battery that had a range of 400 miles and could be recharged in five minutes.
You wouldn't need a fuel cell. But people have been working on that for years, and while battery
technology is improving, it's not going to happen.” Interview with Dennis Campbell, The Globe and
Mail, 23 December 2005.
20

21. demonstrated that policy‐driven technological change can influence the rate and direction
of technological change and reduce the cost of climate change abatement (e.g. Clarke et al.,
2006; Sandén and Azar, 2005; Stern, 2006).
Naturally, a comprehensive analysis of EVs, HVs and the broader social, economic, political
and technological context for transformational change in road transport would be well
beyond the scope and resource constraints of a doctoral research programme. The study
therefore focuses on investigating key technology, market and industry dynamics that are
likely to underpin the development and commercialisation of these options over time.
Through this analysis, the study will seek to address the following core question: What is the
most promising option in terms of evolutionary change potential? As will be demonstrated,
new technologies and fuels can be characterised as ‘evolutionary’ or ‘revolutionary’
depending on a number of factors, such as their relative potential to link‐up to on‐going,
market‐driven technological trajectories and to grow incrementally from the basis of existing
technology and infrastructure. This suggests the possibility of a ‘third way’ between
incremental improvement pathways (such as those relying on improved ICEVs) and
‘revolutionary’ pathways involving major technological and market discontinuities.
1.5 Hypothesis and thesis overview
The study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 starts by reviewing evidence comparing EVs
and HVs in terms of their potential to contribute to GHG abatement and energy security and
also reviews the evidence for favouring these options over more incremental change
pathways in road transport. The chapter then compares each option in terms of near‐term
commercialisation potential, identifying key technological and infrastructural challenges that
might hinder initial market introduction. As already implied above, this starting analysis finds
no overwhelming evidence in favour of either option, especially if long‐term uncertainties
are considered. This is not surprising; new technologies rarely dominate across all relevant
dimensions of merit, which are themselves uncertain due to the lack of market experience
(Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). The analysis suggests that other factors, such as economic
and political linkages between technology, industry and markets, may have a more
determining impact in terms of shaping the ‘selection environment’ of new technologies in
road transport (subject of course to technical constraints imposed by science and
technology).
21

22.
This leads to Chapter 3, which explores historical patterns in the emergence of new
technologies and reviews related theories of innovation and technical change (e.g. as
reviewed by Basalla, 1988; Dosi, 1982; Geels, 2002; Grübler, 1990; Henderson and Clark,
1990; Hughes, 1983; Levinthal, 1998; and Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998). The chapter
focuses on identifying the main mechanisms of large‐scale ‘systemic’ transitions in transport
and energy, i.e. transitions involving major disruptive changes in both technology and
infrastructure. A framework is presented that highlights the critical role of spillovers in
technological transitions while also reviewing the role of niche and hybrid applications as
evolutionary change processes leading to large‐scale transition. Chapter 3 then concludes by
proposing the following hypothesis:
EVs have greater potential than HVs over the long term, not because of any inherent
technical or environmental advantage, but because of their wider scope to link up to
evolutionary change processes at various levels including powertrain, vehicle and
infrastructure development and commercialisation pathways.
The hypothesis is explored in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 seeks to answer the following
question: How do hydrogen and electric vehicles compare in terms of infrastructure
development pathways? More specifically, how do they compare in terms of synergies with
existing infrastructure and opportunities to draw on on‐going infrastructure development
trajectories (e.g. relating to low‐carbon energy)? Chapter 5 focuses on component
development and vehicle commercialisation pathways, asking the following question: How
do hydrogen and electric vehicles compare in terms of linkages to existing technology and
technological trajectories, and of opportunities for early market entry through niche and
hybrid applications? Finally, Chapter 6 integrates the results of both chapters in order to
provide a comprehensive assessment. This chapter also discusses policy implications. This is
followed by Chapter 7, which concludes the thesis with a brief overview and a discussion of
the main limitations of the study.
Key points
The hypothesis presented above was confirmed at various levels, including infrastructure,
technology and markets. As will be shown in Chapter 4, EVs are characterised by strong
22

23. synergies with existing power networks as well as on‐going processes to decarbonise and
modernise this infrastructure (e.g. smart metering, solar and wind energy and CCS). There
are of course major infrastructural challenges to EVs, including the lack of suitable charging
facilities in city centres and other areas, and possible capacity constraints in power
generation, transmission and distribution. Addressing these gaps will require public‐access
charging points in both commercial and residential areas, rapid charging and/or battery
swapping stations as well as new power plants and possibly electricity transmission and
distribution infrastructure investments. But much like modern fuelling infrastructure
evolved from general stores and fuel production and distribution networks that were
antecedent to the fist automobiles (Melaina, 2005; Yergin, 1991), EV charging infrastructure
can be expanded and optimised incrementally, starting with the already considerable
existing stock of technology and infrastructure. In parallel, electricity could be decarbonised
gradually through a variety of means, many of which are already competitive under existing
regulatory environments. In fact, electricity decarbonisation is expected to progress
regardless of whether EVs are present or not.
In contrast, HVs require major investments in both refuelling infrastructure and ‘advanced’
hydrogen technologies, such as small‐scale natural gas reformers and efficient renewable
energy based hydrogen generators. There is some scope for utilising existing industrial gas
infrastructure and associated technology and capabilities within the industrial (or
‘merchant’) gas and oil industries, and some would argue that this could be incrementally
expanded to meet transport needs. However, this study agrees with the view that a
substantial network of filling stations must be developed prior to the initiation of mass
production of FCVs (Melaina and Bremson, 2008). This would effectively require a ‘step
change’ in energy infrastructure. Moreover, the chapter also suggests that without the
‘market pull’ from HVs, the incentives to develop ‘advanced’ infrastructure technology will
remain low. This in turn makes it hard to justify government support on efficiency and
environmental grounds.
The evolutionary potential of EVs is also confirmed for batteries and other key technological
components. It is shown that spillovers from existing high‐volume lithium battery
applications, such as consumer electronics and power tools, have and will continue to
support the development of EVs. Although these applications have different requirements in
terms of energy and power density, calendar life, cycling capability and so on, the synergies
23

24. across lithium battery applications are large enough to provide OEMs, directly or indirectly,
with significant spillovers. This provides OEMs with the opportunity to ‘piggyback’
knowledge and learning‐by‐doing associated to existing and largely market‐driven
technological trajectories in electricity storage, much like early automobiles benefited from
pre‐existing innovations in IC engines and wheel design (Geels, 2005b). In some cases, EV
developers may also draw on existing manufacturing infrastructure and scale economies,
which provide a quick route to cost reduction while minimising ‘chicken‐and‐egg’ problems
relating to large capital investments. In other words, the critical initiating event of the
current generation of EVs is not technological change as usually defined, but rather the
migration of existing technology and related manufacturing capacity to the automotive
application domain. Naturally, automotive industry innovations centred on safety, thermal
management and systems integration are also needed to support the migration of lithium
battery technology to the extremely challenging technical environment posed by road
vehicles.
In contrast, the development trajectory of HVs tends to be characterised by weak to
inexistent linkages to extra‐industry sources of technology. Although some fuel cell
applications are now seeing significant market growth (e.g. forklift truck, backup power
system and APU applications), providing significant economic impetus to the specialist
proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell industry, manufacturing volumes are still too
small to have a major impact on PEMFC costs. Potential high‐volume applications, such as
micro fuel cells for portable electronic devices, have low synergies with automotive
applications. The burden of developing fuel cell and hydrogen technologies thus falls mainly
on OEMs, which must also build associated manufacturing capacity and process knowledge
with few opportunities for drawing on the assets and experience of other industries.
Developers of EVs are also advantaged by a greater scope for drawing on experience curve
effects. A number of early market entry routes centred on niche and hybrid applications are
identified, which provide EVs with the opportunity to grow organically through a virtuous
cycle of increasing scale economies, learning‐by‐doing and network effects (as happened
with ICEVs, railways, telephones, electricity and other cases of successful technology
transitions). For example, BEVs tailored for commuting and commercial deliveries and PHEVs
with limited battery capacity could initiate a pathway for the incremental electrification of
road transport, without any need for large prior technology or infrastructure investments.
24

25. Although these intermediate solutions offer varying benefits in terms of CO2 emission and oil
demand reduction, their main value is to provide a bridge toward BEVs and PHEVs with
extended electric range and mass‐market appeal. For example, early market successes are
likely to incite increased investments into automotive‐grade battery technology and
charging infrastructure while preparing consumers for widespread electrification.
In contrast, it is difficult to imagine how HVs (especially FCVs) could be deployed
incrementally or in hybrid form. The lack of existing refuelling infrastructure precludes most
niche market strategies for introducing HVs, especially in consumer applications such as city
or luxury cars. Other niches such as buses are too small and/or removed from the light‐duty
vehicle application to provide sufficient spillovers. Hydrogen ICEVs are a possible hybrid
pathway, but face the same infrastructural challenges of FCVs – unless flexible fuel capability
is enabled in conjunction with a serious commitment to building a hydrogen infrastructure.
One problem is that the short‐term environmental benefits of hydrogen ICEVs are very
limited due to the lower efficiency of IC engines relative to fuel cells.
Major infrastructure investments preceding the commercial deployment of FCVs thus seem
unavoidable. A widespread network of hydrogen filling stations would enable OEMs to start
selling HVs to early adopters, and to draw on the resulting experience curve effects to lower
costs and expand the market for HVs. However, this strategy effectively implies a
coordinated ‘revolutionary’ transition process of exceptional scale. For instance, OEMs and
energy companies have to build a consensus on the timing, location, scale and growth rate
of capital investments. Among other challenges, the HV market must grow fast enough for
energy suppliers to recover their initial investments in refuelling infrastructure, and for
OEMs and their supply chains to build up sufficient scale economies. In other words, a step
change in manufacturing must be accompanied by a step change in infrastructure, and vice
versa, contravening the ‘normal’ niche‐based model of commercialisation. It is the difficulty
of building a broad consensus across the automotive and energy industries on these difficult
decisions, rather than their actual cost, which is largely unprecedented.
One of the biggest strengths of the EV pathway in this regard is the sequential and quasi‐
autonomous nature of infrastructure and manufacturing capacity investments. As noted,
even the smallest OEM can start selling EVs independently of what other OEMs or energy
companies decide to do (provided of course that they can be competitively priced).
25

26. Agreements spanning several firms and industries are needed in a few areas, e.g. on codes
and standards relating to charging and vehicle safety, but major decisions regarding
manufacturing and infrastructure do not have to be closely coordinated. Thus while doubt,
scepticism and outright hostility toward EVs also exists, it matters less because the
electrification trajectory does not rely on a broad consensus to be negotiated prior to initial
commercialisation.
In summary, the main characteristic differentiating EVs and HVs is not technology or
infrastructure per se. According to evidence presented in Chapter 2 and later chapters, both
visions are technically achievable and environmentally laudable. For example, it is difficult to
differentiate each option in terms of the cumulative cost of their development pathway, or
the amount of government support required to achieve a comprehensive transition away
from petroleum and ICEVs. Instead, it is the possibility to realise this transition through small
incremental steps that differentiates EVs from HVs. And as evidence in favour of HEVs, BEVs
and PHEVs continues to build up, the prospects of a common, unifying vision around
hydrogen become dimmer, and with it the possibility of a purposive hydrogen ‘revolution’ in
road transport.
Naturally, the evolutionary potential of EVs can only be realised in a favourable economic
and political environment. As noted by Sperling and Ogden (2004), “the history of
alternative transportation fuels is largely a history of failures,” and there is no reason to
believe that market forces alone can lead to major changes in the way cars are designed and
fuelled – at least not in the timeframe of this study (2010‐2050). A key point of this thesis is
that government policies should be designed to strengthen and accelerate the evolutionary
change processes already favouring EVs rather than attempt to leapfrog major steps in the
transition to EVs, as past policies often tried and failed to do. For example, ‘market‐pull’
mechanisms such as a carbon tax or ‘cap‐and‐trade’ schemes will provide much of the
impetus required to initiate a self‐sustaining trajectory of growth and development that
could potentially lead to very high rates of electrification and decarbonisation in transport.
Arguments that PHEVs and BEVs offer limited environmental and energy security impacts
(due to their continued reliance on liquid fuels or limited relevance outside of cities or multi‐
car households, or the high carbon intensity of existing grids) and that major investments in
charging infrastructure are needed to make EVs accessible to the general population miss
the point about the evolutionary nature of EVs. These initial markets, while limited, are
26