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1. Religion and Politics
The Demographic Imperative

2. Source: ‘The Moment of Truth’, Ha’aretz, 8 February 2007

3. Religious Fertility vs. Religious
Decline
"One of the most central injunctions of virtually
all traditional religions is to strengthen the family,
to encourage people to have children, to
encourage women to stay home and raise
children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or
anything that interferes with high rates of
reproduction. As a result of these two
interlocking trends, rich nations are becoming
more secular, but the world as a whole is
becoming more religious." (Norris and
Inglehart 2004: 22-23, emphasis added)

4. Hypothesis: a combination of higher
religious fertility and immigration will lead
to a growth in the religious population
(defined in terms of belief) that exceeds
the net loss of communicants through
religious apostasy.

5. Methods
• Source: EVS / WVS & ESS + ethnic
minority surveys
• Cohort Component Projection Parameters:
Fertility & Switching (i.e. religious decline
or revival) by age and sex, plus current
Age/Sex Structure of Religious and
Secular 'Populations'
• Mortality Rates assumed as standard

6. Fig. 5 Projected Religious Population, 6 Early
Secularising Societies, 2004-2104
40%
41%
42%
43%
44%
45%
46%
47%
48%
49%
50%
2004 2014 2024 2034 2044 2054 2064 2074 2084 2094 2104
Proportion
Religious

7. Fig. 7 Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK,
2001 Census
34
25
18
37
39
22
25
32
41
4 4
19
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Muslim No religion Christian
%
in
Age
Band
0 - 15
16 - 34
35 - 64
65 and over

8. What About the Muslim World?
• The religious cleavage between Islamists and
Secular Nationalists/Socialists/Liberals is
Paramount
• Q: Will higher fertility endow Islamists (or
even the wider 'religious' population) with
political leverage into the future?
• Berman & Stepanyan (2003) find a significant
but modest link between Madrassa attendance
and fertility in four countries
• This study uses WVS 1999-2000 dataset on 7-
15 countries (depends on question)
• Aim is to determine parameters for population
projections

9. country
relig
tot fertility rate
1.4048 7.1
.592294
.98574
Source: 2000 WVS and World Bank.
Religiosity and Fertility in Muslim Countries, 2000
Tanzania
Jordan
Egypt
Algeria
Bosnia
Iran
Azerbaijan
'95-97
Bangladesh
Albania
2000
Turkey
Indonesia
Pakistan
Morocco
Nigeria
Uganda
Albania
'95-97

10. Attitudes to Shari'a and Fertility, Islamic Countries, by
Urban and Rural, 2000 WVS (Muslims Only)
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
Str. Agree Agree Neither Disagree Str. Disagree
Children
Ever
Born
city > 100k
town < 10k
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561
respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

13. Religious or Not, by Age Category, Muslims in Islamic
Countries, 2000 WVS
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-98
'A
Religious
Person'
Source WVS 1999-2000. N=15197 cases. Question asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Iran, Morocco,
Turkey, Uganda and Tanzania.

14. Attendance at Religious Services, by Religion and Age,
2004 ESS
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Weekly
Attendance
RC
Prot
Eastern
Muslims
Source: ESS 2004

15. Agree with Shari'a Law, by Age, 2000 WVS, Muslims in
Islamic Countries
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-98
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7436 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

16. Agree with Shari'a Law, by Education, Islamic Countries,
WVS 2000, Muslims Only
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
>
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%
Agreeing
Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 7412 respondents. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

17. Education: +
Town Size: -
National Pride: -
GDP per Capita: -
Age:
indeterminate
Married/Children:
weak -
Country Ed.: +
Country
Fertility: -

18. Conclusions: Fertility
• In Muslim developing countries, unlike other
developing countries, higher national religiosity
is associated with lower fertility and National
GDP per head has no impact on fertility
• Islamists in Muslim countries are more fertile;
some evidence for sharpened fertility effect in
more 'modern' contexts, i.e. cities, the educated
• But effect modest: Muslim Religious Fertility
Dynamics more like USA and Europe than Israel
• The growth of the religious population through
fertility is a long-term process, unlike Israel

19. Conclusions: Religiosity
• Younger, Educated are less religious and/or
Islamist, but effect is complex and there are
exceptions (18-24, university students)
• Urbanites more Islamist than rural population
• Higher education levels may modestly lower
Islamism, but urbanization may raise it.
Generational change will have little effect
• GDP per head unlikely to affect religiosity
• Nationalism and Islamism seem compatible
• All told, we should expect a distinct Muslim
trajectory of modernization and development
rather than secularism

20. • Future Research: projections of religious
and Islamist populations for Muslim world,
Europe, North America
• Own project:
http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html
• IIASA projections project:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~terama/Relig.html