The document discusses the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement aimed at addressing climate change by regulating greenhouse gas emissions. It examines the Kyoto Protocol's effectiveness by comparing it to other international environmental agreements like the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and Montreal Protocol. The document analyzes climate change and greenhouse gas emissions as a tragedy of the commons problem. It evaluates the Kyoto Protocol's mechanisms for regulating emissions and incentivizing reductions, finding they have faced challenges in achieving emissions targets due to competing interests among nations and industries.

1. Bradley Van Rooy
1
What Can We Learn From the Failure of the Kyoto Protocol?
The Kyoto Protocol is an international environmental agreement which regulates the
production of six greenhouse gases (i.e., carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)) in
an attempt to address climate change. Throughout this paper I will be examining how the Kyoto
Protocol attempts to address international environmental issue of climate change, a tragedy of the
commons,by evaluating the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. To this end, I will begin by
discussing how well the Kyoto Protocol was able to regulate the six greenhouse gases. Then,I wil
put the Kyoto Protocol in comparison to both the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and
the Montreal Protocol in an effort to assess it’s comparative success. Lastly, I will assess the
flexibility and ability of the Kyoto Protocol to successfully adapt to the concept of sustainable
development.
The international environmental issue of climate change has been and continues to be a
growing concern among international actors. According to the consensus of the United Nations
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “warming of the climate system is in no doubt,
and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia
[‘000 years].”1 International organizations and agreements, such as the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Kyoto Protocol, put a lot of effort to prevent
damaging effects on our global environment. Though much work has been done to address
increasing concerns over international environmental issues within the past few decades, there
was a time when very few actors were concerned with such issues.
American ecologist Garrett Hardin, in an attempt to draw international attention to such
issues, published an article in the American Association for the Advancement of Science in
1968. In this article, Hardin claimed overpopulation would threaten the world’s common
resources because “a finite world can support only a finite population”.2 As a result of this threat,
Hardin worked out an economic theory to explain the detrimental effects that overpopulation
would have on the environment called the “Tragedy of the Commons”. Though this theory can
be evaluated through both an economic and legal perspective, it can be understood that a tragedy
of the commons occurs when individual actors maximize a “short-term self-interest” of a scarce
resource, leading to a collective over-utilization and inevitable depletion leaving all actors worse
off.3 4 5 6
Tragedies of the Commons are in fact a very distinct set of problems in terms of the types
of incentives which lead to environmental damage and in how various incapacities cause
environmental damage. In the case of a Tragedy of the Commons, “all relevant actors are both
perpetrators and victims.”7 The nuance here is that in the Tragedy of the Commons, all of the
actors adversely affected by the environmental problem are also contributing to it.
1
IPCC, Fifth Assessment Report - Climate Change. 2013. Retrievedon April 10,2015from https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/
2
Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedyof the Commons." AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science. 162.3859(1968): 1243-1248.
Retrievedon May2, 2015 fromhttp://www.geo.mtu.edu/~asmayer/rural_sustain/governance/Hardin 1968.pdf
3
Bagozzi, Benjamin."Economic/Legalistic Perspectives (Plus Tragedyof the Commons)." Class Notes. Universityof Minnesota.Minnesota,
Minneapolis. 0202 2015.
4
Heller, M. "TheTragedy ofthe Anticommons."Retirevedon Februray 10, 2015 from http://opus1journal.org/articles/article.asp?docID=141
5
Fennell, Lee Anne.Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons.Chicago: 2009.1-27. Retrievedon April 10, 2015 from
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/457-261.pdf
6
Hsu, Shi-Ling. What Is a Tragedy of the Commons?Over fishing andthe CampaignSpending Problem. 2006.89-92,100-105. Retirevedon
May 2, 2015from http://www.albanylawreview.org/Articles/Vol69_1/69.1.0075-What_Is_a_Tragedy_of_the_Commons-
Overfishing_and_the_Campaign_Spending_Problem.pdf
7
Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedyof the Commons."AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science. 162.3859(1968): 1243-1248.

2. Bradley Van Rooy
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Comparatively, in upstream/downstream problems there exists at least one actor who is
adversely affected by an environmental issue of which they are not contributing to the cause.8
The nuance in upstream/downstream problems, is that none of the relevant actors concerned
about the problem have caused it, and “those perpetrating it consider their interests harmed by
it.”9
In the context of the environmental issues regulated by the Kyoto Protocol, it is clear that
greenhouse gases and the problem of climate change falls under the paradigm of the tragedy of
the commons. Take for example carbon dioxide, which is constantly going in and out of the
atmosphere through a carbon cycle. The oceans and forests absorb carbon dioxide, however with
industrialization, factories, cars, and power plants more carbon dioxide is being produced than
what can be naturally absorbed. Thus the commons is being significantly overwhelmed. For a
moment think of the earth’s atmosphere as “tremendous bathtub”10. As water flows into the
bathtub just as carbon dioxide is being pumped into the atmosphere, it simultaneously is slowly
being drained just as carbon dioxide is slowly being absorbed. However, if the rate at which the
water is flowing into the bathtub is equal or greater to the rate at which the water is draining, the
water level either remains the same or increases in volume. This holds just as true for carbon
dioxide. If the rate at which carbon dioxide is flowing into the atmosphere is equal to or greater
than the rate at which carbon dioxide is naturally removed from the atmosphere, the carbon
dioxide level either remains the same or increases in volume.
Furthermore, within the the tragedy of the commons framework, there are two main
dimensions, a direct tragedy and an indirect tragedy. As stated in the aforementioned paragraph
the atmosphere is a shared resource among everyone and everything on earth. While the
emission of greenhouse gases in one area would not necessarily negatively affect a specific
region directly, it would in fact add to the concentration of carbon dioxide to the already highly
concentrated atmosphere leading to the greenhouse effect of climate change. While many
individuals would agree to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide
(CO-2) from automobiles and industry, there is not enough motivation for individuals to alter
their daily behavior unless the situation is around the edge to feel virtuous11. Nature has its own
renewable mechanism to maintain the sustainability of the resources, but when the gas emission
speed is over the natural sustainable limit, it causes problems, such as climate change.
The indirect tragedy of climate change provides deeper insights to the tragedy of
commons. Take for instance industry, the incentives for maximal profit actively deter them from
reducing their emission of greenhouse gases, or increase the emission in some cases as long as
there is no direct harmful effects. State and federal governments are largely dependent on
industries, and thus the regulations for industry have never been able to successfully meet the
goal of reduction of emission of greenhouse gases. Instead, industries actively switch to different
forms of production that are unregulated in order to fulfill their profit-making incentives without
reducing emission of greenhouse gases. On a worldwide level, the problem is that there are too
8
Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedyof the Commons." AmericanAssociationfor the Advancement of Science. 162.3859(1968):1243-1248.
9
Bagozzi, Benjamin. "Economic/LegalisticPerspectives (Plus Tragedyof the Commons)." Class Notes. Universityof Minnesota.Minnesota,
Minneapolis. 0202 2015.
10
Schlumberger Excellence in EducationDevelopment (SEED).Global ClimateChange andEnergyTragedy ofthe Commons. Retrievedon April
30, 2015from http://www.planetseed.com/relatedarticle/tragedy-commons
11
Pollitt,Katha.Climate Change Is the Tragedyof the Global Commons.Retrievedon May2, 2015from
http://www.thenation.com/blog/179455/climate-change-tragedy-global-commons#

3. Bradley Van Rooy
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many competing interests among nations and industries. In an attempt to overcome these
differences, many nations have come together to form international agreements in order to
collectively find a solution to various environmental issues. It is possible to see many similarities
and differences among these international environmental regulations that aim to address various
global issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol, IWC, and the Montreal Protocol, in terms of their
success or failure.
The Kyoto Protocol, established in 1997, legally came into effect in 2005 requiring the
Parties in Annex I (developed countries and economies in transition) to reduce emissions of six
greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming, as well as aiming at cutting the costs of
reducing emissions12. In effect, Article 3 of the protocol requires developed countries to reduce
their overall emissions of greenhouse gases “by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the
commitment period 2008 to 2012.” In order to achieve the goals, the Kyoto Protocol set out three
market-mechanisms: (1) clean development mechanism (CDM), (2) joint implementation (JI)
and (3) emission trading13. Under the clean development mechanism defined in Article 12, the
developing countries could could earn a tradable certified credits which can be used by the
developed countries as a part of their emission target under the Kyoto Protocol. Under joint
implementation defined in Article 6, the Parties with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol
generate emission reduction units (ERU) from domestic projects and sell them to another
committed Party, which then uses them to meet part of their reduction target. Emission trading,
as set out in Article 17, allows the Parties with commitments to sell their excess ERUs or acquire
ERUs from another Party to meet part of their reduction goals. Prior to the formation of the
Kyoto Protocol, two similar international agreements were developed to solve two specific
international environmental issues, overfishing (whales specifically) and ozone layer depletion.
The former issue, led to the establishment of the International Whaling Commission (IWC),
while latter led to the creation of the Montreal Protocol. The question here, is how do these
protocols work, and what were they able to effectively achieve compared to the Kyoto Protocol?
The IWC, initiated in 1946, monitors the population of different species of whales, for
the purpose of conservation by limiting hunting. The goal of the IWC is to conserve the world’s
whale stocks and attempt to assist in the proper development of the whaling industry. Initially
many states got involved in the International Whaling Regulation as a “temporary measure
needed to rebuild whale stocks and to develop the revised management procedure to regulate
commercial whaling” 14 even voting to pass a moratorium in 1982. However, over time a shift in
the “composition of the regime’s membership and the nature of its decision rules” 15 lead to the
permanence of the moratorium. As a result many parties in industry, conservationists, and
environmentalists all turned on one another instead of working together to find a collective
solution.
Within the frame of the IWC, the environmental issue of overfishing of whales provides
another excellent example of a direct tragedy of the commons. Whales are an open-access
12
UnitedNation. KyotoProtocol tothe UnitedNations FrameworkConventiononClimate Change. 1998.Retrievedon April 29, 2015from
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf
13
UNFCC. KyotoMechanisms. Retrievedon April 29,2015from http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/2998.php
14
Young, Oran R. Institutional Dynamics Emergent Patterns in International Environmental Governance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 2010. 165-
203. Print.
15
Young, Oran R. Institutional Dynamics Emergent Patterns in International Environmental Governance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 2010. 165-
203. Print.

4. Bradley Van Rooy
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common-pool resource, in which several whaling industries could collectively harvest at
profitably sustainable rates maximizing their self-interest but are affected by incentives which
lead to collective overharvesting.16 17 This example illustrates how even though individual
whaling industries could collectively agree to limit the harvesting of whales, harvesting
incentives create disincentives for self-restraint among the fisheries leading to increased
harvesting. In other words, each whale caught contributes to the depletion of both current and
future whale populations inevitably resulting in the eventual breakdown of both sea ecosystems
and whaling industries. This example provides an understanding of the complex development of
a direct tragedy. Though similar to the complexity of the direct tragedy, the indirect tragedy of
overfishing provides a deeper insight into the nuances of the Tragedies of the Commons.
National and international policies established regulations which aimed to stabilize specific
whale populations to ensure a continued supply of whales.18 19 While these national and
international policies benefit the entire world, they especially benefit whaling industries as they
are able to maintain their current whaling practices by fishing for unregulated whale populations.
The IWC has faced far more difficulties. This is because the international regulation has
an “open accession clause” which meant that “actual participation” in the regulation of whaling
“is not required.” 20 Though the International Whaling Commission contained “specific
procedures for whaling ships and for reviewing permits to harvest whales for scientific
purposes…” 21 the regulation left “implementation” to the “national fisheries agencies of each
member state” 22 leading to nonconformity in regulations worldwide. Additionally the regulation
left “member state reporting” a voluntary act with no enforcement which led to insufficient
information about “the degree to which governments and firms comply with international
regulations.” 23 Lastly, the regulation allowed parties of the convention to “set annual quotas on
the number of whales harvested for commercial purposes or aboriginal subsistence.” 24
Eventually in 1986, “the parties established a ban on all commercial whaling” 25 however, by the
16
Hsu, Shi-Ling. What Is a Tragedy of the Commons?Over fishing andthe CampaignSpending Problem. 2006.89-92,100-105. Retrievedon
April 30, 2015 from http://www.albanylawreview.org/Articles/Vol69_1/69.1.0075-What_Is_a_Tragedy_of_the_Commons-
Overfishing_and_the_Campaign_Spending_Problem.pdf
17
Lajus, Julia. "Indirect 'tragedyof the commons' as a result of Pacific Salmonhatcheries. Whythere is a lack of understandingof the
problem?."1-2. Web. 12 Feb. 2015. RetrievedonAprill 30,2015from http://resilience2014.sciencesconf.org/25295/document
18
Hsu, Shi-Ling. What Is a Tragedy of the Commons? Over fishingandthe CampaignSpendingProblem.2006. 89-92,100-105. Retrievedon
April 30, 2015 from http://www.albanylawreview.org/Articles/Vol69_1/69.1.0075-What_Is_a_Tragedy_of_the_Commons-
Overfishing_and_the_Campaign_Spending_Problem.pdf
19
Lajus, Julia. "Indirect 'tragedyof the commons' as a result of Pacific Salmonhatcheries. Whythere is a lack of understandingof the
problem?."1-2. Web. 12 Feb. 2015.
20
Peterson, M.J. Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and theInternational Management of Whaling.1st ed. Vol. 46. MIT, 1992. 147-186.
Print.
21
Peach, J. Dexter. International Environment International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored : Report to Congressional Requesters.
Washington,D.C.: U.SGeneral AccountingOffice,1992.2-60. Print.
22
Peterson, M.J. Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and theInternational Management of Whaling.1st ed. Vol. 46. MIT, 1992. 147-186.
Print.
23
Walsh, Virginia. M. "Illegal WhalingforHumpbacks by the Soviet Unionin the Antarctic, 1947-1972." TheJournal of Environment &
Development (1999): 307-27. Print.
24
Peach, J. Dexter. International Environment International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored : Report to Congressional Requesters.
Washington,D.C.: U.SGeneral AccountingOffice,1992.2-60. Print.
25
Peach, J. Dexter. International Environment International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored : Report to Congressional Requesters.
Washington,D.C.: U.SGeneral AccountingOffice,1992.2-60. Print.

5. Bradley Van Rooy
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time regulation was put into force the “whale stocks were being depleted at unsustainable levels”
26 leading to the infliction of severe damage on stocks.
The “effectiveness”, a dependent variable, of the IWC is assessed by the estimated
population of whales of different species, and the degree to which member countries have
achieved their declared goals of cooperation.27 Apparently, if the specified whale population
decreases continuously and/or the goals that members have set don’t meet, then the IWC
protocol is considered a failed international agreement. During the first 20 years (1946-mid
1960s), the goal achievement of the IWC was low due to countries being unable to fulfill their
reduced hunting quotas, and the IWC’s reliance on voluntary reporting of figures.28 However,
during the second phase of the protocol (mid 1960 - mid 1970s), there was significant increased
effectiveness in terms of number of whales and “orderly development.”29 Since the third phase
(mid 1970s - present), the international regulation of whaling from IWC has been “a tremendous
success.”30 In addition, most highly-motivated whale-hunting countries has significantly reduced
or stopped hunting.
From a counterfactual standpoint suppose that “economic forces leading to reduced
catches were at work long before international regulations came into being.” 31 Under this
scenario “declining stocks raise the unit costs of harvest, making whaling ultimately less
attractive from a commercial standpoint… and as substitutes became more plentiful… the
commercial incentive to catch whales declined.”32 Thus, the case of whaling can be considered
an example of a life-cycle of declining industry.33 This counterfactual scenario can account for
the actual decline of whale stock populations over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries calling
into question whether or not the policy was ever needed in the first place as there had been a
downward trend of whaling for many years prior to the creation of the International Whaling
Commission. This effectively highlights the very struggle political leaders went through
attempting to pass regulations, as individuals were so uncertain as to the actual cause of the
depleting whale stocks.Though the counterfactual scenario makes a strong case for policy
ineffectiveness, it is clear that while the IWC did have a substantial impact on whaling.
Compared to the Kyoto Protocol, the IWC has established a more binding international
law that bans the hunting of whales. Although it doesn’t define a forceful penalty, and some
whale-hunting countries, such as Japan and Canada, withdrew from the IWC and refuses to obey
the IWC ban, the law provides a defense mechanism for Sea Shepherd groups when interfering
with whale hunters, such as the Japan’s whale hunters in Antarctic Ocean. With the clear clause
and agreement on the Protocol, the IWC has “successfully managed the historical transition from
26
Walsh, Virginia. M. "Illegal WhalingforHumpbacks by the Soviet Unionin the Antarctic, 1947-1972." TheJournal of Environment &
Development (1999): 307-27. Print.
27
Andresen, Steinar. "TheEffectiveness of the International WhalingCommission." Arctic (1993): 108-115.
28
Andresen, Steinar. "TheEffectiveness of the International WhalingCommission." Arctic (1993): 108-115.
29
Andresen, Steinar. "TheEffectiveness of the International WhalingCommission."Arctic(1993): 108-115.
30
Hurd, Ian. "Almost SavingWhales: The Ambiguity ofSuccess at the International WhalingCommission."Ethics andInternational Affairs
26.1 (2011): 2012.
31
Schneider, Viktoria, andDavidPearce. "What Savedthe Whales?An Economic Analysis of 20thCenturyWhaling." Biodiversity and
Conservation:543-62. Print.
32
Schneider, Viktoria, andDavidPearce. "What Savedthe Whales?An Economic Analysis of 20thCenturyWhaling." Biodiversity and
Conservation:543-62. Print.
33
BasbergBjørn L. (2013) A Crisis that Never Came:The decline of theAntarctic WhalingIndustryin the 1950s and1960s, The Mariner's
Mirror, 99:2,196-211,DOI: 10.1080/00253359.2013.785136

6. Bradley Van Rooy
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open whale hunting to highly restricted hunting.” 34 The problem of the centralizing force of the
IWC, however, is the decentralized effect such that “the legal regime on whaling has become
increasingly fragmented and particular rather than coherent and unified.” The Kyoto Protocol, on
the other hand, is based on market- or project-based mechanism with high flexibility. It provides
the economic benefits to some countries, but overall, it’s hard to monitor and regulate each
committing countries with their emission goal. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol relies more on
voluntary regulation without forceful enforcement. In the case of Canada withdrawing the Kyoto
Protocol, the economic penalty wasn’t big enough for a country to obey their commitment.
Another similar international agreement on an environment issue is the Montreal
Protocol. The Montreal Protocol was established in 1987. The goal of the Protocol is to reduce
the emissions of ozone-depleting substances (ODSs), including chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),
halons, carbon tetrachloride, and methyl chloroform. Similar to the previous cases, the
environmental issue of ozone depletion is also an excellent example of a tragedy of the
commons. Ozone layer are an open resource that protects life on earth from ultraviolet ray from
sun. The depletion of ozone would lead to too much exposure of UV radiation which further
cause diseases like skin cancer and eye damage. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were found to be
the main substance that deplete ozone, and it is a collective results of ozone-depleting
substances. In other words, each industry that produces any of these substances contribute to
depletion of ozone. Ozone-depleting substances are mainly found in cooling products, such as
automobile air conditioning units, refrigerators, freezers, ice machines, and fire extinguisher.
Reduction of ozone-depleting substances directly affects these industries as well as the common
consumers, since most of the products are common consumption in daily life. Both industries
and consumers have less incentives to reduce the usage of products to phase out the ozone-
depleting substances. This is an excellent example of direct tragedy of the commons. The
indirect tragedy of ozone depletion provides deeper insights to the tragedy of commons.
Industries have less motivation to reduce their production or invest in development of new
technologies that reduce the emission of ozone-depleting substances due to high transition costs.
Governments and regulators would try to regulate and implement higher standards to meet the
goal of reduction of emissions. However, this simply further increased transition costs. Thus,
industries switched to unregulated emissions that achieved their profit-making goal, which by
extension saved many consumers money effectively reinforcing the use of harmful Ozone
depleting substances.
The effectiveness of the Protocol is measured by equivalent effective stratospheric
chlorine (EESC), and the atmospheric values of ODSs. The success of the protocol is indicated
by the decrease of these measurements compared to the baseline level in 1980s. When the
Montreal Protocol took effect, “as the CFC phase-out dates neared in the industrialized countries,
a thriving international black market in CFC’s emerged.” 35 Reports also indicate “the U.S., the
European Union, and a number of other industrialized countries have been the recipients of
illegal CFC imports.” 36 In the case of the CFC’s however, the rise of the black market indicates
that the policies laid out in the Montreal Protocol were effective and working. Regulations
brought a benefit “to only a few” while leaving the costs spread widely allowing for industry to
34
Hurd, Ian. "Almost SavingWhales: The AmbiguityofSuccess at the International WhalingCommission."Ethics andInternational Affairs
26.1 (2011): 2012.
35
Clapp, Jennifer. "The Illegal CFC Trade: An UnexpectedWrinklein the Ozone ProtectionRegime."International Environmental Affairs 9.4
(1997): 259-73. RetrievedonMay 2,2015from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.4901&rep=rep1&type=pdf
36
Clapp, Jennifer. "The Illegal CFC Trade: An UnexpectedWrinklein the Ozone ProtectionRegime."International Environmental Affairs 9.4
(1997): 259-73. RetrievedonMay 2,2015 from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.4901&rep=rep1&type=pdf

7. Bradley Van Rooy
7
maximize their profit margins through restricting the market. 37 The benefits of the regulation
were “enjoyed by many” while the costs were “borne by few” industry leaders. 38 The ability of
the international community to effectively bring in the “influence of industry” 39 and ensure they
would “not lose-out” 40 determined the success of the Montreal Protocol. The Montreal Protocol
additionally “provides further flexibility by setting different timetables for developed and
developing countries to achieve designated reductions in ozone-depleting substances.” 41 The
Montreal Protocol also “goes beyond… multilateral funds to help developing countries reduce
their use of the controlled substances” 42 effectively combating non-compliance. Additionally, it
further targets non-compliance by prohibiting “the use of the exceptions as an easy way out for
individual members unhappy with specific decisions…” 43 Lastly, it offers a “workable
procedure for adding new families of chemicals to the roster of regulated or banned
substances…” 44 Since 1950s up until the 1990s, the effective chlorine values and the
atmospheric values of ODSs steadily increased, and the peaks appears around late 1990s-early
2000. The global production of CFC’s dropped “sharply in 1994, when the high income
countries” were “obliged to reduce production to one-quarter of 1989 levels.” 45 Then by 1996,
“developed countries production” dropped to zero leaving “all remaining production… due to
developing countries” which eventually come “under Protocol control in 2005, when production
must fall to 50% of 2002 levels.” 46 Eventually by the year 2010 “all production is banned.” 47
Most recent reports have shown that these measurements have dramatically decreased since
2000, and now most of them are much lower than the base level in 1980s. Montreal Protocol has
been successful in reducing the ozone-depleting substances.48
In regards to the Montreal Protocol, from a counterfactual standpoint suppose that “CFC
growth and ozone depletion expected had not the CFC threat to the ozone layer been identified in
1974.” 49 Under this scenario “For at least two decades extending into the early 1970’s… the
global production of CFC’s showed rapid free-market growth... at a rate of about 10 per cent a
37
Grundmann, Reiner. "Climate Change andKnowledge Politics." Environmental Politics: 414-32.
38
Grundmann, Reiner. "Climate Change andKnowledge Politics." Environmental Politics: 414-32.
39
Grundmann, Reiner. "Climate Change andKnowledge Politics." Environmental Politics: 414-32.
40
Vanner, Robin. "Ex-post Estimates of Costs toBusiness of EU Environmental Policies: A Case Study Lookingat Ozone Depleting
Substances." (2006).Retrievedon April 11, 2015from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/ex_post/pdf/ozone.pdf
41
Peach, J. Dexter. International Environment International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored : Report to Congressional Requesters.
Washington,D.C.: U.SGeneral AccountingOffice,1992.2-60.
42
Peach, J. Dexter. International Environment International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored : Report to Congressional Requesters.
Washington,D.C.: U.SGeneral AccountingOffice,1992.2-60.
43
Peach, J. Dexter. International Environment International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored : Report to Congressional Requesters.
Washington,D.C.: U.SGeneral AccountingOffice,1992.2-60.
44
Young, Oran R. Institutional Dynamics Emergent Patterns in International Environmental Governance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 2010. 165-
203. Print.
45
Mason, Robin, andTimothySwanson. TheImpact ofInternationalEnvironmental Agreements: The Case of the MontrealProtocol. Oxford
EconomicPapers 2003, 1-30. Web. Retrievedon April 10,. 2015 from http://www.feem.it/getpage.aspx?id=1027&sez=Publications&padre=73
46
Mason, Robin, andTimothySwanson. TheImpact ofInternational Environmental Agreements: The Case of the Montreal Protocol. Oxford
EconomicPapers 2003, 1-30. Web. Retrievedon April 10,. 2015 from http://www.feem.it/getpage.aspx?id=1027&sez=Publications&padre=73
47
Mason, Robin, andTimothySwanson. The Impact of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of theMontreal Protocol. Oxford
EconomicPapers 2003, 1-30. Web. Retrievedon April 10,. 2015 from http://www.feem.it/getpage.aspx?id=1027&sez=Publications&padre=73
48
National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration. ScientificAssessment of Ozone Depletion: 2002. RetreivedonApril 10, 2015 from
http://esrl.noaa.gov/csd/assessments/ozone/2002/
49
Prather, M., Midgley, P., Rowland, F. S., andStolarski, R.: The ozonelayer: The roadnot taken, Nature,381, 551–554,
doi:10.1038/381551a0, 1996.

8. Bradley Van Rooy
8
year.”50 Thus “If we had ignored the scientific evidence, or not had it at all, ozone depletion
would be dramatically worse than that which we are controlling today.”51 This counterfactual
scenario identifies the actual need of the Montreal Protocol regulation, as industry would not
have curbed their production of CFC without regulation according to the upward trend of
production.
There are multiple factors contributed to the success of the Montreal Protocol: 1)
negotiation is heavily on leadership and innovation approaches; 2) chemicals and sectors are
clearly laid out, which allows governments prioritize early; 3) the Protocol provides a stable
framework that allows long-term research and innovation for chemicals industries; 4) the
Protocol established an independent expert panel, Technology and Economic Assessment Panel,
aiming at helping committed countries make solid and timely decision on complex issues; 5)
flexibility of the Protocol allows stricter controls later on by amending the Protocol; 6) the
Multilateral Fund provides funding and institutional support for the developing countries; 7)
trade provisions allows only the trade among committed countries, which further lead to more
participation of non-committed countries to the Protocol.52 The Kyoto Protocol has very similar
aspects, compared to the Montreal Protocol, however, it’s considered not as successful as the
Montreal Protocol.
The Kyoto protocol, established in 1997, legally came into effect in 2005. The
international environmental agreement excluded three of the leading emitter countries: China and
India never signed the treaty, and the United States signed but never ratified the protocol.
According to the treaty, members set the target emission based on the emission level in 1990,
and the targets on average is to cut 5 percent from 1990 to 2012. According to national reports53
54, twenty one countries met their emission targets, however, most of them contribute very little
to the global greenhouse gases emission. Most of the leading emitter countries didn’t meet their
target of reduction; instead, their emission of CO2 increased by up to ~15%, which indicates the
failure of Kyoto protocol. There are many different agents which affect the atmosphere and it is
not clear about the impacts of environmental change on sustainability. The Kyoto Protocol is at
its initial enforcing phase, and the framework is still not quite clear. For example, it is unclear
about the rules of governing emission trading, joint implementation, the clean development
mechanism and the treatment of carbon sinks.55 The international negotiation process rarely
offers guidance on estimating the costs of implementing emission reduction.
Kyoto Protocol has been widely considered as a failure, while the IWC and the Montreal
Protocol have been a tremendous success in terms of fulfilling their goals, the Kyoto Protocol,
has been involved in numerous controversies between nations, developing countries and
50
Prather, M., Midgley, P., Rowland, F. S., andStolarski, R.: The ozonelayer: The roadnot taken, Nature, 381, 551–554,
doi:10.1038/381551a0, 1996.
51
Prather, M., Midgley, P., Rowland, F. S., andStolarski, R.: The ozonelayer: The roadnot taken, Nature,381, 551–554,
doi:10.1038/381551a0, 1996.
52
Rae, Ian. Savingthe ozone layer: why the Montreal Protocol worked. The Conversation,September 9,2012. RetrievedonApril 10, 2015
from http://theconversation.com/saving-the-ozone-layer-why-the-montreal-protocol-worked-9249
53
UNFCC. SubmittedNational Communications. Retrievedon April 10, 2015from
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/items/7742.php
54
Gelis, Steven. Kyoto Protocol, 10years later: Diddeal to combat greenhouse emissions work andwhat of its future? National Post, February
14, 2015. Retrievedon April 30, 2015 from http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/kyoto-protocol-10-years-later-was-the-deal-to-combat-
greenhouse-emissions-successful-and-what-of-its-future
55
Manne, A. S., & Richels, R. G. (2000). The KyotoProtocol: a cost-effectivestrategy for meetingenvironmental objectives?. In Efficiency and
Equity of ClimateChange Policy (pp. 43-61).Springer Netherlands.

9. Bradley Van Rooy
9
developed countries. According to Article 11, developed countries also need to provide
additional financial resources for the fees incurred by developing countries, for the transfer of
technologies and for the full incremental costs to support the fees incurred by developing
countries. Within the Kyoto Protocol framework, no countries that have ratified are able to meet
the target level of reduction of emission. There are multiple challenges on Kyoto protocol
negotiation and effectiveness. First of all, nations are treated unequally in terms of their emission
level. The protocol only agreed on the regulation of developed countries, while developing
countries, such as China and India which are big emitters of greenhouse gases, are not within the
protocol range. Secondly, the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States, has
less incentives to agree on the protocol with the concern of its economic development.
Additionally, the protocol doesn’t provide a stable framework that allows long-term research and
innovation. The base year and emission base unit (not per capita) used in the protocol are also
controversial or not clear enough. These set hurdles on the Kyoto protocol, and nations would
make policies at their best interests without violating the protocol, which ultimately cause the
tragedy of the commons. Despite its failure, the Kyoto Protocol was the first attempt to test
various ideas regarding to international environment issues, including clean development, joint
implementation and emission trading. Unlike ozone-depleting substances in the Montreal
Protocol, greenhouse gases affect more of individuals daily lives’ through signs of extreme
weather, droughts, etc…
Many claim the Kyoto Protocol was an important tool for sustainable development, but
how can such a limited protocol restricted to just developing countries be so effective?
Sustainable development is often defined as “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 56 57 However,
throughout the years this definition has expanded to encompass three essential aspects: (i)
environmentally, renewable natural resources shouldn’t be over-exploited, while nonrenewable
resources should be depleted at the reasonable pace that adequate substitutes are produced; (ii)
economically, goods and services should be produced on a continuing basis while balancing
agricultural protection and industrial production, (iii) socially, there exists equity in distribution
and opportunity, while providing adequate social services including health, education, gender
equity, political accountability, and participation. 58
Sustainable development requires and achieves balance among all these three aspects,
through compromises and trade-offs between measures that advance one aspect while causing
harm to another. 59 Environmental sustainable systems must maintain biodiversity, atmospheric
stability, and other ecosystem functions not classified as economic resources. Economic
sustainable systems must maintain different kinds of capital that provide for economic
production, such as manufactured capital, natural capital, human capital, and social capital, most
of which are complementary. 60 Social sustainable systems must fulfill most basic health and
educational needs, and provide for participatory democracy, both crucial elements of
development.
56
Brundtland, G. H. WCED (1987) Our commonfuture. World commission onenvironment and development. OxfordUniversityPress, Oxford
57
Bojo, J., Maler, K. G., & Unemo, L.(1992). Environment and development: aneconomic approach (p.211).Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
58
Harris, J. M. (2003). Sustainabilityandsustainable development. Internet Encyclopediaof Ecological Economics.
59
Munasinghe, M., (2000) Development,equity and sustainability (DES)in the context of Climate Change.In ClimateChange andits linkages
with development,equity andsustainability, M. MunasingheandR. Swart (eds.), Intergovernmental Panel onClimateChange,Geneva.
60
Harris, J. M. (2003). Sustainabilityandsustainable development. Internet Encyclopediaof Ecological Economics.

10. Bradley Van Rooy
10
Though seemingly straight forward, sustainable development is seen very differently by
each stakeholder in the international arena. For instance, ecologists and economists have two
different points of view when it comes to debates over natural resources: ecologists place a value
on natural resources which goes beyond their productive use holding they cannot be substituted
by an form of capital; while economists hold the opposite position, that as long as productive
capacity is maintained, natural resources can be consumed and substituted by other forms of
capital. On one hand, human population and total resources demand must be controlled, on the
other hand, the market mechanism more tends to deplete and degrade the natural capital.
With the framework of sustainability in mind, it is clear that the Kyoto protocol fails to
meet the standard set by sustainable development. The fact, that the Kyoto Protocol still has yet
to go into effect, that it excludes many actors who are part of the international environmental
issue and the fact that it fails to effectively address many economic concerns of transition costs,
shows that the Kyoto Protocol was highly ineffective. However, the intersection between the
Kyoto Protocol and sustainable development stands to teach many scholars, based upon the
Kyoto Protocol’s failures with sustainability how to best, in the future, develop international
policy to incorporate sustainable development in a meaningful way.
In this paper, I have discussed the how the Kyoto Protocol fits within the frame of the
Tragedy of the Commons and upstream/downstream problems; I have successfully identified the
successes and failures of the Kyoto Protocol in comparison to international environmental
agreements such as the IWC and the Montreal Protocol; and I have effectively identified how the
Kyoto Protocol fails to meet the standards set by sustainable development policy. Though the
Kyoto Protocol was deemed a failure in its effectiveness it is undeniable that it was a good first
attempt at solving greenhouse gas emissions by trying a different flexible mechanism than
policies before. Scholars, can learn from the failure of this agreement to assist in the successful
creation of new international environmental agreements down the road.
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