1. From Superquinn to SuperValu:
Corporate Rebranding in Ireland’s
Grocery Retail Sector
Charlie Geoghegan B.A.
Management Research Project presented towards the award of
Postgraduate Diploma in Management & Marketing
Dublin Institute of Technology
Aungier Street
College of Business
School of Marketing
Supervisor: Gerry Mortimer
September 2014
2. Declaration
I hereby certify that the material which is submitted in this paper towards the award of a
Postgraduate Diploma in Management & Marketing is entirely my own work and has not
been submitted for any academic assessment other than part-fulfilment of the award named
above.
Signature of candidate: ………………………………………………………………………
Date: ……………………….
3. Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor, Gerry Mortimer, for his help throughout the process. I
wish him all the best upon his retirement.
Thanks to all the students and faculty at DIT’s School of Marketing who have made the
previous year such an enjoyable and worthwhile one.
Thanks to my colleagues at SuperValu Sutton. I truly appreciate the support and the
flexibility afforded to me over the course of the past year, enabling me to do as well as I
possibly can.
Thanks to my parents Jimmy and Kate, always so supportive.
5. 2.5.6 Change Management...............................................................................................13
2.6 The Rebranding Process.................................................................................................13
2.6.1 Research and Analysis.............................................................................................13
2.6.2 Planning...................................................................................................................14
2.6.3 Implementation........................................................................................................15
2.6.4 Evaluation................................................................................................................16
2.7 The Effects of Rebranding .............................................................................................16
Chapter Three: Research Methodology ..................................................................................18
3.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................19
3.2 Qualitative Research ......................................................................................................19
3.3 The Case Study Approach..............................................................................................19
3.4 Research Question..........................................................................................................19
3.5 Study Propositions .........................................................................................................20
3.6 Validity...........................................................................................................................20
3.7 Design.............................................................................................................................20
3.8 Sources of Evidence.......................................................................................................21
3.9 Analytic Strategy............................................................................................................22
Chapter Four: Case Study........................................................................................................23
4.1 Historical Background....................................................................................................24
4.2 The 2000s: A Decade of Decline ...................................................................................24
4.3 The Musgrave Influence.................................................................................................25
4.4 Time for a Change..........................................................................................................27
4.5 In the Meantime .............................................................................................................27
4.6 A New Beginning...........................................................................................................29
Chapter Five: Discussion.........................................................................................................30
5.1 Study Propositions .........................................................................................................31
5.1.1 Study Proposition I..................................................................................................31
5.1.2 Study Proposition II.................................................................................................31
5.1.3 Study Proposition III ...............................................................................................32
5.1.4 Study Proposition IV ...............................................................................................34
5.1.5 Study Proposition V.................................................................................................34
5.1.6 Study Proposition VI ...............................................................................................35
5.2 Why was Superquinn rebranded as SuperValu? ............................................................36
6. 5.2.1 Growth.....................................................................................................................36
5.2.2 Cost Saving..............................................................................................................37
5.3 How was Superquinn rebranded as SuperValu? ............................................................37
5.3.1 Promotion ................................................................................................................37
5.3.2 Execution.................................................................................................................38
Chapter Six: Conclusion ..........................................................................................................40
6.1 Conclusion of Findings ..................................................................................................41
6.2 Limitations .....................................................................................................................42
6.3 Further Research ............................................................................................................43
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................44
7. Abstract
Title: From Superquinn to SuperValu: Corporate Rebranding in Ireland’s Grocery Retail
Sector
Author: Charlie Geoghegan
Taking a case study approach, the present paper qualitatively investigates the phenomenon of
corporate rebranding using as an exemplar the rebranding of the Irish grocery retail multiple
Superquinn as SuperValu in early 2014. The primary objective was to explore why and how
rebranding occurred. An in-depth review of the literature yielded a conceptualisation of
rebranding as existing along a “continuum” with the poles “evolutionary” and
“revolutionary”, and identified reasons why companies rebrand, the strategies they adopt, and
the potential benefits and risks involved. These insights provided the theoretical framework
for the choice, design, and execution of an exploratory, single-case embedded case study,
which revealed that the renaming of Superquinn as SuperValu was an act of revolutionary
rebranding initiated for reasons of corporate growth and cost-saving. Using the strategy of
brand integration, the Superquinn brand was dropped and the stores were absorbed into the
larger SuperValu network. The implementation stage of the process, which was promoted
through advertising and public relations, saw the launch of two own-brand ranges into
Superquinn stores, the use of integrated marketing communications materials featuring the
message “We Believe Together is Better”.
9. 2
1. Introduction
Superquinn was an Irish grocery multiple, founded in 1960 by Feargal Quinn. Though a small
player relative to the size of the market, the company built up a reputation for excellence in
customer service, fresh food and tireless innovation. It remained family-owned until 2005,
when it was acquired by property development consortium Select Retail Holdings. The chain
found itself in trouble as the economy worsened. In 2011, Superquinn’s debtors placed the
firm into receivership. Before long it was acquired once again, this time by Cork-based
Musgrave Group, the largest grocery group in the country and parent of the SuperValu
network of franchised stores.
In February 2014, after 54 years in business, Superquinn’s network of 24 stores was renamed
SuperValu. The present dissertation will explore the phenomenon of corporate rebranding
using this case as an exemplar. The paper will attempt to answer the underlying research
question, “Why and how was Superquinn rebranded as SuperValu?”
The area of corporate rebranding has been chosen because it is a contemporary issue
spanning both management and marketing. As a body of literature it is relatively small but
growing at a fast pace. The literature is replete with case study research into companies big
and small that have rebranded.
The specific case of Superquinn’s rebranding as SuperValu has been chosen because:
i. The current author has been employed by Superquinn, now SuperValu, for just under
a decade. Informal participant observation on the author’s part during this time has led
to an interest in the company’s activities generally, and the recent rebranding exercise
specifically.
ii. Because the rebranding of Superquinn as SuperValu is such a recent phenomenon
(having occurred seven months prior to the time of writing), there has been no
academic research into the case to date. As such, the case is one suitable for an
exploratory qualitative research project.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows.
Chapter 2, a review of the literature on the subject, will provide the paper with the theoretical
underpinnings necessary to deal thoroughly with the subject.
10. 3
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology behind the research component of the paper. Opting for
secondary analysis of qualitative data, an exploratory case study approach will be adopted.
The chapter will explain the rationale behind this choice as well as addressing issues of
validity, case study design, evidence gathering and analytic strategy.
The case study itself is reported upon in Chapter 4. In light of extensive secondary research,
the chapter will recount Superquinn’s early successes; more recent problems; its 2011
acquisition by the Musgrave Group; and, ultimately, the company’s rebranding as SuperValu.
In Chapter 5, the case study is discussed and analysed. A series of six study propositions are
evaluated before the aforementioned research question is answered.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the paper by summarising the main findings, acknowledging the
limitations of the present study, and identifying areas for further research.
12. 5
2.1 Corporate Rebranding
Corporate rebranding can be placed within the wider context of branding and brand
management. It is defined as “the creation of a new name, term, symbol, design or a
combination of them for an established brand with the intention of developing a differentiated
(new) position in the mind of stakeholders and competitors” (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006, p.
805).
Corporate rebranding is a business phenomenon in which theory lags behind practice
(Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006). As more firms are rebranding, and at a faster rate, than
academics are studying and writing about the area, the existing literature is relatively recent
and is dwarfed by business media and practitioner reports. Only over the last decade has
academic interest in the area really started to grow, and scholarly publications on the subject
have started to appear more frequently and widely.
In order to build the solid theoretical foundation that the discussion and analysis of the
present case study on Superquinn’s rebranding to SuperValu requires, this chapter will
review available and relevant literature on the subject.
For the purpose of this paper, the term “corporate rebranding” will be used interchangeably
with a number of alternative terms from the literature including “rebranding”, “brand
transfer” (Kapferer, 2008) and “brand rechristening” (Kaikati & Kaikati, 2004).
To better illustrate the intricacy of the rebranding process, the next section will consider the
notion of the rebranding continuum.
2.2 The Rebranding Continuum
Rebranding is a nuanced and complex process, and the extent of the changes that are brought
about varies considerably. In light of this, it is useful to conceptualise it as existing along a
continuum (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004; Daly & Moloney, 2004; Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006;
Gotsi & Andriopoulos, 2007). At one end, the changes that are brought about are small and
“evolutionary”; at the other end, they are transformative, profound and “revolutionary”.
2.2.1 Evolutionary Rebranding
It would appear that the evolutionary rebranding located at one end of the spectrum is
common to all firms over time (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004; Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006; Gotsi
& Andriopoulos, 2007). Changes of an evolutionary nature are small, cosmetic, and
13. 6
superficial, such as adjustments to the design of an existing logo or the phrasing of a
corporate slogan (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004). Furthermore, evolutionary rebranding can be
considered as just another aspect of managing brand equity over time (Kaikati & Kaikati,
2003). Changes such as those outlined above are necessary to maintain the relevance and
desirability of brand equity in the long run. In evolutionary rebranding, any changes to brand
positioning in this instance tend to be minor and insignificant (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006).
It has been suggested that the goal of an evolutionary rebrand is to refresh and revitalise the
existing brand without significant change to its more fundamental aspects such as vision or
values (Gotsi & Andriopoulos, 2007). As the marketplace evolves over time, so too should
the brand. As a result, any rebranding effort at this end of the continuum should strike a
balance between brand progression (to the extent of remaining relevant in an evolving
marketplace) while remaining true to core brand ideology (Merrilees & Miller, 2008). Thus it
can be surmised that evolutionary rebranding can and does occur without much fanfare, and
should be a regular, albeit subtle, weapon in the arsenal of any manager of brands and brand
equity (Daly & Moloney, 2004).
2.2.2 Revolutionary Rebranding
Revolutionary rebranding is located at the opposite end of the continuum. As the label
suggests, this process is of greater significance and is more outwardly visible to customers
and other stakeholders. While evolutionary rebranding is about minor changes to brand
aesthetics and positioning, revolutionary rebranding involves major changes across these
areas, and is generally accompanied by a name change (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006). The
literature is replete with detailed cases of revolutionary rebranding, including Eircell to
Vodafone (Daly & Moloney, 2004; Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006), Andersen Consulting to
Accenture (Kaikati, 2003) and Telecom Eireann to eircom. (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006), to
name but a few. In each case, the company in question underwent profound changes in terms
of brand aesthetics and positioning, culminating in a new brand name, image, identity, and
associations. Consistent with Stuart and Muzellec’s observations (2004), these revolutionary
rebranding exercises had in common the fact that in each case the name, logo and slogan of
the company was changed.
However, in spite of these similarities, each case was unique in the rationale behind it, the
strategies chosen for it, and the particular risks and challenges facing it. The next section will
outline the various reasons that a company may have for rebranding.
14. 7
2.3 Reasons for Rebranding
The literature identifies a number of reasons why a firm may decide to rebrand. This decision
may be voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary rebranding may be prompted by strategic
decisions to expand into new territories, to target new segments, or to reposition and
propagate an entirely new image or offering. Involuntary decisions to rebrand, which are less
common, are prompted, for example, by legal and regulatory forces, imposed upon or beyond
the control of management.
2.3.1 Mergers and Acquisitions
A common thread across much of the literature is that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a
key driving force in global rebranding activity (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2008; Merrilees &
Miller, 2008; Daly & Moloney, 2004; Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006; Lambkin & Muzellec,
2008). Stemming from an increase in growth through M&As, there is a trend towards brand
consolidation or standardisation (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2008). Following an M&A, the larger
company, or the acquirer, will seek to absorb the smaller or acquired company under its own
master brand. Alternatively, an M&A may result in counter-takeover rebranding (see 2.4.10
below), where the acquiring company assumes the brand name of the acquired company
(Kaikati & Kaikati, 2003).
2.3.2 Image-Related Rebranding
There are a number of image-related reasons why a company may choose to rebrand:
It may believe that the current brand image and associated values, though not
unfavourable, no longer adequately reflect the company or its activities. Evolutionary
or minor aesthetic changes may be sufficient to remedy this (Muzellec & Lambkin,
2008; Dubey, 2014; Kapferer, 2008).
Some image-related issues require a more revolutionary overhaul. Where the
company has a negative public perception, as was the case with the former state-
owned telecommunications monopoly Telecom Eireann, and is associated with
bureaucracy and inefficiency, a rebrand may enable it to move past such negativity
(Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006).
Regardless of individual company credentials, some industries inherently attract for
its players a negative image. Given enough time, negative sentiment may become so
great that the company abandons its established brand outright just to get away from
15. 8
it. This was the case when tobacco giant Philip Morris, by any measure a successful
company, rebranded itself as Altria (Phang Ing, 2012).
2.3.3 Legal Requirements
As indicated above, rebranding is not always a voluntary exercise. The decision to rebrand
may be taken not by senior management but instead imposed on the company by an
arbitrator, judge or other legal official. Kaikati (2003) outlines the case of one such
involuntary rebrand, where Andersen Consulting was legally forced to undergo rebranding,
which led to it changing its name to Accenture. This was also the case when Yves Saint
Laurent had to rebrand one of its products as a result of a legal challenge from the
Champagne region in France (Kapferer, 2008).
2.3.4 Diversification
To achieve and sustain growth, a company may need to target segments outside of its
traditional customer base. As a result, it may need to engage in activities outside its existing
remit, or in contention with established brand values (Merrilees & Miller, 2008; Luck, 2012).
The current brand name, image and stakeholder associations may inhibit such diversification
because of perceived limitations in the scope of its activities, as described in the case of
Guinness’ rebrand to Diageo (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2008). Revising the existing brand can
facilitate the addition of new brand attributes, better enabling the firm to serve the needs and
wants of such new segments or markets (Luck, 2012).
2.3.5 Repositioning
Not unrelated to the point above, the desire to reposition on a small scale may be realised by
minor, evolutionary adjustments (Merrilees & Miller, 2008). A change in slogan alone can be
an effective means through which to reflect a change in brand positioning (Stuart &
Muzellec, 2004). In more revolutionary terms, renaming can quite effectively alter the
brand’s positioning (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006).
2.3.6 Expansion
Where a brand is intrinsically tied to a specific geographical territory, expansion into new
areas may be limited. To overcome such limitations, rebranding may be considered as a
means of more accurately communicating the growing geographic scope of the organisation,
as was the case for the Acton Leather Company (Merrilees & Miller, 2008). This was
illustrated on a global scale by the Midwest Compensation Association whose territorial
16. 9
expansion was reflected in two consecutive name changes, first to the American
Compensation Association and, eventually, to WorldatWork (Ruddy, 2000).
2.4 Rebranding Strategies
Reflecting the many reasons why, and situations in which, a company may decide to rebrand,
the literature offers a wide variety of strategies that firms can undertake when rebranding.
2.4.1 Interim/Dual
This strategy is recommended where one brand acquires another and the two are to become
one (Daly & Moloney, 2004). Prior to the outright renaming of the legacy brand, the new
entity should temporarily share the names of both the acquirer and the acquired. Such an
action enables the absorption of brand equity from the legacy brand into the new brand,
before abandoning the legacy brand altogether. This strategy was adopted successfully by
Vodafone following its acquisition of Eircell – the new entity was temporarily known as
Eircell-Vodafone before the legacy brand was dropped (Daly & Moloney, 2004; Muzellec &
Lambkin, 2006).
2.4.2 Prefix
Upon the merger of two or more brands, a completely new brand name is temporarily added
as a prefix to the legacy brand(s). In time, the legacy brands are removed altogether and the
prefix now solely constitutes the new brand (Daly & Moloney, 2004).
2.4.3 Substitution
Here, the changeover from one brand to another is swift and comprehensive (Daly &
Moloney, 2004). Kaikati and Kaikati (2003) refer to a nearly identical strategy – “sudden
eradication” (p. 21) – and recommend it in cases where the firm wishes to move away from
an existing, undesirable image or where a brand is considered to be dead or otherwise beyond
saving. Given the emotional attachments that stakeholders can develop for established
brands, Daly and Moloney (2004) warn that this strategy should be undertaken with extreme
caution and care.
2.4.4 Brand Amalgamation
This strategy is advocated in the case of a merger between two or more strong brands, where
both brand names are retained to some degree (Daly & Moloney, 2004). The intended result
is a rebranded entity greater than the sum of its constituent parts. Examples include
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Jurys Doyle Hotel Group (JDHG). It is argued that this
17. 10
strategy may lead to a long-winded name as all parties may have strong feelings as to how
much of their legacy brand remains in the revised name (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004).
2.4.5 Phase-In/Phase-Out
As outlined by Kaikati and Kaikati (2003), this strategy comprises two stages: the phase-in
stage introduces the new brand by linking it in some way with the legacy brand for a pre-
determined period of time. Then, during the phase-out stage, the legacy brand is gradually
phased out before being dropped altogether. This was the case, for example, when Disney
rebranded its Parisian theme park from “Euro Disney” to “Euro Disneyland” (with less
emphasis on the “Euro”), then to “Euro Disneyland Paris” and, finally, to “Disneyland Paris”.
2.4.6 Brand Integration
Symptomatic of a trend towards post-acquisition standardisation and consolidation of brands,
this strategy involves uniting the company and its constituent businesses and products under a
single brand name. The resulting enhanced corporate visibility empowers the firm to take
advantage of the associated increase in market share (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2008).
2.4.7 Brand Separation
The exact opposite of the aforementioned integration strategy, brand separation is undertaken
when the firm, for whatever reason, wishes to separate the master corporate brand from its
constituent businesses and products. This can be exemplified by Diageo’s separating its own
corporate brand from its constituent Guinness brand (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2008). In such a
situation, the desire is for the parent brand to be distinct and distinguishable from its
subsidiary brand(s).
2.4.8 Stealth
This strategy, according to Muzellec and Lambkin (2008), can be adopted in a merger
situation, prior to the actual rebranding and brand/name changeover. The firm should use this
interim period to quietly align and integrate the various operations and cultures as required by
the organisational transition. The brand changeover takes place only after this process is
complete and any associated issues have been resolved. As a result, there is minimal change
and disruption at the time of brand changeover. Potential negative impact of the change upon
brand equity is mitigated somewhat by the fact that any changes to the day-to-day operation
are already in place. Hence, they will cause minimal disruption to stakeholders and may not
even be associated with the actual brand changeover.
18. 11
2.4.9 Translucent Warning
This strategy aims to keep customers abreast of changes and developments by alerting them
before, during and after the rebranding process (Kaikati & Kaikati, 2003).
2.4.10 Counter-Takeover Rebranding
Contrary to conventional rebranding strategy following a takeover, this strategy sees the
acquirer rebrand itself as the entity which it has acquired. Such a strategy would befit a
situation where the acquired company’s brand is stronger, more popular, or more respected
than the acquirer’s (Kaikati & Kaikati, 2003). A hypothetical example (evaluated in Section
5.1.3) would be if Musgrave had adopted Feargal Quinn’s suggestion that it rebrand all of its
SuperValu stores under the Superquinn name (Burke-Kennedy, 2013).
2.4.11 Retrobranding
This strategy, described by Kaikati and Kaikati (2003), occurs when a firm reinstates a brand
name which it had previously abandoned, effectively reversing an earlier rebranding decision.
Kaikati and Kaikati (2004) cite the case of the direct marketing company Wunderman, who
in the space of one year rebranded to Impiric and then back to Wunderman. The British Post
Office had a somewhat similar experience when it changed its name to Consignia: under
pressure from public opinion it was forced to rename itself the Royal Mail Group (Stuart &
Muzellec, 2004).
2.5 Risks Associated with Rebranding
The decision to rebrand is not one which a company should take lightly (Kapferer, 2008).
The literature cites a great many potential risks associated with rebranding, any one of which
can have detrimental effects on the corporate brand. A number of areas of particular concern
include:
2.5.1 Brand Equity
Revolutionary corporate rebranding involves the abandonment of the established, legacy,
brand name. Such an act runs the risk of impacting negatively upon brand equity (Muzellec &
Lambkin, 2006). Intrinsic to the brand name may be favourable stakeholder sentiments,
expectations and associations. To abandon the name thus poses the threat of abandoning the
associated goodwill. Any venture on the company’s part towards changing the legacy brand
name must therefore take this very real threat into account (Gotsi & Andriopoulos, 2007). Far
from being some je ne sais quoi marketing concept, brand equity is also a quantifiable
19. 12
accounting term (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004). As will be discussed in Section 2.5.4, damaging
brand equity can have serious financial repercussions for the company.
2.5.2 Stakeholder Alienation
When rebranding, the firm must take care to include all relevant stakeholders in the process.
Over-emphasising shareholder interests without due consideration to those of other
stakeholders – particularly employees – runs the risk of alienating the latter (Gotsi &
Andriopoulos, 2007). What Gotsi and Andriopoulos call “stakeholder myopia” (p. 347), and
the associated failure to engage sufficiently in internal communication, can affect employee
morale and buy-in, resulting in frontline staff being unwilling or unable (or both) to
effectively live the new brand. The newly espoused corporate image is bound to suffer as a
result: “If a staff member is not actively supporting the corporate brand then they are diluting
the brand” (Merrilees & Miller, 2008, p. 547).
2.5.3 Market Share
Kapferer (2008) argues that rebranding involves abandoning an established brand, and that it
therefore removes an established player from the market. The new brand may not have the
same level of customer loyalty and as a result market share can be lost.
2.5.4 Cost
Even successful rebranding campaigns are expensive, drawing as they do upon the
company’s limited resources of finance, time and labour (Daly & Moloney, 2004; Kaikati,
2003). Stuart and Muzellec (2004) detail some of the many costs associated with the
rebranding process, which include the financial costs of changing a host of branded items and
equipment, and the opportunity cost implied by the additional drain on employees to deal
with the change aspect of the process – employees, who might otherwise be carrying out
other value-creating tasks. The status of brand equity as a financial accounting term, and its
associated value assigned to it on balance sheets is worthy of note. Stuart and Muzellec
(2004) cite the case of Swiss firm UBS, whose balance sheet lost $770 million as a result of
abandoning two very highly-valued brand names.
2.5.5 Superficiality
There are many reasons why a firm rebrands, and, by now it should be clear that there are
several good reasons to do so. However, rebranding is not a catch-all solution to the problems
of struggling businesses. Rebranding is a risky endeavour if it attempts to solve some
problem or another of the company by making only cosmetic changes while failing to address
20. 13
underlying systemic, organisational issues (Shetty, 2011; Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006). A
rebranding exercise may develop superficial “labels” such as a new name or logo, without
adequately translating them into new and understandable “meanings” with which staff can
identify (Gotsi & Andriopoulos, 2007, p. 348). Superficial changes that do not adequately
convince stakeholders of the merits of the rebranding can lead to poor morale, which may in
turn exacerbate existing organisational problems, as was the case when Telecom Eireann
rebranded to eircom (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006). To avoid this problem, it is suggested that
companies should research and analyse their own fundamental strengths and weaknesses
prior to making any rebranding decision (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004).
2.5.6 Change Management
Rebranding can be regarded as a change management initiative (Merrilees & Miller, 2008).
The importance of working cross-functional alignment and detailed planning into the overall
rebranding strategy should not be underestimated. This can be difficult to achieve for two
reasons, namely that people generally do not like change, and – as, by its very nature
rebranding can be a contentious and emotional issue – not everybody involved in the process
may be on the same page or see themselves as working towards the same goal (Stuart &
Muzellec, 2004). Furthermore, it is proposed that because rebranding as a change
management initiative requires considerable cross-functionality, organisations that have
many distinct and disparate divisions or “multiple identities” may have a particular challenge
in unifying and aligning all such divisions so that they actively identify with the new brand
(Gotsi & Andriopoulos, 2007, p. 349).
2.6 The Rebranding Process
While the literature is not unanimous on the best way for a company to carry out a rebranding
exercise, a number of case studies offer insights into how some companies have done so, with
varied results (Kaikati, 2003; Daly & Moloney, 2004; Muzellec & Lambkin, 2008; Merrilees
& Miller, 2008; Luck, 2012). This process can be distilled into four broad stages, which will
be outlined in the following subsections.
2.6.1 Research and Analysis
The seriousness of the rebranding decision requires that it should be preceded by research on,
and analysis of, the company’s current situation. Although the degree and methods of
research may vary from company to company, it is recommended that a balance be struck
21. 14
between quantitative and qualitative methods. Moreover, analysis at this stage should focus
on both internal and external issues (Daly & Moloney, 2004).
Understanding internal stakeholders – be they employees or senior managers – is of
considerable importance (Kaikati, 2003). As renaming can be a sore or emotional point for
stakeholders generally (Daly & Moloney, 2004), research should be undertaken to develop an
understanding of and an appreciation for the impact that such a change may have on staff and
management in order to better inform the later planning stages.
Externally, market analysis should take place to assess the competition and identify any
opportunities and threats. Brand audits may be used to gauge and evaluate how the brand is
currently viewed in the marketplace and the macro-environment. Both endeavours will
inform the later stages of the process (Daly & Moloney, 2004).
2.6.2 Planning
The importance of thorough and meticulous planning throughout the rebranding process
should not be overlooked. Furthermore, Daly and Moloney (2004) propose a formal planning
stage as a key part of the process. This planning stage forms the basis of the following sub-
sections.
2.6.2.1 Internal Communication
Having developed some insight into how the rebranding exercise may affect internal
stakeholders, it is recommended that the company plan and develop a customised
communication programme with this cohort in mind (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006). Internal
programmes may include work- and discussion groups (Kapferer, 2008); training
programmes (Daly & Moloney, 2004); the establishment of designated brand champions at
various organisational levels and the implementation of rewards schemes for those employees
seen to be living the brand (Causon, 2004); and inviting employees to special events, be they
live and in person or via webcast or other technological means (Kaikati, 2003). According to
Daly and Moloney (2004), any such programme should have the dual purpose of gaining
employee support (commonly referred to in the literature as “buy-in”) for the change and
providing training or information in relation to new company policies and procedures.
Achieving meaningful buy-in is crucial to the successful and smooth implementation of the
process by overcoming any resistance or ill will towards the new brand. Successful
implementation can ultimately give frontline and other staff a positive outlook towards the
22. 15
new brand, empowering them to bring it to life in-store (Merrilees & Miller, 2008).
Importantly, it is proposed that employees who truly buy into and live the values of the new
brand have the power to informally shape and influence how customers perceive and feel
about that new brand (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006).
2.6.2.2 Renaming/Rebranding Strategy
Building upon the insights gained through market analysis, a renaming (or rebranding)
strategy should be selected (Daly & Moloney, 2004). Section 2.4 above, provides an
extensive (though not exhaustive) list of potential rebranding strategies. The decision may be
made in-house, informed by prior research, although the use of an external agency such as a
brand consultancy is also a viable option (Kaikati, 2003; Luck, 2012). In addition, direct
stakeholder involvement in the name-generation process can yield successful results. This
was the case for Andersen Consulting’s rebranding campaign, where a senior manager based
in Oslo, Norway came up with the new name “Accenture” (Kaikati, 2003).
2.6.2.3 Rebranding Marketing Plan
Formal marketing planning is well established in the wider marketing literature (Burk Wood,
2011). It is suggested that, at this stage, the company should draw up a robust marketing plan
with respect to the ongoing rebranding effort, which is informed by the aforementioned steps
(Daly & Moloney, 2004).
2.6.3 Implementation
Implementation of the rebranding campaign requires marrying the revised corporate brand
with the firm’s various functional components (Merrilees & Miller, 2008). Opinions in the
literature differ as to how best the firm should implement its rebranding campaign. However,
there are several areas of consensus, which include:
2.6.3.1 Promotion
To a greater or lesser extent, the firm must promote its rebranding exercise in order to
communicate to its stakeholders that a change is taking place (Merrilees & Miller, 2008).
Advertising is a very popular medium through which the firm can communicate that it is
rebranding, and one that has been used to great effect by, among others, Vodafone (Daly &
Moloney, 2004) and Accenture (Kaikati, 2003). In the light of the high cost of advertising,
Merrilees and Miller (2008) suggest public relations and staff-involved in-store experiences
as possible alternatives.
23. 16
2.6.3.2 Execution
The revised brand must be brought to life visually in-store and across all company livery
(Merrilees & Miller, 2008). Furthermore, in revolutionary rebranding campaigns in which the
legacy brand is abandoned outright, a thorough audit of all existing signage, banners,
stationery, etc. is necessary in order to completely erase any trace of that brand (Daly &
Moloney, 2004). Where the rebranding involves changes to packaging design, it is
recommended that the firm invest in removing old stock from retailer shelves and replacing it
with the newly packaged products so as to maintain consistency after the launch of the
rebrand (Kapferer, 2008).
2.6.4 Evaluation
This is an ongoing stage in which the campaign is constantly and consistently monitored and
evaluated with a view to continuous improvement and refinement (Daly & Moloney, 2004).
To evaluate the relative success of a rebranding campaign, the firm may hire a market-
research or analytics agency or carry out its own research (Kaikati, 2003).
It is acknowledged that measuring the relative success or failure of a rebranding exercise is
difficult (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004). This is attributed to a lack of robust measurement
procedures and a tendency for firms to ascribe results too easily and too quickly to the
rebranding endeavour. The latter authors also stress that measurement should extend beyond
the marketing communications aspect of the campaign and should also consider longer-term,
more strategic measures.
2.7 The Effects of Rebranding
From the literature, a number of potential effects of rebranding can be identified:
Brand equity: Revising a brand will have some impact on brand equity, for better or
for worse. Even if the new brand is well-received, erasing the old one also erases an
associated non-cash value on the firm’s balance sheet (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004).
Lose customers: Rebranding a customer favourite may completely sever the
relationship of loyalty between brand and customer (Kapferer, 2008).
Confuse stakeholders: Particularly in situations where the legacy brand has been
revised to include a new, abstract logo or an uncommon name, confusion may arise as
to what aspects of the brand and its values have changed (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004).
24. 17
Gain entry into new markets: As discussed earlier, a legacy brand name may
intrinsically limit the firm to one particular market (Merrilees & Miller, 2008). Thus,
revising the brand may allow it greater scope to expand into other markets.
Furthermore, where foreign markets are seen as particularly difficult to get into, a
rebranding following a merger or acquisition may provide an entry route for an
international firm that may not otherwise have existed (Kapferer, 2008). This,
according to Muzellec and Lambkin (2006), is typical of Vodafone’s modus operandi
for entering new markets.
Reposition the firm: Revising the brand to a greater or larger extent can successfully
reposition it in the eyes of its stakeholders (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004).
Become the best-practice example: A rebranding exercise may be so successful that,
as in the case of Eircell’s rebrand to Vodafone (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006), it
becomes a blueprint for future campaigns.
Employee morale: Rebranding can affect employee morale in positive or negative
ways. When handled well with strong leadership and internal communication, it can
make employees feel as though they are a valued part of the process (Kaikati, 2003).
On the other hand, failure to consult employees as key stakeholders and to appreciate
their loyalty to the legacy brand may lead to resentment of, or suspicion towards, the
revised brand (Stuart & Muzellec, 2004).
26. 19
3.1 Introduction
Having examined the relevant literature on the topic of corporate rebranding in Chapter 2, the
present chapter will outline the methodology employed in secondary analysis conducted for
the current study.
3.2 Qualitative Research
Qualitative research is characterised by the use of multiple methods in an attempt to gain an
in-depth understanding of a given phenomenon (Hogan, Dolan, & Donnelly, 2009). It aims at
gathering and making sense of information in many, largely non-numeric, forms. This non-
numeric data is generally kept at the level of words, whereas quantitative methods may seek
to reduce its data to the level of single variables. To a far greater extent than its quantitative
counterpart, qualitative research focuses on the “perspectives of the participants and their
diversity” (Flick, 2009, p. 16). Hence, a qualitative approach is well suited to the study of
complex situations and phenomena. Characteristic of qualitative research is that it is
purposive in nature, often interested in studying a subject or object specifically chosen due to
some unique circumstance or characteristic that is of interest to the researcher or the research
topic.
3.3 The Case Study Approach
Yin (2009, p. 2) recommends the case study approach over available alternatives when:
“(a) “how” or “why” questions are being posed
(b) the investigator has little control over events
(c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context.”
Given how closely the Superquinn rebranding situation meets these criteria, the case study
approach has thus been chosen. More specifically, the present research will take the form of
an exploratory case study, recommended in situations where the investigator is interested in
an analytical or conceptual issue, perhaps broad in nature and featuring conjecture derived
from theory, observation or experience (Roche, 1997).
3.4 Research Question
The research question that forms the point of departure of the present study is: Why and how
was Superquinn rebranded as SuperValu?
27. 20
3.5 Study Propositions
The following study propositions will guide and inform the current research with a view to
answering the research question:
I. Renaming Superquinn as SuperValu was an act of revolutionary rebranding.
II. Abandoning the Superquinn brand name jeopardised 54 years’ worth of brand equity.
III. A strategy of counter-takeover rebranding could have been a viable alternative to that
of brand integration, at least in Dublin.
IV. Musgrave’s initial acquisition of Superquinn was made with the long-term intention
of rebranding.
V. The Superquinn brand was already damaged beyond repair prior to the Musgrave
acquisition.
VI. The Superquinn business in its then form was unsustainable.
3.6 Validity
To ensure the quality of the current research, the following four tests are considered (Yin,
2009):
Construct validity: With respect to the observation of correct operational measures,
it was endeavoured to draw data from multiple sources of evidence.
Internal validity: As the current case study is exploratory in nature, this test is not
relevant.
External validity: In order to adequately define the extent to which the research
findings can be generalised, the case study is predicated on the theoretical research
question and study propositions as set out in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. The findings of the
study cannot and should not be generalised beyond the breadth of this domain.
Reliability: So that the operations of the current study, including data collection and
other procedures, can be repeated and with the same results, an extensive case study
database has been compiled. All works cited are included in the bibliography.
3.7 Design
The following research takes the form of an exploratory case study (Roche, 1997) in which
“[t]he researcher’s main purpose is to explored the basic properties or dynamics revealed in
the case…to contribute to theory or model building” (Roche, 1997, p. 108). More
28. 21
specifically, the design adopted is a single-case embedded case study, with a chronological
compositional structure (Yin, 2009).
The case in question is the recent rebranding of Superquinn’s 24 stores to SuperValu, and the
two embedded units of analysis are:
1. The decisions made leading up to, during and following the rebrand
2. The actions taken during the implementation stage of the rebranding programme.
The rationale for choosing a single case over multiple cases to address the research question
is that the chosen case represents the critical case in testing the theory formulated above. The
research question and study propositions outlined in sections 3.4 and 3.5 have been
formulated within the specific context of this particular case. In using the single-case design,
it is hoped to confirm, challenge, or extend the formulated theory as set out above.
3.8 Sources of Evidence
Following Yin’s (2009) guidelines, the case evidence will primarily come from:
Documentation: Given that the research conducted is secondary in nature, a wide
selection of documentation will be drawn from, including business media, relevant
academic journals, reports and studies. Yin notes that documentation may not contain
the unmitigated truth and will invariably have been written for a purpose and an
audience other than the current case study. As such, efforts have been made to draw
from as wide a pool of documentation as possible.
Physical artefacts: A limited number of physical artefacts will be presented as case
evidence, with explicit reference made to the digital editions of a number of corporate
marketing materials.
Following Yin (Yin, 2009), two principles will be adhered to throughout in order to maximise
the benefits of these data types:
Use multiple sources of evidence: Although it can be sufficient to use just one type
of evidence (Yin, 2009), the present case study’s data collection efforts include two
types, namely documentation and physical artefacts. The benefit of doing so lies in
the concept of data triangulation, whereby different sources can be used to
complement, corroborate or dispute others. This is necessary because not all sources
29. 22
will be inherently reliable. This type of triangulation minimises the potential for bias
of any kind and helps improve construct validity.
Creating a case study database: Developments in Microsoft Word allow for the
author to maintain a running case study database throughout the process. The database
is available in a robust, orderly and formal fashion and as such assists in the reliability
of the case study. Hence, another investigator could repeat the process by engaging
with the source material and expect to achieve the same results.
3.9 Analytic Strategy
In order to analyse the case study evidence collected, Yin’s (2009) strategy of relying on
theoretical propositions will be employed. As the theoretical propositions set out in Sections
3.4 and 3.5 above (the research question and study propositions, respectively) have guided
and informed the collection of evidence, it is desirable that they remain the focus for the case
study analysis.
31. 24
4.1 Historical Background
The Superquinn story began with the opening of a single outlet, Quinn’s Supermarket, in
Dundalk in 1960. Founder Feargal Quinn’s overarching philosophy was to give his customer
a reason to come back – his famous “Boomerang Principle” (Quinn, 1996, p. 6). With a
passion for customer service, a focus on specialising in fresh food, and a penchant for tireless
innovation (O'Callaghan & Wilcox, 2000), Superquinn became a middle-class institution
(Pope, 2013). Over the next five decades the company expanded into a network of 24 stores,
primarily located in affluent parts of the greater Dublin region such as Sutton and Blackrock.
In an interview in 1989, Quinn revealed that the firm had at that point been profitable for
each of the preceding 29 years in which it had been operational, publicly announcing a pre-
tax profit of £2.7 million for the previous financial year (Dunne, 1989).
4.2 The 2000s: A Decade of Decline
Despite this sustained success, the new millennium brought with it new challenges for the
business. Competition intensified. Having entered the market in 1997, Tesco was not long in
gaining a considerable market share, and, due to its huge scale, it was able to compete largely
on price (O'Callaghan & Wilcox, 2002). The arrival of the German hard discounters, Lidl and
Aldi, had a profound impact on the Irish grocery sector (Pope, 2014). Their model in the
early 2000s was poles apart from Superquinn’s: store ambience was minimal, range relatively
small and customer service not a priority.
In the face of such stiff competition, family-owned Superquinn found itself in difficulties.
Presciently, the Quinn family sold the business to Irish property consortium Select Retail
Holdings; the deal was finalised in early 2005. At the time, the business media suggested that
the acquisition may have had as much to do with Superquinn’s considerable property
portfolio as with any interest in the company’s retail operation (Curran, 2005). Nonetheless,
investments were made in the existing store network and expansion into new store locations.
Furthermore, a new growth strategy was formulated whereby the firm would target the top
end of the market. Championed by new chief executive Simon Burke, this lucrative segment
was targeted through a decidedly luxury offering, with an emphasis once again on quality,
while also drawing inspiration from premium operators in other markets, such as Whole
Foods in the US and Albert Heijn in Holland (Beesley, 2005).
In terms of its philosophy, this strategy was not dissimilar from Feargal Quinn’s own winning
formula (O'Halloran, 2011). Historically, Quinn had looked to foreign markets for innovative
32. 25
new ideas to introduce to the Irish market (Quinn, 2013). Against the backdrop of Ireland’s
seemingly endless financial prosperity at the time, targeting the higher end of the market was
a reasonable strategy. High-end products commanding a higher price tag – offset largely by
the promise of superior customer service – could reasonably be expected to yield higher
profit margins than an offer based primarily on price. In the short-term, it paid off: By
September 2008, Superquinn had returned to profitability and its operating business
(excluding its property portfolio) was valued at between €250 and €300 million. The
company was opening new outlets and the ultimate aim was to increase the network to 35
stores (Hancock, 2008).
However, this growth spurt and period of investment was cut short in the autumn of 2008,
when the world economy went into recession: Superquinn’s latest store at Portlaoise had
barely been open a fortnight when the collapse of the Lehman Brothers that September led to
the greatest economic crisis in living memory. Disposable income plummeted and
Superquinn’s high-end offering quickly became a luxury that most could now ill afford.
Indeed the very luxury image it had strived to propagate over the preceding years now
weighed heavily against the chain, associated as it was with a perception of higher prices
(Pope, 2011). This drop in sales (The Irish Times, 2009) meant serious trouble for a company
that now found itself heavily burdened by property debt (Danaher, 2011). The next few years
saw the company being starved of further investment under excruciating cost-cutting
measures (Hancock, 2009), losing much of its workforce through redundancy (The Irish
Times, 2009), and experiencing a revolving door of senior management (Mulligan, 2013;
Reddan, 2011).
4.3 The Musgrave Influence
With the economy showing no signs of improvement, and the trading environment as tough
as ever, Superquinn was in trouble (Hancock, 2009). Speculation of a potential buyout was
common in these intervening years, with the company’s future in some doubt (Hancock,
2008; Pope, 2011). In July 2011, with debts of €330 million, Superquinn went into
receivership under the management of joint receivers Kieran Wallace and Eamonn
Richardson of KPMG (O'Brien, 2011). The ensuing weeks were a tumultuous time for the
firm’s stakeholders. Uncertainty regarding the future abounded, employees feared for their
jobs, suppliers were not paid, and the company’s recently-appointed chief executive, Andrew
Street, resigned in protest over the handling of the receivership process (Reddan, 2011).
33. 26
The Cork-based Musgrave Group stepped in as a potential buyer. Primarily a wholesaler,
Musgrave operated the SuperValu and Centra franchises in Ireland, as well as others in the
UK and Spain (Hancock, 2013b). Musgrave’s heritage and Irishness were seen as a good fit
for the Superquinn business (RTE News, 2014). The takeover process was nonetheless met
with considerable resistance, and was far from straightforward. A tumultuous few months
ensued, featuring a failed examinership bid and an associated High Court battle (Kilfeather,
2011). Moreover, the entire deal was subject to the approval of the Competition Authority
(Mulligan, 2011). By October 2011, a deal had been finalised whereby Musgrave acquired
the Superquinn business for €200 million. In addition, a fund of €10 million was set up to
reimburse Superquinn’s suppliers who had not been paid in full during the receivership phase
(Hancock, 2011).
Following the Musgrave acquisition, the Superquinn business continued to trade as a going
concern. The group at the time cited the acquisition as exemplary of its wider growth strategy
(Musgrave Group, 2011). November 2011 saw the establishment of Musgrave Operating
Partners Ireland (MOPI), a new division of the Musgrave Group tasked with running the
Superquinn business (Retail News, 2011). A marked difference from Musgrave’s wholesale
and franchise focus, the 24 stores within the MOPI network remained centrally run via the
existing Superquinn Support Office in Lucan, Co. Dublin. A new management team was
introduced, two of whom (managing director, Tim Kenny, and trading & marketing director,
Eoin McCormack) had previously held directorships within the wider Musgrave group, and
two (HR & operations director, Clare Leonard, and finance director, Richard Collins) had
held analogous roles in Superquinn.
Investment, long overdue, was made in revamping the store network and various promotional
campaigns. The latter included dedicated discount days for customers over the age of 65 and
“Fresh Price Cuts” (Musgrave Group, 2012), an initiative that saw the introduction of long-
term price reductions on a range of more than 200 fresh food products. The introduction of
the Steak and Wine Sale proved a great success, marrying two of the company’s core
competences across fresh meat and wine; it has since been widely imitated by the competition
(Retail News, 2012). This period saw Superquinn’s decline in market share cease, stabilising
at 5.4%. Despite the considerable levels of investment, however, it did not experience
growth, with both market share and sales remaining well below peak levels (Hancock,
2013a).
34. 27
4.4 Time for a Change
On the morning of 7 August 2013, it was announced that Superquinn’s 24 stores were to be
rebranded as SuperValu. The announcement was made concurrently across the social media
platforms of both Superquinn and SuperValu, the first of many dual marketing
communications to come. Commenting on the announcement, Musgrave chief executive,
Chris Martin, said (Wynne-Jones, 2013a, p. 33):
We understand that some customers will be sad to see the Superquinn name change.
However, the decision follows a considered review of all options and is an inevitable
next step, given the realities of a totally changed grocery market and what the Irish
consumer now needs.
The initial announcement – and subsequent communications – strongly inferred that changes
to Superquinn’s brand identity would be minimal: Beloved products such as Superquinn
Sausages were “here to stay”; there would be no store closures; and the change would not
affect the jobs of anybody working in the stores. The change did, however, mean that 102
members of staff at the Superquinn Support Office would lose their jobs. This was explicitly
stated from the beginning, and it was also publicised that career support would be made
available to those affected (Cashell, 2013).
4.5 In the Meantime
MOPI stores continued to trade as Superquinn for five months following the rebranding
announcement, including the crucial Christmas trading period. During this time, a number of
initiatives were introduced:
The own-brand SuperValu Range, which had recently been successfully repositioned
into a core competence of SuperValu (DDFH&B, 2012), was launched in all
Superquinn stores (The Punt, 2013). Marketing communications materials heavily
promoted the range for its award-winning credentials, quality, scope, and, above all,
the savings to be made. The range was featured prominently in-store through signage
and feature space, as well as being highlighted in promotional cycle leaflets, using the
interim tag line “Big Savings at Superquinn with SuperValu Range”.
SuperValu Signature Tastes, a new top-tier own brand range, was launched
simultaneously in SuperValu and Superquinn stores in October 2013. The range was
an amalgamation of the firms’ incumbent top-tier private labels, Superquinn’s
35. 28
Superior Quality and SuperValu’s Supreme (Wynne-Jones, 2013b). Products ranged
from fresh to ambient and, where possible, were locally sourced. Unusual for an own
brand range, the individual producers behind the products featured prominently on the
packaging, emphasising provenance and artisan credentials. The launch attempted to
convince both the sceptical and the loyal Superquinn shopper that SuperValu could
truly offer quality on par with the best of Superquinn. Indeed, the attempt was
successful, as sales growth within Superquinn actually outstripped that within the
SuperValu stores (DDFH&B, 2014b).
The design of Superquinn’s marketing materials (in-store signage, special-offer
leaflets, point-of-sale materials) was gradually altered to align it with that of
SuperValu. Promotional cycle leaflets featuring current special offers were subtly
altered from the beginning of 2014 onwards: on the price callout graphic for each
offer, the established Superquinn design of white typography on red (Superquinn,
2013) was phased out in favour of SuperValu’s yellow on red (Superquinn, 2014). As
a result, both Superquinn and SuperValu for a time shared this yellow-on-red callout
style (SuperValu, 2014), despite otherwise operating under their own individual
corporate fascia. At the time of the changeover, all Superquinn designs would be
completely eradicated.
A localised outdoor advertising campaign (PML Group, 2014, p. 2) was launched
across Dublin, heralding the imminent opening of 18 new SuperValu stores, i.e. the
MOPI network. The advertisements encompassed all billboard formats, and were
located in areas of maximum commuter impact, including DART stations, Dublin
Bus- and Luas stops, and a number of bridges in the city centre. The design featured
high-quality photography of high-quality foods, and featured tag lines such as “Dublin
– get ready for even more local tenderness”.
In more general terms, marketing communications illustrated the campaign’s ethos of
“We Believe Together is Better” by emphasising the dual pillars of those aspects
that would be staying the same (for example certain signature products such as
Superquinn Sausages and Sean’s Brown Bread), and those that would be changing
(for example the launch of new own-brand ranges and considerable investment in the
store network).
36. 29
4.6 A New Beginning
At close of business on 12 February 2014, Superquinn’s 24 stores shut their doors for the last
time. The following morning, each store opened its doors under the SuperValu banner. With
zero downtime (Retail News, 2013), the brand transition occurred overnight and was
seamless: all traces of the legacy Superquinn brand had vanished and had been replaced in
kind with new SuperValu fascia; a veritable catalogue of new staff uniforms had been
introduced (CWS-boco Ireland, 2014). The re-launch of the flagship Blackrock store was
featured on the national news (RTE News, 2014): SuperValu managing director, Martin
Kelleher, unveiled the new SuperValu door sign, joined by Blackrock’s store manager,
Neville Raethorne, and, even Feargal Quinn himself. This PR activity was supported by
strong social media and an ambitious advertising campaign (Wynne-Jones, 2014),
particularly in the Dublin region.
The process was complete. The Superquinn brand was consigned to the history books and
sausage packaging. SuperValu was now the number two grocery multiple in the Irish market,
well within reach of Tesco.
38. 31
In order to answer the underlying research question, “Why and how was Superquinn
rebranded as SuperValu?” and to assess the theoretical study propositions, this section will
discuss links between the literature reviewed and the case study itself. In order to do so, the
study propositions outlined earlier will be critically evaluated, and the research question itself
will then be addressed.
5.1 Study Propositions
5.1.1 Study Proposition I
Renaming Superquinn as SuperValu was an act of revolutionary rebranding.
The rebranding of Superquinn as SuperValu is situated at the “revolutionary” pole of the
rebranding continuum. Consistent with Stuart and Muzellec (2004), this rebranding process
involved a change of logo, slogan, and name – albeit from the legacy brand to an existing
one. Superquinn became SuperValu, adopted SuperValu’s logo and its slogan of “Real Food,
Real People”. Using Muzellec and Lambkin’s (2006) terminology, it follows that changes to
brand aesthetics – the aforementioned changes to logo and slogan, in addition to alterations to
the design of marketing, point-of-sale, and other materials – were significant enough to
qualify as “revolutionary”.
Less immediately apparent, however, is a significant change in brand positioning. Much of
the marketing communications efforts attempted to downplay perceptions of massive change
to the quality of the Superquinn offering. This is an understandable tactic given the threat to
legacy brand equity and the particularly loyal customer base involved. It was certainly
Musgrave’s intention to maintain Superquinn’s quality credentials while addressing the
common perception that is was particularly expensive (Mulligan, 2014). Convincing the
average customer that Superquinn is not too expensive is a positioning challenge that has
faced senior management since 2005. Musgrave has gone to greater lengths than anybody
before it to meet that challenge through promoting its value credentials, such as its SuperValu
Range, in addition to its quality focus.
In sum, renaming Superquinn as SuperValu was indeed an act of revolutionary rebranding
both with regard to aesthetics and brand positioning.
5.1.2 Study Proposition II
Abandoning the Superquinn brand name jeopardised 54 years’ worth of brand equity.
39. 32
To alter or abandon any brand name is to risk that brand’s equity (Gotsi & Andriopoulos,
2007). This is of particular concern in the case of a brand with the level of customer loyalty
that Superquinn had (Moriarty, 2013). The firm built up this loyal following over time, in no
small part because it was loyal to its customers: Superquinn had an impeccable record of
customer service, and went to great lengths to reward its already loyal customers, showing
disregard for more traditional business thinking (Quinn, 1996). Though the risk was an issue
of consideration for Musgrave, it was also one that on balance it was willing to take
(Mulligan, 2014).
Without primary research into the research and planning stages behind the rebranding
decision, any comment on same would be speculative. Moreover, at time of writing only
seven months have elapsed since the rebranding and it is thus too early to meaningfully
evaluate the process in terms of its success or failure in transferring Superquinn’s extant
brand equity into the new brand – or indeed to attribute any rise or fall in sales, or other
metric, solely to the rebrand effort. However, the very fact that the rebranding went ahead
indicates confidence on Musgrave’s part in the endeavour’s success.
Judging the exercise’s success or failure (in either a general or specific sense) is beyond the
scope of the present paper. Both the literature and the case evidence provide tentative support
for the proposition that abandoning the Superquinn name jeopardised the brand equity the
firm had built in its 54 years of operation. It was however a risk that Musgrave was willing to
take.
5.1.3 Study Proposition III
A strategy of counter-takeover rebranding could have been a viable alternative to that of
brand integration, at least in Dublin.
Counter-takeover rebranding is the antithesis of the brand integration strategy: in an M&A
situation, the acquiring company deliberately drops its own-brand and adopts that of the
acquired company (Kaikati & Kaikati, 2003). At the time of the Superquinn rebranding
announcement, Feargal Quinn half-jokingly suggested that Musgrave adopt such a strategy
(Burke-Kennedy, 2013). The present section will argue that this could actually have been a
viable alternative to the strategy undertaken, at least in the Dublin region.
Of the reasons for Musgrave’s original acquisition of the Superquinn business, among the
most commonly cited is the Cork wholesaler’s desire to gain a greater foothold in the Dublin
40. 33
region (DDFH&B, 2014a). Traditionally, Superquinn was at its strongest in this region, with
the majority of its stores based there. Moreover, its Dublin stores tended to trade better than
their rural counterparts (Hancock, 2011). By contrast, the capital was something of a weak
spot for SuperValu (Hancock, 2013b).
It could therefore be argued that Superquinn was the stronger brand in the capital, and as such
a worthy candidate for a strategy of counter-takeover rebranding (Kaikati & Kaikati, 2003):
In this case, SuperValu stores – in Dublin, at least - would have been rebranded under the
Superquinn banner. In addition to gaining a much stronger foothold in Dublin, such a move
could have raised perception of the stores’ quality almost overnight. This is an issue that,
independent of the current rebrand, has been a major focus of recent advertising efforts
(DDFH&B, 2014a).
However, the case study evidence suggests that such a move was probably not very viable,
for a number of reasons:
Musgrave’s business model: Musgrave’s primary position as a wholesaler, and
SuperValu’s franchise model, mean that most SuperValu stores within Dublin (and
indeed throughout the country) are independently owned outlets. Rebranding these
independent stores as Superquinn would therefore have been a more complicated
process than the current campaign. While it would have been within Musgrave’s
power to transform literally overnight the 24 stores within its MOPI division, doing so
with the scattered network of nearly 200 SuperValu stores (or even the smaller cluster
within Dublin) would have been a logistic nightmare. Moreover, it would have been
heavily dependent on the cooperation and agreement of the independent retailers
involved.
Cost: Renaming Superquinn’s 24 stores as SuperValu creates a synergy in terms of
marketing and distribution. The cost of advertising is offset considerably when
divided among 223 stores rather than 24. In theory, the same cost savings (advertising
split across 223 stores, etc.) would apply in the counter-takeover rebranding strategy.
However, the cost of rebranding nearly 200 SuperValu stores, many of which are
independently owned, would conceivably erase a large amount of the expected cost
savings and economies of scale before they were even realised.
41. 34
Although the literature does support the idea of such a counter-takeover rebranding strategy,
if only in Dublin, the case study evidence indicates that it would probably not have been a
viable alternative in this case.
5.1.4 Study Proposition IV
Musgrave’s initial acquisition of Superquinn was made with the long-term intention of
rebranding.
Shortly after the 2011 acquisition of the Superquinn business, Musgrave CEO, Chris Martin,
hinted that some degree of rebranding in the future was a possibility, citing the variance in
trading performance between Superquinn’s Dublin and regional stores as something “that has
to be looked at and… an opportunity to flex the Musgrave brands” (Hancock, 2011, p. 36). In
addition, the business media speculated on the issue (O'Connell, 2013; Checkout, 2011). The
literature (Merrilees & Miller, 2008; Daly & Moloney, 2004) cites mergers and acquisitions
among the primary reasons why a firm may rebrand. Specifically, Muzellec and Lambkin’s
(2008) criteria for adopting the brand integration strategy closely reflects the situation in
which Musgrave found itself in late 2011.
Without further primary research into the issue, any conclusions drawn on Musgrave’s
intentions would be no more than informed speculation. Taking into account the literature
and the case evidence, it could however be reasonably argued that the initial acquisition was
made with the prospect of a possible rebranding in the longer term.
5.1.5 Study Proposition V
The Superquinn brand was already damaged beyond repair prior to the Musgrave
acquisition.
The 2000s was a tough decade for the retail trade, not least for Superquinn. The case provides
some context as to the intensity of the competition facing the company. Furthermore, the
economic situation in Ireland was such that many hitherto regular customers could no longer
afford Superquinn’s high-end offering. Attempts were made to rejuvenate and revitalise the
brand:
The strategy of chasing the top end of the market combined with expansion, which
was initiated in 2005 was ambitious and, at least in the short term, successful
(Beesley, 2005; Hancock, 2008). However, its timing could not have been worse, and
eventually the company found itself treading water once again. It is contended that the
42. 35
2005 strategy was ideologically in tune with that with which the company had been so
successful in the past (Quinn, 2013), and that against a different economic backdrop it
could have turned the company around and restored faith in the brand.
After the Musgrave acquisition, the company received healthy investment. The “Fresh
Price Cuts” campaign (Retail News, 2012) was an attempt to erase the perception that
Superquinn was too expensive, while simultaneously emphasising its fresh food
credentials. It appears that the message did not resound with customers to the extent
intended.
Such efforts, of which these are just two of many examples, were ultimately not enough to
save the Superquinn brand. It had certainly suffered throughout the previous decade and had
lost its way somewhat, doing a bit of everything yet nothing particularly well. However, in
the opinion of the present author – informed as it has been by informal participant
observation on the floor of the company during the years in review as well as the
documentary evidence - the brand was not damaged beyond repair, and it could have been
restored or improved given the right strategy, level of investment and a more favourable
economic backdrop.
5.1.6 Study Proposition VI
The Superquinn business in its then form was unsustainable.
It has been established that the Superquinn business had experienced considerable hardship
over the decade prior to its rebranding. When the rebranding was announced in the summer
of 2013, Superquinn held a market share of approximately 5.4% (Ó Fátharta, 2013), which
was considerably down from its 2003 high of 8.8% (The Grocer, 2004). Marketing
communications on social media in the wake of the announcement referred to a 10-year sales
decline culminating in present day sales being 22% off their peak. The grocery sector itself
was shrinking, as was Superquinn’s share of it. The present case study has outlined the
difficulties that the company experienced in the decade prior to the rebrand and a number of
unsuccessful attempts to reposition and revitalise the business through investment, expansion
and promotional activity (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3 above).
The case evidence shows Superquinn facing a number of serious challenges in the
marketplace, and failing to effectively overcome any of them. Insight into the firm’s finances
over the past decade or more would be required to conclusively confirm or reject the
proposition that Superquinn’s business in its then form was unsustainable. The available data
43. 36
indicates a declining and at best stagnant market share while the competition had gained
serious ground. This is reasonably supportive of the proposition that the Superquinn business,
as it was at the time, was unsustainable.
5.2 Why was Superquinn rebranded as SuperValu?
The decision to rebrand the MOPI network of stores cannot have been an easy one, though
the possibility of such an exercise was hinted at from as early as 2011 (Hancock, 2011). The
decade prior to the announcement had been a challenging one for the company, characterised
as it was by declining sales and market share, heightened competition, crises of leadership,
redundancies, receivership, and two acquisitions. This culminated in the announcement of 7
August 2013 that Superquinn’s 24 stores were to be rebranded as SuperValu. To answer the
“why” aspect of the research question, this section will draw on the literature and the case
evidence. It is proposed that this rebranding exercise should be attributed to the following
two reasons.
5.2.1 Growth
In the broadest sense, the rebranding of Superquinn came about as a consequence of
Musgrave’s growth strategy. The initial acquisition in 2011 aimed to achieve and sustain
growth for the Cork-based group (Musgrave Group, 2011), and with time it led to the
rebranding of the Superquinn network. Although considerable investment was made with a
view to rejuvenating the struggling brand (Hancock, 2011), the acquirer ultimately
consolidated the acquired brand , absorbing it into its larger and more successful SuperValu
brand (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2008).
Consolidating these two grocery operations saw SuperValu leapfrog Dunnes Stores in terms
of market share: overnight it became the number two operator in the Irish market, only
decimal places behind Tesco (Patterson, 2014). Rebranding the 24 stores made for a greater
singularity of corporate visibility for the SuperValu brand (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2008), not
least in Dublin, where the brand had been weak (DDFH&B, 2014a).
The decision to adopt the brand integration strategy favoured by Muzellec and Lambkin
(2008) simplified Musgrave’s Irish operation by abandoning the troubled Superquinn brand
and simultaneously strengthening the growing SuperValu brand. In so doing, Musgrave
addressed two of its key weaknesses – namely, Superquinn’s stagnant performance and
44. 37
SuperValu’s poor Dublin presence – and placed the new SuperValu entity in a much stronger
position to contribute to the wider Musgrave Group’s ongoing growth strategy.
5.2.2 Cost Saving
Rebranding the MOPI stores as SuperValu allowed Musgrave to make considerable cost
savings. As Ireland’s largest grocery group, it already benefited from massive economies of
scale across purchasing, marketing, distribution and elsewhere in its value chain. By
comparison, the MOPI network was relatively small. Yet, it still operated from its own
support office and incurred its own costs across purchasing, marketing, distribution and so
on. Absorbing the smaller entity into the bigger network again simplified the operation,
achieving a level of synergy that by its very nature will drive down costs.
5.3 How was Superquinn rebranded as SuperValu?
As outlined in the case study, the announcement was made to the public in early August
2013. By the following February, the process was complete. This was achieved through a
strategy of brand integration, as described in Section 2.4.6 above (Muzellec & Lambkin,
2008). Consistent with the theoretical post-acquisition scenario, in this instance the acquirer
effectively absorbed the acquired: Superquinn’s stores were transformed into SuperValu
stores, Musgrave integrating the MOPI chain into its larger MRPI (Musgrave Retail Partners
Ireland) network.
Acknowledging the limitations associated with the nature of secondary research, comment
will not be made on internal aspects such as research and planning, internal communication,
evaluation and so on. The following actions were taken during the interim period, at what
would be reasonably considered the implementation stage.
5.3.1 Promotion
As indicated in Section 2.6.3.1 of the literature review, it is important that the rebranding
company makes its intentions and efforts known to its stakeholders. In this case, this was
done through the following channels.
5.3.1.1 Public Relations
Public relations, traditionally a strength of Superquinn’s (Quinn, 2013), was utilised well
throughout the campaign. The news that Superquinn was to be rebranded as SuperValu was
made public in early August 2013 via both company’s social media platforms. In the
campaign’s early hours, days and weeks, social media personnel were on hand to field a large
45. 38
number of enquiries, complaints and other comments regarding the announcement and
impending rebrand. Musgrave’s responses were simultaneously reassuring and informative.
Furthermore, Musgrave’s director of communications, Edel Clancy, has spoken to the media
on the issue of the rebranding (Cashell, 2013) and the group has wisely gotten the
endorsement of Feargal Quinn, who compared the rebrand favourably to seeing a daughter
marry into a good family (RTE News, 2014).
5.3.1.2 Advertising
There was a considerable advertising spend involved with the rebranding campaign (PML
Group, 2014). Advertisements were primarily print, out-of-home pieces targeting the greater
Dublin area. The designs, high-quality and featuring luxury food products, were a clear
attempt to subtly communicate SuperValu’s quality credentials to a geographical area that
would not be overly familiar with the brand. Wording did not mention that Superquinn was
going away or disappearing, but rather encouraged the viewer to prepare for the imminent
opening of so many new SuperValu outlets.
5.3.2 Execution
To more fully understand how Superquinn was rebranded as SuperValu, the following
initiatives are considered.
5.3.2.1 Own-Brand Launch
In the months following the rebrand announcement, two SuperValu own-brand ranges were
launched in Superquinn stores:
First, the mid-tier SuperValu Range, an award-winning selection of over 2,000
products (DDFH&B, 2012), was launched in Superquinn stores. Marketing
communications materials about the rebrand heavily emphasised the level of value
associated with this range and positioned it as a major strength of the SuperValu
brand. While Superquinn had an own-brand range, SuperValu’s was touted as bigger
and better, and offering a higher level of value for money. Customers could save up to
33% against manufacturer brands, and its introduction would offer the Superquinn
customer the “best value”, a notion that Superquinn had traditionally found difficult to
convey.
The top-tier SuperValu Signature Tastes range (DDFH&B, 2014b) was launched
concurrently in both SuperValu and Superquinn stores. With its quality credentials,
this range sought to win over the sceptical former Superquinn shopper.
46. 39
Introducing these ranges into Superquinn stores prior to the rebrand presented the customer
with a view of things to come. It was reflective of SuperValu’s emphasis on own-brand as a
driver of growth and a way to offer value that just cannot be done with manufacturer brands.
The quality credentials of both being so high also implicitly told the Superquinn shopper just
how important it is to SuperValu.
5.3.2.2 Marketing Materials
The rebrand was brought to life in-store through the use of marketing materials such as
overhead signage, external banners, shelf-talkers and more. Materials communicating the
“We Believe Together is Better” message were commonplace, with store-specific graphics
featuring working members of staff in old and new uniforms to demonstrate the change and
the effect it would – or would not – have.
48. 41
6.1 Conclusion of Findings
In summary, the findings of current research are as follows.
Rebranding Superquinn as SuperValu was an act of revolutionary rebranding on Musgrave’s
part. The campaign abandoned the established name, logo and slogan of Superquinn and
integrated it with the SuperValu brand. These aesthetic changes occurred in addition to a
change in positioning whereby a greater emphasis on value was communicated to the
customer – greater, perhaps, than ever before, though still in conjunction with a message of
quality.
Abandoning the Superquinn brand name jeopardised its 54 years’ worth of brand equity. It is
too early to surmise whether, and the extent to which, any damage to brand equity has
actually been incurred or whether a successful transfer of equity took place from Superquinn
to SuperValu. The case evidence suggests that Musgrave did not take the rebranding decision
lightly, and was confident of its long-term success. Nonetheless it remains the case that, as
with abandoning any established and well-liked brand, the campaign risked the accrued brand
equity.
A counter-takeover strategy, if only within the Dublin region, would not have been a readily
viable alternative to that of brand integration. The case evidence suggests that because of
Musgrave’s business model and for reasons of cost, a counter-takeover strategy would not
have been feasible.
Without access to the inner workings of Musgrave senior management, it cannot be stated
conclusively that its 2011 acquisition of the Superquinn business was made with a future
rebrand in mind. The available evidence does however support the possibility.
It was reasoned that the Superquinn brand, despite experiencing difficulties over its final 10
years in business, was not beyond saving. Attempts were made in vain to revise and
rejuvenate the brand, not without considerable effort and expense. It is argued that given a
combination of the right strategy, requisite investment and a favourable economy, the brand
could have yet been returned to its former prestige.
Though once again impossible to state conclusively without primary research into company
financial records, the findings support the proposition that that the Superquinn business, as it
was, was probably no longer sustainable.
49. 42
In light of the above, it was found that Superquinn was rebranded as SuperValu for the dual
reasons of assisting Musgrave in its overall growth strategy, and for saving cost at the level of
the Superquinn and SuperValu businesses. Consolidating one into the other allowed
Musgrave to considerably simplify its Irish operation and overnight made SuperValu the
number two player in the Irish grocery retail sector, close behind the market leader, Tesco.
Economies of scale were achieved across marketing, logistics and other functions as the
hitherto two businesses became one.
Finally, how Superquinn was rebranded as SuperValu was discussed. Undertaking a strategy
of brand integration, the smaller Superquinn brand was absorbed into the larger SuperValu
one. This was supported with extensive promotion from the campaign’s inception on 7
August, 2014 to its completion on 13 February, 2014. Exemplary use was made of public
relations and advertising to communicate the change to all stakeholders. In terms of
execution, the changeover of physical stores was preceded by the introduction into
Superquinn stores of two of SuperValu’s own-brand ranges and the use of marketing
materials, largely promoting the campaign “We Believe Together is Better”.
6.2 Limitations
The author at this time acknowledges a number of limitations involved with the current study.
In the course of his employment with Superquinn and SuperValu, the author has engaged in
considerable informal participant observation. Though this has been of benefit in selecting,
evaluating and analysing the secondary material used, the impossibility of anonymizing such
material leads to it being excluded from the current study.
As has been acknowledged, scholarly articles on the topic of corporate rebranding lag
significantly behind the actual practice. Furthermore it is only in more recent years that
academics have begun to write with greater frequency on the subject. Additionally, much of
the work particularly in the Irish context comes from a relatively small pool of authors. As a
result, the bibliography of works cited in the literature review may appear relatively small for
a work of this size, as may the number of different authors cited.
The research undertaken was secondary, qualitative and purposive in nature. Most of the
evidence used was of a documentary nature and will not necessarily contain the unbiased
truth. Particular effort has thus been made to where possibly corroborate data through the use
of multiple sources of evidence.
50. 43
The case study approach undertaken, and particularly its exploratory, single-case design, may
limit the generalizability of the current study’s findings.
6.3 Further Research
The following areas are identified as worthy of further research, either from apparent gaps in
the literature or as interesting questions arising from the research itself:
The body of literature would benefit from a replication of the current research on a
larger scale, incorporating all of Yin’s (2009) sources of evidence including in-depth
interviews and the examination of internal communications and other such
documentation.
The subject of the current study could be built into a multiple-case design to
investigate an earlier instance of rebranding in Superquinn’s history: In 1970, the
company was rebranded from Quinn’s Supermarket to Superquinn. The secondary
sources of evidence utilised for the current study offer very little data on the subject
and as such primary research is recommended.
The lack of codified, robust metrics for evaluating rebranding campaigns appears to
be a gap in the literature and worth investigating.
51. 44
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