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WEP Whacker Aim of the project :  To exploit the weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4 as used in WEP and thus recover encryption keys with passive attack on 802.11 network
802.11 Wireless Networks ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
A WiFi Setup ,[object Object],Internet
The Problem:  Security ! ,[object Object],[object Object]
WEP ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],(encrypted traffic)
How WEP Works 24 bits 40 bits ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],IV sent in the clear Worse: 802.11b says that  changing IV with each packet is optional! CRC-32 checksum  is linear in   : if attacker flips some bit in plaintext, there is a known, plaintext-independent set of CRC bits that, if flipped, will produce the  same  checksum no integrity!
WEP Data Transmission 802.11b Header IV[0] IV[1] IV[2] Key ID SNAP[0] SNAP[1] SNAP[2] SNAP[3] 32-bit Checksum Payload
WEP Data Transmission IV[0] IV[1] IV[2] SK[0] SK[4] SK[3] SK[2] SK[1] K = IV . SK
WEP Data Transmission K = IV . SK Node Node Generates IV through a counter or randomly
WEP Data Transmission Encrypted Data K = IV . SK Node Node
WEP Data Transmission K = IV . SK Encrypted Data K = IV . SK Node Node Uses received IV with Static Key to decrypt data
WEP Problems ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
WEP Problems (Cont.) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
WEP Problems (Cont.) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Attacks on WEP ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Attacks on WEP  (cont’d) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
RC4  Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
RC4  Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
RC4  Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
RC4  Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object]
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K)
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K) PRGA(K)
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR Data
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR Data Air
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR Data Air K =  IV  . SK
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR Data Air K =  IV  . SK KSA(K)
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR Data Air K =  IV  . SK KSA(K) PRGA(K)
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR Data Air K =  IV  . SK KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR
FMS Attack - RC4 Algorithms ,[object Object],KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR Data Air K =  IV  . SK KSA(K) PRGA(K) XOR Data
FMS Attack - KSA Initialization ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f, 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f Initialization
FMS Attack - KSA Scrambling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK =  3 , f, 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f Initialization 3 0 i=0, j= 0 + 0 + 3 =3
FMS Attack - KSA Scrambling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3,  f , 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f Initialization 3 0 i=0, j=0+0+3= 3  0 1 i=1, j= 3 + 1 + f =3
FMS Attack - KSA Scrambling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f,  7 , 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f Initialization 3 0 i=0, j=0+0+3=3  0 1 i=1, j=3+1+f= 3   c 2 i=2, j= 3 + 2 + 7 =c
FMS Attack - KSA Scrambling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK =  1 , 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f, 7,  1 , 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f Initialization 3 0 i=0, j=0+0+3=3  0 1 i=1, j=3+1+f=3  c 2 i=2, j=3+2+7= c   5 1 i=3, j= c + 1 + 1 =e  Note that S[B+3] contains information relating to SK[B], since SK[B] is used to calculate j
FMS Attack - KSA Scrambling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f, 7,  1 , 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f Initialization 3 0 i=0, j=0+0+3=3  0 1 i=1, j=3+1+f=3  c 2 i=2, j=3+2+7= c   3 0 c e 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b 2 d 1 f Done with KSA e 1 i=3, j= c + 1 + 1 =e
FMS Attack - PRGA Initialization ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f, 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 3 0 c e 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b 2 d 1 f Initialization 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
FMS Attack - PRGA Generation Loop ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f, 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 3 0 c e 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b 2 d 1 f Initialization 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 3 i=1, j= 0 + 0 =0, z=S[ 3  +  0 ]=e e is the output for the first byte
FMS Attack - PRGA Generation Loop ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f, 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 3 0 c e 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b 2 d 1 f Initialization 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 3 i=1, j= 0 + 0 =0, z=S[ 3  +  0 ]=e e is the output for the first byte e is then xor’ed with the first byte of data, which is always 0xaa on ip networks
FMS Attack - KSA Scrambling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f, 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f Initialization 3 0 i=0, j=0+0+3=3  0 1 i=1, j=3+1+f=3  c 2 i=2, j=3+2+7=c  3 0 c e 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b 2 d 1 f Done with KSA e 1 i=3, j=c+1+1=e
FMS Attack - KSA Scrambling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Let N = 16 Let B = 0 Let IV = B + 3, f, 7 Let SK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let K = IV . SK = 3, f, 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Let l = the # of elements in K Assume no elements get swapped when I > B + 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f Initialization 3 0 i=0, j=0+0+3=3  0 1 i=1, j=3+1+f=3  c 2 i=2, j=3+2+7= c   3 0 c e 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b 2 d 1 f Done with KSA e 1 i=3, j= c + 1 +1=e
FMS Attack - Reversing Output to Key Byte ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
FMS Attack - Analysis of Results ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
FMS Attack - Detection of Weak IVs ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
FMS Attack - Filtering Weak IVs Weak IV Filter: Let l = the amount of elements in SK i = 0 For B = 0 .. l - 1 If (((0 <= a and b < B) or   (a = B and b = (B + 1) / 2 : 1)) and   (B % 2 ? a != (B + 1) / 2 : 1)) or   (a = B + 1 and (B = 0 ? B = (B + 1) * 2 : 1)) or   (x = B + 3 and y = N - 1) or   (B != 0 and !(B % 2) ? (x = 1 and y = (B / 2) + 1) or   (x = (B / 2) + 2 and y = (N - 1) - x) : 0) Then ReportWeakIV
Conclusion / Expected Results ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Conclusions
Improving WEP’s Security ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Thank You ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

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Wepwhacker !

  • 1. WEP Whacker Aim of the project : To exploit the weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4 as used in WEP and thus recover encryption keys with passive attack on 802.11 network
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7. WEP Data Transmission 802.11b Header IV[0] IV[1] IV[2] Key ID SNAP[0] SNAP[1] SNAP[2] SNAP[3] 32-bit Checksum Payload
  • 8. WEP Data Transmission IV[0] IV[1] IV[2] SK[0] SK[4] SK[3] SK[2] SK[1] K = IV . SK
  • 9. WEP Data Transmission K = IV . SK Node Node Generates IV through a counter or randomly
  • 10. WEP Data Transmission Encrypted Data K = IV . SK Node Node
  • 11. WEP Data Transmission K = IV . SK Encrypted Data K = IV . SK Node Node Uses received IV with Static Key to decrypt data
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  • 46. FMS Attack - Filtering Weak IVs Weak IV Filter: Let l = the amount of elements in SK i = 0 For B = 0 .. l - 1 If (((0 <= a and b < B) or (a = B and b = (B + 1) / 2 : 1)) and (B % 2 ? a != (B + 1) / 2 : 1)) or (a = B + 1 and (B = 0 ? B = (B + 1) * 2 : 1)) or (x = B + 3 and y = N - 1) or (B != 0 and !(B % 2) ? (x = 1 and y = (B / 2) + 1) or (x = (B / 2) + 2 and y = (N - 1) - x) : 0) Then ReportWeakIV
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