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2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
WHO NEEDS MALWARE?
UNDERSTANDING FILELESS ATTACKS AND HOW TO STOP THEM
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
1 What are fileless attacks
2 How does a fileless attack work
3 Real world examples
4 Why traditional approaches don’t work
5 The CrowdStrike approach
POOL QUESTION
HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR
KNOWLEDGE OF FILELESS ATTACKS 1 TO 5
(1 = NONE. 5 = EXPERT)
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
WHAT IS A FILELESS ATTACK
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
An attack that does not require a malicious executable file
to be written to disk
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
THE REALITY OF FILELESS ATTACKS
Fileless techniques are not
new
More prevalent than
Ransomware 24% vs. 21%
78% of organizations are
concerned about fileless
attacks
Only 51% of breaches include
malware - Source Verizon BDR
2017
Not all attacks are 100%
fileless
80% of attacks use some
fileless techniques - Source
CrowdStrike Incident Response
FILELESS ATTACK TECHNIQUES
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
FILELESS
TECHINQUES
FILELESS INTRUSION TECHNIQUES OBSERVED BY
THE FALCON PLATFORM
§ Spear phishing for credentials
§ Lateral movement using ‘living off the
land’ tools (WMI, Unix commands,
Powershell)
§ Registry persistence
§ Webshells
2016 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
1.	Attacker	identifies	
organization	with	vulnerable	
web	application
2.	Remote	attacker	uses	SQL	
injection	or	other	
vulnerability	to	drop	payload
3. Vulnerable
webserver is
compromised
and becomes
backdoor
WEBSHELL ATTACKS
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
FILELESS
TECHINQUES
FILELESS INTRUSION TECHNIQUES OBSERVED BY
THE FALCON PLATFORM
§ Spear phishing for credentials
§ Lateral movement using ‘living off the
land’ tools (WMI, Unix commands,
Powershell)
§ Registry persistence
§ Webshells
§ Powershell-based credential dumpers
G O A L
T O O L S
T E C H N I Q U E
HOW A FILELESS ATTACK TAKES PLACE
I N I T I A L
C O M P R O M I S E
1
Remote access to a
system using a
web browser. Can
be web scripting
language
E.g. China Chopper
GAIN
ACCESS
WebShell
C O M M A N D
A N D C O N T R O L
2
Run system
commands to
find out where we
are
RECON
Sysinfo,
Whoami
P R I V I L E G E
E S C A L AT I O N
3
Run a PowerShell
script such as
Mimikatz to
dump credentials
DUMP
CREDENTIALS
PowerShell
P E R S I S T E N C E
4
Modifies Registry
to create a
backdoor
E.g. On screen
keyboard or
sticky keys
MAINTAIN
PERSISTENCE
Registry
E X F I LT R AT I O N
5
Uses system tools
to gather data and
China Chopper
Webshell to
exfiltrate data
EXFILTRATE
DATA
VSSAdmin,
Copy, NET use,
Webshell
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
REAL WORLD
EXAMPLES
§ Fileless Malwre: Kovter
§ Fileless Attack: Nation State
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
KOVTER
§ Click-fraud
§ Fileless after initial infection
§ Hides encrypted malicious modules in the registry
§ Hides other malicious modules in PowerShell scripts
§ Uses shortcut file (.lnk) to download PowerShell scripts. The
script launches PowerShell to start a shellcode
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
NATION STATE
ATTACK
§ Weaponization: Spoofed website
§ Delivery: Spear phishing
§ PowerShell modules connect to a
remote server
§ Install/run MimiKatz
§ Lateral movement through stolen
credentials
MOVING LATERALLY WITHOUT MALWARE
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
Attacker sets the
bait with a fake
website
Extract
credentials
from initial
victim
Move laterally
to other hosts
HOW TO PROTECT AGAINST FILELESS
ATTACKS
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR CURRENT
LEVEL OF PROTECTION AGAINST FILELESS
ATTACKS (1 = POOR – 5 = EXCELLENT)
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
EDUCATE
83%Rate traditional AV based signature
efficacy good or excellent
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
WHY TRADITIONAL APPROACHES DON’T
WORK
No file to analyze No artifacts left behind Blind if prevention fails
Uses legitimate applications No file to detonate Hands on keyboard
PROTECTS AGAINST ALL
TYPES OF ATTACKS
Protect against Known/
Unknown Malware/Malware Free
Protect Against
Zero-Day Attacks
Endpoint Detection and Response
Managed Threat Hunting
BENEFITS
FALCON ENDPOINT PROTECTION
Machine
Learning
IOA
Behavioral
Blocking
Block
Known Bad
Exploit
Mitigation
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
PROCESS	INJECTS	A	
THREAD	INTO	
SYSTEM	PROCESS
INJECTED	THREAD	
READS	CREDENTIALS	FROM	
THE	SYSTEM	PROCESS	
MEMORY
DUMPED	CREDENTIALS	
ARE	USED	TO	LOGIN	INTO	
EXCHANGE	SERVER
MAILBOXES	ARE	
EXPORTED	OUT	OF	
EXCHANGE
INDICATORS OF ATTACK
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
PROCESS	CONDUCTS	
RECONNAISSANCE
PROCESS	ELEVATES	
PRIVILEGES
WEB	SERVER	
EXECUTES	A	
PROCESS
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
THE THREAT IS REAL TRADITIONAL AV IS NOT
ENOUGH CURRENT DEFENSES
DO NOT WORK
NEED TO THINK BEYOND
MALWARE AND FOCUS ON
STOPPING THE BREACH
2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
Questions?
Please submit all questions in the Q&A chat
right below the presentation slides
Contact Us
Additional Information
Join	Weekly	Demos
crowdstrike.com/productdemos
Featured	Asset:
How	Adversaries	Use	Fileless Attacks	To	
Evade	Your	Security
Link in Resource List
Website: crowdstrike.com
Email: info@crowdstrike.com
Number: 1.888.512.8902 (US)

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Understanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop Them

  • 1. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. WHO NEEDS MALWARE? UNDERSTANDING FILELESS ATTACKS AND HOW TO STOP THEM
  • 2. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 1 What are fileless attacks 2 How does a fileless attack work 3 Real world examples 4 Why traditional approaches don’t work 5 The CrowdStrike approach
  • 3. POOL QUESTION HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FILELESS ATTACKS 1 TO 5 (1 = NONE. 5 = EXPERT) 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 4.
  • 5. WHAT IS A FILELESS ATTACK 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. An attack that does not require a malicious executable file to be written to disk
  • 6.
  • 7. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE REALITY OF FILELESS ATTACKS Fileless techniques are not new More prevalent than Ransomware 24% vs. 21% 78% of organizations are concerned about fileless attacks Only 51% of breaches include malware - Source Verizon BDR 2017 Not all attacks are 100% fileless 80% of attacks use some fileless techniques - Source CrowdStrike Incident Response
  • 8. FILELESS ATTACK TECHNIQUES 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 9. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. FILELESS TECHINQUES FILELESS INTRUSION TECHNIQUES OBSERVED BY THE FALCON PLATFORM § Spear phishing for credentials § Lateral movement using ‘living off the land’ tools (WMI, Unix commands, Powershell) § Registry persistence § Webshells
  • 10. 2016 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 1. Attacker identifies organization with vulnerable web application 2. Remote attacker uses SQL injection or other vulnerability to drop payload 3. Vulnerable webserver is compromised and becomes backdoor WEBSHELL ATTACKS
  • 11. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. FILELESS TECHINQUES FILELESS INTRUSION TECHNIQUES OBSERVED BY THE FALCON PLATFORM § Spear phishing for credentials § Lateral movement using ‘living off the land’ tools (WMI, Unix commands, Powershell) § Registry persistence § Webshells § Powershell-based credential dumpers
  • 12. G O A L T O O L S T E C H N I Q U E HOW A FILELESS ATTACK TAKES PLACE I N I T I A L C O M P R O M I S E 1 Remote access to a system using a web browser. Can be web scripting language E.g. China Chopper GAIN ACCESS WebShell C O M M A N D A N D C O N T R O L 2 Run system commands to find out where we are RECON Sysinfo, Whoami P R I V I L E G E E S C A L AT I O N 3 Run a PowerShell script such as Mimikatz to dump credentials DUMP CREDENTIALS PowerShell P E R S I S T E N C E 4 Modifies Registry to create a backdoor E.g. On screen keyboard or sticky keys MAINTAIN PERSISTENCE Registry E X F I LT R AT I O N 5 Uses system tools to gather data and China Chopper Webshell to exfiltrate data EXFILTRATE DATA VSSAdmin, Copy, NET use, Webshell
  • 13. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REAL WORLD EXAMPLES § Fileless Malwre: Kovter § Fileless Attack: Nation State
  • 14. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. KOVTER § Click-fraud § Fileless after initial infection § Hides encrypted malicious modules in the registry § Hides other malicious modules in PowerShell scripts § Uses shortcut file (.lnk) to download PowerShell scripts. The script launches PowerShell to start a shellcode
  • 15. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NATION STATE ATTACK § Weaponization: Spoofed website § Delivery: Spear phishing § PowerShell modules connect to a remote server § Install/run MimiKatz § Lateral movement through stolen credentials
  • 16. MOVING LATERALLY WITHOUT MALWARE 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Attacker sets the bait with a fake website Extract credentials from initial victim Move laterally to other hosts
  • 17. HOW TO PROTECT AGAINST FILELESS ATTACKS 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 18. HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR CURRENT LEVEL OF PROTECTION AGAINST FILELESS ATTACKS (1 = POOR – 5 = EXCELLENT) 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 19.
  • 20. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. EDUCATE 83%Rate traditional AV based signature efficacy good or excellent
  • 21. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. WHY TRADITIONAL APPROACHES DON’T WORK No file to analyze No artifacts left behind Blind if prevention fails Uses legitimate applications No file to detonate Hands on keyboard
  • 22. PROTECTS AGAINST ALL TYPES OF ATTACKS Protect against Known/ Unknown Malware/Malware Free Protect Against Zero-Day Attacks Endpoint Detection and Response Managed Threat Hunting BENEFITS FALCON ENDPOINT PROTECTION Machine Learning IOA Behavioral Blocking Block Known Bad Exploit Mitigation 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  • 24. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. KEY TAKEAWAYS THE THREAT IS REAL TRADITIONAL AV IS NOT ENOUGH CURRENT DEFENSES DO NOT WORK NEED TO THINK BEYOND MALWARE AND FOCUS ON STOPPING THE BREACH
  • 25. 2017 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Questions? Please submit all questions in the Q&A chat right below the presentation slides Contact Us Additional Information Join Weekly Demos crowdstrike.com/productdemos Featured Asset: How Adversaries Use Fileless Attacks To Evade Your Security Link in Resource List Website: crowdstrike.com Email: info@crowdstrike.com Number: 1.888.512.8902 (US)