Essay

To what extent has the Internet changed
the relationship of citizens to the public sphere?
Daniele Ihns
19th
May 2004

We live in a time where traditional controlling influences are changing and giving way to
new forms of organizing the world. The power of the nation-states gets smaller while the
big media conglomerates seem to dictate more of the rules. The growing world-trade of
goods and information break down traditional cultural barriers and appear to reduce
regional contrasts. New communication technologies are said to bring everyone in the
world together in a ‘Global Village’. The concentration of media ownership in the hands
of a few media tycoons ‘reduces consumer choice and makes expression restricted to
being a property right’ (Wheeler, 1997: 201) and as such citizens’ democratic rights are
excluded from decision-making. Habermas argues that a free market, such as the one we
have today, can in some ways democratise communications; but the commercialisation of
mass communication networks results in an unhealthy manipulation of the public sphere
(Allan, 1999: 191). Public sphere denotes the space between the state and civil society; a
virtual arena for public debate, where rational-critical citizens would exchange
information and views in order to form public opinion. Subjects in this sphere would be
the carriers of public opinion and act as critical judges to guarantee democracy
(Habermas, 1989: 102). Many critics agree with Habermas that that the mass media have
become the ‘site for ideological manipulation and the distortion of information’ (Wheeler,
1997: 207). They argue that centralisation of media and communications seriously
‘threatens democracy and gives the major trans-national corporations massive political,
economic and cultural power’ (ibid: 201). This idea suggests equivalence to the power of
the Church and the Monarchs in the Middle Ages with the domination of advertising and
media spin-doctors in the large media industry today. Habermas had foreseen this trend in
capitalism when he warned of a crisis in the public sphere, what he called the
‘refeudalisation’ of the public sphere. In his own words: ‘tendencies pointing to the
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collapse of the public sphere are unmistakable, for while its scope is expanding
impressively, its function has become progressively insignificant’ (Habermas, 1994: 84)
On the other hand, advocates of new multi-media technologies argue that ‘such problems
can be challenged through the emerging Information and Communication Technologies’,
particularly through the Internet (Wheeler, 1997: 207). The Internet is seen by some
critics as ‘democracy hero’ and a number of optimists believe it brings the beginning of a
revolution. These critics believe that the Internet provides new democratic possibilities
that will ‘circumvent the centralized, conglomerate and outmoded media structures’
(ibid). And they have many reasons to think so: the unregulated and unmediated
environment of the Internet has revolutionary aspects that have effects on us and on our
interactions. If we think of the low cost of entry, freedom of speech and self-expression
that are characteristics of the Internet we might as well become optimistic about it.
However, we must also consider the weaknesses of this new medium. One of the most
discussed themes amongst pessimists in the cyberculture studies is the one of the ‘digital
divide’. This term refers to the split between what other critics prefer to call the
information ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ to signify the gap between those who have access to
and use new media technologies and, most importantly, those who do not (Hargittai,
2004: 137). Many issues are involved in this discussion. First, the domination of the
English language excludes millions of people from many of the discussions hosted on the
Web. For Mark Poster, this is the main example that inequalities in the web exist and
change ‘the democratic structure of the Internet’ into an occasion for further wrongs to
the poorer populations (ibid). The second factor of exclusion from the Internet democracy
is illiteracy. According to statistics, ‘if there were 100 residents in the Global Village, 70
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would be unable to read and write’ (Croteau, 2000: 359). Even within the higher use
countries, studies have shown that ‘educated, wealthy and white males are
disproportionate users’ (Poster, 1995a: 23). For Eszter Hargittai (2004), the term ‘digital
divide’ is misleading because it suggests a one-dimensional divide. She suggests that
‘digital inequalities’ would be a better term to express the multiple dimensions of this
divide: technological access, autonomy, social support, skill types of uses (ibid: 141).
With the text-based character of the Internet and statistics like the ones above, we are
bind to agree that if the Internet opens up democratic possibilities, they favour a very
limited number of people.
Accordingly, we can assume that social relations and inequalities on the Internet fit in
with patterns of the ‘real’ society. In the Third World countries, where social inequalities
are greater, one cannot expect to see the people that are now politically ignorant getting
involved in political discussions after their first contact with a computer. Even if they
become Internet users, one cannot expect to see these people engaged in political debates,
for example, on the web if they do not do yet do it in their daily lives. According to Mark
Poster, ‘areas of the Internet extend pre-existing identities and institutions […] prevailing
modern cultures transfer their characteristics to the new domain’ (Poster, 1995b). Also
due to this, one should not expect that the Internet will cause a democratic revolution.
Other pessimists, such as Robert W. McChesney, argue that even the positive aspects of
the Internet are going to end up with the same fate as the marginal American public
service broadcasting system. He believes that the Internet is going to become nothing
more than a commodity. He reminds us that it was the educational broadcasters who
played the biggest role in developing AM and FM radio as well as UHF television. In
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each case, he says, ‘once it became clear that money could be made, the educators were
displaced and the capitalists seized their reins’ (quoted in Wheeler, 1997: 217). He adds
that the Internet has also been pioneered as a ‘public service by the non-profit sector, with
government subsidies, until the capital decides to take over and relegate the pioneers to
the margins’ (ibid). We can see this wealth-manipulation happening when, for example,
Bill Gates’ Microsoft forms partnerships with telephone companies such as BT and with
credit card companies such as VISA in 1993. Following this trend, the distribution of
information will be centralised, the amount of services we have now will be no longer
guaranteed and the information citizens will once again become mere consumers (ibid).
Again, reinforcing my point, the virtual society will follow the patterns of the real world.
Despite all the pessimism about the future, it is possible to recognize features provided by
the Internet that were never before possible in real society. Many net users suggest that
‘the outmoded media structures have failed the public and the Internet provides the forum
for public debate’ (Wheeler, 1997: 224). For John Katz, the Internet offers a vast global
means to for transmitting ideas and opening minds. Anyone can post messages on the
web, raise questions, share information and change minds (ibid). He believes that an
electronic agora (a shift from representative to direct democracy) will exist and the
Internet will be the hero that will reform the public sphere and maintain a healthy
democracy. Internet users can indeed send, receive and store vast amounts of information
as never before. They can express themselves through their homepages or in discussion
rooms, and their freedom of speech is guaranteed. Users have unmediated access to the
Internet which means that there will be no filters for the information posted there. But one
of the key aspects of the Internet might be its anonymity. ‘Users of computer-mediated
communication often cite anonymity as one of its attractive features’ (Dunlop et al., 1991:
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323). There is a kind of freedom in connection to the online relationships, which are
marked by the ‘absence of various communicative cues’ (ibid). Users feel that electronic
communications ‘exhibit less self-regulation and self-awareness’ (ibid). As in the old
agora and coffee shops, citizens can have rational discussions openly as equals. Mark
Wheeler points out some views of the Internet as according to its advocates:
State control and market closure will be ameliorated to allow citizens to
participate in their civil, political and social rights. The Information Superhighway
will provide the electronic landscape for a reinvented civil society. The
unregulated cyberspace of the ICTs allows information to bypass state
interventions and produce greater citizen empowerment. Top-heavy, concentrated
media monopolies will be displaced by responsive, multiple source models of
communications. Governments, regulators and owners will be impotent against a
system in which millions can adopt the interconnecting technology and engage in
political discourse. (Wheeler, 1997: 208)
Unfortunately, the visions above are hard to achieve. For Howard Rheingold, when
people become too fascinated by the democratic possibilities of the Internet they start
‘spreading the idea that such networks are inherently democratic in some magical way
[…] they run the risk of becoming unwitting agents of commodification’ (Wheeler, 1997:
230). Additionally, the hyperrealist school, to which Jean Baudrillard and Guy Debord
belong, warns us that the politicians in hyperspace become a commodity just as anything
else that can be consumed. According to John Gray the public’s attention is falsely being
distracted from state and capitalist power. He argues that the public has been manipulated
to believe the Internet provides political freedom while it actually does not. For them, the
cyberspace is a simulation and commercial version of the real that is assisted by media to
manipulate our desire (ibid: 231). The idea that the new communication media
decentralise power is undermined by the fact that media monopolies, computer giants and
telecommunication corporations are always combining to shape the flow of information.
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Then again, Mark Poster questions if this simulation could not be a type of public sphere.
He deploys ‘the category of the public sphere to evaluate democracy on the Internet’
(Poster, 1995b). Habermas’ idea of the public sphere is based on the ‘autonomous rational
subject as a universal foundation for democracy’ (ibid) and on the emancipatory
potentials of this model of consensus through rational, informed, debate. These
definitions, including democracy itself, are based on Modern principles associated with
the Enlightenment and do not match the Postmodern character of the social relation on the
Internet. Today, we have a news-saturated society that is not necessarily informed. The
enormous amount of information on the Web cannot also be confused with knowledge.
The new medium does allows people to talk as equals, which is also one of the main
aspects of a healthy public sphere. However, in virtual discussions, ‘rational argument
rarely prevails and consensus is widely seen as impossible’ (Wheeler, 1997: 225). The
reason he gives to explain why it is impossible is as follows:
Traditionally, a person’s identity is defined by contact. Identity is rooted in the
physical body. The stability forces individuals to be accountable for their positions
and allows trust to be built up between people…The internet, however, allows
individuals to define their own identities and change them at will…This kind of
protean of identity is not consonant with forming a stable political community as
we have known it. (Poster, 1995c: 42)
Therefore, we cannot use the concept of the public sphere to explain what is going on
inside the Internet environment; we cannot call the Internet a ‘public sphere’. But does
the Internet change the relation of citizens to the ‘real world’ public sphere? Recent
studies have shown that this is also not the case. A study published by the Harvard
International Journal of Press-Politics suggests that the ‘role of the Internet in promoting
citizenship is limited’ (Nisbet and Scheufele 2002: 55). The researchers compared various
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types of media and their impact on political efficacy, knowledge, and participation. They
said that, in fact, respondents who used the Web frequently for entertainment purposes
were less likely to feel efficacious about their potential role in the democratic process and
also knew less about facts relevant to current events.
In conclusion, the crisis of the public sphere is very real but the Internet as a salvation is
not. The ‘Global Village’ is marked by big ‘digital inequalities’ and these online
inequalities follow patterns of the real world society. But, despite these problems there
are many Internet enthusiasts who argue that any medium carries inequalities (press, for
example, excludes the illiterate) and we should focus on the good side of this global
communications medium. Some see the possibility of an Electronic Agora, which would
be a shift from representative democracy to a direct democracy where citizens could
participate online in political decisions. Their optimistic views lead them to believe that
the Internet can reinvent civil society and revitalise democracy, hoping that the Internet
will finally bring back an idealised public sphere, where citizens would discuss equally
and make informed democratic decisions. However, recent studies prove that these views
are more likely to remain as theories. The concepts of democracy and public sphere
themselves have to be adapted as they do no fit with the Postmodern character of the
Internet. It looks like we are waiting, in a way, for the Messiahs that will free society
from the hands of the Rupert Murdochs and Michael Eisners. But, unfortunately, this does
not seem to be the time yet and the Internet does not seem to be the hero. The invention of
the Internet has given us new ways to communicate but it has not significantly changed
the way in which we relate to the public sphere.
2.240 words
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Bibliography
Allan, S. (1999) News Culture, Buckingham: Open University Press.
Croteau, D. and Hoynes, W. (2000) Media/Society: Industries, Images and Audiences,
London: Academic Press.
Dunlop, C. and King, R. (eds.) (1991) Computerization and Controversy: Values,
Conflicts and Social Choices, London: Academic Press.
Habermas, J. (1994) ‘The Emergence of the Public Sphere’ Polity Reader in Cultural
Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press. pp. 81-90.
Hargittai, E. (2004) ‘Internet Access and Use in Context’ New Media & Society 6(1).
London: Sage.
Nisbet, M.C. and Scheufele, D.A. (2002) ‘Being a Citizen Online: New Oportunities and
Dead Ends’ Harvard International Journal of Press-Politics 7 (3). London: Sage.
Poster, M. (1995a) The Second Media Age, Cambridge: Blackwell.
Poster, M (1995b) ‘Cyberdemocracy: Internet and the Public Sphere’ [Internet] Available
at: <URL: http://www.hnet.uci.edu/mposter/writings/democ.html> [Accessed: 18/05/04]
Poster, M. (1995c) ‘The Net as a Public Sphere?’ Wired, November 1995, pp 42.
Wheeler, M. (1997) Politics and the Mass Media, Cambridge: Blackwell.
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