Advancing innovation, mexico's innovation agents (eng)

Guillermo M. Cejudo
Mauricio Dussauge
Cynthia Michel

Advancing Innovation:
Mexico’s Innovation Agents
Guillermo M. Cejudo, Mauricio Dussauge
and Cynthia Michel
2015
This project was funded by Omidyar Network.
The opinions and information inside this document are entirely the responsibility of its authors and do not represent the opinion
of CIDE as an institution.

ADVANCING INNOVATION: MEXICO’S INNOVATION AGENTS 1
Preface
In 2014, the Office of the President of
Mexico launched an initiative called
National Innovation Agents (Agentes de
Innovación Nacional, or AIN, in
Spanish). The initiative has been
sponsored by the Coordination for the
National Digital Strategy (Coordinación
de la Estrategia Digital Nacional, or
CEDN, in Spanish) in an attempt to
solve certain public problems by
pursuing open innovation processes,
seeking to redefine the collaboration
between citizens and the public sector
through co-creation between civil
servants and external agents.
This report is the result of an
evaluation of the AIN undertaken by a
research team from the Center for
Research and Teaching in Economics
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económicas, or CIDE, in Spanish),
financed by Omidyar Network. This
report offers an analysis of the overall
strategy (a detailed analysis of the five
projects developed under the AIN
initiative is available in Spanish at
http://administracionpublica.cide.edu/
?p=645).
The authors thank the public
officials at the CEDN, the internal and
external agents, the technological team,
other participants from the federal
government, and Reboot and Public
Works (Stanford University) for
agreeing to several interviews and for
sharing their information: Lorena
Rivero, Aura Martinez, Leticia Jáuregui,
Santiago Ocejo, Tania Castillo,
Alejandro González, Alberto Saracho,
José María Aspiroz, Patrick Kane,
Eduardo Garza, Mois Cherem, Natalia
Briseño, Hugo Osorio, Panthea Lee,
Kerry Brennan, Jenny Stefanotti, and
Alejandra Lagunes. We express our
gratitude for the original drive of Ania
Calderón, Guillermo Ruíz de Teresa,
Jorge Soto, Alejandra Ruíz del Río,
Laura Bacon, and Libby Haight. We also
thank Anahí Gutierrez for her
contributions during the first stage of
this evaluation and Xóchitl Toledo and
Roberto Zedillo for translating this
report into English.
Some of the findings from this
evaluation have already been
presented at the Fifth International
Conference on Government,
Administration and Public Policy
GIGAPP IUIOG 2014, at the Open
Government Partnership’s Americas
Regional Meeting in 2014, at the 1st
National Colloquium on Public
Administration of the National Institute
of Public Administration (Instituto
Nacional de Administración Pública, or
INAP, in Spanish) in 2015, at the MX
Abierto Seminar on Public Innovation
in 2015, at the 65th Political Studies
Association Annual International
Conference, which took place in
England in 2015, and at the Open
Government Partnership’s Global
Summit in Mexico City in 2015.

2 ADVANCING INNOVATION: MEXICO’S INNOVATION AGENTS
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the
promotion of innovation to improve
the efficiency and efficacy of public
management has become one of
governments’ main objectives (Brown
and Osborne, 2013). International
organizations, universities and civil
society organizations have sought to
contribute to this purpose by creating
observatories, laboratories, and think
tanks that offer advice on the best
practices to accomplish it. This has
influenced countries to increasingly
adopt various innovation strategies
that range from the creation of
structures that support organizations
in their processes of innovation to the
implementation of policies centered
specifically on the encouragement of
innovation in government agencies
(OECD, 2015).
In Mexico, the Federal
Government has followed this trend by
implementing various initiatives, one
of which is National Innovation Agents
(Agentes de Innovación, or AIN, in
Spanish.) AIN is a recent and novel
proposal from the Coordination of the
National Digital Strategy (Coordinación
de Estrategia Digital Nacional, or CEDN,
in Spanish), which is the agency, within
the Office of the President of Mexico, in
charge of this topic. This strategy is
meant to solve public problems by
pursuing open innovation processes
(i.e. those based on a design
methodology centered on the citizen),
and seeks to redefine the collaboration
between citizens and the public sector.
To this effect, it links people from
outside the government with those
public officials responsible for the
design and implementation of public
policy in order to make them work
together in the development of
technology-based projects meant to
solve problems from a citizen
perspective (Estrategia Digital
Nacional, 2014).
This report is the result of an
evaluation of the AIN undertaken by a
research team from the Center for
Research and Teaching in Economics
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económicas, or CIDE, in Spanish) and
financed by Omidyar Network. The
work of the evaluation team was
focused on analyzing each stage of the
innovation process in order to identify
the factors that either enable or
prevent innovation in the public sector.
In this sense, the team studied the way
each innovation was born, the
sequence of interactions among all
parties involved, the products that
resulted from each innovation project,
as well as all their potential effects on
the public institutions for which they
were created.
On the following pages, we
present a brief explanation of the
initiative as a whole. We later explore
the project’s precedents and the way
the idea for it came about.
Subsequently, we outline the design of
AIN and compare it to the way the
initiative was implemented. Finally, we
offer some conclusions and
recommendations.

Background
Created in 2012, the CEDN seeks to
promote “innovation, openness,
transparency, collaboration, and civil
participation in the country in order to
bring Mexico into the society of
knowledge” (Reglamento de la Oficina
de la Presidencia de la República, art.
10, par. I). The CEDN is also tasked
with designing and implementing the
Action Plan 2013-2015 to which
Mexico committed as a member of the
Open Government Partnership (OGP).
The CEDN combines the
government’s innovation agenda with
the use of information technology in
government and the actions of open
government. This combination explains
several decisions related to the design
of AIN, since the purpose was to create
a program that would incorporate the
use of ICTs and involve citizens in the
development of projects meant to
improve public management and
advance government openness. The
challenge was to let the Office of the
President manage the strategy while
also allowing the various federal
ministries involved to design their own
projects. In other words, it was about
finding a way to let government offices
become the protagonists in the
implementation of innovation
processes that would allow them to be
more efficient and effective, without
those processes being entirely
exogenous to them.
The main issue the CEDN
wanted to address through AIN was the
limited efficiency and efficacy
associated with the implementation of
processes in government agencies and
the way this affects their relations with
citizens. This definition of the problem
coincided with one of the main
objectives of the new administration:
to achieve a government that is both
efficient and able to offer a better
quality of service than it currently does
through the incorporation of
Information and Communications
Technologies (ICTs) (see PGCM,
Programa para un Gobierno Cercano y
Moderno).
The team responsible for
implementing AIN was in charge of the
CEDN’s General Director of Innovation
and Citizen Participation, and the
Deputy General Director of Civic
Innovation. While all team members
have a solid academic background
including postgraduate studies abroad,
and also have experience in developing
innovation projects, their involvement
in the CEDN was their first job
experience as public sector officials.

How did AIN come about?
The project was designed to cut across
different ministries and sectors of
government, while being coordinated
by the CEDN. With this in mind, several
ministries were convened to identify
the actors that could potentially lead
innovation projects. There was a need
for people who had experience in each
particular institution, but who at the
same time were capable of thinking
“outside the box”. This is how five
public servants (afterwards called
“internal agents”) were ultimately
chosen. Each one of them came from a
different ministry, linked to a policy
area considered strategic for the
federal government: health, education,
security, economic promotion, and
modern government.
The CEDN team acknowledged
that public servants generally lack the
time needed to develop tasks that go
beyond their routines, which prevents
them from thinking of and
implementing innovations in their
institutions. Consequently, it was
decided that the design of AIN should
promote co-creation, meaning the
collaboration between public servants
and experts in different sectors1. In
addition, to team up with the “internal
agents”, they found “external agents”
who had experience in each
corresponding sector and a track
record in offering innovative solutions
to traditional problems.
1 Several international experiences that had
innovation in the public sector as their main
purpose were studied for the design of AIN. In
particular, two experiences in the US public
administration were taken as a reference:
CODE for America and Presidential Innovation
Fellows.
Innovations would be ICT-based.
According to the CEDN, a clear lack of
connection between the technical and
substantive areas in government
ministries made technological
innovations look like something
exogenous; hence the decision to
incorporate a technological component
into innovation processes. In fact, the
CEDN acknowledged that continuous
innovation aimed at improving both
government efficiency and the public
sector’s relationship with citizens is
not properly a task of government
itself, since public offices generally do
not provide any spaces for civil
servants to take risks, suggest ideas, or
even fail.
This had two implications. The
first one was that AIN was designed to
create a space where public servants of
various ministries could actually take
risks and think “outside the box”,
without having to worry about any
possible failures that could potentially
have negative effects. In addition, the
purpose was to encourage federal
agencies to actually adopt and
incorporate the innovations, since
solutions, instead of being externally
imposed, would be created from
within. The second implication for the
design of AIN was that a new member
would have to be added to the
innovation team aside from the
internal and external agents: someone
that had enough experience in the
development of software and other
technological resources, so that
everyone’s specific needs could be met.
Finally, the international
experiences reviewed by the CEDN
team showed that innovation strategies

in the public sector tended to be poorly
structured, and that the people in
charge tended to understand these
initiatives as tasks for which the
ultimate purpose was to develop a
technological tool and then come back
to their government office to deliver a
finished product. The CEDN decided to
rely on an institution that was able to
give structure to each team’s
innovation process and lead them to
co-create. To this effect, it invited
Public Works, an agency from Stanford
University with substantial experience
in using the Design Thinking
methodology to generate innovative
projects in the public sector.

The Design of AIN
Once the problem that AIN would deal
with was defined as the limited
efficiency and efficacy of government
processes across ministries and the
effects this has on the government’s
relationship with citizens, the CEDN
team conceived the strategy to be
based on four fundamental tools: a) a
team of agents for each participating
ministry; b) periodical meetings
between them; c) resources for the
team-building efforts, and d) follow up
on all processes, whether
institutionally from the CEDN or in a
more specialized manner through
other partners. The objective was to
create conditions for the teams to
innovate and find solutions to concrete
public problems. The ultimate goal was
to produce five innovations, even
though team members at the CEDN
were aware from the start that they
would all probably achieve different
degrees of success.
The strategy required agents to get
together periodically, and to accede to
ongoing support, for them to be able to
design technology-based innovative
proposals meant to solve issues related
to the efficiency and efficacy of their
own government institutions. The first
step was thus to identify and recruit
potential internal and external agents.
An internal agent needed:
a) To be a public servant in the
federal government;
b) To have a decision-making position
in her department;
c) To have institutional backing to
participate in the project;
d) To be willing to form part of an
open, citizen-oriented innovation
process, and
e) To be in charge of tasks that were
compatible with the purpose of the
project in order to be able to invest
time in it.
FIGURE 1. AIN’s CAUSAL THEORY
Limited efficiency
and efficacy in
government
processes across
departments and
its effects on the
government's
relationship with
its citizens
1. AIN teams
2. Periodical
meetings
3.Economic
resources
4. Follow-up
Conditions that
allow internal
agents to
innovate and
solve concrete
problems within
the government.
Five innovations
with different
degrees of
success.
Problem Tools Products Results

External agents, for their part, were
required:
a) To have outstanding careers in the
subject of the project.
b) Not to be government employees.
c) To manage or have experience
managing a project or organization
related to the problem they would
solve or the city it was related to,
and
d) To commit at least 25 percent of
their time to the development of
the project.
Agents in each team were expected to
hold periodical meetings so as to
collaboratively define both the problem
they would address and their
technology-based innovative solution
for it. Thus solutions would result from
a co-creation process between both
parties. The CEDN planned to put a
series of resources at the disposal of
the teams to aid their innovation
efforts. The first resource was support
from a facilitator from Public Works, a
program at the Hasso Plattner Institute
of Design in Stanford (better known as
d.-school) which, based on the Design
Thinking methodology (which aims to
solve problems in a creative manner,
focusing designs on the users),
supports members of the civil society
and government reformers in the
development of innovations. Public
Works would run a short workshop at
the beginning of the AIN initiative in
order to teach the Design Thinking
methodology to all teams. Afterwards,
a couple of working sessions would be
held separately with each team so as to
offer them more specific advice.
Throughout the following weeks, the
facilitator from Public Works would be
available for virtual sessions during
office hours to answer any questions
the teams might have about the design
process. Therefore, the expectation was
that, in accordance with the Design
Thinking methodology, all teams would
develop a technology-based innovation
according to the following stages:
1. Definition of the problem and
ideation.
Agents and the technology developer,
with the support from a Public Works
facilitator, would narrow down the
problem to be solved. To this effect,
they would engage in fieldwork meant
to “generate empathy” among potential
service users and to identify their
needs. In addition, agents would come
up with multiple possible solutions and
assess the risks of each one.
2. Prototype creation and
testing.
Teams would explore the possible
solutions they thought of during step
one and develop simple prototypes to
test them with citizens and other
potential service users. At the end of
this stage, all teams would have enough
elements to pick their best solution for
further development.
3. Innovation development.
During this stage, teams would rely on
the technological developer to create
the ICT basis for the innovation,
meeting weekly for follow-up.
4. Transition.
In order for the government institution
for which the innovation was
developed to be able to keep up with
its administration and maintenance, as
well as for it to be able to “scale it up”
(apply it in other agencies), the
technology involved would be

documented and personnel intended to
be in charge of it would be trained.
Teams were expected to follow the
timetable described in Table 1,
although CEDN members were aware
that each stage could require more or
less time.
An additional tool was that of
mentoring sessions. These were
intended to provide each team with an
expert’s point of view about the policy
area in which they focused, so that they
could improve the design of their
proposed solutions.
An additional tool to support the
teams and their operation consisted in
providing them with economic
resources ($1,000,000.00 MX, or
approximately USD $75,000 per team)
so that they could hire up to four new
team members with additional skills.
To this effect, the plan was that the
CEDN team would issue an open call to
invite new people with different
technical profiles to become part of the
teams.
The involvement of Reboot
(www.reboot.org), a social
organization based in New York and
dedicated to inclusive development
and to the promotion of governance,
was considered to be another tool
which would support the teams.
Reebot’s role consisted in documenting
and evaluating the entire innovation
process, as well as interacting with the
team members to create a
communication strategy to transmit
the lessons learned from the initiative
across the international open
government community.
TABLE 1.
STAGES OF THE AIN PROJECT

Finally, the CEDN team itself
would be an additional tool at the
agents’ disposal. Even though the
Innovation was to be the person in
charge of following every team, there
was some debate inside the CEDN as to
how closely the teams should be
monitored. On the one hand, nobody
wanted to distort each team’s
innovation process. On the other, they
planned to create a structure that could
mediate their relationship with the
agents so as to give certainty to the
process. In the end, the decision was to
undertake a regular yet flexible follow-
up scheme in relation to the agents’
work. In practical terms, this would
require weekly calls between the teams
and the CEDN. The point of these calls
was not only to keep track of the
progress made by each team, but also
to help agents solve any possible
obstacles they might face while
developing their innovations. The plan
was that the CEDN would have a full-
time team dedicated to coordinating
the AIN project so as to provide teams
with a working place and
infrastructure (computer equipment,
server space, connectivity) if needed,
as well as to offer political support to
overcome possible resistance in their
agencies.
It was expected that, with these
tools at hand, the five teams would
satisfy a set of minimum necessary
conditions that would enable them to
innovate and solve concrete problems.
With these resources, the CEDN would
be creating spaces inside each of the
five public institutions involved, so that
agents could get away from their
bureaucratic routines and from all the
other factors that usually inhibit
innovation processes. This did not only
mean that those responsible for the
various projects involved would find
time to innovate, but also that they
would work in collaboration with
certain actors external to the
government. In addition, any possible
failures would not be considered signs
of poor performance on the part of
internal agents.
Ultimately, AIN was expected to
deliver five innovations based on
technology, one per team. The
possibility of “failure” was also
considered—meaning the possibility
that none of the participating
institutions might incorporate the
team’s proposed solution into their
operations. Analyzing the diversity
across the teams’ experiences would
allow to identify the factors that make
innovation in the public sector more or
less feasible.
AIN also sought to generate
abilities to innovate among all internal
agents. Once the project was finished,
agents themselves were expected to
acknowledge that innovation is not
costly, that certain methodologies to
innovate help reduce the risk of failure,
and thus that innovation is possible.
Finally, the AIN strategy was expected
to have a demonstration effect, making
the interest in innovation rise in other
federal areas and institutions. This
would manifest itself in the form of
other agencies from the federal
government expressing their intention
to belong to a second round of the AIN
strategy.

The Implementation of AIN
The implementation of AIN started off
with the selection of participant
government institutions and the
internal agents to be involved. Five
ministries were chosen, each one
related to an objective set forth in the
EDN: Government Transformation,
Digital Economy, Quality Education,
Universal and Effective Healthcare, and
Public Security. Thus, the Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit, the National
Institute for the Entrepreneur (which is
part of the Ministry of Economy), the
Ministry of Public Education, the
Mexican Institute of Social Security,
and the Ministry of the Interior were all
selected.
During the writing of the PGCM
(Programa para un Gobierno Cercano y
Moderno), the CEDN team was in touch
with public officials from the five
institutions mentioned above. This
helped identify people who would later
participate as internal agents by
invitation through a closed call. The
internal agents, together with the
CEDN team, defined the problem that
would be addressed by each team in
general terms. The selection of the
external agents and of the team that
would be in charge of developing the
necessary technology subsequently
took place also through a closed call.
The selection took more time than
expected, which pushed the start date
for the project back for one month.
At the same time, the CEDN also
remained in touch with Public Works,
Reboot, and CIDE to define the role that
each one of these partners would have
in the project. Nevertheless, Reboot’s
role was not clearly distinguished since
the beginning from the CIDE’s (in
charge of evaluating the initiative), nor
from the role of Public Works
(responsible for advising teams
throughout the innovation process).
The role of Reboot was modified along
the project as a result of a lack of
communication and of well-defined
expectations. In fact, aside from
documenting the agents’ work
processes, Reboot ended up advising
the CEDN during the implementation.
During this stage, the CEDN also
established communications with
Omidyar Network and with The William
and Flora Hewlett Foundation, which
provided funding for the work of CIDE
and Reboot, respectively.
The official launching of the
project took place in June 2014, in a
ceremony led by the CEDN
Coordinator, with the participation of
Undersecretaries, senior officials, and
the agents from all institutions
involved. During the following two
days, agents participated in a training
course about Design Thinking, taught
by the facilitator from Public Works.
The purpose of this was for agents to
be able to apply the methodology in the
design and implementation of their
own projects.
Ideas and starting points for the
five innovation projects were also
presented during the launching
session. In the case of public security,
the team would attempt to create an
innovation that would allow citizens to
get involved in violence prevention. As
to digital economy, the purpose would
be to create a system that would make
the fund for entrepreneurs more
transparent and accessible. In terms of
universal healthcare, the goal would be

to make health services more
accessible. In relation to education
quality, the goal was to rethink the
long-distance education system,
keeping the newest available
technologies in mind. Finally, as to
government transformation, the goal
was to find a way to integrate feedback
from beneficiaries into the evaluations
of social programs’ performance (see
Table 2).
TABLE 2. PROJECTS OF THE NATIONAL INNOVATION AGENTS
EDN
OBJECTIVE
Government
office of the
internal
agent
Question that
guides the
innovation
Innovation Product
Prototype
Change expected,
according to each
team
Security
Ministry of
the Interior
How could we
involve citizens in
violence
prevention?
Replica of the model of the Citizen
Integration Center (CIC) that exists
in a northern state of Mexico, which
consists in a technological platform
that receives and spreads reports
from citizens via tweets, e-mails, a
mobile app, SMS, and a web page
about traffic regulations, security,
public services, and emergencies.
Greater
participation from
the citizens in
actions meant to
prevent social
violence.
Digital
Economy
National
Institute for
the
Entrepreneur
How could we
create a system
that provides
funding to
Mexican
entrepreneurs and
makes the existing
process more
transparent and
accessible for
them?
Redesigning the processes used for
project placing, evaluation, and
disbursement of the resources
provided by the entrepreneur
system, as well as the technological
platform related to it.
More transparency
in the processes for
project placing and
evaluation, and for
resource
disbursement, as
well as better
communication
with the applicants
Universal
and
Effective
Healthcare
Mexican
Institute of
Social
Security
How could we
make health
services more
accessible for
citizens through
social innovation?
App with three sections aimed at
pregnant women: 1) Information
about the development of their
pregnancy; 2) Information to know
whether their doctor appointments
are in line with the IMSS guide, and
3) access to paperwork related to
maternity leave.
Better quality in the
service for
pregnant women:
empowered women
and less crowded
medical centers.
Education
Quality
Ministry of
Public
Education
How could we
rethink the long-
distance education
system based on
the newest
available
technologies?
Technological platform with seven
areas of socioemotional skills, 21
videos and interactive contents,
plus one tool for self-assessment for
each one of the different subject-
areas related to school desertion.
Lower drop-out
rates. Since they get
motivated to
continue their
education, students
develop
socioemotional
competences and
have important
information to
build their
professional future.

Aside from the course about Design
Thinking, the facilitator from Public
Works held a series of individual
sessions, where teams received more
detailed advice about the initial
development of their projects.
Additional meetings took place around
two months later (August 2014), where
teams could present their progress to
different experts from their policy
areas, so that feedback could
contribute to a more effective solution.
A couple of weeks after these meetings,
each team made an official
presentation of their progress before
the CEDN and the Undersecretaries in
charge of the areas where the internal
agents worked. The point of this
presentation was to secure (or in some
cases generate) support from the
corresponding institution so that the
innovative solution under way could be
adopted when the time arrived.
Even though the teams were
supposed to have a nearly finished
version of their prototypes by the end
of 2014, a series of factors delayed this.
Mainly, the CEDN did not provide the
teams with the economic resources
they had initially offered. Nor was
there anyone in charge of monitoring
or meeting regularly with each team in
case they needed it.
Therefore, by the first months of
2015 each team had achieved a
different level of progress. In many
cases, a certain indifference towards
the general project of the AIN could be
felt, as well as certain distance from the
CEDN team. By that time (March 2015),
the CEDN had not yet secured
economic resources for the teams,
while it established communications
with them only sporadically. This led
the formal closure of the AIN project—
originally planned for December
2014—to take place in different
moments, according to the evolution,
interests, and personal schedules of
each team. The CEDN showed interest
in holding an official closing ceremony
for the project on September 2015. The
purpose was to place the AIN initiative
as a precedent for a laboratory of
public innovation that would be
promoted from the CEDN. However, by
the time this report was written
(December 2015), the ceremony had
not yet taken place.
CONTINUATION OF TABLE 1. PROJECTS OF THE AGENTS OF INNOVATION
EDN
OBJECTIVE
Government
office of the
internal
agent
Question that guides
the innovation
Innovation Product
Prototype
Change expected,
according to each
team
Government
Transforma-
tion
Ministry of
Finance and
Public Credit
How can we integrate
user satisfaction
feedback regarding
budgetary programs
and incorporate it into
program performance
evaluations?
An electronic platform that
consists on a (suggested)
methodology to gather and
concentrate every citizen’s
perception about the
public programs from
which they receive
benefits.
Incorporation of
the beneficiaries’
satisfaction in the
evaluation of
programs.
Source: own elaboration.

Analysis of the Implementation of AIN
As it was previously described, the
implementation of the AIN initiative
deviated significantly from the original
design. In this section, we present a
detailed analysis of the gaps we noted,
as well as their implications for the
development of the project 2 . The
analysis is divided into two sections,
each one corresponding to a specific
stage in the project.
The tools
1. Selection of internal and external
agents. From the beginning, the CEDN
defined clear and reasonable guidelines
to choose the agents. In most cases,
criteria were closely followed,
especially by the external agents.
However, some of the internal agents
did not meet the guidelines, either
because they lacked decision-making
faculties inside their areas or because
they were not fully backed by their
institution to participate in the project.
This affected the co-creation process
that was expected to take place
between agents, since, in those cases
where internal agents lacked decision-
making capabilities, external agents
ended up deciding on most issues
related to the project. The absence of
institutional backing had a further
negative impact on the probability that
the corresponding government agency
would adopt the innovation. In those
cases, the solution was not perceived to
satisfy any institutional needs.
2 A detailed analysis of the five projects
developed under the AIN initiative is available
in Spanish at the following URL:
http://administracionpublica.cide.edu/?p=645
2. Advice provided to the teams by
Public Works. The Public Works
facilitator showed ample experience
with the Design Thinking methodology
and was able to both ensure team
members became familiar with it from
the start and get actively involved in
the development of their
methodologies. Design Thinking was
useful for each team to a different
degree because of two factors: the
development status of each project (in
terms of fulfilling their purposes), and
the previous knowledge some agents
had regarding this methodology.
While the plan was for all teams
to begin at a similar starting point
(identifying a problem to solve or a
need to be addressed), in some cases
the “solution” had been already
decided by the time AIN started. Even
before the initiative began, there were
some projects whose design and
purpose had already been agreed upon
by the government agency and an
external consultant/agent. Therefore,
in some cases, the methodology that
was meant to support the design of the
“innovation” was not really relevant.
Furthermore, the methodological
principles did not change existing
working relationships in those cases
where the agents had been
collaborating since before the AIN
initiative started.
In the case of those teams in
which the agents were already familiar
with the Design Thinking methodology,
innovations had a clear and simple
causality underlying their design.
However, most of the teams did not
stick to this methodology throughout
the development of their project. This

was basically due to the fact that the
training course for agents was only two
days long, and so it did not provide
them with enough time to recognize
the value it could add to the innovation
process. Only some teams defined the
problem adequately, and only one of
them engaged in fieldwork in order to
identify the needs of those service
users the innovation was aimed at.
Moreover, the development of the
teams’ innovations was the result of a
process of co-creation between both
agents only in some cases. In fact, only
one of the teams can be said to have
created a prototype following the
Design Thinking methodology (even
though by the time this report was
written the innovation had yet to be
adopted.)
The plan was for the facilitator
from Public Works to assist agents
during the process to provide solutions
for these challenges. While the
facilitator was always willing to help
teams, she did not speak Spanish and
was not familiar with the intricacies of
the Mexican bureaucracy. Therefore,
mistakes in terms of problem definition
or proposed solutions went under her
radar in spite of their various
interactions.
3. Session with experts. The external
experts invited to participate as
‘mentors’ are widely renowned
publicly. The purpose of these
meetings was for agents to get
feedback from them that could
contribute to improve the design of
their innovations. However, these
‘mentors’ were not really subject-
matter experts but rather politicians,
and thus their contributions were
limited.
4. Economic resources. This was yet
another tool meant to support the daily
operation of each team and facilitate
the recruitment of additional team
members. However, no resources were
provided to the agents, which
complicated the development of the
projects at different stages in each case.
For those in which the agents
committed more time, the lack of
material resources brought difficulties
towards the end of the process, during
the development of the prototypes. For
those in which external agents had less
time for the project (or where there
were changes in internal agents along
the process), it was impossible to
recruit additional members who could
concentrate full time on the project and
its development.
5. Advice from Reboot. Reboot had a
constant presence throughout the
project. However, the terms of its
involvement were not clearly defined
in the design of the AIN initiative. Thus
agents did not regard Reboot as a
source of support or advice. As the
project progressed, Reboot became an
advisor to the CEDN. Members from
the CEDN team found Reboot’s analysis
to be very relevant, but they reckoned
that receiving feedback on a regular
basis (instead of only at the end of the
project) would have been better.
6. Support from the CEDN. The original
plan was that a CEDN team would be
fully devoted to follow up with agents
and provide them with infrastructure
and political support in order to
surmount any obstacles they might
encounter, while still giving them
enough flexibility to act and evolve in
whatever way they saw fit. The CEDN
did always keep communication

channels open for agents to pose their
questions or share their problems. This
allowed agents to contact the CEDN on
a regular basis. However, clear
communications flowing in the
opposite direction did not always take
place. This became obvious when the
Innovation (who was in principle the
manager of the initiative) left the
CEDN. Agents were never officially
notified of his departure, something
they eventually discovered on their
own. This, along with the inability of
the CEDN to secure economic
resources, fueled animosity amongst
the agents.
The lack of a clear definition on
the form the CEDN’s relationship with
the teams should take—in practical
terms—generated uncertainty and
created expectations among the agents
that could not be fulfilled in the end.
This same lack of definition allowed the
team at CEDN to reduce its own role in
the project. It became merely reactive
as its own workload increased due to
other projects. Thus CEDN’s time and
commitment to all matters related to
the AIN initiative gradually decreased,
as did its communication with the
agents. In fact, for over four months
(April to July 2015), the agents had no
idea whether they would eventually
receive economic resources, nor
whether the project would be officially
wrapped up.
The product
According to the original plan, if agents
had had access to the tools previously
mentioned (the Design Thinking
methodology, the support from Reboot,
the economic resources, and the
support from the CEDN) they would
have been in a good position to
innovate and solve public problems
related to specific citizen needs. Their
solutions would have been (i) relevant
for their own government agencies, (ii)
based on technology, and (iii) the result
of a co-creation process. Because the
tools did not work the way they were
planned to, only one team performed
according to what was expected. In that
case—the team working on the health
sector—, agents built a productive
relationship that allowed them to
identify a problem that was relevant
for their institution and that could be
solved with an ICT basis. Relying on the
Design Thinking methodology, they
were able to understand how their
solution was linked to the specific
needs of the service users and
providers. This also helped the internal
agent find a specific area within the
institution which could be interested in
promoting the solution. Even though
they found obstacles (for instance, they
had disagreements with the
technological developer, and never
received the economic resources they
were promised), they managed to deal
with them successfully.
For the other cases, at least one
of the elements of the causal theory
underlying AIN was missing.
Sometimes the co-creation process
between the agents did not come to
reality because of two reasons. The
first is related to situations where the
solution was predetermined (that is, it
had already been agreed upon before
the initiative was launched), and
preexisting working relationships
between the internal and external
agents were not modified by AIN. The
second reason was related to the lack
of decision-making power of internal

agents, which prevented them from
influencing substantial matters during
the innovation process, since it was
clear that their opinions were not
backed by their institution. In these
cases, the external agent ended up
leading the project.
In one of the projects, the issue
was that the problem to be addressed
was not properly defined: it was not
linked to any real needs from service
users. Therefore, the result was an
innovation that did not deal with any
real problems and which the institution
was not interested in making its own.
Only in cases where all the
necessary conditions were created, and
therefore the team came up with an
innovation that could be adopted by
the institution, could internal agents be
expected to have developed new skills
for innovation and their work to have a
demonstration effect.

Conclusions and
recommendations
The AIN initiative addressed a real
problem faced by the Mexican public
sector, which is also present in many
other governments: the difficulty in
generating conditions for innovation
which will, in turn, improve the
administration’s overall level of
efficiency and efficacy. The selected
tools had potential to generate such
conditions. The Design Thinking
methodology seemed appropriate for
promoting two elements that are
crucial in innovation processes: the
identification of real citizen needs, and
a co-creation dynamic. The assistance
provided was expected to make
innovation easier: mentors were
supposed to provide feedback on
innovation design; resources provided
by the CEDN were supposed to help
build a team, and the CEDN was
supposed to provide orientation, solve
possible obstacles, and secure political
backing so as to make adoption easier.
It was thus reasonable to expect five
co-created, technology-based, need-
oriented innovations with high chances
of being adopted by participating
institutions. However, as it has been
shown above, only one innovation
fulfilled all the criteria.
Here we identify some decisions
which should be taken into account for
future similar initiatives, in order to
ensure that innovations are both
relevant and bought in by participating
agencies.
1. Agent selection. Internal agents
should have decision-making
power and institutional backing so
as to be able to both get fully
involved in a co-creation process
and facilitate adoption of the
innovation.
2. Problem definition. Problems
should be based on actual citizen
needs. The definition of the
problem should be part of the co-
creation process, and therefore
should not be an imposition by any
party. In addition, it should be
relevant to the institution.
3. Clear expectations. It is essential
that all actors involved (agents,
superiors, proponents) are aware
of the reasons why they are taking
part, the support they will be
provided, the expectations they
should have regarding the
participation of others, and the
timetable they must adhere to.
4. Guidance to agents. Although
agents should be given a certain
degree of flexibility and space for
maneuver, there should also be
enough resources so as to
systematically monitor and, when
necessary, even guide agents
through any obstacles they might
encounter.
5. Visibility. Finally, it is also essential
that the initiative is perceived as
something valuable to the
government. This would lead
agents to see themselves as part of
a broader, ambitious initiative,
which would in turn motivate them

for their work. Granting the issue
greater visibility would also lead
institutions to recognize the value
in having their members
participate in the innovation
processes, and to better
understand the benefits of
adopting and institutionalizing the
innovation products.

References
Browne, L. and Stephen P. Osborne (2013) Risk and Innovation, Public
Management Review 15 (2): 186-208.
Estrategia Digital Nacional [EDN] (2014) Agentes de Innovación Nacional.
Retrieved from: http://edn.dosdev.com/agentes-de-innovacion-nacional
OCDE (2015) Public-sector innovation. Retrieved from:
http://www.oecd.org/sti/outlook/e-
outlook/stipolicyprofiles/competencestoinnovate/public-
sectorinnovation.htm
Reglamento de la Oficina de la Presidencia de la República (2013, April 2).
Diario Oficial de la Federación.
The information in this document is based on three rounds of interviews with
both internal and external agents, as well as with members from the CEDN.

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