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Securitateaîn secolul 21 IlieValentin (em) eminemix@gmail.com
Cine generează probleme?
Probleme de securitate Confidențialitatea Autentificarea Controlul accesului Integritatea Non-repudierea
Metode de rezolvare Servicii de securitate Mecanisme (criptare, hash) Semnaturadigitala Politici de securitate Software (antivirus) Educatie Măsuri legale
Modelul de bază al criptării Trudy text cifrat text modif M M’ Disp cifrare Disc descif. text clar text clar txt cifrat Cheie cifrare K Cheie descif. K’ Alice Bob
Definitii Spargereacifrurilor – criptanaliza Text cifratcunoscut Text clarcunoscut Text clar ales Proiectareacifrurilor – criptografie Notatii: F: {M} x {K} -> {C} Cifrare/Descifrare: C=Ek(M) / D=Dk’(C)
Caracteristicilesistemelor secrete Neconditionatsigur Rezistă la orice atac, indiferent de cantitatea de text interceptat. Computational tare Nu poate fi spart printr-o analiza sistematica cu resursele disponibile Sistem ideal Indiferent de volum interceptat, exista mai multe solutii, cu probabilitati apropiate
Problemecetrebuieluate in considerare Redundanta Magazin online, comenzi Prospetimea 100 x Bogdan Ana
Clasificare Metode criptografice Clasice Substitutie Monoalfabetica Poliaflabetica Poligrafica Transpozitie Computationale Simetrice Asimetrice Cu coduri redundante
Metode clasice Cezar  Vignere Poligrafica Transpozitie Cheie – (Cezarsuccesiv) Mama are mere  Gigi ace face
One time pads Un de bitipe post de cheie. Se face un XOR intrecheiesimesaj. Ex: Mesaj– DefCampDefcamp. Cheie: Albastru.  Criptanalistul nu le poatesparge. Diferitecheiacoperitoarerezultadiferitemesajevalide.
One time pads (2) De ce nu suntfolosite in practica? Cum transmit cheia? Probleme cu desincronizare. Dacă se pierde un singur bit de informatie restul mesajului devine invalid. Solutia – Criptografie cuantica Criptografie cuantica Polarizarea luminii Probleme: Tehnologiecomplexasiscumpa.
Metodecomputationale Sistemecriptofrafice Simetrice Asimetrice Cerinte generale Cifrare/descifrareeficientapentrutoatecheile Sistemusor de folosit Securitateasadepinda de chei, nu de algoritm Confidentialitate – sa nu poata fi determinatDk din C chiardaca se cunoaste M Autentificare – sa nu poate fi determinatEk din C chiardaca se cunoaste M
Sistemesimetrice (Chei secrete) Implementare hardware DES, Triple DES AES
Sistemeasimetrice Utilizatorul Face publicacheiaEu de criptare. PastreazasecretacheiaDude decriptare. Cheilecomută– Eu(Du(M))=Du(Eu(M)) Avantaje Nu se pot deduce usorsa se deduca D din E Nu poate fi spartprincriptanaliza.
Aplicatiecheiasimetrice (RSA) 1. Se alegdouanumere prime p, q. 2. Se calculeaza n=pxq, z=(p-1)x(q-1) 3. Se alege d a.i. (z,d)=1 4. Se alege e a.i. exd=1 mod z Exemplu. Aleg p=3, q=11 => n=33, z=20, d=7, e=3
Demonstratie RSA Th Fermat : (a,p)=1  ap-1 mod p = 1 Th Euler : (a,n)=1  aɸ(n) mod n = 1  undeɸ(n)numarul de intregipozitivi < n, primi cu n. e, d au fostalesea.i. ɸ(n)=1, un mesaj Mϵ [0,n-1) a.i (M,n)=1 avem(ME mod n)d mod n = M Dem (ME mod n)d mod n = = MED mod n = Mtɸ (n)+1 mod n  = M((Mɸ(n) mod n)t mod n) mod n = M
Semnaturadigitala Cu cheiesecreta – Big Brother. Fiecareutilizatorisi duce cheiasecreta la BB. Cand Alice vreasatrimita un mesaj, BB ii recunoastecheiasecreta, decripteazamesajul, semneaza cu cheiapublica a lui Bob, si cu cheiapublica a BB sitrimitemesajul.
Semnaturadigitala cu cheiepublica Trudy EB(DA(M)) DA (M) DA (M) cifrare cifrare cifrare cifrare Alice Bob DA  ϙ priv EB  ϙ pub DB ϙ priv EA  ϙ pub
Rezumareamesajelor De ceesteimportanta? Multi biti -> Putinibiti Dispersia mare Autentificare. Ex: MD5, SHA-1. Dezavantaje Coliziuni calculate in timprezonabil
PKI, X509 De ce e nevoie?  Probleme cu cheilepublice Implementatca un lant Ierarhicsaulant de incredere (web of trust). ROOT RA1 RA2 CA1 CA2 CA3
Quiz Ceschimbari se producdacaalegemsainterschimbamceledoua faze? (A intaisemneaza cu cheiapublica a lui B apoi cu a lui) A descoperacacheialuiprivataesteidentica cu cheiapublica a lui T. Ceartrebuisafaca A in cazulasta? Artrebuisafacaceva?
Securitateaparolelor student:$1$5exrrU9Z$hqy39CPEydK46LLhZR8br1:15157:0:99999:7::: http://howsecureismypassword.net/ Litere + Cifre, Caracterespeciale. Tastare cu tastaturavirtuala, cu spatii. Nu aceeasiparolapeste tot. Faranumelemamei, zile de nastere, nume de telefon. mkpasswd Autentificare cu cheiepublicapeservere.
Bibliografie Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Computer Networks http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5

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Securitatea in secolul 21

  • 1. Securitateaîn secolul 21 IlieValentin (em) eminemix@gmail.com
  • 3. Probleme de securitate Confidențialitatea Autentificarea Controlul accesului Integritatea Non-repudierea
  • 4. Metode de rezolvare Servicii de securitate Mecanisme (criptare, hash) Semnaturadigitala Politici de securitate Software (antivirus) Educatie Măsuri legale
  • 5. Modelul de bază al criptării Trudy text cifrat text modif M M’ Disp cifrare Disc descif. text clar text clar txt cifrat Cheie cifrare K Cheie descif. K’ Alice Bob
  • 6. Definitii Spargereacifrurilor – criptanaliza Text cifratcunoscut Text clarcunoscut Text clar ales Proiectareacifrurilor – criptografie Notatii: F: {M} x {K} -> {C} Cifrare/Descifrare: C=Ek(M) / D=Dk’(C)
  • 7. Caracteristicilesistemelor secrete Neconditionatsigur Rezistă la orice atac, indiferent de cantitatea de text interceptat. Computational tare Nu poate fi spart printr-o analiza sistematica cu resursele disponibile Sistem ideal Indiferent de volum interceptat, exista mai multe solutii, cu probabilitati apropiate
  • 8. Problemecetrebuieluate in considerare Redundanta Magazin online, comenzi Prospetimea 100 x Bogdan Ana
  • 9. Clasificare Metode criptografice Clasice Substitutie Monoalfabetica Poliaflabetica Poligrafica Transpozitie Computationale Simetrice Asimetrice Cu coduri redundante
  • 10. Metode clasice Cezar Vignere Poligrafica Transpozitie Cheie – (Cezarsuccesiv) Mama are mere Gigi ace face
  • 11. One time pads Un de bitipe post de cheie. Se face un XOR intrecheiesimesaj. Ex: Mesaj– DefCampDefcamp. Cheie: Albastru. Criptanalistul nu le poatesparge. Diferitecheiacoperitoarerezultadiferitemesajevalide.
  • 12. One time pads (2) De ce nu suntfolosite in practica? Cum transmit cheia? Probleme cu desincronizare. Dacă se pierde un singur bit de informatie restul mesajului devine invalid. Solutia – Criptografie cuantica Criptografie cuantica Polarizarea luminii Probleme: Tehnologiecomplexasiscumpa.
  • 13. Metodecomputationale Sistemecriptofrafice Simetrice Asimetrice Cerinte generale Cifrare/descifrareeficientapentrutoatecheile Sistemusor de folosit Securitateasadepinda de chei, nu de algoritm Confidentialitate – sa nu poata fi determinatDk din C chiardaca se cunoaste M Autentificare – sa nu poate fi determinatEk din C chiardaca se cunoaste M
  • 14. Sistemesimetrice (Chei secrete) Implementare hardware DES, Triple DES AES
  • 15. Sistemeasimetrice Utilizatorul Face publicacheiaEu de criptare. PastreazasecretacheiaDude decriptare. Cheilecomută– Eu(Du(M))=Du(Eu(M)) Avantaje Nu se pot deduce usorsa se deduca D din E Nu poate fi spartprincriptanaliza.
  • 16. Aplicatiecheiasimetrice (RSA) 1. Se alegdouanumere prime p, q. 2. Se calculeaza n=pxq, z=(p-1)x(q-1) 3. Se alege d a.i. (z,d)=1 4. Se alege e a.i. exd=1 mod z Exemplu. Aleg p=3, q=11 => n=33, z=20, d=7, e=3
  • 17. Demonstratie RSA Th Fermat : (a,p)=1  ap-1 mod p = 1 Th Euler : (a,n)=1  aɸ(n) mod n = 1 undeɸ(n)numarul de intregipozitivi < n, primi cu n. e, d au fostalesea.i. ɸ(n)=1, un mesaj Mϵ [0,n-1) a.i (M,n)=1 avem(ME mod n)d mod n = M Dem (ME mod n)d mod n = = MED mod n = Mtɸ (n)+1 mod n = M((Mɸ(n) mod n)t mod n) mod n = M
  • 18. Semnaturadigitala Cu cheiesecreta – Big Brother. Fiecareutilizatorisi duce cheiasecreta la BB. Cand Alice vreasatrimita un mesaj, BB ii recunoastecheiasecreta, decripteazamesajul, semneaza cu cheiapublica a lui Bob, si cu cheiapublica a BB sitrimitemesajul.
  • 19. Semnaturadigitala cu cheiepublica Trudy EB(DA(M)) DA (M) DA (M) cifrare cifrare cifrare cifrare Alice Bob DA ϙ priv EB ϙ pub DB ϙ priv EA ϙ pub
  • 20. Rezumareamesajelor De ceesteimportanta? Multi biti -> Putinibiti Dispersia mare Autentificare. Ex: MD5, SHA-1. Dezavantaje Coliziuni calculate in timprezonabil
  • 21. PKI, X509 De ce e nevoie? Probleme cu cheilepublice Implementatca un lant Ierarhicsaulant de incredere (web of trust). ROOT RA1 RA2 CA1 CA2 CA3
  • 22. Quiz Ceschimbari se producdacaalegemsainterschimbamceledoua faze? (A intaisemneaza cu cheiapublica a lui B apoi cu a lui) A descoperacacheialuiprivataesteidentica cu cheiapublica a lui T. Ceartrebuisafaca A in cazulasta? Artrebuisafacaceva?
  • 23. Securitateaparolelor student:$1$5exrrU9Z$hqy39CPEydK46LLhZR8br1:15157:0:99999:7::: http://howsecureismypassword.net/ Litere + Cifre, Caracterespeciale. Tastare cu tastaturavirtuala, cu spatii. Nu aceeasiparolapeste tot. Faranumelemamei, zile de nastere, nume de telefon. mkpasswd Autentificare cu cheiepublicapeservere.
  • 24. Bibliografie Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Computer Networks http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. Confidentialitatea – Intrusulsa nu paotareconstituimesajulAutentificarea – Intrusulsa nu poatamodificamesajulfaraca Bob saisideaseama
  2. TCifC – Un text cifrat, metoda, limbajultextuluiclar, subiect, cuvintecheie din text;TClaC – Un text clar, text cifratcunoscut, anumitecuvintecheie;TClaA – Mod cifrareanumiteportiune text, exemplubaza de date, (modificare -&gt; efect).
  3. Este siguracestsistem? Nu estesigurdacaavem un fostangajatrauvoitor. Totusidacaadaugamredundanta le facemviatamaiusoara la criptanalistiPrincipiul criptografic 1: Mesajele trebuie să conţină redundanţă.Principiul criptografic 2: Este necesară o metodă pentru a dejuca atacurile prin replicarea mesajelor.
  4. Cezar,monoalfabetica. Vignere, polialfabetica. Poligrafica
  5. DES a fost învăluit în controverse de cand a aparut. NSA voia o cheia de 56 de biti. IBM de 128 de biti. Conspiratie. A fostabandonat. A fostdemonstratcapoate fi spartprincautareexhaustiva 2^56 de pass-uri in maiputin de o zi. =&gt; Triple DES.Chiar dacă NSA reuşeşte să construiască o maşină cu un miliard de procesoare, fiecare fiindcapabil să evalueze o cheie în fiecare picosecundă, ar trebui pentru o astfel de maşină aproximativ 10^10 saspargaparola.
  6. Un text cifrat cu E_u nu poate fi descifrat tot cu E_u.PentruautentificareEu(Du(M))=Du(Eu(M))
  7. Puterilemari nu se calculeazaniciodata.
  8. Dezavantaje? Cine este BB? El poatecitittotul.Avantaje: Alice nu poatenegaca a trimismesajul.
  9. Alice nu maipoatespuneca nu i-a trimismesajullui Bob o data trimis. (A semnatmesajul cu cheiaeiprivata).
  10. De ceestemaifolosit MD5decat SHA-1.
  11. User/Parola/UltimadatacandafostSchimbata/Numar minim de zile in care trebuieschimbata/NrMaximDezileValida/NumarDeZileInainteAvertisment/NumarDeZileDupaExpirare=&gt;Disabled/Data candcontuldevine Disabled