SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  20
Télécharger pour lire hors ligne
Deploying DNSSEC
Champika Wijayatunga | ION – Islamabad | 25 Jan 2017
DNS Recap
2
| 3
Client Resolver
(ISP)
www.example.net. ? www.example.net. ?
a.server.net.
1.2.3.4
DNS Resolution
3
10.1.2.3
.net
nameserver
a.server.net.
1.2.3.4
Root
Server
l.root-servers.net.
199.7.83.42
2001:500:3::42
example.net
nameserver
ns.example.net.
5.6.7.8
Threats and Risks in DNS
| 5
Basic Cache Poisoning
Attacker
– Launches a spam campaign
where spam message
contains
http://loseweightfastnow.com
– Attacker’s name server will
respond to a DNS query for
loseweightnow.com with
malicious data about
ebay.com
– Vulnerable resolvers add
malicious data to local caches
– The malicious data will send
victims to an eBay phishing
site for the lifetime of the
cached entry
5
What is the IPv4 address
for
loseweightfastnow.com
My Mac
My local resolver
ecrime name
server
loseweightfastnow.com IPv4
address is 192.168.1.1
ALSO www.ebay.com is at
192.168.1.2
I’ll cache this
response… and
update
www.ebay.com
| 6
Query Interception (DNS Hijacking)
1/24/17 6
• A man in the middle (MITM) or spoofing attack forwards
DNS queries to a name server that returns forge
responses
– Can be done using a DNS proxy, compromised access router or
recursor, ARP poisoning, or evil twin Wifi access point
Bank
Web
SiteIntended path for online banking transactions
Redirected path
Fake
Bank
Web
Site
Evil
Twin
AP
Attacker’s
resolverEvil twin AP or
compromised router
redirects DNS queries
to attacker’s name
server
Attacker’s name
server returns fake
bank web site
address
Why DNSSEC?
7
| 8
DNS: Data Flow
8
Primary Caching
Servers
Resolvers
Zone administrator
Zone file
Dynamic
updates
1
2
Secondaries
3
4
5
| 9
DNS Vulnerabilities
9
Primary Caching
Servers
Resolver
Zone administrator
Zone file
Dynamic
updates
1
2
Secondaries
3
Server protection
4
5
Corrupting data Impersonating master
Unauthorized updates
Cache
impersonation
Cache pollution by
Data spoofing
Data protection
Altered zone data
| 10
Where DNSSEC fits in
• CPU and bandwidth advances make legacy
DNS vulnerable to MITM attacks
• DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) introduces
digital signatures into DNS to cryptographically
protect contents
• With DNSSEC fully deployed a business can be
sure a customer gets un-modified data (and visa
versa)
| 11
What DNSSEC does and doesn’t do
• Does not do
– Protect against host threats (DDoS, buffer
overruns in code, etc.)
– Keep DNS data private
– Ensure correctness of DNS data
• Does Do: Establish the legitimacy of data
retrieved from the DNS
– Protects end users from being redirected to
malicious sites
– Allows any data stored in the DNS to be validated
as trustworthy
| 12
Client Resolver
(ISP)
www.example.net. ? www.example.net. ?
a.server.net.
How DNSSEC Works
12
10.1.2.3
.net
nameserver
Root
Server
example.net
nameserver
| 13
How DNSSEC Works
• Data authenticity and integrity by signing the Resource
Records Sets with a private key
• Public DNSKEYs published, used to verify the RRSIGs
• Children sign their zones with their private key
– Authenticity of that key established by parent signing hash (DS) of
the child zone's key
• Repeat for parent…
• Not that difficult on paper
– Operationally, it is a bit more complicated
– DSKEY → KEY –signs→ zone data
13
| 14
The Business Case for DNSSEC
• Cyber security is becoming a greater concern to
enterprises, government, and end users. DNSSEC is a
key tool and differentiator.
• DNSSEC is the biggest security upgrade to Internet
infrastructure in over 20 years. It is a platform for new
security applications (for those that see the opportunity).
• DNSSEC infrastructure deployment has been brisk but
requires expertise. Getting ahead of the curve is a
competitive advantage.
| 15
DNSSEC Deployment
https://rick.eng.br/dnssecstat/
| 16
DNSSEC: So what’s the problem?
• Not enough IT departments know about it or are too
busy putting out other security fires.
• When they do look into it they hear old stories of FUD
and lack of turnkey solutions.
• Registrars*/DNS providers see no demand leading to
“chicken-and-egg” problems.
*but required by new ICANN registrar agreement
| 17
Ways to Deploy DNSSEC
• As part of the DNS software used
– Manual key management
– Can be quite complex
– For static environment
– Some means of automation using
• option commands and scripts
• Use with a hardware security module (HSM)
– Semi-automatic
– Good for dynamic environment
• Using an external appliance
– ‘dnssec-in-a-box’
– Fully automates key generation, signing and rollover
1
DNSSEC tools for BIND,
NSD, PowerDNS, etc
HSM,
OpenDNSSEC
DNS Appliance
| 18
What you can do
• For Companies:
– Sign your corporate domain names
– Just turn on validation on corporate DNS resolvers
• For Users:
– Ask ISP to turn on validation on their DNS resolvers
• For All:
– Take advantage of DNSSEC education and training
DNSSEC: Internet infrastructure
upgrade to help address today’s needs
and create tomorrow’s opportunity.
| 20
Email: <champika.wijayatunga@icann.org>
Website: icann.org
gplus.to/icann
weibo.com/ICANNorg
flickr.com/photos/icann
slideshare.net/icannpresentations
twitter.com/icann
twitter.com/icann4biz
facebook.com/icannorg
linkedin.com/company/icann
youtube.com/user/icannnews
Thank you and Questions

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Monitoring for DNS Security
Monitoring for DNS SecurityMonitoring for DNS Security
Monitoring for DNS SecurityThousandEyes
 
Securing Data in Transit -
Securing Data in Transit - Securing Data in Transit -
Securing Data in Transit - wolfSSL
 
Secure Communication: Usability and Necessity of SSL/TLS
Secure Communication: Usability and Necessity of SSL/TLSSecure Communication: Usability and Necessity of SSL/TLS
Secure Communication: Usability and Necessity of SSL/TLSwolfSSL
 
MRA AMA Part 7: The Circuit Breaker Pattern
MRA AMA Part 7: The Circuit Breaker PatternMRA AMA Part 7: The Circuit Breaker Pattern
MRA AMA Part 7: The Circuit Breaker PatternNGINX, Inc.
 
Decentralized possibilities with filecoin &amp; ipfs_encode filecoin club
Decentralized possibilities with filecoin &amp; ipfs_encode filecoin clubDecentralized possibilities with filecoin &amp; ipfs_encode filecoin club
Decentralized possibilities with filecoin &amp; ipfs_encode filecoin clubKlaraOrban
 
ROTLD DNSSEC Implementation
ROTLD DNSSEC ImplementationROTLD DNSSEC Implementation
ROTLD DNSSEC ImplementationKevin Meynell
 
Qunog12-DNS暗号化
Qunog12-DNS暗号化Qunog12-DNS暗号化
Qunog12-DNS暗号化Manabu Sonoda
 
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source Software
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source SoftwareZero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source Software
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source SoftwareMyNOG
 
2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover
2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover
2017 DNSSEC KSK RolloverAPNIC
 

Tendances (20)

Monitoring for DNS Security
Monitoring for DNS SecurityMonitoring for DNS Security
Monitoring for DNS Security
 
Deploying DNSSEC: A .ZA Case Study - ION Cape Town
Deploying DNSSEC: A .ZA Case Study - ION Cape TownDeploying DNSSEC: A .ZA Case Study - ION Cape Town
Deploying DNSSEC: A .ZA Case Study - ION Cape Town
 
ION Cape Town - DANE: The Future of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
ION Cape Town - DANE: The Future of Transport Layer Security (TLS)ION Cape Town - DANE: The Future of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
ION Cape Town - DANE: The Future of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
 
ION Sri Lanka - Why Implement DNSSEC?
ION Sri Lanka - Why Implement DNSSEC?ION Sri Lanka - Why Implement DNSSEC?
ION Sri Lanka - Why Implement DNSSEC?
 
ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS
ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLSION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS
ION Sri Lanka - DANE: The Future of TLS
 
Securing Data in Transit -
Securing Data in Transit - Securing Data in Transit -
Securing Data in Transit -
 
ION Sri Lanka - DNSSEC at LK Domain Registry
ION Sri Lanka - DNSSEC at LK Domain RegistryION Sri Lanka - DNSSEC at LK Domain Registry
ION Sri Lanka - DNSSEC at LK Domain Registry
 
ION Durban - NAT64/DNS64 Experiments and the NAT64Check Tool
ION Durban - NAT64/DNS64 Experiments and the NAT64Check ToolION Durban - NAT64/DNS64 Experiments and the NAT64Check Tool
ION Durban - NAT64/DNS64 Experiments and the NAT64Check Tool
 
DANE/DNSSEC/TLS Testing in the go6Lab - ION Cape Town
DANE/DNSSEC/TLS Testing in the go6Lab - ION Cape TownDANE/DNSSEC/TLS Testing in the go6Lab - ION Cape Town
DANE/DNSSEC/TLS Testing in the go6Lab - ION Cape Town
 
ION Santiago: Lock It Up: TLS for Network Operators
ION Santiago: Lock It Up: TLS for Network OperatorsION Santiago: Lock It Up: TLS for Network Operators
ION Santiago: Lock It Up: TLS for Network Operators
 
Secure Communication: Usability and Necessity of SSL/TLS
Secure Communication: Usability and Necessity of SSL/TLSSecure Communication: Usability and Necessity of SSL/TLS
Secure Communication: Usability and Necessity of SSL/TLS
 
MRA AMA Part 7: The Circuit Breaker Pattern
MRA AMA Part 7: The Circuit Breaker PatternMRA AMA Part 7: The Circuit Breaker Pattern
MRA AMA Part 7: The Circuit Breaker Pattern
 
Decentralized possibilities with filecoin &amp; ipfs_encode filecoin club
Decentralized possibilities with filecoin &amp; ipfs_encode filecoin clubDecentralized possibilities with filecoin &amp; ipfs_encode filecoin club
Decentralized possibilities with filecoin &amp; ipfs_encode filecoin club
 
ION Tokyo: The Business Case for DNSSEC and DANE, Dan York
ION Tokyo: The Business Case for DNSSEC and DANE, Dan YorkION Tokyo: The Business Case for DNSSEC and DANE, Dan York
ION Tokyo: The Business Case for DNSSEC and DANE, Dan York
 
DNSSEC and DANE Deployment: Trends, Tools and Challenges
DNSSEC and DANE Deployment: Trends, Tools and ChallengesDNSSEC and DANE Deployment: Trends, Tools and Challenges
DNSSEC and DANE Deployment: Trends, Tools and Challenges
 
ROTLD DNSSEC Implementation
ROTLD DNSSEC ImplementationROTLD DNSSEC Implementation
ROTLD DNSSEC Implementation
 
Qunog12-DNS暗号化
Qunog12-DNS暗号化Qunog12-DNS暗号化
Qunog12-DNS暗号化
 
RSA APJ Velociraptor Lab
RSA APJ Velociraptor LabRSA APJ Velociraptor Lab
RSA APJ Velociraptor Lab
 
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source Software
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source SoftwareZero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source Software
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source Software
 
2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover
2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover
2017 DNSSEC KSK Rollover
 

En vedette (6)

ION Islamabad - What's Happening at the IETF?
ION Islamabad - What's Happening at the IETF?ION Islamabad - What's Happening at the IETF?
ION Islamabad - What's Happening at the IETF?
 
Mind Your MANRS - Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security
Mind Your MANRS - Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing SecurityMind Your MANRS - Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security
Mind Your MANRS - Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security
 
ION Islamabad - Opening Remarks
ION Islamabad - Opening RemarksION Islamabad - Opening Remarks
ION Islamabad - Opening Remarks
 
ION Islamabad - IPv6 - Delegations, Deployments and Trends
ION Islamabad - IPv6 - Delegations, Deployments and TrendsION Islamabad - IPv6 - Delegations, Deployments and Trends
ION Islamabad - IPv6 - Delegations, Deployments and Trends
 
Status of IPv6 in Pakistan
Status of IPv6 in PakistanStatus of IPv6 in Pakistan
Status of IPv6 in Pakistan
 
Workshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network SecurityWorkshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network Security
 

Similaire à ION Islamabad - Deploying DNSSEC

Understanding and Deploying DNSSEC, by Champika Wijayatunga [APRICOT 2015]
Understanding and Deploying DNSSEC, by Champika Wijayatunga [APRICOT 2015]Understanding and Deploying DNSSEC, by Champika Wijayatunga [APRICOT 2015]
Understanding and Deploying DNSSEC, by Champika Wijayatunga [APRICOT 2015]APNIC
 
DNSSEC Tutorial, by Champika Wijayatunga [APNIC 38]
DNSSEC Tutorial, by Champika Wijayatunga [APNIC 38]DNSSEC Tutorial, by Champika Wijayatunga [APNIC 38]
DNSSEC Tutorial, by Champika Wijayatunga [APNIC 38]APNIC
 
Windows Server 2016 Webinar
Windows Server 2016 WebinarWindows Server 2016 Webinar
Windows Server 2016 WebinarMen and Mice
 
PLNOG 5: Eric Ziegast, Zbigniew Jasinski - DNSSEC
PLNOG 5: Eric Ziegast, Zbigniew Jasinski -  DNSSECPLNOG 5: Eric Ziegast, Zbigniew Jasinski -  DNSSEC
PLNOG 5: Eric Ziegast, Zbigniew Jasinski - DNSSECPROIDEA
 
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruptionCNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruptionSam Bowne
 
DNS_Tutorial 2.pptx
DNS_Tutorial 2.pptxDNS_Tutorial 2.pptx
DNS_Tutorial 2.pptxviditsir
 
Windows 2012 and DNSSEC
Windows 2012 and DNSSECWindows 2012 and DNSSEC
Windows 2012 and DNSSECMen and Mice
 
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense VectorDNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense VectorPositive Hack Days
 
bdNOG 7 - Re-engineering the DNS - one resolver at a time
bdNOG 7 - Re-engineering the DNS - one resolver at a timebdNOG 7 - Re-engineering the DNS - one resolver at a time
bdNOG 7 - Re-engineering the DNS - one resolver at a timeAPNIC
 
Whalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptx
Whalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptxWhalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptx
Whalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptxAns Sembiring
 
DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks
DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS AttacksDNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks
DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS AttacksFindWhitePapers
 
PLNOG14: DNS, czyli co nowego w świecie DNS-ozaurów - Adam Obszyński
PLNOG14: DNS, czyli co nowego w świecie DNS-ozaurów - Adam ObszyńskiPLNOG14: DNS, czyli co nowego w świecie DNS-ozaurów - Adam Obszyński
PLNOG14: DNS, czyli co nowego w świecie DNS-ozaurów - Adam ObszyńskiPROIDEA
 
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruptionCNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruptionSam Bowne
 

Similaire à ION Islamabad - Deploying DNSSEC (20)

ION Hangzhou - Why Deploy DNSSEC?
ION Hangzhou - Why Deploy DNSSEC?ION Hangzhou - Why Deploy DNSSEC?
ION Hangzhou - Why Deploy DNSSEC?
 
8 technical-dns-workshop-day4
8 technical-dns-workshop-day48 technical-dns-workshop-day4
8 technical-dns-workshop-day4
 
Understanding and Deploying DNSSEC, by Champika Wijayatunga [APRICOT 2015]
Understanding and Deploying DNSSEC, by Champika Wijayatunga [APRICOT 2015]Understanding and Deploying DNSSEC, by Champika Wijayatunga [APRICOT 2015]
Understanding and Deploying DNSSEC, by Champika Wijayatunga [APRICOT 2015]
 
DNSSEC Tutorial, by Champika Wijayatunga [APNIC 38]
DNSSEC Tutorial, by Champika Wijayatunga [APNIC 38]DNSSEC Tutorial, by Champika Wijayatunga [APNIC 38]
DNSSEC Tutorial, by Champika Wijayatunga [APNIC 38]
 
DNS Security
DNS SecurityDNS Security
DNS Security
 
Domain Name System (DNS)
Domain Name System (DNS)Domain Name System (DNS)
Domain Name System (DNS)
 
Windows Server 2016 Webinar
Windows Server 2016 WebinarWindows Server 2016 Webinar
Windows Server 2016 Webinar
 
PLNOG 5: Eric Ziegast, Zbigniew Jasinski - DNSSEC
PLNOG 5: Eric Ziegast, Zbigniew Jasinski -  DNSSECPLNOG 5: Eric Ziegast, Zbigniew Jasinski -  DNSSEC
PLNOG 5: Eric Ziegast, Zbigniew Jasinski - DNSSEC
 
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruptionCNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
 
DNS_Tutorial 2.pptx
DNS_Tutorial 2.pptxDNS_Tutorial 2.pptx
DNS_Tutorial 2.pptx
 
Windows 2012 and DNSSEC
Windows 2012 and DNSSECWindows 2012 and DNSSEC
Windows 2012 and DNSSEC
 
Grey H@t - DNS Cache Poisoning
Grey H@t - DNS Cache PoisoningGrey H@t - DNS Cache Poisoning
Grey H@t - DNS Cache Poisoning
 
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense VectorDNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
DNS как линия защиты/DNS as a Defense Vector
 
bdNOG 7 - Re-engineering the DNS - one resolver at a time
bdNOG 7 - Re-engineering the DNS - one resolver at a timebdNOG 7 - Re-engineering the DNS - one resolver at a time
bdNOG 7 - Re-engineering the DNS - one resolver at a time
 
DNSSEC and VoIP: Who are you really calling?
DNSSEC and VoIP: Who are you really calling?DNSSEC and VoIP: Who are you really calling?
DNSSEC and VoIP: Who are you really calling?
 
Re-Engineering the DNS – One Resolver at a Time
Re-Engineering the DNS – One Resolver at a Time Re-Engineering the DNS – One Resolver at a Time
Re-Engineering the DNS – One Resolver at a Time
 
Whalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptx
Whalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptxWhalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptx
Whalebone-UKNOF44security992_new_impl.pptx
 
DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks
DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS AttacksDNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks
DNSSEC: The Antidote to DNS Cache Poisoning and Other DNS Attacks
 
PLNOG14: DNS, czyli co nowego w świecie DNS-ozaurów - Adam Obszyński
PLNOG14: DNS, czyli co nowego w świecie DNS-ozaurów - Adam ObszyńskiPLNOG14: DNS, czyli co nowego w świecie DNS-ozaurów - Adam Obszyński
PLNOG14: DNS, czyli co nowego w świecie DNS-ozaurów - Adam Obszyński
 
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruptionCNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
CNIT 40: 5: Prevention, protection, and mitigation of DNS service disruption
 

Plus de Deploy360 Programme (Internet Society)

Plus de Deploy360 Programme (Internet Society) (20)

ION Belgrade - Jordi Palet Martinez IPv6 Success Stories
ION Belgrade - Jordi Palet Martinez IPv6 Success StoriesION Belgrade - Jordi Palet Martinez IPv6 Success Stories
ION Belgrade - Jordi Palet Martinez IPv6 Success Stories
 
ION Belgrade - ISOC Serbia Belgrade Chapter Presentation
ION Belgrade - ISOC Serbia Belgrade Chapter PresentationION Belgrade - ISOC Serbia Belgrade Chapter Presentation
ION Belgrade - ISOC Serbia Belgrade Chapter Presentation
 
ION Belgrade - IETF Update
ION Belgrade - IETF UpdateION Belgrade - IETF Update
ION Belgrade - IETF Update
 
ION Belgrade - Opening Slides
ION Belgrade - Opening SlidesION Belgrade - Opening Slides
ION Belgrade - Opening Slides
 
ION Belgrade - MANRS by Serbian Open eXchange (SOX)
ION Belgrade - MANRS by Serbian Open eXchange (SOX)ION Belgrade - MANRS by Serbian Open eXchange (SOX)
ION Belgrade - MANRS by Serbian Open eXchange (SOX)
 
ION Belgrade - Closing Slides
ION Belgrade - Closing SlidesION Belgrade - Closing Slides
ION Belgrade - Closing Slides
 
AusNOG - Two Years of Good MANRS
AusNOG - Two Years of Good MANRSAusNOG - Two Years of Good MANRS
AusNOG - Two Years of Good MANRS
 
ION Malta - IETF Update
ION Malta - IETF UpdateION Malta - IETF Update
ION Malta - IETF Update
 
ION Malta - MANRS Introduction
ION Malta - MANRS IntroductionION Malta - MANRS Introduction
ION Malta - MANRS Introduction
 
ION Malta - Introduction to DNSSEC
ION Malta - Introduction to DNSSECION Malta - Introduction to DNSSEC
ION Malta - Introduction to DNSSEC
 
ION Malta - DANE: The Future of TLS
ION Malta - DANE: The Future of TLSION Malta - DANE: The Future of TLS
ION Malta - DANE: The Future of TLS
 
ION Malta - IANA Transition Roles & Accountability
ION Malta - IANA Transition Roles & AccountabilityION Malta - IANA Transition Roles & Accountability
ION Malta - IANA Transition Roles & Accountability
 
ION Malta - IPv6 Case Study: Finland
ION Malta - IPv6 Case Study: FinlandION Malta - IPv6 Case Study: Finland
ION Malta - IPv6 Case Study: Finland
 
ION Malta - Seeweb Thoughts on IPv6 Transition
ION Malta - Seeweb Thoughts on IPv6 TransitionION Malta - Seeweb Thoughts on IPv6 Transition
ION Malta - Seeweb Thoughts on IPv6 Transition
 
ION Malta - Seeweb Why MANRS is good for you
ION Malta - Seeweb Why MANRS is good for youION Malta - Seeweb Why MANRS is good for you
ION Malta - Seeweb Why MANRS is good for you
 
ION Malta - Opening Slides
ION Malta - Opening SlidesION Malta - Opening Slides
ION Malta - Opening Slides
 
ION Malta - Closing Slides
ION Malta - Closing SlidesION Malta - Closing Slides
ION Malta - Closing Slides
 
ION Durban - How peering behaviour affects growth of the internet
ION Durban - How peering behaviour affects growth of the internetION Durban - How peering behaviour affects growth of the internet
ION Durban - How peering behaviour affects growth of the internet
 
ION Durban - Introduction to ISOC Gauteng Chapter
ION Durban - Introduction to ISOC Gauteng ChapterION Durban - Introduction to ISOC Gauteng Chapter
ION Durban - Introduction to ISOC Gauteng Chapter
 
ION Durban - What's Happening at the IETF?
ION Durban - What's Happening at the IETF?ION Durban - What's Happening at the IETF?
ION Durban - What's Happening at the IETF?
 

Dernier

Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, AdobeApidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobeapidays
 
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoffsammart93
 
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdfCyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdfOverkill Security
 
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Orbitshub
 
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdfRansomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdfOverkill Security
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...Martijn de Jong
 
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdfSandro Moreira
 
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024MIND CTI
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingEdi Saputra
 
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century educationpresentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century educationjfdjdjcjdnsjd
 
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Victor Rentea
 
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Angeliki Cooney
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesrafiqahmad00786416
 
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAndrey Devyatkin
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...apidays
 
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdfRising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdfOrbitshub
 
Spring Boot vs Quarkus the ultimate battle - DevoxxUK
Spring Boot vs Quarkus the ultimate battle - DevoxxUKSpring Boot vs Quarkus the ultimate battle - DevoxxUK
Spring Boot vs Quarkus the ultimate battle - DevoxxUKJago de Vreede
 
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWEREMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWERMadyBayot
 

Dernier (20)

Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, AdobeApidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
 
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
AXA XL - Insurer Innovation Award Americas 2024
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
 
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdfCyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
Cyberprint. Dark Pink Apt Group [EN].pdf
 
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
 
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdfRansomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
Ransomware_Q4_2023. The report. [EN].pdf
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
 
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
[BuildWithAI] Introduction to Gemini.pdf
 
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
MINDCTI Revenue Release Quarter One 2024
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
 
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century educationpresentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
 
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
 
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
 
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
 
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdfRising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
Rising Above_ Dubai Floods and the Fortitude of Dubai International Airport.pdf
 
Spring Boot vs Quarkus the ultimate battle - DevoxxUK
Spring Boot vs Quarkus the ultimate battle - DevoxxUKSpring Boot vs Quarkus the ultimate battle - DevoxxUK
Spring Boot vs Quarkus the ultimate battle - DevoxxUK
 
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWEREMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
 

ION Islamabad - Deploying DNSSEC

  • 1. Deploying DNSSEC Champika Wijayatunga | ION – Islamabad | 25 Jan 2017
  • 3. | 3 Client Resolver (ISP) www.example.net. ? www.example.net. ? a.server.net. 1.2.3.4 DNS Resolution 3 10.1.2.3 .net nameserver a.server.net. 1.2.3.4 Root Server l.root-servers.net. 199.7.83.42 2001:500:3::42 example.net nameserver ns.example.net. 5.6.7.8
  • 5. | 5 Basic Cache Poisoning Attacker – Launches a spam campaign where spam message contains http://loseweightfastnow.com – Attacker’s name server will respond to a DNS query for loseweightnow.com with malicious data about ebay.com – Vulnerable resolvers add malicious data to local caches – The malicious data will send victims to an eBay phishing site for the lifetime of the cached entry 5 What is the IPv4 address for loseweightfastnow.com My Mac My local resolver ecrime name server loseweightfastnow.com IPv4 address is 192.168.1.1 ALSO www.ebay.com is at 192.168.1.2 I’ll cache this response… and update www.ebay.com
  • 6. | 6 Query Interception (DNS Hijacking) 1/24/17 6 • A man in the middle (MITM) or spoofing attack forwards DNS queries to a name server that returns forge responses – Can be done using a DNS proxy, compromised access router or recursor, ARP poisoning, or evil twin Wifi access point Bank Web SiteIntended path for online banking transactions Redirected path Fake Bank Web Site Evil Twin AP Attacker’s resolverEvil twin AP or compromised router redirects DNS queries to attacker’s name server Attacker’s name server returns fake bank web site address
  • 8. | 8 DNS: Data Flow 8 Primary Caching Servers Resolvers Zone administrator Zone file Dynamic updates 1 2 Secondaries 3 4 5
  • 9. | 9 DNS Vulnerabilities 9 Primary Caching Servers Resolver Zone administrator Zone file Dynamic updates 1 2 Secondaries 3 Server protection 4 5 Corrupting data Impersonating master Unauthorized updates Cache impersonation Cache pollution by Data spoofing Data protection Altered zone data
  • 10. | 10 Where DNSSEC fits in • CPU and bandwidth advances make legacy DNS vulnerable to MITM attacks • DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) introduces digital signatures into DNS to cryptographically protect contents • With DNSSEC fully deployed a business can be sure a customer gets un-modified data (and visa versa)
  • 11. | 11 What DNSSEC does and doesn’t do • Does not do – Protect against host threats (DDoS, buffer overruns in code, etc.) – Keep DNS data private – Ensure correctness of DNS data • Does Do: Establish the legitimacy of data retrieved from the DNS – Protects end users from being redirected to malicious sites – Allows any data stored in the DNS to be validated as trustworthy
  • 12. | 12 Client Resolver (ISP) www.example.net. ? www.example.net. ? a.server.net. How DNSSEC Works 12 10.1.2.3 .net nameserver Root Server example.net nameserver
  • 13. | 13 How DNSSEC Works • Data authenticity and integrity by signing the Resource Records Sets with a private key • Public DNSKEYs published, used to verify the RRSIGs • Children sign their zones with their private key – Authenticity of that key established by parent signing hash (DS) of the child zone's key • Repeat for parent… • Not that difficult on paper – Operationally, it is a bit more complicated – DSKEY → KEY –signs→ zone data 13
  • 14. | 14 The Business Case for DNSSEC • Cyber security is becoming a greater concern to enterprises, government, and end users. DNSSEC is a key tool and differentiator. • DNSSEC is the biggest security upgrade to Internet infrastructure in over 20 years. It is a platform for new security applications (for those that see the opportunity). • DNSSEC infrastructure deployment has been brisk but requires expertise. Getting ahead of the curve is a competitive advantage.
  • 16. | 16 DNSSEC: So what’s the problem? • Not enough IT departments know about it or are too busy putting out other security fires. • When they do look into it they hear old stories of FUD and lack of turnkey solutions. • Registrars*/DNS providers see no demand leading to “chicken-and-egg” problems. *but required by new ICANN registrar agreement
  • 17. | 17 Ways to Deploy DNSSEC • As part of the DNS software used – Manual key management – Can be quite complex – For static environment – Some means of automation using • option commands and scripts • Use with a hardware security module (HSM) – Semi-automatic – Good for dynamic environment • Using an external appliance – ‘dnssec-in-a-box’ – Fully automates key generation, signing and rollover 1 DNSSEC tools for BIND, NSD, PowerDNS, etc HSM, OpenDNSSEC DNS Appliance
  • 18. | 18 What you can do • For Companies: – Sign your corporate domain names – Just turn on validation on corporate DNS resolvers • For Users: – Ask ISP to turn on validation on their DNS resolvers • For All: – Take advantage of DNSSEC education and training
  • 19. DNSSEC: Internet infrastructure upgrade to help address today’s needs and create tomorrow’s opportunity.
  • 20. | 20 Email: <champika.wijayatunga@icann.org> Website: icann.org gplus.to/icann weibo.com/ICANNorg flickr.com/photos/icann slideshare.net/icannpresentations twitter.com/icann twitter.com/icann4biz facebook.com/icannorg linkedin.com/company/icann youtube.com/user/icannnews Thank you and Questions