The document discusses several cases related to a lawyer withdrawing services from a client. It summarizes the Orcino vs Gaspar case, where the court ruled that a lawyer may only withdraw services for specific good causes outlined in the rules. It also summarizes Arambulo vs CA, where the court found that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing an appeal due to non-payment of fees, as the notice was sent to a lawyer who had withdrawn from the case. The document provides guidance on the circumstances under which a lawyer may withdraw from a case.

1. CANON 22
EARL VINCENT H. VISTA
JD-1, BUCL

2. CANON 22
A lawyer shall withdraw his
services only for good cause
and upon notice appropriate in
the circumstances.

3. Rule 22.01 – A lawyer may withdraw his services
in any of the following cases:
• When the client pursues illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with
the matter he is handling;
• When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules;
• When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the
client;
• When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively;
• When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails with the
retainer agreement;
• When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
• Other similar cases.

4. Rule 22.02 – A lawyer who withdraws or
is discharged shall, subject to a retainer
lien, immediately turn over all papers
and property to which the client is
entitled, and shall cooperate with his
successor in the orderly transfer of the
matter, including all information
necessary for the proper handling of the
matter.

5. CASES:
1. Orcino v. Gaspar, 279 SCRA 379 (1997)
2. Arambulo v. CA, 226 SCRA 589 (1993)
3. Ong Ching v. Ramolete, 51 SCRA 13 (1973)
4. Olivares v. Leola, 97 Phil. 253 (1955)
5. Requierme, Jr. v. Yuipco, Adm. Case No. RTJ -98-1427
(November 27, 2000)

6. ORCINO VS GASPAR
Facts:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent to
prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against
several suspects in the slaying of her husband. In
consideration thereof, complainant bound herself to pay
respondent legal fees. Complainant was also to pay
P500.00 per appearance of respondent before the court
and fiscal.

7. ORCINO VS GASPAR
Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties. He
interviewed witnesses and gathered evidence to build a
case against the suspects. He drew up the necessary
sworn statements and dutifully attended the
preliminary investigation. The case was thereafter filed
with the RTC. As private prosecutor, respondent
religiously attended the bail hearings for the accused
although these hearings were postponed on motion of
the accused’s counsel.

8. ORCINO VS GASPAR
Respondent however failed to attend the hearing
scheduled in August 1991. It was at this nearing that
the court, over complainant’s objections, granted
bail to all the accused. Complainant became
belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the
case by his absence. Complainant asked for the records
of the case saying that she could refer them to another
lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the
records.

9. ORCINO VS GASPAR
Complainant never returned the records nor did she see
respondent. Respondent filed before the trial court a
“Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.” The motion did not
bear the consent of complainant so the court issued an
order directing respondent to secure complainant’s
consent to the motion “and his appearance as private
prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this
consent.”

10. ORCINO VS GASPAR
Complainant refused to sign her conformity to
respondent’s withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearings in
the criminal case continued. Respondent did not
appear at the hearings nor did he contact
complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to
engage the services of another lawyer. Hence, the letter-
complaint.

11. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Respondent Lawyer
has the liberty to withdraw his services
for the complainant anytime.

12. RULING:
No, unlike the client-complainant which has the
absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at any time with or without cause. The right
of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation
other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably
restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an
action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.

13. RULING:
He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause.
A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or
from a good cause. Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court states that a lawyer may retire at any
time from any action special proceeding with the
written consent of his client filed in court and copy
thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client
refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an
application with the court.

14. RULING:
The court, on notice to the client and adverse party,
shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to
retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on
a good cause. In the instant case, complainant did not
give her written consent to respondent’s
withdrawal, however, respondent did not file an
application with the court for it to determine
whether he should be allowed to withdraw.

15. RULING:
Granting that respondent’s motion without complainant’s
consent was an application for withdrawal with the court,
we find that this reason is insufficient to justify his
withdrawal from the case. Respondent’s withdrawal
was made on the ground that “there no longer existed
the confidence” between them and that there had
been “serious differences between them relating to
the manner of private prosecution” which is not in
accordance with Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

16. RULING:
A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the
following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or
immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that
the lawyer pursue conduct violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or
more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to
the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical
condition of the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the
case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to pay
the attorney’s fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected
or appointed to public office; (g) other similar cases.

17. RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is admonished to
exercise more prudence and judiciousness in
dealing with his clients. He is also ordered to return
to complainant within fifteen (15) days from notice
the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
representing a portion of his legal fees received from the
latter with a warning that failure on his part to do so
will result in the imposition of stiffer disciplinary action.

18. ARAMBULO VS CA
Facts:
Petitioner urged the court to review and set aside the Resolution
of the respondent Court of Appeals of 11 November 19911 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 323482 which, for failure to pay the docket
fee, considered their appeal "ABANDONED and DISMISSED,
pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50, Rules of Court," and its
Resolution of 8 June 19923 which denied their motion to
reconsider the former. They claim that the notice to pay the
docket fee was addressed to an attorney who had already
withdrawn his appearance with their consent.

19. ARAMBULO VS CA
On 30 January 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff
Danilo S. Ferreras, ordering defendant Spouses Carlos S. Arambulo and Eloisa I. Arambulo to —
1) Pay unto said Plaintiff Danilo S. Ferreras the amounts of —
a) P365,000.00 — representing the balance of the contract price of P1,700,000.00;
b) P90,333.75 — proportionate 1/2 share of defendant-spouses in the increase in the cost of
construction materials; and
c) to pay the costs.
Defendants' counterclaim is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

20. ARAMBULO VS CA
On 7 February 1991, the Arambulos, through Atty. Jimenez, filed their
notice of appeal informing the trial court that they are appealing the
decision to the Court of Appeals.
On 12 February 1991, Atty. Jimenez filed a Withdrawal of Appearance
with the express conformity of the defendants, while Atty. Pineda
entered his Appearance as their new counsel. Copies of the pleadings
were furnished the counsel for the plaintiff. Furthermore, the Summary
Index prepared by one Ramon A. Rosario, Officer-in Charge of the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the trial court and attached to the original record of
CA-G.R. CV No. 32348, indicates that the Withdrawal of Appearance and the
Appearance are respectively found on pages 209-210 and 207-208 of the
original record of Civil Case No. 5301.

21. ARAMBULO VS CA
On 19 June 1991, the Chief of the Judicial Records Division
of the Court of Appeals sent Atty. Jimenez a letter informing
him that the original records of the case were being
processed and also requiring him to pay the docketing fee
of P400.00 and the additional amount of P20.00 pursuant
to R.A. No. 3870 within fifteen days from receipt thereof.
From the return card, it appears that Atty. Jimenez received this
letter on 9 July 1991. No such letter or any notice to pay the
aforesaid amounts was sent to Atty. Romeo Pineda.

22. ARAMBULO VS CA
In a manifestation and motion filed with the Court of Appeals on 21
January 1992, counsel for the plaintiff-appellee prayed that final judgment
be entered into the records in view of the failure of the appellants "to
perfect their appeal" and that the case be remanded to the trial court for
execution of judgment. A copy of the above pleading was sent to Atty.
Jimenez.
On 22 January 1992, the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals made
an entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 32348 declaring therein that
the Resolution of 11 November 1991 had become final and executory
on 7 December 1991. Copy thereof was again sent to Atty. Jimenez. No
copy was sent to Atty. Pineda.

23. ARAMBULO VS CA
When the sheriff of the trial court attempted to enforce the writ
of execution, the petitioners, through Atty. Pineda, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, Reinstatement of Appeal, and
Acceptance of Docket Fee with the Court of Appeals on 12
March 1992. On the said date, they also paid the required
docket and other legal fees. But the Court of appeals denied
the motion in its Resolution of 8 June 1992 on the ground
that the Resolution of 11 November 1991 had already
become final and the records had been remanded to the
trial court after the entry of judgment was made.

24. ISSUE:
Whether or not the public
respondent committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners'
appeal?

25. RULING:
Under the circumstances of this case, we do not hesitate
to rule that the public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal of the
Arambulos solely on the basis of the alleged failure
of the petitioners to pay the docket and other fees.
As earlier adverted to, the notice with respect thereto
was not furnished to or received by their counsel of
record, Atty. Romeo Pineda.

26. RULING:
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the
Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty. Jose Jimenez, Jr. was
filed with the trial court on 12 February 1991. Since the
withdrawal was with the clients' consent, no
approval thereof by the trial court was required
because a court approval is indispensable only if the
withdrawal is without the client's consent. The first
paragraph of Section 26 of Rule 138 expressly provides:

27. RULING:
Sec. 26. Change of Attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any
time from any action or special proceeding, by the written
consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any
time from an action or special proceeding, without the
consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the
client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he
ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the
name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on
the docket of the court in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse
party.

28. RULING:
Under the first sentence of this section, the retirement is completed once
the withdrawal is filed in court. No further action thereon by the court is
needed other than the mechanical act of the clerk of court of entering
the name of the new counsel in the docket and of giving written notice
thereof to the adverse party. The appearance of the new counsel, Atty.
Pineda, did not likewise require the approval of the court. An
appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer,
or through the formal method, viz., by delivering to the clerk of court a
written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the counsel. The
latter method is exactly what Atty. Pineda followed.

29. RULING:
On the other hand, although Atty. Pineda did not formally withdraw before
Atty. Jimenez took over the handling of the case, the execution by the
Arambulos of the special power of attorney in favor of Atty. Jimenez
amounted to a dismissal of Atty. Pineda. The dismissal of Atty. Pineda is
clearly authorized under the second paragraph of the aforementioned
Section 26 of Rule 138 which reads as follows:
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he
shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated
in the contract . . . .

30. RULING:
Accordingly, the public respondent Court of Appeals should not have
declared the appeal abandoned and ordered its dismissal solely on the
basis of the failure of the petitioners to comply with the June 1991 notice
to pay the docketing and other fees, which was erroneously sent to Atty.
Jimenez.
Nevertheless, the appeal can be dismissed, not on the basis of the
respondent Court of Appeals' error but on a different ground for which
Atty. Pineda must answer. As the new counsel for the petitioners, it was
incumbent upon him, consistent with his duty to serve his client with
competence and diligence, to inquire either from the trial court or the
appellate court about the status of the appeal since he had not received
any notice to pay the docketing and other fees despite the lapse of
several months from the time he entered his appearance.

31. RULING:
The failure of Atty. Pineda and the petitioners to exercise due
diligence with respect to the appeal was either done deliberately
to delay the execution of judgment, which we cannot tolerate, or
caused by negligence, in which case the settled rule that the
negligence of counsel binds the client should be applied.
In the light of the foregoing, the dismissal of the petitioners' appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 32348 was justifiable for another reason. Concurrence
in the result of the challenged resolutions is inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

32. ONG CHING VS RAMOLETE
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for
preliminary injunction, to set aside the order dated July
24, 1972, of respondent Court of First Instance of Cebu,
in Civil Case No. R-10866, denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the judgment therein and
granting the writ of execution.

33. ONG CHING VS RAMOLETE
In a judgment rendered by the respondent court on April 14,
1972, the complaint of petitioner as lessee against private
respondents, owners of the leased property as
defendants was dismissed, and said party was ordered to
vacate the leased premises, surrender the possession
thereof to defendants, remove the improvements he
constructed thereon, and pay defendants the rentals from
October 24, 1968, until the date of the judgment, at
P1,680.00 per month, and the sum of P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus the costs of the suit.

34. ONG CHING VS RAMOLETE
After petitioner (plaintiff) received a copy of the judgment on April 18,
1972, a motion for reconsideration of the said decision on behalf of
petitioner was filed with respondent court on May 18, 1972, not by
Atty. Candido Vasquez, counsel of record of petitioner, but by one Atty.
Higinio Hermosisima.
This motion for reconsideration, was opposed by the private
respondents as defendants in the case, principally on the ground that
the "motion for reconsideration" having been filed by a new counsel,
with no formal appearance in the case and without complying with
the requirements of Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
for substitution of attorneys has no legal effect whatsoever and
therefore the filing of such pleading did not suspend the running of the 30
day period to appeal.

35. ONG CHING VS RAMOLETE
In its order of July 24, 1972, the trial court after
reiterating its previous findings and construction of the
renewal system clause of the lease agreement, denied
the motion for reconsideration and ruled that there
being no proper substitutions of counsel, the
motion filed by Atty. Hermosisima, was without any
legal effect and could not have suspended the running
of the period for appeal and consequently considered
the judgment final and granted the issuance of a writ of
execution.

36. ONG CHING VS RAMOLETE
On July 31, 1972 when the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu
proceeded to levy on execution plaintiffs properties
pursue to the writ of execution, petitioner (plaintiff)
filed the present petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid order of the court.
On August 17, 1972, the court required respondents to
file the answer and issued a temporary restraining
order to enjoin the enforcement of the challenged order.

37. ISSUE:
Whether or not the substitution of
attorneys is valid.

38. RULING:
No. The settled rule is that in order that there may
be a valid substitution of attorneys in a given case,
there must be (a) written application for
substitution; (b) a written consent the client; and
(c) a written consent of the attorney to be
substituted. In case the consent of the attorney to be
substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be
proof that notice of the motion for substitution has been
served upon him in the manner prescribed by the rules.

39. RULING:
The present case, however, does not involve a substitution
of attorneys, but merely the employment by petitioner of a
additional counsel. True it is, as claimed by respondents, that
the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Hermosisima
gives no indication that he was presenting his motion in
collaboration with Atty. Vasquez; but neither would it
indicate that by his filing of the pleading in the case, Atty.
Hermosisima was replacing Atty. Vasquez as counsel for
petitioner. In law it is assumed prima facie that every attorney
who appears in court does so with sufficient authority.

40. RULING:
The fact that a second attorney enters an appearance on
behalf of litigant does not authorize a presumption that the
authority of the first attorney has been withdrawn. There is
no question that a party may have two or more lawyers working
in collaboration as his counsel in a given litigation. Thus in the
case at bar the certificate dated May 16, 1972, executed by
Atty. Vasquez, is to the effect that he, with the consent and
authority of petitioner (who signified his confirmity in
writing) was authorizing Atty. Hermosisima to collaborate
with him in the case due to his ill health.

41. RULING:
While it may be desirable in the interest of an
orderly conduct of judicial proceedings, that a
counsel for a party should file with the court his
formal written appearance in the case, before filing
a pleading therein, or mention in said pleading that
he is submitting the same in collaboration with the
counsel of record, the mere circumstance that such
acts were not done does not warrant the conclusion
that the pleading filed by such counsel has no legal
effect.

42. OLIVARES VS LEOLA
Facts:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, denying defendants-appellants'
petition for relief under section 2, Rule 38, of the Rules
of Court, on the ground that petitioners had failed to
perfect their appeal within the reglamentary
period. The appeal involves only questions of law.

43. OLIVARES VS LEOLA
This is an action for the specific performance of personal delivery of real
property agreed in a contract.
The aforesaid agreement refers to two parcels of land specifically
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint, situated in barrio San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, owned by the "Colegio de San Jose,"
defendant Macario Leola had a contract to purchase (Exhibit A) with
the 'Colegio" on April 3, 1948. The two parcels of rice land herein
referred to, had 40,000 square meters more or less, known as lots 110 and
133-B and were purchased from the 'Colegio' for P4,800 payable in ten
years of equal installments of 7 per cent annual interest, subject
however to the receivership in Civil Case No. 9039.

44. OLIVARES VS LEOLA
Later, the said Macario Leola sold all his rights and interests in the said
two parcels of rice land to Primo Olivares on April 18, 1948, for and in
consideration of the sum of P1,500, as shown by the public instrument
(Exhibit B). Plaintiff Primo Olivares on the other hand executed a deed
of sale with mortgage (Exhibit C) in favor of the 'Colegio", as shown by
the public instrument executed on July 12, 1950. When plaintiff
attempted to commence possession and cultivation of the said two
lots, defendants prevented him to do so, particularly Angela Leola, the
daughter of the herein defendant Macario Leola, and thus depriving
plaintiff of his lawfully acquired possession. Notwithstanding several
demands made by the plaintiff, the said defendants refused to
surrender possession. To this the "Colegio' intervened to protect its
right of ownership on the two lots.

45. OLIVARES VS LEOLA
Upon hearing, the evidence of record militates in favor of the plaintiff
and against defendants by preponderance of evidence. The pretension
of defendants, that they were the owners of the two parcels is strongly
offset by the documents (Exhibit A, A-1 and A-2) he signed in favor of the
"Colegio".
The Court rendered decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, by declaring the execution of the contract Exhibit B valid and
binding as between the parties and the defendants are ordered to deliver
to the plaintiff the two parcels of rice land described in paragraph 2 of the
complaint; for the said defendants to abstain from disturbing plaintiff of
his rightful possession and ownership of the parcels in questions, to which
he is lawfully entitled to possess and enjoy.

46. OLIVARES VS LEOLA
Copy of the above decision was sent by the trial court to Atty. Maximiano
San Diego, counsel of record for defendants-appellants, which copy he
received on or about August 18, 1951; but he failed to notify his clients
thereof. In this connection, it should be stated that on July 12, 1951, Atty.
Eusebio V. Navarro filed his appearance as counsel for the defendants.
The hearing of the case was continued with Atty. Navarro handling the case for
the defendants-appellants. It is a fact, however, that Atty. Maximiano San Diego
remained as counsel for the said defendants-appellants according to the
records of the case. In filing his appearance for the said parties, Atty. Navarro
did not state that his appearance was in place or in substitution of Atty.
San Diego. The defendants-appellants did not inform the trial court that
they had terminated the services of Atty. San Diego; neither has said
attorney filed a withdrawal of his appearance as counsel for them.

47. OLIVARES VS LEOLA
According to defendants-appellants, it was only on December 7,
1951, after they had dispatched a messenger to Biñang, Laguna
that they learned of the rendition of the decision. On December
10, 1951, they filed a motion for new trial which motion
was later amended so as to be a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. On March 28,
1952, the trial court denied said petition for relief on the
ground that it was filed out of time. Failing to secure a
reconsideration of said order of denial, they appealed directly
to this Court claiming that the lower court erred in denying
the petition for relief.

48. ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid
substitution of counsel in the sense that
the filing of Atty. Navarro's appearance
on July 12, 1951, served as his
substitution for Atty. San Diego.

49. RULING:
In the case of U.S. vs. Borromeo, 20 Phil., 189, this Tribunal said:
No substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless the following requisites concur:
1. There must always be filed a written application for substitution.
2. There must always be filed the written consent of the client to the substitution.
3. There must be filed the written consent of the attorney substituted if such
consent can be obtained.
4. In case such written consent cannot be procured there must be filed with the
application for substitution proof of the service of notice of such motion in the
manner required by the rules of the attorney to be substituted.

50. RULING:
Unless these formalities are complied with no
substitution will be permitted and the
attorney who appeared last in the cause
before such application for substitution will
be regarded as the attorney of record and will
be held responsible for the conduct of the
cause.

51. RULING:
In Aznar vs. Honorable Norris, 3 Phil., 636, it was
held that the fact that a second attorney enters
an appearance on behalf of a litigant does not
authorize a presumption that the authority of
the first attorney had been withdrawn. The
conclusion therefore is that the attorney San
Diego was and continued to be the counsel of
record for defendants-appellants.

52. RULING:
The record fails to show and defendants-appellants
failed to prove that they had dispensed with the
services of Atty. San Diego; that he had withdrawn his
appearance for them; that Atty. Navarro had assumed
exclusive control over the case of the herein
defendants-appellants; that he had substituted himself
in the place of Atty. San Diego, and that the latter had
been notified of said substitution. Consequently, the
trial court committed no error in denying said petition
for relief. Said order of denial is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellants.

53. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
Facts:
In a verified complaint Pablo C. Requierme, Jr. and his
counsel, Atty. Dominador Maphilindo O. Carillo, charged
Judge Evangeline S. Yuipco with serious misconduct for
acting with manifest partiality towards defendants in
Civil Case No. 838 entitled "David Gegato v. Virgilio
Balaqui and Romeo Balaqui" for recovery of possession
and/or specific performance with preliminary
injunction and damages.

54. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
In said case, plaintiff was represented by Atty.
Rolando C. Casaway, while defendants were
represented by Atty. Lou A. Nueva of the Public
Attorney’s Office. Defendants filed a third party
complaint against Requierme, Jr. who secured
the services of the Nograles Cabebe & Carillo
Law Office (NCC Law). Atty. Carillo appeared
on behalf of the firm.

55. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
Requierme, Jr., through counsel, duly filed an
Answer to the third party complaint, and
subsequently, an "Omnibus Motion (A) For
Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative
and/or Special Defense in Answer to
Third Party Complaint; Or, In the
Alternative; (B) For Summary Judgment.

56. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
On the scheduled hearing, Atty. Nueva manifested in
open court that he was no longer appearing as
counsel of the defendant since the latter already
engaged the services of Atty. Dominador P. Calonia as
new counsel. Acting on the verbal motion, respondent
judge issued an Order giving the new counsel Atty.
Calonia or Virgilio Balaqui a period of fifteen days to
file an Opposition or Comment to the Omnibus
Motion.

57. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
During pre-trial conference, however, Atty. Nueva again
appeared as counsel for defendants. Respondent judge
issued an order giving Atty. Nueva and plaintiff fifteen (15)
days to file their Opposition to the Omnibus Motion and
reset the pre-trial conference to March 15, 1994. On said
date, plaintiff and third-party defendant duly appeared with
their respective counsels. Defendants were absent. Atty. Nueva
again verbally manifested that he was no longer the counsel
of defendants. Upon plaintiff’s motion, defendants were
declared "as in default" with respect to the complaint, and
"non-suited" with respect to the third party complaint.

58. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
On April 21, 1994, Requierme received a "Motion to Lift
the Order of Default and Opposition to Declare Third
Party Plaintiff Non-Suited" dated April 14, 1994.
Requierme promptly filed a Comment/Opposition on
the ground that the Motion to Lift was a mere scrap of
paper since it did not contain a notice of hearing
stating the time and place of hearing, and was not
directed at the parties but the Clerk of Court.

59. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
After the pre-trial conference, respondent judge issued
an Order dated June 17, 1994 denying the Omnibus
Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment, and
granting the "Motion to Lift" and setting the case for
trial. Upon reminder of plaintiff’s counsel that no pre-
trial order had been issued, respondent judge replied that
she would issue the order after the presentation of the
witnesses.

60. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
On March 24, 1995, Requierme and Atty. Carillo filed a
"Motion for Disqualification/Inhibition of Presiding
Judge." On the date set for hearing of the inhibition
motion, Requierme and Atty. Carillo failed to appear.
Respondent judge gave plaintiff and defendants ten (10)
days to file their comments on the motion to inhibit, and
reset the hearing to May 16, 1995. On said date,
Requierme and Atty. Carillo appeared, only to find out
that all hearings of respondent judge were cancelled,
and their hearing re-scheduled to October 27, 1995.

61. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
Finally, on said date, another lawyer from the NCC firm appeared for
third party defendant. Atty. Gerardo C. Nograles of NCC Law informed
the court that he was taking over the case since Atty. Carillo already
resigned from the firm to join Sycip, Salazar Hernandez and Gatmaitan,
Davao Branch. Respondent judge however made derogatory remarks
against Atty. Carillo saying that he was incompetent and
irresponsible. She asked Atty. Nograles if he was standing by the motion
to inhibit. Atty. Nograles replied in the affirmative. Respondent judge reset
the hearing of the motion to inhibit to February 14, 1996 which was later
rescheduled to November 24, 1995, specifically ordering "Atty. Carillo" to
appear and prove the allegations in his motion under penalty of
contempt.

62. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
On December 6, 1995 respondent judge issued an
Order, denying the motion for inhibition and citing
Atty. Carillo for direct contempt of court and
imposing upon him a fine of P500.00. The NCC, law
firm filed a motion reconsideration which was denied.
Hence, Atty. Carillo paid the fine under protest. In the
meantime, the NCC firm filed a Formal Offer of Exhibits
ad cautelam. Defendants duly filed their opposition
thereto.

63. REQUIERME VS YUIPCO
On October 25, 1996, Requierme and Atty. Carillo filed the
present administrative case against respondent judge. The
matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, recommendation and report. The OCA found that
respondent judge disregarded procedural rules when she
entertained the Motion to Lift which did not contain a
proper notice of hearing addressed to the parties, and when
she allowed the verbal substitution of counsels for
defendants. As to the contempt order, the OCA found it
improper for lack of basis and for being excessive compared to
the amount allowed under the Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

64. ISSUE:
Whether or not a verbal
substitution of attorneys is
valid?

65. RULING:
No. A verbal substitution of counsel, albeit impliedly
granted by respondent judge, contravenes Section 26 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the
requirements for change of attorneys. Said provision requires
that the written consent of the client should be filed in
court and the adverse party should be given written notice
of the substitution. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, if her
intention was to obviate delay, then she should have ordered the
counsel of record, Atty. Nueva, who was present during the
hearing, to file the required comment or opposition.

66. RULING:
Judges are called to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They are not common men
and women, whose errors men forgive and
time forgets. Judges sit as the embodiment of
the people’s sense of justice, their last
recourse where all other institutions have
failed.

67. RULING:
WHEREFORE, Judge Evangeline S. Yuipco of the
Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur,
Branch 6, is found liable for serious misconduct, i.e.,
acting with manifest partiality toward the
defendants in a case, and hereby ORDERED to pay a
FINE of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

68. THANK YOU!
That in all things God may be glorified.