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Maturity Model of Security Disciplines
Florian Roth
Contents
§ Concept of Maturity Modell of Security Disciplines
§ Some highlights and low hanging fruits
§ Security Monitoring
§ Low hanging fruits
§ Compromise Assessments
§ Threat Intel Management
Maturity Model of Security Disciplines
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Em
ailFilter
Antivirus
Backup
/Restore
SecurityM
onitoring
VulnerabilityM
anagem
ent
M
FA
Advanced
M
alwareDetection
NIDS
EDR
Com
promiseAssessm
ent
Com
puterForensicsRed
Team
ing
ThreatIntelM
anagem
ent
Zero
Trust
SOAR
Implemented Planned Missed
Expensive
Setup Costs
Cheap
DegreeofImplementation
Black Hole
Security Monitoring: Wrong Paradigms
§ „Security devices hold the most important logs“
- Firewall,WAF,VPN logs are less important than you might think
§ „Antivirus events with status ‚successfully removed‘ don‘t matter“
- Better method: Antivirus Event Analysis Cheat Sheet
§ „Only the perimeter matters“
- SSL/TLS connections
- Stage1 is often MS Office Doc with low AV detection rate
§ „If you invest enough in protection you don‘t need a sound
detection“
Security Monitoring: New Paradigms
§ „Assume Compromise“
- Answer the question:
- „what if an attack gained domain admin privileges 6 months ago?“
- „do we detect someone running ‚whoami‘ on one of our servers?“
§ „Githubification of InfoSec“1
- New standards empower community sharing (YARA, Sigma,ATT&CK)
§ „Software is broken“ (not so new but often overlooked ;)
- Always expect vulnerabilities
- Detection is as important as protection and often cheaper to implement
1 https://medium.com/@johnlatwc/the-githubification-of-infosec-afbdbfaad1d1
Security Monitoring
§ Log Collection
§ Log Sources (prioritization)
§ Coverage (degree of implementation)
§ Depths (audit policies)
§ Monitoring
§ Matching
§ IOCs (feeds, management)
§ Methods (Sigma)
§ Correlations
§ Anomaly Detection
§ (Processes)
§ Quality Control
§ MITRE ATT&CK & CAR
§ Red Teaming
Log Sources
Log Source Volume11 IOC Matching Threat Hunting Audit Trail9 APT Detection10
Antivirus Low - ++3 + +++
Windows & Sysmon Medium8 ++1 +++4 ++ ++
Proxy Medium ++2 +5 ++ +
NIDS/NSM7 Medium +2 + + +
DNS High ++2 +5 + +
Mail6 Medium + - + -
Firewall High +2 - ++ -
Linux (auditd) Medium - + + -
1 – File hash values (MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
2 – C2 IPs or domain names
3 – see „Antivirus Event Analysis Cheat Sheet“
4 – Sigma can help a lot
5 – Patterns (URL, hostname), suspicious TLDs
6 – No personal experience with this log source but highly recommended by others
7 – Suricata, Zeek or alike
8 – Depends mainly on audit policy (use Microsoft Baseline) and Sysmon config
Priority
High
Low
9 – Usefulness in reconstruction of events
10 – How useful are these logs in the detection of persistent threats
(reconnaissance, backdoors, lateral movement)
11 – Depends on audit policy and filters (rule of thumb)
Low Hanging Fruit 1: AntiVirus
§ Antivirus Event Analysis
Cheat Sheet
§ Threat Type
§ Location
§ Available as Sigma rules
https://github.com/Neo2
3x0/sigma/tree/master/r
ules/windows/malware
Low Hanging Fruit 2: Sigma
§ Answers the question:
„What should I look for in
my logs?“
§ Generic rules
§ No vendor lock
§ Sharing communities
§ Easy to write and read
§ Expression language covers
95% of use cases (use
explicit queries for the rest)
https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/tree/master/rules
Sigma Excursion >
Audit Policies 1/2
§ Antivirus > get everything
§ Windows
§ Microsoft Baseline
§ Sysmon
§ Olaf Hartong‘s „Sysmon Modular“: https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular
§ SwiftOnSecurity‘s “Sysmon Config“: https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config
§ Proxy > get everything
Audit Policies 2/2
§ NIDS > depends on product
§ DNS
§ Exclude AD / Windows service related queries
§ Mail > unknown
§ Firewall
§ High Volume
§ Filter on Priority (see table)
§ Storage: often collected in cheaper systems
Direction Action Priority
Out Blocked High
Out Allowed Medium
In Allowed Medium
In Blocked Low
Advantages of Sysmon/Sigma over EDR
§ Transparency
§ You know exactly what you‘re able to detect
§ No hidden signatures and Machine Learning magic
§ Customizability
§ Independent Response to Threats
§ Community provides detection rules/ideas fast
§ Don‘t have to ask a vendor if he has already pushed
corresponding rules
Security Monitoring: Quality Control
§ MITRE ATT&CK Coverage
§ Don‘t forget the depths:
Webshell Detection isn‘t Webshell Detection
§ Red Teaming
§ It‘s not rocket science - ask:
§ „Do we detect LOCAL_SYSTEM running
‚whoami‘ on one of our servers?“
§ „Do we detect RDP logins with service
accounts?“
§ „Do we detect local admin creations on
Sundays?“
Compromise Assessment
§ Addressing the „Assume Compromise“
paradigm
§ Typically: Consulting + Scripts / Tools1
§ EDR <> Compromise Assessment
§ EDR: Live view of processes, connections, activity
§ CA: Forensic analysis of past events - caches, logs,
error reports, dumps, etc.
§ see it as complementary and not competing
1 e.g. THOR by Nextron Systems
Threat Intel Management
§ Provider: OTX, MISP, Local
Authorities, EclecticIQ,
CrowdStrike, BEA,
Kaspersky, FireEye ...
§ Structures and curated
Threat Intelligence (TI) is a
thing
Source: EclecticIQ

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Maturity Model of Security Disciplines

  • 1. Maturity Model of Security Disciplines Florian Roth
  • 2. Contents § Concept of Maturity Modell of Security Disciplines § Some highlights and low hanging fruits § Security Monitoring § Low hanging fruits § Compromise Assessments § Threat Intel Management
  • 3. Maturity Model of Security Disciplines 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Em ailFilter Antivirus Backup /Restore SecurityM onitoring VulnerabilityM anagem ent M FA Advanced M alwareDetection NIDS EDR Com promiseAssessm ent Com puterForensicsRed Team ing ThreatIntelM anagem ent Zero Trust SOAR Implemented Planned Missed Expensive Setup Costs Cheap DegreeofImplementation Black Hole
  • 4. Security Monitoring: Wrong Paradigms § „Security devices hold the most important logs“ - Firewall,WAF,VPN logs are less important than you might think § „Antivirus events with status ‚successfully removed‘ don‘t matter“ - Better method: Antivirus Event Analysis Cheat Sheet § „Only the perimeter matters“ - SSL/TLS connections - Stage1 is often MS Office Doc with low AV detection rate § „If you invest enough in protection you don‘t need a sound detection“
  • 5. Security Monitoring: New Paradigms § „Assume Compromise“ - Answer the question: - „what if an attack gained domain admin privileges 6 months ago?“ - „do we detect someone running ‚whoami‘ on one of our servers?“ § „Githubification of InfoSec“1 - New standards empower community sharing (YARA, Sigma,ATT&CK) § „Software is broken“ (not so new but often overlooked ;) - Always expect vulnerabilities - Detection is as important as protection and often cheaper to implement 1 https://medium.com/@johnlatwc/the-githubification-of-infosec-afbdbfaad1d1
  • 6. Security Monitoring § Log Collection § Log Sources (prioritization) § Coverage (degree of implementation) § Depths (audit policies) § Monitoring § Matching § IOCs (feeds, management) § Methods (Sigma) § Correlations § Anomaly Detection § (Processes) § Quality Control § MITRE ATT&CK & CAR § Red Teaming
  • 7. Log Sources Log Source Volume11 IOC Matching Threat Hunting Audit Trail9 APT Detection10 Antivirus Low - ++3 + +++ Windows & Sysmon Medium8 ++1 +++4 ++ ++ Proxy Medium ++2 +5 ++ + NIDS/NSM7 Medium +2 + + + DNS High ++2 +5 + + Mail6 Medium + - + - Firewall High +2 - ++ - Linux (auditd) Medium - + + - 1 – File hash values (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) 2 – C2 IPs or domain names 3 – see „Antivirus Event Analysis Cheat Sheet“ 4 – Sigma can help a lot 5 – Patterns (URL, hostname), suspicious TLDs 6 – No personal experience with this log source but highly recommended by others 7 – Suricata, Zeek or alike 8 – Depends mainly on audit policy (use Microsoft Baseline) and Sysmon config Priority High Low 9 – Usefulness in reconstruction of events 10 – How useful are these logs in the detection of persistent threats (reconnaissance, backdoors, lateral movement) 11 – Depends on audit policy and filters (rule of thumb)
  • 8. Low Hanging Fruit 1: AntiVirus § Antivirus Event Analysis Cheat Sheet § Threat Type § Location § Available as Sigma rules https://github.com/Neo2 3x0/sigma/tree/master/r ules/windows/malware
  • 9. Low Hanging Fruit 2: Sigma § Answers the question: „What should I look for in my logs?“ § Generic rules § No vendor lock § Sharing communities § Easy to write and read § Expression language covers 95% of use cases (use explicit queries for the rest) https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/tree/master/rules
  • 11. Audit Policies 1/2 § Antivirus > get everything § Windows § Microsoft Baseline § Sysmon § Olaf Hartong‘s „Sysmon Modular“: https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular § SwiftOnSecurity‘s “Sysmon Config“: https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config § Proxy > get everything
  • 12. Audit Policies 2/2 § NIDS > depends on product § DNS § Exclude AD / Windows service related queries § Mail > unknown § Firewall § High Volume § Filter on Priority (see table) § Storage: often collected in cheaper systems Direction Action Priority Out Blocked High Out Allowed Medium In Allowed Medium In Blocked Low
  • 13. Advantages of Sysmon/Sigma over EDR § Transparency § You know exactly what you‘re able to detect § No hidden signatures and Machine Learning magic § Customizability § Independent Response to Threats § Community provides detection rules/ideas fast § Don‘t have to ask a vendor if he has already pushed corresponding rules
  • 14. Security Monitoring: Quality Control § MITRE ATT&CK Coverage § Don‘t forget the depths: Webshell Detection isn‘t Webshell Detection § Red Teaming § It‘s not rocket science - ask: § „Do we detect LOCAL_SYSTEM running ‚whoami‘ on one of our servers?“ § „Do we detect RDP logins with service accounts?“ § „Do we detect local admin creations on Sundays?“
  • 15. Compromise Assessment § Addressing the „Assume Compromise“ paradigm § Typically: Consulting + Scripts / Tools1 § EDR <> Compromise Assessment § EDR: Live view of processes, connections, activity § CA: Forensic analysis of past events - caches, logs, error reports, dumps, etc. § see it as complementary and not competing 1 e.g. THOR by Nextron Systems
  • 16. Threat Intel Management § Provider: OTX, MISP, Local Authorities, EclecticIQ, CrowdStrike, BEA, Kaspersky, FireEye ... § Structures and curated Threat Intelligence (TI) is a thing Source: EclecticIQ