Infrastructure Protection from Extreme Natural Hazards: Marine oil terminals
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ANA MARIA CRUZ, Ph.D Consultant, Natural and Industrial Disaster Risk Management and Adjunct Professor, Kyoto University
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Infrastructure Protection from Extreme Natural Hazards: Marine oil terminals
- 1. Infrastructure Protection from Extreme Natural Hazards: Marine oil terminals ANA MARIA CRUZ, Ph.D Consultant, Natural and Industrial Disaster Risk Management and Adjunct Professor, Kyoto University IDRC, Davos, Switzerland 31 May 2010
- 6. Comprehensive Analysis Framework Extreme natural hazard LIFELINES/ OTHER SYSTEMS MARINE OIL TERMINAL & PORTS COMMUNITY
- 12. Chevron refinery affected by Hurricane Georges* 1998 Facility’s port terminal damaged by storm surge and high winds Flooded naphtha tank farm Tornado damages cooling tower Salt-water intrusion on control panel Hurricane Georges in 1998, Pascagoula, MS (*Cruz et al. , Natural Hazards Review, 2001) Control center moved by storm surge
- 23. GRACIAS! THANK YOU! GRAZIE! MERCI! ARIGATO-GOZAIMASU!
- 25. I DRiM Society DRS, DPRI, Kyoto University Uji Campus, Gokasho, Uji, Kyoto 611-0011 Japan Tel: +81(0) 774384043 Fax: +81(0) 774384044 [email_address] Contacts:
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- Natech disasters are particularly problematic types of disasters for a number of reasons. Simultaneously, response efforts are likely to be required to attend to both the technological disaster and the triggering natural disaster If these problems are not taken into account during the planning process, emergency response needs are likely to overwhelm response capacity. Steinberg and Cruz (2004) found that risk management and emergency response planning for accidental hazmat releases during normal day-to-day plant operation are not sufficient if they have not taken into account the problems that accompany a natech event. Although safety techniques have been developed and implemented to prevent or contain accidents at industrial facilities and other hazardous installations, they are typically not designed to accommodate releases that are triggered by, and are simultaneous with, natural disasters
- IN this study I propose the use of a comprehensive analysis approach that encompasses the industrial facilities, lifeline infrastructure, and the community. The effects and consequences of the earthquake on these three systems affects emergency response capacity as well.
- Will pose many challenges to the oil and gas sector A changing climate including increased temperatures, changes in ….
- coastal flooding and storm surge, rising sea-levels, and ground subsidence and erosion
- coastal flooding and storm surge, rising sea-levels, and ground subsidence and erosion
- Ports and marine terminals are affected by earthquakes and tsunamis, and liquefaction and soil problems during earthquakes (Tang 2000, Erdik 1998). Ground shaking, settlement, and lateral displacement caused damage to port facilities in Izmit Bay following the Kocaeli earthquake (Tang (2000). To illustrate, ground subsidence and/or submarine slides caused the loss of 200 meters of pier at the AKSA chemical company in Yalova on the south shore of Izmit Bay (Steinberg and Cruz 2004). Liquefaction and permanent ground deformation devastated the Port of Kobe, Japan, damaging more than 90 % of the port’s moorings (Erdik 1998). Damage to ports can have severe economic impact on a region, as occurred following the Kobe earthquake, cutting Kobe off from the rest of Japan and the outside world (Cataldo 1995). The American Society of Civil Engineers’ Ports and Harbors Committee has developed planning and design guidelines for small harbors (Sorensen et al. 1992), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has done research concerning design and redevelopment of ports and harbors (Lillycrop et al. 1991).
- In 1964 a large earthquake of 7.5 magnitude triggered a 4 m tsunami in Niigata, Japan. The earthquake initially caused fires in five storage tanks and hundreds of oil spills at two oil refineries in Niigata harbor (Iwabuchi et al. 2006). When the tsunami hit the already earthquake stricken facilities additional damage to storage tanks and plant processing equipment occurred and spread the fire throughout the two plants. The ignited crude oil from the refineries was then carried by the flood waters into residential areas and resulted in the destruction of 286 houses by fire (Iwabuchi et al. 2006, Akatsuka and Kobayashi 2008, Cruz, Krausmann, and Franchello 2010).
- The are various ways in which chemical accidents and industrial losses can be reduced. In each case, it is important to understand that these measures all help to reduce the risk and/or impacts of chemical releases to some extent, but do not eliminate them entirely (Steinberg 2003) . To insure the best results risk and risk reduction, alternatives should be evaluated and adopted along the entire life cycle of a plant.