SlideShare une entreprise Scribd logo
1  sur  27
Security Testing of Mobile Applications
(Android - BlackBerry - iOS)
Introduction to Android Security & AppUse
Mobile application threat model - What makes mobile application security so different?
• The Android linux OS security
• The Dalvik VM
• The Android security mechanisms
• Application file system isolation
• The permission model
• Least privilege model
• Database isolation
• The Android emulator VS. physical device
• The AppUse VM ("Android Pen-test Platform Unified Standalone Environment")
• The Android Debug Bridge (ADB)
• The logcat interface
Traffic Analysis and Manipulation
• Intro to server side attacks - SQL injection, XSS
• Insecure remote Authentication - client id, IMEI, etc.
• Insecure session management
• authorization
• Traffic interception
• Using proxies and sniffers
• Importing SSL certificates & trusted CA's
• Sensitive information transmission
• Bypassing server certificate validations
• Exposing insecure traffic
Insecure data K11storage
• Exploring deployed application files at the /data/data directory
• The file system security model
• Insecure file system permissions
• Insecure storage of sensitive data in files
• The SDcard
• The SQLite Database storage
• Using sqlite browser
• Application shared preferences storage
• Storage of sensitive data at the server side
• Secrets in code
• Insecure log exposure
• Bad cryptography
Reverse engineering the application binaries
• The APK file package
• APK extraction - Investigating layout, manifest, permissions and binaries
• Extracting the content of the classes.dex file
• Using smali/baksmali Dalvik assembler/disassembler
• Using jasmin/jasper JVM assembler/disassembler
• Decompilation
• Using dex2jar
• Identifying interesting API calls - file access, networking, SDcard access, SQLite, etc
• Identifying insecure code - certificate validation bypass, insecure xml parsing, clipboard access,
geo-location, address book, client xss and html injection, etc.
• Finding hard coded secrets in code
• Using Android Lint
• Code patching and modification
• Recreating and resigning the modified APK
Android application components security
• Major component types - Activity, Service, Content provider, Broadcast receiver
• The Intent message
• Components and the manifest file
• Using manifest explorer
• Component permissions and visibility
• Activating components
• Accessing restricted screens
• Attacking content providers and client side sql injection
• Direct component invocation by unauthorized apps
Analyzing Runtime Analysis
• Monitoring process activity
• Observing file access
• Monitoring network connectivity
• Debugging
• Setting breakpoints
• Memory dumping and analysis
• Analyzing logs using logcat
Android Platform Security Architecture
Android seeks to be the most secure and usable operating system for mobile platforms by re-purpo
Protect user data
Protect system resources (including the network)
Provide application isolation
To achieve these objectives, Android provides these key security features:
Robust security at the OS level through the Linux kernel
Mandatory application sandbox for all applications
Secure interprocess communication
Application signing
Application-defined and user-granted permissions
The sections below describe these and other security features of the Android platform. Figure 1 summarizes the security components and considera
New Android's Feature will Regularly Scan Your Apps
Recently Google has officially announced to increase the security of Android users by adding a new feature to android which will regularly scan all the
The new feature by Google would be a part of Verify Apps feature which is already protecting android users from harmful apps installed by third party
The feature will scan for spywares , malwares , sending unauthorized messages and in-app installations for changes in app activity after it is installed
The first comprehensive guide to discovering and preventing attacks on the Android OS
As the Android operating system continues to increase its share of the smartphone market, smartphone hacking remains a growing threat. Written b
If you are a mobile device administrator, security researcher, Android app developer, or consultant responsible for evaluating Android security, you w
A crack team of leading Android security researchers explain Android security risks, security design and architecture, rooting, fuzz testing, and vulne
Covers Android application building blocks and security as well as debugging and auditing Android apps
Prepares mobile device administrators, security researchers, Android app developers, and security consultants to defend Android systems against a
Android Hacker's Handbook is the first comprehensive resource for IT professionals charged with smartphone security.
IT Policy:
-Primary policy for all protection mechanisms
Access to Network/Resources/Settings
Prohibited and Mandatory installations of apps
Controlling third-party Java application permissions
-Per-Handset + Global Policy stored on BES
-Initial Policy is signed by master key at pairing
Stored in NV RAM
Future updates OTA must be signed by master key
Application Controls:
- All applications run in the JVM
- IT Policy controls how the applications interact
-Developed with the user and company in mind
Most restrictive overlap
- I9 application control policy categories
Cross Application Control
-Hardware
-Network domnains
-PIM data/ applications
-Inter-application communication
-Browser
-User Autherntication and Settings
-Input Simulation
-MDS
Code signing
- Core BB applications must be RIM Signed
- Class files verified for interface compliance
- No user-defined class loaders
-No Java Native Interface or user extensions
-System classes cannot be overridden
Data Security
-Java RMS offers various forms of crypto
-Keys must be explicitly shared by apps
-PIM protected by Blackberry Attachment Service
Renders and decrypts data on the BES
Sends rasterized information to display
Avoids image exploits
Manages PGP on BES
The iOS Security Model
Apple has incorporated four layers of security in iOS to protect the user and their data.
Device Security
Techniques to prevent an unauthorized individual from using the device
Data Security
Techniques to protect the data stored on the device, even if the device is stolen
Network Security
Tools to encrypt data while it is in transit across a network
Application Security
Mechanisms to secure the operating system and isolate applications while they are running
Information gathering
Observe application behavior
Determine the application’s data states (at rest, in transit or on display) and sensitivity
Identify access methods
Identify what frameworks are in use
Identify server side APIs that are in use
Identify what protocols are in use
Identify other applications or services with which the application interacts
Decrypt Appstore binaries: the .ipa will be decrypted at runtime by the kernel’s mach loader. Cydia has several applications available: Crackulo
Determine the architecture the application was compiled for: otool –f <app name> or lipo -info <app>.
Get information about what functions, classes and methods are referenced in the application and in the dynamically loaded libraries. Use nm <a
List the dynamic dependencies. Use otool –L <app name>
Dump the load commands for the application. Use otool –l <app name>
Dump the runtime information from the compiled application. Identify each class compiled into the program and its associated methods, instanc
Dump the keychain using dump_keychain to reveal application specific credentials and passwords if stored in the keychain.
Determine the security features in place:
Locate the PIE (Position Independent Executable) - an app compiled without PIE (using the ―–fPIE –pie‖ flag) will load the executable at a fixed
Stack smashing protection - specify the –fstack-protector-all compiler flag. A ―canary‖ is placed on the stack to protect the saved base pointer, s
iPhone Analyzer allows you to forensically examine or recover data from in iOS device.
It principally works by importing backups produced from iTunes or third party software,
and providing you with a rich interface to explore, analyze and recover data in human readable formats.
Because it works from the backup files everything is forensically safe, and no changes are made to the data.
IPhone Analyzer is now free for Personal use
If you’re an app developer with a solid foundation in Objective-C, this book is an absolute must—chances are very high that your company’s iOS app
This guide illustrates several types of iOS attacks, as well as the tools and techniques that hackers use. You’ll learn best practices to help protect yo
Examine subtle vulnerabilities in real-world applications—and avoid the same problems in your apps
Learn how attackers infect apps with malware through code injection
Discover how attackers defeat iOS keychain and data-protection encryption
Use a debugger and custom code injection to manipulate the runtime Objective-C environment
Prevent attackers from hijacking SSL sessions and stealing traffic
Securely delete files and design your apps to prevent forensic data leakage
Avoid debugging abuse, validate the integrity of run-time classes, and make your code harder to trace
Top 10 Mobile Risks
M1 : Weak Server Side Controls
M2 : Insecure Data Storage
M3 : Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
M4 : Unintended Data Leakage
M5 : Poor Authorization and Authentication
M6 : Broken Cryptography
M7 : Client Side Injection
M8 : Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs
M9 : Improper Session Handling
M10: Lack of Binary Protections
What is the Heartbleed bug?
It’s an OpenSSL vulnerability. OpenSSL is a security protocol that encrypts communications between your computer (or device) and a Web server. A
Most websites, many operating systems, and many apps use OpenSSL. It’s everywhere, and one version of it has a critical bug that lets hackers exp
Which operating systems are affected:
iOS devices are safe.
Windows Phone OS is likely safe.
BlackBerry is ―investigating.‖
Android is vulnerable if you have
version 4.1.1, according to Google.
OWASP Mobile Security Project - MobiSec
The MobiSec Live Environment Mobile Testing Framework project is a live environment for testing m
Thank you!

Contenu connexe

Tendances

Mobile Application Security
Mobile Application SecurityMobile Application Security
Mobile Application SecurityDirk Nicol
 
Unicom Conference - Mobile Application Security
Unicom Conference - Mobile Application SecurityUnicom Conference - Mobile Application Security
Unicom Conference - Mobile Application SecuritySubho Halder
 
Mobile application security – effective methodology, efficient testing! hem...
Mobile application security – effective methodology, efficient testing!   hem...Mobile application security – effective methodology, efficient testing!   hem...
Mobile application security – effective methodology, efficient testing! hem...owaspindia
 
Mobile Application Security Code Reviews
Mobile Application Security Code ReviewsMobile Application Security Code Reviews
Mobile Application Security Code ReviewsDenim Group
 
Mobile Threats and Trends Changing Mobile App Security
Mobile Threats and Trends Changing Mobile App SecurityMobile Threats and Trends Changing Mobile App Security
Mobile Threats and Trends Changing Mobile App SecurityDevOps.com
 
Malware on Smartphones and Tablets - The Inconvenient Truth
Malware on Smartphones and  Tablets  - The Inconvenient  TruthMalware on Smartphones and  Tablets  - The Inconvenient  Truth
Malware on Smartphones and Tablets - The Inconvenient TruthAGILLY
 
Secure Android Apps- nVisium Security
Secure Android Apps- nVisium SecuritySecure Android Apps- nVisium Security
Secure Android Apps- nVisium SecurityJack Mannino
 
Mobile Application Security – Effective methodology, efficient testing!
Mobile Application Security – Effective methodology, efficient testing!Mobile Application Security – Effective methodology, efficient testing!
Mobile Application Security – Effective methodology, efficient testing!espheresecurity
 
Developing Secure Mobile Applications
Developing Secure Mobile ApplicationsDeveloping Secure Mobile Applications
Developing Secure Mobile ApplicationsDenim Group
 
Building secure mobile apps
Building secure mobile appsBuilding secure mobile apps
Building secure mobile appsMartin Vigo
 
Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rationa...
Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rationa...Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rationa...
Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rationa...Alan Kan
 
Pentesting Android Applications
Pentesting Android ApplicationsPentesting Android Applications
Pentesting Android ApplicationsCláudio André
 
Transforming Risky Mobile Apps into Self Defending Apps
Transforming Risky Mobile Apps into Self Defending AppsTransforming Risky Mobile Apps into Self Defending Apps
Transforming Risky Mobile Apps into Self Defending AppsBlueboxer2014
 
Designing Secure Mobile Apps
Designing Secure Mobile AppsDesigning Secure Mobile Apps
Designing Secure Mobile AppsDenim Group
 
5 Key Ways to Incorporate Security Protection into your Organization’s Mobile...
5 Key Ways to Incorporate Security Protection into your Organization’s Mobile...5 Key Ways to Incorporate Security Protection into your Organization’s Mobile...
5 Key Ways to Incorporate Security Protection into your Organization’s Mobile...IBM Security
 

Tendances (20)

Mobile Application Security
Mobile Application SecurityMobile Application Security
Mobile Application Security
 
Unicom Conference - Mobile Application Security
Unicom Conference - Mobile Application SecurityUnicom Conference - Mobile Application Security
Unicom Conference - Mobile Application Security
 
Mobile application security – effective methodology, efficient testing! hem...
Mobile application security – effective methodology, efficient testing!   hem...Mobile application security – effective methodology, efficient testing!   hem...
Mobile application security – effective methodology, efficient testing! hem...
 
Mobile Application Security Code Reviews
Mobile Application Security Code ReviewsMobile Application Security Code Reviews
Mobile Application Security Code Reviews
 
Chapter 4
Chapter 4Chapter 4
Chapter 4
 
Mobile Apps Security Testing -3
Mobile Apps Security Testing -3Mobile Apps Security Testing -3
Mobile Apps Security Testing -3
 
Mobile Threats and Trends Changing Mobile App Security
Mobile Threats and Trends Changing Mobile App SecurityMobile Threats and Trends Changing Mobile App Security
Mobile Threats and Trends Changing Mobile App Security
 
Malware on Smartphones and Tablets - The Inconvenient Truth
Malware on Smartphones and  Tablets  - The Inconvenient  TruthMalware on Smartphones and  Tablets  - The Inconvenient  Truth
Malware on Smartphones and Tablets - The Inconvenient Truth
 
Security testing in mobile applications
Security testing in mobile applicationsSecurity testing in mobile applications
Security testing in mobile applications
 
Secure Android Apps- nVisium Security
Secure Android Apps- nVisium SecuritySecure Android Apps- nVisium Security
Secure Android Apps- nVisium Security
 
Mobile Application Security – Effective methodology, efficient testing!
Mobile Application Security – Effective methodology, efficient testing!Mobile Application Security – Effective methodology, efficient testing!
Mobile Application Security – Effective methodology, efficient testing!
 
Developing Secure Mobile Applications
Developing Secure Mobile ApplicationsDeveloping Secure Mobile Applications
Developing Secure Mobile Applications
 
Building secure mobile apps
Building secure mobile appsBuilding secure mobile apps
Building secure mobile apps
 
Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rationa...
Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rationa...Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rationa...
Discovering the Value of Verifying Web Application Security Using IBM Rationa...
 
Mobile Security
Mobile SecurityMobile Security
Mobile Security
 
Pentesting Android Applications
Pentesting Android ApplicationsPentesting Android Applications
Pentesting Android Applications
 
Transforming Risky Mobile Apps into Self Defending Apps
Transforming Risky Mobile Apps into Self Defending AppsTransforming Risky Mobile Apps into Self Defending Apps
Transforming Risky Mobile Apps into Self Defending Apps
 
Designing Secure Mobile Apps
Designing Secure Mobile AppsDesigning Secure Mobile Apps
Designing Secure Mobile Apps
 
Mobile security
Mobile securityMobile security
Mobile security
 
5 Key Ways to Incorporate Security Protection into your Organization’s Mobile...
5 Key Ways to Incorporate Security Protection into your Organization’s Mobile...5 Key Ways to Incorporate Security Protection into your Organization’s Mobile...
5 Key Ways to Incorporate Security Protection into your Organization’s Mobile...
 

En vedette

Android Security - Common Security Pitfalls in Android Applications
Android Security - Common Security Pitfalls in Android ApplicationsAndroid Security - Common Security Pitfalls in Android Applications
Android Security - Common Security Pitfalls in Android ApplicationsBlrDroid
 
Android security model
Android security modelAndroid security model
Android security modelrrand1
 
Deep Dive Into Android Security
Deep Dive Into Android SecurityDeep Dive Into Android Security
Deep Dive Into Android SecurityMarakana Inc.
 
Costume & Props
Costume & PropsCostume & Props
Costume & Propsgmisso33
 
My Flippts
My FlipptsMy Flippts
My FlipptsSoloten
 
Institutional regulations
Institutional regulationsInstitutional regulations
Institutional regulationsgmisso33
 
EmakumeEkin en Be the Change
EmakumeEkin en Be the ChangeEmakumeEkin en Be the Change
EmakumeEkin en Be the ChangeEmakumeEkin
 
Mistakes in Android OS:causes and prospects.
Mistakes in Android OS:causes and prospects.Mistakes in Android OS:causes and prospects.
Mistakes in Android OS:causes and prospects.Soloten
 
(Pdf) yury chemerkin _ath_con_2013
(Pdf) yury chemerkin _ath_con_2013(Pdf) yury chemerkin _ath_con_2013
(Pdf) yury chemerkin _ath_con_2013STO STRATEGY
 
Blackberry playbook – new challenges
Blackberry playbook – new challengesBlackberry playbook – new challenges
Blackberry playbook – new challengesSTO STRATEGY
 
Презентация игрового приложения для инвесторов
Презентация игрового приложения для инвесторовПрезентация игрового приложения для инвесторов
Презентация игрового приложения для инвесторовSoloten
 

En vedette (19)

Android Security
Android SecurityAndroid Security
Android Security
 
Android Security - Common Security Pitfalls in Android Applications
Android Security - Common Security Pitfalls in Android ApplicationsAndroid Security - Common Security Pitfalls in Android Applications
Android Security - Common Security Pitfalls in Android Applications
 
Android security model
Android security modelAndroid security model
Android security model
 
Android system security
Android system securityAndroid system security
Android system security
 
Deep Dive Into Android Security
Deep Dive Into Android SecurityDeep Dive Into Android Security
Deep Dive Into Android Security
 
Brief Tour about Android Security
Brief Tour about Android SecurityBrief Tour about Android Security
Brief Tour about Android Security
 
Android security
Android securityAndroid security
Android security
 
Costume & Props
Costume & PropsCostume & Props
Costume & Props
 
Love
Love Love
Love
 
Informatica
InformaticaInformatica
Informatica
 
My Flippts
My FlipptsMy Flippts
My Flippts
 
Institutional regulations
Institutional regulationsInstitutional regulations
Institutional regulations
 
EmakumeEkin en Be the Change
EmakumeEkin en Be the ChangeEmakumeEkin en Be the Change
EmakumeEkin en Be the Change
 
Mistakes in Android OS:causes and prospects.
Mistakes in Android OS:causes and prospects.Mistakes in Android OS:causes and prospects.
Mistakes in Android OS:causes and prospects.
 
(Pdf) yury chemerkin _ath_con_2013
(Pdf) yury chemerkin _ath_con_2013(Pdf) yury chemerkin _ath_con_2013
(Pdf) yury chemerkin _ath_con_2013
 
Blackberry playbook – new challenges
Blackberry playbook – new challengesBlackberry playbook – new challenges
Blackberry playbook – new challenges
 
Una sonrisa
Una sonrisaUna sonrisa
Una sonrisa
 
Slide nahu (2)
Slide nahu (2)Slide nahu (2)
Slide nahu (2)
 
Презентация игрового приложения для инвесторов
Презентация игрового приложения для инвесторовПрезентация игрового приложения для инвесторов
Презентация игрового приложения для инвесторов
 

Similaire à Security testing of mobile applications

CNIT 128 8: Mobile development security
CNIT 128 8: Mobile development securityCNIT 128 8: Mobile development security
CNIT 128 8: Mobile development securitySam Bowne
 
Mobile Security for the Enterprise
Mobile Security for the EnterpriseMobile Security for the Enterprise
Mobile Security for the EnterpriseWill Adams
 
The Ultimate Security Checklist Before Launching Your Android App
The Ultimate Security Checklist Before Launching Your Android AppThe Ultimate Security Checklist Before Launching Your Android App
The Ultimate Security Checklist Before Launching Your Android AppAppknox
 
Mobile security
Mobile securityMobile security
Mobile securityStefaan
 
Mobile Application Security Threats through the Eyes of the Attacker
Mobile Application Security Threats through the Eyes of the AttackerMobile Application Security Threats through the Eyes of the Attacker
Mobile Application Security Threats through the Eyes of the Attackerbugcrowd
 
Mobile Security Training, Mobile Device Security Training
Mobile Security Training, Mobile Device Security TrainingMobile Security Training, Mobile Device Security Training
Mobile Security Training, Mobile Device Security TrainingTonex
 
Introduction to Android Application Security Testing - 2nd Sep 2017
Introduction to Android Application Security Testing - 2nd Sep 2017Introduction to Android Application Security Testing - 2nd Sep 2017
Introduction to Android Application Security Testing - 2nd Sep 2017Satheesh Kumar V
 
How to Test Security and Vulnerability of Your Android and iOS Apps
How to Test Security and Vulnerability of Your Android and iOS AppsHow to Test Security and Vulnerability of Your Android and iOS Apps
How to Test Security and Vulnerability of Your Android and iOS AppsBitbar
 
Analysis and research of system security based on android
Analysis and research of system security based on androidAnalysis and research of system security based on android
Analysis and research of system security based on androidRavishankar Kumar
 
Building a Mobile Security Program
Building a Mobile Security ProgramBuilding a Mobile Security Program
Building a Mobile Security ProgramDenim Group
 
Security framework for connected devices
Security framework for connected devicesSecurity framework for connected devices
Security framework for connected devicesHCL Technologies
 
Symantec Mobile Security Whitepaper June 2011
Symantec Mobile Security Whitepaper June 2011Symantec Mobile Security Whitepaper June 2011
Symantec Mobile Security Whitepaper June 2011Symantec
 
Droidcon mobile security
Droidcon   mobile securityDroidcon   mobile security
Droidcon mobile securityJudy Ngure
 
Standards and methodology for application security assessment
Standards and methodology for application security assessment Standards and methodology for application security assessment
Standards and methodology for application security assessment Mykhailo Antonishyn
 
Mobile Enterprise Application Platform
Mobile Enterprise Application PlatformMobile Enterprise Application Platform
Mobile Enterprise Application PlatformNugroho Gito
 
DEF CON 24 - Dinesh and Shetty - practical android application exploitation
DEF CON 24 - Dinesh and Shetty - practical android application exploitationDEF CON 24 - Dinesh and Shetty - practical android application exploitation
DEF CON 24 - Dinesh and Shetty - practical android application exploitationFelipe Prado
 
Secure coding guidelines
Secure coding guidelinesSecure coding guidelines
Secure coding guidelinesZakaria SMAHI
 
Owasp Mobile Risk Series : M4 : Unintended Data Leakage
Owasp Mobile Risk Series : M4 : Unintended Data LeakageOwasp Mobile Risk Series : M4 : Unintended Data Leakage
Owasp Mobile Risk Series : M4 : Unintended Data LeakageAnant Shrivastava
 

Similaire à Security testing of mobile applications (20)

CNIT 128 8: Mobile development security
CNIT 128 8: Mobile development securityCNIT 128 8: Mobile development security
CNIT 128 8: Mobile development security
 
Mobile Security for the Enterprise
Mobile Security for the EnterpriseMobile Security for the Enterprise
Mobile Security for the Enterprise
 
The Ultimate Security Checklist Before Launching Your Android App
The Ultimate Security Checklist Before Launching Your Android AppThe Ultimate Security Checklist Before Launching Your Android App
The Ultimate Security Checklist Before Launching Your Android App
 
Mobile security
Mobile securityMobile security
Mobile security
 
Mobile Application Security Threats through the Eyes of the Attacker
Mobile Application Security Threats through the Eyes of the AttackerMobile Application Security Threats through the Eyes of the Attacker
Mobile Application Security Threats through the Eyes of the Attacker
 
Mobile Security Training, Mobile Device Security Training
Mobile Security Training, Mobile Device Security TrainingMobile Security Training, Mobile Device Security Training
Mobile Security Training, Mobile Device Security Training
 
OS-Project-Report-Team-8
OS-Project-Report-Team-8OS-Project-Report-Team-8
OS-Project-Report-Team-8
 
Introduction to Android Application Security Testing - 2nd Sep 2017
Introduction to Android Application Security Testing - 2nd Sep 2017Introduction to Android Application Security Testing - 2nd Sep 2017
Introduction to Android Application Security Testing - 2nd Sep 2017
 
How to Test Security and Vulnerability of Your Android and iOS Apps
How to Test Security and Vulnerability of Your Android and iOS AppsHow to Test Security and Vulnerability of Your Android and iOS Apps
How to Test Security and Vulnerability of Your Android and iOS Apps
 
Analysis and research of system security based on android
Analysis and research of system security based on androidAnalysis and research of system security based on android
Analysis and research of system security based on android
 
Building a Mobile Security Program
Building a Mobile Security ProgramBuilding a Mobile Security Program
Building a Mobile Security Program
 
Security framework for connected devices
Security framework for connected devicesSecurity framework for connected devices
Security framework for connected devices
 
Top 6 Android Security Best Practices for App Development
Top 6 Android Security Best Practices for App DevelopmentTop 6 Android Security Best Practices for App Development
Top 6 Android Security Best Practices for App Development
 
Symantec Mobile Security Whitepaper June 2011
Symantec Mobile Security Whitepaper June 2011Symantec Mobile Security Whitepaper June 2011
Symantec Mobile Security Whitepaper June 2011
 
Droidcon mobile security
Droidcon   mobile securityDroidcon   mobile security
Droidcon mobile security
 
Standards and methodology for application security assessment
Standards and methodology for application security assessment Standards and methodology for application security assessment
Standards and methodology for application security assessment
 
Mobile Enterprise Application Platform
Mobile Enterprise Application PlatformMobile Enterprise Application Platform
Mobile Enterprise Application Platform
 
DEF CON 24 - Dinesh and Shetty - practical android application exploitation
DEF CON 24 - Dinesh and Shetty - practical android application exploitationDEF CON 24 - Dinesh and Shetty - practical android application exploitation
DEF CON 24 - Dinesh and Shetty - practical android application exploitation
 
Secure coding guidelines
Secure coding guidelinesSecure coding guidelines
Secure coding guidelines
 
Owasp Mobile Risk Series : M4 : Unintended Data Leakage
Owasp Mobile Risk Series : M4 : Unintended Data LeakageOwasp Mobile Risk Series : M4 : Unintended Data Leakage
Owasp Mobile Risk Series : M4 : Unintended Data Leakage
 

Dernier

Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Victor Rentea
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingEdi Saputra
 
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectorsMS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectorsNanddeep Nachan
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, AdobeApidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobeapidays
 
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWEREMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWERMadyBayot
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfsudhanshuwaghmare1
 
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...Jeffrey Haguewood
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...apidays
 
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Orbitshub
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...apidays
 
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Victor Rentea
 
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Bhuvaneswari Subramani
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...Zilliz
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesrafiqahmad00786416
 
WSO2's API Vision: Unifying Control, Empowering Developers
WSO2's API Vision: Unifying Control, Empowering DevelopersWSO2's API Vision: Unifying Control, Empowering Developers
WSO2's API Vision: Unifying Control, Empowering DevelopersWSO2
 
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native ApplicationsArchitecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native ApplicationsWSO2
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAndrey Devyatkin
 
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...apidays
 
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Angeliki Cooney
 

Dernier (20)

Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
 
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectorsMS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, AdobeApidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
 
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWEREMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
EMPOWERMENT TECHNOLOGY GRADE 11 QUARTER 2 REVIEWER
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
 
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
FWD Group - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
Navigating the Deluge_ Dubai Floods and the Resilience of Dubai International...
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
Apidays New York 2024 - The value of a flexible API Management solution for O...
 
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
Finding Java's Hidden Performance Traps @ DevoxxUK 2024
 
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
 
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challengesICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
ICT role in 21st century education and its challenges
 
WSO2's API Vision: Unifying Control, Empowering Developers
WSO2's API Vision: Unifying Control, Empowering DevelopersWSO2's API Vision: Unifying Control, Empowering Developers
WSO2's API Vision: Unifying Control, Empowering Developers
 
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native ApplicationsArchitecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
 
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
Apidays New York 2024 - APIs in 2030: The Risk of Technological Sleepwalk by ...
 
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
Biography Of Angeliki Cooney | Senior Vice President Life Sciences | Albany, ...
 

Security testing of mobile applications

  • 1. Security Testing of Mobile Applications (Android - BlackBerry - iOS)
  • 2. Introduction to Android Security & AppUse Mobile application threat model - What makes mobile application security so different? • The Android linux OS security • The Dalvik VM • The Android security mechanisms • Application file system isolation • The permission model • Least privilege model • Database isolation • The Android emulator VS. physical device • The AppUse VM ("Android Pen-test Platform Unified Standalone Environment") • The Android Debug Bridge (ADB) • The logcat interface
  • 3. Traffic Analysis and Manipulation • Intro to server side attacks - SQL injection, XSS • Insecure remote Authentication - client id, IMEI, etc. • Insecure session management • authorization • Traffic interception • Using proxies and sniffers • Importing SSL certificates & trusted CA's • Sensitive information transmission • Bypassing server certificate validations • Exposing insecure traffic
  • 4. Insecure data K11storage • Exploring deployed application files at the /data/data directory • The file system security model • Insecure file system permissions • Insecure storage of sensitive data in files • The SDcard • The SQLite Database storage • Using sqlite browser • Application shared preferences storage • Storage of sensitive data at the server side • Secrets in code • Insecure log exposure • Bad cryptography
  • 5. Reverse engineering the application binaries • The APK file package • APK extraction - Investigating layout, manifest, permissions and binaries • Extracting the content of the classes.dex file • Using smali/baksmali Dalvik assembler/disassembler • Using jasmin/jasper JVM assembler/disassembler • Decompilation • Using dex2jar • Identifying interesting API calls - file access, networking, SDcard access, SQLite, etc • Identifying insecure code - certificate validation bypass, insecure xml parsing, clipboard access, geo-location, address book, client xss and html injection, etc. • Finding hard coded secrets in code • Using Android Lint • Code patching and modification • Recreating and resigning the modified APK
  • 6. Android application components security • Major component types - Activity, Service, Content provider, Broadcast receiver • The Intent message • Components and the manifest file • Using manifest explorer • Component permissions and visibility • Activating components • Accessing restricted screens • Attacking content providers and client side sql injection • Direct component invocation by unauthorized apps
  • 7. Analyzing Runtime Analysis • Monitoring process activity • Observing file access • Monitoring network connectivity • Debugging • Setting breakpoints • Memory dumping and analysis • Analyzing logs using logcat
  • 8. Android Platform Security Architecture Android seeks to be the most secure and usable operating system for mobile platforms by re-purpo Protect user data Protect system resources (including the network) Provide application isolation To achieve these objectives, Android provides these key security features: Robust security at the OS level through the Linux kernel Mandatory application sandbox for all applications Secure interprocess communication Application signing Application-defined and user-granted permissions The sections below describe these and other security features of the Android platform. Figure 1 summarizes the security components and considera
  • 9.
  • 10. New Android's Feature will Regularly Scan Your Apps Recently Google has officially announced to increase the security of Android users by adding a new feature to android which will regularly scan all the The new feature by Google would be a part of Verify Apps feature which is already protecting android users from harmful apps installed by third party The feature will scan for spywares , malwares , sending unauthorized messages and in-app installations for changes in app activity after it is installed
  • 11. The first comprehensive guide to discovering and preventing attacks on the Android OS As the Android operating system continues to increase its share of the smartphone market, smartphone hacking remains a growing threat. Written b If you are a mobile device administrator, security researcher, Android app developer, or consultant responsible for evaluating Android security, you w A crack team of leading Android security researchers explain Android security risks, security design and architecture, rooting, fuzz testing, and vulne Covers Android application building blocks and security as well as debugging and auditing Android apps Prepares mobile device administrators, security researchers, Android app developers, and security consultants to defend Android systems against a Android Hacker's Handbook is the first comprehensive resource for IT professionals charged with smartphone security.
  • 12.
  • 13. IT Policy: -Primary policy for all protection mechanisms Access to Network/Resources/Settings Prohibited and Mandatory installations of apps Controlling third-party Java application permissions -Per-Handset + Global Policy stored on BES -Initial Policy is signed by master key at pairing Stored in NV RAM Future updates OTA must be signed by master key
  • 14. Application Controls: - All applications run in the JVM - IT Policy controls how the applications interact -Developed with the user and company in mind Most restrictive overlap - I9 application control policy categories Cross Application Control -Hardware -Network domnains -PIM data/ applications -Inter-application communication -Browser -User Autherntication and Settings -Input Simulation -MDS
  • 15. Code signing - Core BB applications must be RIM Signed - Class files verified for interface compliance - No user-defined class loaders -No Java Native Interface or user extensions -System classes cannot be overridden
  • 16. Data Security -Java RMS offers various forms of crypto -Keys must be explicitly shared by apps -PIM protected by Blackberry Attachment Service Renders and decrypts data on the BES Sends rasterized information to display Avoids image exploits Manages PGP on BES
  • 17. The iOS Security Model Apple has incorporated four layers of security in iOS to protect the user and their data. Device Security Techniques to prevent an unauthorized individual from using the device Data Security Techniques to protect the data stored on the device, even if the device is stolen Network Security Tools to encrypt data while it is in transit across a network Application Security Mechanisms to secure the operating system and isolate applications while they are running
  • 18.
  • 19. Information gathering Observe application behavior Determine the application’s data states (at rest, in transit or on display) and sensitivity Identify access methods Identify what frameworks are in use Identify server side APIs that are in use Identify what protocols are in use Identify other applications or services with which the application interacts Decrypt Appstore binaries: the .ipa will be decrypted at runtime by the kernel’s mach loader. Cydia has several applications available: Crackulo Determine the architecture the application was compiled for: otool –f <app name> or lipo -info <app>. Get information about what functions, classes and methods are referenced in the application and in the dynamically loaded libraries. Use nm <a List the dynamic dependencies. Use otool –L <app name> Dump the load commands for the application. Use otool –l <app name> Dump the runtime information from the compiled application. Identify each class compiled into the program and its associated methods, instanc Dump the keychain using dump_keychain to reveal application specific credentials and passwords if stored in the keychain. Determine the security features in place: Locate the PIE (Position Independent Executable) - an app compiled without PIE (using the ―–fPIE –pie‖ flag) will load the executable at a fixed Stack smashing protection - specify the –fstack-protector-all compiler flag. A ―canary‖ is placed on the stack to protect the saved base pointer, s
  • 20. iPhone Analyzer allows you to forensically examine or recover data from in iOS device. It principally works by importing backups produced from iTunes or third party software, and providing you with a rich interface to explore, analyze and recover data in human readable formats. Because it works from the backup files everything is forensically safe, and no changes are made to the data. IPhone Analyzer is now free for Personal use
  • 21. If you’re an app developer with a solid foundation in Objective-C, this book is an absolute must—chances are very high that your company’s iOS app This guide illustrates several types of iOS attacks, as well as the tools and techniques that hackers use. You’ll learn best practices to help protect yo Examine subtle vulnerabilities in real-world applications—and avoid the same problems in your apps Learn how attackers infect apps with malware through code injection Discover how attackers defeat iOS keychain and data-protection encryption Use a debugger and custom code injection to manipulate the runtime Objective-C environment Prevent attackers from hijacking SSL sessions and stealing traffic Securely delete files and design your apps to prevent forensic data leakage Avoid debugging abuse, validate the integrity of run-time classes, and make your code harder to trace
  • 22. Top 10 Mobile Risks M1 : Weak Server Side Controls M2 : Insecure Data Storage M3 : Insufficient Transport Layer Protection M4 : Unintended Data Leakage M5 : Poor Authorization and Authentication M6 : Broken Cryptography M7 : Client Side Injection M8 : Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs M9 : Improper Session Handling M10: Lack of Binary Protections
  • 23. What is the Heartbleed bug? It’s an OpenSSL vulnerability. OpenSSL is a security protocol that encrypts communications between your computer (or device) and a Web server. A Most websites, many operating systems, and many apps use OpenSSL. It’s everywhere, and one version of it has a critical bug that lets hackers exp Which operating systems are affected: iOS devices are safe. Windows Phone OS is likely safe. BlackBerry is ―investigating.‖ Android is vulnerable if you have version 4.1.1, according to Google.
  • 24.
  • 25. OWASP Mobile Security Project - MobiSec The MobiSec Live Environment Mobile Testing Framework project is a live environment for testing m
  • 26.