3. expressed their grievances through political channels,
and later in the 1970s encouraged by many external and
THEME
regional players, resorted to violence and terrorism.
Peace overtures by Sri Lankan Government did not bear
any result and armed conflict sparked on. Suicide
attacks and protracted insurgency also resulted into
hundreds of civilian and military casualties. Sri Lankan
Armed Forces finally accomplished decisive victory in
this counter insurgency campaign by end of May 2009,
bringing about total subjugation of the rebels along with
elimination of the terrorist leadership. It had truly been a
tale of unflinching national spirit, military professionalism
and resolve for sacrifices by the Sri Lankan armed
forces and public alike.
Above in view, carry out analysis of the Tamil
3
insurgency in Sri Lanka examining its back ground,
5. IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE COMPASSIONATE,
THE MOST MERCIFUL
5
6. Introduction
• The pearl of Indian ocean.
• Target of a ruthless insurgent
movement
• Sri Lanka fielded a series of
responses
• Episode of violence, grief and
death
6
7. Introduction
• The worst face of terrorism
• LTTE
had
evolved
into
a
globally prominent organization
7
10. Aim
To present the analysis of
Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka with
a view to draw pertinent lessons
for dealing with terrorism
10
11. SEQUENCE
Part – I
Tamil Insurgency – Its Rise and Support
LT HASAN
Part – II
Past Measures for Conflict Resolution
LT TAFSEER
Part – III Change in Strategy
LT HABIB
Part – IV
Analysis & Lessons Learnt
LT ANEES
11
12. PART – I
TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE &
SUPPORT
Contents
Genesis of LTTE
Role of Tamil Diaspora and India
Conclusions
Genesis of
LTTE
Conclusions
Role of Tamil Diaspora
and India
Preview
12
13. History Of Sri Lanka Is
Marked By Inveterate Mutual
Fear
Sinhalese
Part - I
Tamil
13
14. In The Pre Colonial Era
• Small Sinhalese Kingdoms
in the centre and South
• Tamil kingdom in the North
of the island
Part - I
14
17. Three Main Steps
Emergence of LTTE
1956
Sinhala Only Act
1972
1972
Late
70s
Revival of
Isolation of Tamils
Sinhalese Nationalism
THE TIPPING POINT IN THE CONFLICT
18. Emergence Of LTTE
• LTTE came into existence
in 1974
• Prabhakaran
was
the
founding member
Part - I
18
19. THREE MAIN REASONS
FOR SURVIVAL
• Other groups were MarxistLeninist
• They
entered
mainstream
following Indo – Lanka accord
of 1987
• LTTE systematically lobbied
for assistance from the Tamil
Diaspora
Part - I
19
28. Suicide Bombing
• An asymmetric strategy
• Not a religious phenomenon for LTTE
• Types of suicide missions
Part - I
28
29. Gender Manipulation
• LTTE used gender manipulation to improve combat
efficiency
• The women were grouped with small male teams
• To ensure that the men fought for winning the
admiration
Part - I
29
31. Tamil Diaspora
• As of 2001, Tamil
Diaspora around the
globe was 600,000 to
800,000 strong
• 23 to 30% of global
Tamil population
Part - I
31
32. Tamil Diaspora
• 250,000 Tamils in North
America alone
• 200,000 Tamils resided in
Europe
• Almost 30,000 in Australia
• The Tamil Diaspora is highly
educated
and
occupies
professional jobs
Part - I
32
34. Reasons For Involvement
• Sri Lankan overtures towards West, caused worry
• To placate the Indian Tamil population
• India was not interested in Tamil independence
Part - I
34
36. Change In Indian Approach
• Indian policy makers soon realised that their policy
could backfire
• India withdrew its official support after the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi
INDIA
Part - I
36
38. Sinhalese-Tamil Rivalry
• Sinhalese-Tamil rivalry has its roots in the history
beyond the colonial rule
• Rivalry kept simmering during the colonial period
and gained momentum in post independence era
Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
38
42. LTTE - Novel Tactics
• Militarily, LTTE never failed to
innovate
and
obfuscate
security forces with its novel
tactics
• It gave new dimensions to
suicide bombing
Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
42
43. Tamil Diaspora
• Tamil Diaspora supported the
insurgency
possible
through
legitimate
all
and
illegitimate means
• The war can rightly be termed
as the “Diaspora funded war”
Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
43
44. Indian Involvement
• Indian involvement in the
conflict was based on self
interest
• Tamils misinterpreted Indian
involvement and tried to
invoke the 1971 war
Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
44
45. Indian Involvement
• Indians, were never interested in the Tamil Eelam
• Would have encouraged Tamil population in India
to raise demand for independence
Part – I TAMIL INSURGENCY – ITS RISE AND SUPPORT
45
46. PART – II
Political And Military
Response
Contents
1. Political Response
2. Military Response
3. Conclusions
48. Fighting continued between two
sides and Sri Lankan forces
managed to corner LTTE in Jaffna
Part - II
48
49. Indian Sponsored Peace
Talks
• Indo-Lankan agreement at Colombo in Jul 1987
• Indian forces were never welcomed by either side
Part - II
49
50. Indian Sponsored Peace
Talks
• Extremist JVP loathed presence of Indian forces
• LTTE started ambushing Indian Forces and
abandoned the truce
Part - II
50
51. Indian Sponsored Peace
Talks
• Forms the basis of “Op Pawan” by IPKF
• President
Premadasa
demanded
immediate
withdrawal of IPKF on 2nd January 1989
Part - II
51
52. Indian Sponsored
Peace Talks
• Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw IPKF
• V P Singh in December 1989, declared the policy
as utter failure
Part - II
52
53. Eelam War II
• Newly elected government of
Chandrika Kumaratunga offer
peace talks
• Policy of military engagement
with the Tigers
• Retaking the control of Jaffna
from insurgents
Part - II
53
54. 1994 Peace Talks
• President Kumaratunga initiated peace talks in
1994
• Short lived cease fire took place but failed
Part - II
54
55. Reasons
• Lack of sincerity
• Lack of professionalism
• Lack of flexibility
Part - II
55
56. Eelam War III
• Failure of 1994 talks led to
Eelam War III
• LTTE resorted to shoulder
fired anti aircraft, “Stinger
Missiles”
• Hit two Sri Lankan planes
flying over Jaffna
Part - II
56
59. Critical Issues
• LTTE’s exclusion from reconstruction talks
• Tamil people were not receiving the full economic
benefits of peace
• Tamil held areas are not as peaceful
Part - II
59
60. Parliamentary Elections –
2005
• Mahindra Rajapakse offered to
hold unconditional peace talks
in 2005
• LTTE
instead
announced
refresh war effort
Part - II
60
62. Eelam War IV
• Resolved not to hold talks
• Pursue the military option
• Leadership is not interested in
a peaceful coexistence
• In
2006
fighting
officially
resumed after a cease fire
Part - II
63
63. Eelam War IV
• Continued fighting led to territorial gains
• Operation is termed as Eelam War IV
• Changed Sri Lankan strategy started to pay
dividends
Part - II
64
65. Failure Of Peace
Negotiations
Attributed to LTTE’s belief that they could achieve
political goals through violence and intimidation
Part – II Political and Military Response
66
66. Lacked Sincerity Of
Purpose
Both came to the negotiations table only because of
either external pressure or to achieve some shortterm gains
Part – II Political and Military Response
67
67. Display Flexibility
• To reach a compromise solution
• Agenda should widen as the negotiations proceed
to maintain confidence in the process
Part – II Political and Military Response
68
68. Role Of IPKF
• IPKF failed to bring peace in Sri Lanka
• LTTE considered the agreement
has deflected
their goal to establish independent Tamil State
Part – II Political and Military Response
69
69. Role Civil Society
•
•
•
•
Crucial for any settlement to ethnic conflicts
People’s voice was weak in Sri Lanka
Be informed of the broad contours of the talks
Broad-basing of negotiations will weaken
manipulation
Part – II Political and Military Response
70
70. Change In Strategy
• Paid the dividends in the form of complete
eradication of LTTE leadership
• Army this time focused on elimination of LTTE
leadership instead
Part – II Political and Military Response
71
71. PART – III
CHANGE IN STRATEGY
Part
Part
Part
1
2
3
Change in
Political
Thinking
Change in
Military
Strategy
Conclusions
72. Past Political Strategy
• Mounting pressure by the International community
• Straight forward military strategy could not be
formulated
• Insufficient provision of equipment and logistics
• Lack of international and regional interagency and
security cooperation
Part – III
74
73. Past Political Strategy
• Weak
agencies
to
develop
frontline
intelligence
• Lack
of
political
commitment
Part – III
75
75. Nuanced Political
Approach
• LTTE invited to negotiation table
• LTTE’s unwillingness to implement peace
accords
• International community tried to force the
government
• Resisted all such external pressures
Part – III
77
77. Model Of Fighting
Terrorism
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Unwavering political will
Disregard for biased international opinion
No negotiations with forces of terror
Improved flow of conflict information
Absence of political intervention
Complete operational freedom
Accent on young commanders
Kept the regional countries in the loop
Part – III
79
78. Proactive Foreign Policy
•
•
•
•
To gain support of international community
To create awareness in support of official stance
Complete support from China, Russia and Pakistan
Keeping United States, India and Europe neutral
Part – III
80
84. Air Strategy
• Continuous raids on identified LTTE fortifications
and nerve centers
• Sri Lankan Air force did well to counter LTTE air
threat
Part – III
86
85. Land Forces Strategy
• Focused on destroying terrorists instead of capturing
the territory
Part – III
87
89. Morale Of Troops
• Good training
• Effective casualty evacuation plans
Part – III
91
90. Brief Account Of
Operations
• Military offensive commenced in February 2007
which continued up to March 2009 and finally
concluded in May 2009
• LTTE command structure completely destroyed
Part – III
92
99. Foreign Policy
• Undeterred by international pressure
• Continued with its policy
• Limiting the diplomatic damage through astute
diplomacy
Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
101
100. Warfare Transformation
• Embarked upon a transformation process from
conventional to irregular warfare
• Under the dynamic leadership of the Army Chief
General Fonseka
Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
102
101. Warfare Transformation
• Multipronged, unconventional in nature
• Based on sub unit level actions instead of large
scale conventional assaults
Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
103
102. Personal Supervision
• Personally supervised operations
• Maintained touch with field commanders
• Appointed young commander to infuse enthusiasm
Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
104
103. Role Of Navy
• By choking LTTE’s lifeline through sea
Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
105
104. Role Of Air Force
• Precision strikes against insurgents and by
destroying elements of LTTE
Part – III CHANGE IN STRATEGY
106
105. PART
IV
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
AND LESSONS LEARNT
Contents
• Political Aspects
Military Aspects
106. Causes Of Sri Lankan
Success
• Two decades in the conflict
• Neither side was strong enough to overcome the
other
Part – IV
108
107. Causes Of Sri Lankan
Success
Change in strategy came three years
ago
MOB TACTICS
INTELLIGENCE
YOUNG COMMANDERS
Part – IV
109
108. Political Aspects
• To defeat terrorism, all political forces must develop
consensus
Part – IV
110