As a part of a communications course at the University of Minnesota, Herbert B. Ferguson-Augustus researched the Chinese aid system in Africa. Specifically, he researched the distribution of aid disbursements across the continent, African perspectives on Chinese foreign aid and case studies on Chinese aid policy in Ghana, Angola, South Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia. The full report on these findings can be found here.
1. Herbert B. Ferguson-Augustus
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA: TWIN CITIES
2015
W R I T 3 5 6 2 : T E C H N I C A L W R I T I N G
走出去
Zou Chuqu
Statistics, Perspectives and Recommendations
On the Chinese Aid System in Africa
Herbert B. Ferguson-Augustus
2. 1
Abstract
Development aid has failed in Sub Saharan Africa. Of its forty-seven nations, only eight
– Angola, Swaziland, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea and
Seychelles have achieved middle-income status or higher. In 2010, 48.5 percent of people living
in the region were in poverty or extreme poverty. This comes in spite of rich countries, primarily
the member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development or OECD,
transferring more than $1 trillion in foreign aid to Sub Saharan Africa, since the 1940s (Moyo
28). Development aid and its conventional forms of delivery by OECD member states – the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan and Germany being the largest donors, face
growing criticism in face growing scrutiny on this aid’s effectiveness.
This contrasts a changing international aid regime, where the proliferation of
nontraditional donors has challenged the OECD conventions on delivering and disbursing ODA.
Of these donors, the Chinese aid regime is the most striking alternative. With its average
disbursement of development aid to Sub Saharan Africa averaging $59.8 million per project
compared to $1.3 million average per project disbursement from the OECD member states,
China has become one of Africa’s largest donors (AidData.org). China rejects conditionality as
determining factor for selecting aid recipients, couples development aid, official investments and
foreign direct investment to stimulate long-term development and utilizes a myriad of substrate
actors to provide ODA and administer development aid project. It seeks long term profitability
for Chinese firms operating there in a way that compliments China’s own economic
development. China’s economic agenda contrasts the political agenda of its OECD equivalents.
African leaders, both on the community and national level, therefore face an ever
diversify international aid regime, characterized by the prevalence of nontraditional donors like
China. Consequently, these leaders have to develop a new set of tools and practices when
negotiating for aid from these actors. This report serves as a guide to one of these nontraditional
donors, China. It provides a breakdown of the Chinese aid system in Sub Saharan Africa. It
explains the motivations of that system, the methods by which it disburses development aid and
the experiences of several African states with this system. On these findings, it makes general
recommendations on how African leader might maximize the benefit of Chinese development
aid in their state. The purpose of this report is thus to address the deficit in information on non-
traditional donors and provide a road map for navigating the new aid landscape.
3. 2
Table of Contents
Table of Contents............................................................................................................................ 2
List of Figures................................................................................................................................. 3
Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... 4
Background..................................................................................................................................... 5
Section 1: Introduction.................................................................................................................... 7
Section 2: Methodology.................................................................................................................. 8
Section 3: Results.......................................................................................................................... 10
3.1 Sino-African Economic Engagement: A Reflection of China’s Foreign policy................. 10
3.2 Understanding Reality: China’s Economic Context ........................................................... 12
3.3 Flying Geese and Zou Chuqu: China’s Development Strategy ......................................... 13
3.4 Economics first, Politics later: The players in china’s aid system...................................... 16
3.4.1 The State Council ......................................................................................................... 17
3.4.2 The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)..................................................................... 17
3.4.3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)....................................................................... 18
3.4.4 The Ministry of Finance (MOF)................................................................................... 18
3.4.5 The National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) The Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA) and Education (MOE) ........................................................................... 18
3.4.6 The Export Import Bank of China (Eximbank)............................................................ 18
3.5 The Aid Process with Chinese Characteristics.................................................................... 19
Section 4: Discussion.................................................................................................................... 24
4.1 Case Studies: Where is Chinese Development Aid Going?................................................ 24
4.1.1 Angola .......................................................................................................................... 25
4.1.2 Mozambique................................................................................................................. 26
4.1.3 South Africa.................................................................................................................. 28
4.1.4 Nigeria .......................................................................................................................... 29
4.1.5 Ethiopia......................................................................................................................... 31
4.1.6 Summary of Case Studies............................................................................................. 32
4.2 Catalysts of Industrialization: Chinese ODA across economic sectors .............................. 33
4.3 In the Public Eye: How the African public perceives the Chinese Aid System.................. 34
Section 5: Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 39
References..................................................................................................................................... 41
Appendix A – Glossary of Terms
Appendix B – Data Sets
4. 3
List of Figures
Figure A - Chinese FDI and ODA to Africa................................................................................... 9
Figure B - ODA to Africa by Donor............................................................................................... 9
Figure C - Chinese export to and imports from Africa,.................................................................. 9
Figure D - Organization Chart for the Chinese Aid System......................................................... 16
Figure E - Process Map for Chinese Aid Requests....................................................................... 19
Figure F - Geochart for the distribution of Chinese aid in Africa ................................................ 23
Figure G - Survey of African citizens on Chinese Aid policies ................................................... 38
Figure H - Number of Chinese ODA project by Economic Sector .............................................. 38
Figure I - Chinese ODA to Africa by Economic Sector ............................................................... 38
5. 4
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AfDB African Development Bank Group
BRICS the Association of Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa
CADF China-Africa Development Fund
CAR Central African Republic
CBRC China’s Bank Regulatory Commission
CDB China Development Bank
Complant Executive Bureau of Complant in the Ministry of Commerce
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFA Department of Foreign Aid
DFI Development Finance Institutions
DFEC Department of International Economic Cooperation
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
Eximbank the Import Export Bank of China
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
IMF International Monetary Fund
MFA China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNC Multi National Corporations
MOA China’s Ministry of Agriculture
MOF China’s Ministry of Finance
MOFCOM China’s Ministry of Commerce
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOF Other Official Flows
SOE State Owned Enterprises
UAE United Arab Emirates
6. 5
Background
Development Aid or ODA is complex. Encompassing grants, concessional and zero-
interest loans, technical assistance programs, scholarships as well as debt relief, it is a form of
foreign assistance given by a country or private party to a developing country for the purpose of
social, economic, cultural or political development (Moyo 9). It can be given bilaterally or
multilaterally through international financial institutions, like the IMF or World Bank.
Differentiating it from humanitarian aid, ODA is intended to address the underlying conditions
that cause poverty (Moyo 8). Although private parties like corporations, non-profits or SOEs can
give aid, governments are technically its only providers. To be considered as such, ODA must:
be undertaken by official agencies, bodies or local governments;
have the objective to stimulate economic development and improve the welfare of
beneficiaries in the developing country receiving said assistance;
be given on concessional terms - if a loan, having a 25% grant element.
This criteria has formed the bases of OECD ODA policy and thus the international aid regime
until recently. Norms associated with why and how ODA should be disbursed has changed for
the OECD continuously with each passing decade.
The postwar environment of the 1940s shaped ODA as not only an instrument of
international development but also foreign policy. Indeed, the Marshall plan, a series of loans
made by the United States to the governments of Western Europe, to fund reconstruction formed
was the first example of ODA (Moyo 11). The theory held that large scale investment in
infrastructure and industry would trigger large scale industrialization, also called structural
transformation in developing countries. Driving structural transformation in developing countries
became a means by which the United States and Western Europe could deter the spread of
communism, beginning first with the Marshall Plan (Carothers 22). These countries thus sought
to harmonize their ODA policies to contain the spread of communism. Consequently the OECD
and the Development Assistance Community or DAC formed in 1960, thereby establishing the
International Aid Regime, to which Chinese aid policy will be compared.
However, the proliferation of leftist regimes in the developing world in the 1960s
challenged the efficacy of structural transformation. Moreover, the success of countries like
China and Cuba in providing basic health services contrasted the failure of large scale
7. 6
development projects benefitting the poor (Carothers 35). Consequently, the DAC prioritized
poverty reduction through the provision of basic services, emphasizing rural development in the
1970s. Lending to low income countries grew exponentially during this period. After the Oil
crisis of 1972 and 1979, massive borrowing along with this policy by African governments drove
the region into a debt crisis (Moyo 19). This crisis would precipitate structural adjustment.
In the 1980s, an emphasis on neoliberalism as ideal driver of economic development
grew with the rise of Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and Reaganism in the United States.
prominent academics blamed the state-led development as the root cause of the debt crisis in
Saharan Africa (Carothers 41). Consequently, the largest providers of development aid in the
1960s and 70s, the IMF and World Bank instituted conditionality as a key part of debt relief and
more broadly, the provision of development aid. In return for debt cancellation and/or
rescheduling as well as emergency funds to keep bankrupted African governments afloat, the
IMF and World Banks demanded the imposition of austerity measures, the liberalization of trade
and the mass privatization of SOEs (Moyo21). The International community referred to these
measures as structural adjustment. The effect was however disastrous; unemployment and
poverty levels spiking in the short term which in turn destabilized African states in the long run.
The structural adjustment policies of the late 1980s were short lived. Their effects
triggered social and political strife in its recipients, particularly in West Africa and the Great
Lakes region. Therefore, in the 1990s, the DAC did again altered its development aid policy.
Maintaining its commitment to conditionality as a requisite, the DAC prioritized democratization
in addition to market oriented policies (Carothers 56). This helped triggered called third wave of
democracy, where authoritarian regimes across the globe and in Africa democratized (Carothers
59). These objective in addition to safeguarding human rights in African countries, forms the
bases of the international aid regime today and thus the conventions of ODA. The OECD, IMF
and World Bank perpetuates these norms through their respective aid policies.
There is no universally accepted definition of development aid, despite these norms,
hence the complexity of the term. However, understanding the conventions of ODA, normalized
by fifty years of development policy creates a point of comparison, when discussing the Chinese
aid system. Moreover, this section provides a brief history of Sub Saharan experience with
development aid, thereby contextualizing the African response to the Chinese aid system, which
will be also explored later in this report.
8. 7
Section 1: Introduction
Although the amount varies, all but four Sub Saharan African states – Chad, Burkina
Faso, the Gambia as well as Sao Tomb and Princeps receive aid from China. As in the case with
any donor, African leaders must understand the interworking of the Chinese aid system to
optimize its benefit to their respective communities and nation. China is transforming the
international aid regime through its aid policies. As pictured in Figure B, between 2000 to 2011
period, it was the fourth largest bilateral provider of ODA (aiddata.org). China differentiates
itself from more traditional donors by bundling ODA with OOF, embracing a noninterventionist
foreign policy that rejects conditionality and decentralizing its approach to aid delivery through a
request based tender system (aiddata.org). Historically China aid system has had to compete with
the more established OECD donor states and now other nontraditional donors, like Brazil and
India. China formulated these policies to make itself more attractive to aid recipients. Its
motivations for doing s, will be explored in detail later.
As is the case with any donor, the goal of aid negotiations is to craft the most mutually
beneficial agreement. Agreements with the Chinese government are no exception but China’s
way of going about this process is extremely liberal, making it susceptible to manipulation by
African and Chinese substrate actors. Helping African leaders leverage their respective countries
diplomatic position, this report is intended to facilitate aid negotiations involving China by
providing an overview of the Chinese aid system to African leadership. To that ends this report
can be divided into two parts: The first being an examination of the structure and methods of the
Chinese aid system and the second being an appreciation of African agency in negotiations for
and the implementation of development aid projects. By this means, this report examines aid in
Sino-African relations from both the African and the Chinese perspective. For simplicity
purposes, this reports focuses almost exclusively on ODA but acknowledges that for China,
ODA, OOF and FDI are inexorably linked. It then concludes by making recommendation on how
Sino-African relations in this area could be optimized.
The primary objective in writing this report is to address the deficit in information on
Sino-African aid relations as well as highlight the role nontraditional donors play in African
development. By this means, it seeks to broaden appreciation of alternative methods for
delivering aid, which is done in the hopes that greater transparency and mutual understanding in
the international aid regime will boost aid effectiveness in the region.
9. 8
Section 2: Methodology
The methodology employed in this report can be broken down into its quantitative and
qualitative parts. The quantitative portion focuses on gathering data on the distribution of
Chinese aid in the region by country and by economic sector. Conversely, the qualitative portion
attempts to explain this data by examining China’s motivations, foreign policy and methods for
disbursing ODA. The synthesis of these methods produces the results and discussion seen below.
Aiddata.org, a collaborative project by the College of William and Mary, Bringham
Young University and Development provides the majority of data used in this report. Relying on
media reports of aid projects, Aiddata.org has created a comprehensive platform to measure both
OOF and ODA. it measures data for not just China but OECD member states and other
nontraditional donors, thereby creating a medium by which to compare aid systems. The data
assessed covers from 2000 until 2011. These years mark a historic change in China’s aid policy
as it launched the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation or FOCAC in 2000 and released its first
white paper on foreign aid in 2011. Other data analyzed includes trade and FDI statistics from
the Brookings Institute as well as polling information from two Hong Kong based universities.
However Aiddata’s statistics are limited. Since China does not publically disclose its aid
figures, roughly 35 percent of the Chinese ODA disbursements accounted for in this report lack
financial values (Aidata.org). Chinese ODA likely exceeds the numbers reported here. However
this data works in identifying the patterns of Chinese ODA disbursement in the region..
The qualitative portion of this report relies on interpretation of China’s aid policies by
academics, specializing in this field. China’s aid policy is confined to a few white papers on
foreign aid, public statements made by Chinese presidents and the published outcomes of
FOCACs. Thus primary sources on China aid policy are extremely limited. To compensate for
this deficit, this report consults premier academics based in the United States, Africa and China
are provide a holistic understanding of the Chinese aid system within its fifty years history.
These academics include Dr. Deborah Brautigam of John Hopkins University, the authority of
Sino-African economic relations, Linglan University’s Dr. Baohui Zhang, an expert on Chinese
foreign policy and Dr. Dambisa Moyo, an international economist specializing in aid in Africa.
These sources can only do so much to characterize the Chinese aid system and its
conceptualization in this report is largely based on their and other academics’ findings.
11. 10
Section 3: Results
To detach the Chinese aid system from China’s economic context towards Sub Saharan
African would be to misrepresent it. Indeed, its aid system is an extension of its development
strategy which in turn derives from China’s economic context. In contrast to its OECD
counterparts, Foreign policy acts more as guidelines. China is after all a development state and
so its chief motivation in Sub Saharan Africa is sustaining its own economic growth through the
creation of economic linkages across the region. To facilitate the creation of these linkages and
the globalization of Chinese firms, it decentralized aid administration across a myriad of Chinese
agencies and policy banks. Therefore, this section not only aims to explain the structure of the
Chinese aid system but its reasons for being. It is thus broken down into a brief overview of
China’s foreign policy and domestic economic context. Given these factors, this section then
details China’s development strategy and the consequential structure of its aid system and the
methods that system employs to disburse aid. By this means, African leadership can understand
both the Chinese perspective on ODA and the Chinese development aid system itself.
3.1 Sino-African Economic Engagement: A Reflection of China’s Foreign policy
China ‘s foreign policy toward Sub Saharan Africa responds to geopolitical issues, such
as China’s position on the world stage and its efforts to manipulate South-to-South cooperation
to is benefit. However it important to note that in these objectives, Sub Saharan Africa is not a
priority. That value is reserved for its immediate neighbors and great powers like the United
States, Russia and India (Sun 13). In terms of development aid therefore, aid policy is
subservient to commercial policy not foreign policy (Sun 21). China’s foreign policy is still
worth discussing because it provides a framework by which Chinese aid agencies make decisions
and so a precedent by which African states can self-advocate.
The strategy of Fazhan Zonghe Guoli, translated literally as ‘reshape the international
order’ emphasizes China’s commitment to challenge the normative order of global and regional
politics. The FOCAC represents a means by which China can assert itself as a regional player in
African politics in a way that undermines rivals like the United States in India (Zhang 40).
China seeks to enhance its prestige internationally and make accessible to African states, high
profile projects, like dams, stadiums and roadways. This has been China behavior in dealings
with Africa for quite some time. In 1972 for example, it built the Tanzam railway in Zambia and
12. 11
India, while in 2008 it started building the Bui hydroelectric dam in Ghana, pictured in figure F
(Moyo 103). This practice, often called ‘Stadium diplomacy’ works to persuade African states to
support China in attempts to change international institutions like the United Nations and WTO
(Alden 22). African states have voted as a bloc in support of China before, when they voted
overwhelmingly in favor of replacing Taiwan with China on the UN Security Council in 1972.
China’s determination to upset the international order is however balanced commitment
to the philosophy of Hexie Shehui, meaning ‘harmonious world.’ Historically, harmonious world
stemmed from China’s desire to differentiate itself from other powers, thereby evading
accusations of neocolonialism (Gill 108). This philosophy attempts to make internationalism,
multilateralism and noninterference principal parts of Chinese foreign policy, particularly
towards its fellow developing countries. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai articulated this
commitment in “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence;” they are:
Mutual Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity
Mutual Non-Aggression
Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs
Equality and mutual benefit
Peaceful Coexistence
These principles were rephrased and reaffirmed in former president Hu Jintao’s five principles
for assisting developing countries in 2005, which were in turn echoed by current president Xi
Jinping in 2012 (Zhang 41). Particularly, when it comes to a policy of noninterference, China has
demonstrated its commitment consistently. It did this, first in 2008, when China stood by Sudan
during the conflict in Darfur, despite international condemnation, and in 2011 when China made
concessions to Zambia, following anti-Chinese protests (Alden 40). The state council
consistently demonstrates its commitment to these principles by overruling the decision making
of MOFCOM, the MFA or Chinese firms abroad or by making concessions to the aid recipient.
Chinese foreign policy is forced to reconcile the political constraints it imposes on itself
through Hexie Shehui with the ambitions of Fazhan Zonghe Guoli. African states can exploit
these policy declaration to leverage their own interests in aid negotiation, whether this be by
protesting China’s failure to adhere to Hexie Shehui or said African states said role in achieving
Fazhan Zonghe Guoli in Africa and globally.
13. 12
3.2 Understanding Reality: China’s Economic Context
China’s foreign policy permits a decentralized approach to disbursing ODA, given the
constraints it imposes on itself through Hexie Shehui. Chinese agencies, firms and policy banks
the lead in aid negotiation, as opposed to the MFA or State council. Thus, China’s aid policy
derives from the interests of these actors. These interests power the Chinese aid system in Africa
and are consequence of domestic circumstances these actors confront. China’s rapid
industrialization has resulted in environmental degradation and been detrimental to food security
and public. These problems provoke greater public unrest domestically. More pressing however
is the threat globalization and rising input costs poses to the competiveness of Chinese firms. In
Africa thusly, these actors see a means to offset these challenges and sustain growth.
Pollution in China is rampant. China contributes the second highest amount of
greenhouses gases and rated approximately sixty percent of its groundwater resources as being in
poor or extremely poor health. In terms of public health, these developments have resulted in
more than 100,000 deaths per annum in terms of diseases related to environmental degradation
(Pieter van Dijk 41). With coal comprising 69 percent of China’s energy consumption in 2011
and the country’s largest polluter, China desperately needs to diversify its energy resources to
scale back pollution (Pieter van Dijk 41). Having exhausted it natural resources, it thus has to
outsource to achieve that diversification. In Africa, it can procure petroleum from Angola and
Sudan, inputs for solar panels from the DRC and Zambia and natural gas from Nigeria and
Mozambique (Pieter van Dijk 42). Energy resources abound, Chinese energy companies’ move
to secure their interests in Sub Saharan Africa and have already done so in Ghana and Angola.
Social unrests however plays a larger role in the desire to offshore and outsource
production. Land use has become a highly contested issue between China’s industrial class and
rural communities. In 2005, the Chinese government reported 74,000 incidents of protest over
land disputes, as opposed to ten thousand per annum a decade prior (Pieter van Dijk 40).
Although environmental degradation plays a role in this issue, industrialization has driven up
land prices causing the gradual disenfranchisement of China’s farmers. With China becoming a
food importer in 2008, the growing demand for meat and other foodstuffs by the emerging
middle class has put pressure on the Chinese government to assure domestic food security (Pieter
van Dijk 40). With African agricultural productivity so underdeveloped, the MOA and
14. 13
MOFCOM perceive Africa as prim for agricultural intensification and extensification, for the
purpose of satiating China’s growing food demand (Pieter van Dijk 42).
Moving from a macroeconomic to a microeconomic context, firms face an increasingly
competitive environment globally, given the increase of input prices at home. This challenge is
the legacy of the socialist experiments and self-imposed isolationism of the Mao era. During this
period, shielded from competition, manufacturing, energy and construction firms lacked access
to innovative technologies and experience in strategizing in global market; this however changed
with the Deng Xiaoping reforms of the 1980s but China is still a latecomer to international
business (Alden 40). Consequently, Chinese owned MNCs and SOEs find themselves competing
in saturated markets against their already established American, European and Asian
counterparts. The protectionist policies employed by these firms’ government poses further
limits on the growth of Chinese firms. In one example, the Chinese National Offshore Oil
Company or CNOOC failed to acquire controlling stakes in Chevron, because US congress
passed legislature blocking the arrangement despite outbidding the highest US competitor,
Unacoal (Alden 43). However, Chinese firms do not just compete firms from developed
countries but those from developing countries as well. Turkey has secured preferential trade
agreements with twenty-five African countries and India has launched their own Africa, South
America and South East Asia forums to give their MNCs and SOEs the competitive edge in
emerging markets (Moyo 112). Thus Chinese firms must contend with globalization, whilst
sustaining current growth figures. African markets thus represent relatively untapped
For the past twenty years, China has reported near double digits in terms of percentage of
economic growth. These factors undermine the extent to which China can continue this level of
growth without provoking greater social unrest, jeopardizing public health and isolating Chinese
MNCs and SOEs. Being cognoscente of China’s economic context and more importantly its
issues enables African negotiators to leverage their interests relative to that of Chinese firms.
3.3 Flying Geese and Zou Chuqu: China’s Development Strategy
China’s development aid system reinforces the efforts made by sub-state actors in
overcoming China’s economic and environmental challenges. It has adapted the East Asian
development model to globalization through its policy of Zou Chuqu, founded upon the ‘Flying
Geese paradigm’ and the theory of creative destruction. Development aid for china is thus an
15. 14
extension of its development strategy to which governmental agencies like MOFCOM and
Eximbank are subservient. All actors involved in the development aid process do so in the hopes
of accomplishing the overarching goal of sustaining China’s economic development.
The Chinese government continues its role as a development state and enters the third
phase of the East Asian development model (Alden and Hughes 566). This model, pioneered first
by Japan in the 1950s and then adopted by South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore in
the 1970s and finally China in 1980s, emphasizes export-oriented growth through the
development of the manufacturing sector, specifically it comprises three phases. In the first
stage, the state promotes industrial policy promotes light industry, like textile and other
consumer durables. Then, in the second stage, industrial policy shifts to the promotion of heavy
industry, such as transportation, steel, petrochemicals and synthetic fibers. Finally in the third
phase, governments target skill and research and development intensive industries, such as
robotics, biotechnology, computers, telecommunication equipment and computers. The
government adjusts its industrial policy through these phases with the objective of producing a
surplus of these goods to export and soliciting foreign direct investment to finance economic
development (Oatley 373). China is now attempting to transition into the third phase of it
development, yet the issues above obstruct its transition. One theory explaining these issues that
has a growing following in Chinese discourse is Joseph Schumpeter’s Creative destruction. The
theory holds innovation drives business cycles to destroy industries at the same rate at which
they create new industries; an example of this in China is the decline of the steel industry relative
to the growth of personal computers (Brautigam 90). The attempt to protect and bolster these
declining industries domestically has resulted in the issues discussed above. The Chinese
government turned to outsourcing or off shoring industry to sustain its current growth figures.
Therefore, China incorporated globalization into its development strategy. This strategy
is based on the so called “Flying Geese Paradigm” by Brautigam, whereby industry oscillates
from developed to developing countries based on the availability of cheap factor inputs in the
developing country; the migration of Chinese people to these place triggers this oscillation
(Brautigam 90). Consequently, there is third facet of Chinese foreign policy: Zou Chuqu. Zou
Chuqu translates literally as “going out” and overshadows Fazhan Zonghe Guoli as a priority for
policy planners in China. To explain, Zou Chuqu is the philosophy that if China establishes itself
in emerging markets, exposes its firms to global competition and achieves consumer preference
16. 15
in said market will maintain its current growth figures (Alden and Hughes 565). Hence, China
uses a request-based system in the disbursement of development aid to align its development
strategy with the interests of sub state actors. Companies can propose ODA projects (Alden 40).
This largely works as contractual agreements between China and the company in question and
for the most part funding is transferred directly from the government to company as opposed to
be channeled through the recipient government. Sinopec, a Chinese oil SOE, employed this
method to build a partnership with Sonogol Real Estate, a parastatal construction company.
Whether motivated by environmental or economic considerations, the Chinese
governments sees Sub Saharan Africa as an avenue by which to implement this strategy. The
expanse of arable land and the abundance of energy and mineral resources in the region are
obvious incentives. China’s banks, firms and government have invested in mineral extraction
from the DRC, ROC and Zambia, petroleum in Sudan and Nigeria as well as agriculture in
Ethiopia, Ghana and Angola (Moyo 105). Yet this turn to Africa derives less from cheap inputs
and more from the institutional advantages Chinese firms have in Africa. They have a
competitive political advantage, where China’s historical adherence to noninterference has built
a degree of trust in Sino-African relations absent; it also has a comparative economic advantage
stemming from low cost bidding for contracts and cheap managerial costs in project
implementation (Alden 42). These advantages erode at the entry barriers that have deterred or
driven out American and European firms. Therefore, in Africa, Chinese firms also tap into new
forms of demand in African markets and thus have, for example established large, medium and
small scale firms in the retail districts of every major African city (Moyo 105). These factors
explain the growth of FDI in Figure A above as well as the imports from and exports to China,
pictured in Figure C. China directs ODA to Africa, to better enhance the opportunities upon
which its own firms and agencies have already capitalized.
China’s development strategy seeks to harmonize ODA, OOF and FDI in a way that
stimulates the growth of Chinese firms in foreign countries. An example of this, Eximbank
contracting out a project that it funds to the China State Construction and Engineering Company.
Effectively, the Eximbank provided a concessional loans to the Mauritian government to build an
airport expansion near Port Louis, Mauritius, which it in turns uses to pay the China State
Construction Engineering Company to build the new airport terminal (aiddata.org). Thus
Eximbank actively subsidizes Chinese firms to export their services abroad as a means to better
17. 16
establish them in foreign markets. Conversely, China employs ODA to incentivize banking with
Chinese commercial and policy banks. One way of doing this for these banks to do this, is how
policy banks like the Eximbank bundle ODA with OOF to court postwar economics like South
Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique that have low international credit ratings. Referring back to
the Bui Dam project mentioned earlier as an example of China’s projects of prestige overseas,
the Eximbank provided both $348 million in ODA and $270 million in OOF to finance the
project, when most other donors turned the Ghanaians down (aiddata.org). China’s policy banks
seeks to compete with the IMF, World Bank and western financial institutions in development
finance by cornering closed markets, where competitors are absent do to poor credit ratings.
3.4 Economics first, Politics later: The players in china’s aid system
The Structure of the Chinese Aid System reflects the need on the part of the Chinese
government desire to manifest its development strategy through its aid policy. Thus control of
foreign aid has shifted from the MFA to MOFCOM. The Eximbank, not just in terms of ODA
but OOF as well, has played an increasing role in China’s Africa strategy and the development
aid system as a whole. Thus, as pictured in organization chart that is figure D, China funnel
development aid through three channels: the MOF, MOFCOM and the Eximbank. However,
China’s request based system is still a collective process that involves a myriad of government
agencies and banks, depending on the nature of the project under consideration. This subsection
details the role of each of these actors within China’s aid system.
China’s Aid System
Figure D - Organization Chart for the Chinese Aid System
18. 17
3.4.1 The State Council
The supreme governing body of China, on which the Chinese president sits as chair,
consists of the leaders from each ministry. Collectively, it approves the annual foreign aid
budget; any grants above $1.5 million, aid projects costing $12.5 million or more, aid to
“politically sensitive” countries like Sudan or Zimbabwe and any requests that exceed the annual
aid budget. Given this approval status the State Council holds, the council can and has bypassed
the department of foreign aid in the past, in 2009, former president Hu Jintao signed off on a 260
million dollar loan to build an airport expansion in Mauritius, pictured in Figure F.
3.4.2 The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
MOFCOM evolved out of a merger in 1982 between the Ministry of Trade and the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which was charged with overseeing foreign aid. In
addition, MOFCOM determines China’s trade policy by regulating imports and exports, FDI
inflows and outflows, consumer protection and market competition. MOFCOM manages
development aid through the following offices:
The Department of Foreign Aid (DFA) programs all Zero Interest Loans and
Grants, Manages the Foreign Aid Joint Venture and Cooperation Fund and
coordinates with the Eximbank on Concessional Loans. The department can rely on
the guidance from each other Chinese Ministry’s department of International
Cooperation for guidance on subjects like Health, Education or Agriculture.
However, Foreign aid oversees the implementation of all ODA projects through the
selection and approval process of ODA projects.
The Executive Bureau of International Economic Cooperation (Complant) manages
the foreign aid tender system that awards aid contracts to MNCs, NGOs, SOEs and
other Chinese agencies. This bureau is also responsible for maintaining a registry of
all Chinese companies investing overseas. It enforces corporate regulations on how
Chinese company can or cannot operate overseas and therefore reserves the right to
revoke their permit for operating overseas.
Department of Foreign Economic Cooperation (DFEC) works with Chinese
companies seeking business overseas through consultations and the coordination
with Eximbank to disburse preferential buyer’s credits. MOFCOM can also upon
19. 18
the departments of international economic cooperation housed in every other
ministry and municipal government, for specialists and advisors in the disbursement
of development aid and execution of development projects.
3.4.3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
The MFA oversees China’s diplomatic relations. It plays a reporting role in the China’s
aid system. Its Department of Policy Planning provides guidance to the Department of Foreign
aid in the formation of it’s the annual foreign aid proposal. It also monitors the implementation
of ODA projects through the Economic Counselors Office (ECO) in each Chinese embassy.
Beyond that, it manages China’s volunteer programs as well as disbursing humanitarian aid.
3.4.4 The Ministry of Finance (MOF)
The MOF coordinates China’s macroeconomic policy, allocates donations to multilateral
institutions, determines the national annual budget, handles fiscal policy and accounts for
government expenditure by the state. In terms of development aid, the MOF donates to the
United Nations and various regional organizations. In addition, it oversees debt cancellation or
rescheduling for all countries, who owe the Chinese government money.
3.4.5 The National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) the Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA) and Education (MOE)
China divides its technical assistance programs into functional groups based on the
activities undertaken. Thus, NHFPC, formally the Ministry of health oversees medical assistance
programs, MOA oversees agricultural assistance programs and MOE oversees teaching
assistance programs for non-medical or agricultural subjects. Each Chinese ministry that has a
technical assistance program operating overseas has its own respective DFEC. These assistance
programs are financed through either MOFCOM or the Eximbank, depending on the program in
question. Additionally, MOE funds China’s scholarship program.
3.4.6 The Export Import Bank of China (Eximbank)
In 2009 alone, the Eximbank disbursed some $36 billion in loans to African states.
Providing buyers credits – subsidies for foreign governments to purchase Chinese goods, export
credits – subsidies for companies to export goods abroad, commodity backed loans and regular
20. 19
loans and concessional loans with MOFCOM’s oversight, the Eximbank exists to promote
Chinese exports as well as SOEs and MNCs global expansion. The Eximbank’s concessional
loan program can be explained through the following example:
Camco Machinery and Equipment Company proposed an aid project - in this case
constructing two agricultural schools. It suggests the project to the Angolan government.
The Angolan Ministry of Finance applied for a loan from the Eximbank to projects.
Eximbank does a preliminary appraisal, and in this case gives the go ahead
The Ministry of Finance then forwards the request to Foreign Aid for approval
Foreign Aid gave Eximbank the go ahead and the Eximbank signs an agreement with the
Angolan government contractually binding
The Eximbank then transferred the funds directly to Camco, who implemented the
project. However, in the case of a country with a higher credit rating like Botswana or
Mauritius, they would pay that government to pay the company in question.
The Angolan government is in the process of repaying the loan now
The project referred in the process, is pictured in Figure F. Eximbank’s concessional loan
program represents the largest loans available to African governments and is largely driven by
the initiative of African governments themselves.
3.5 The Aid Process with Chinese Characteristics
Figure E - Process Map for Chinese Aid Requests
21. 20
Having detailed the structure of Chinese aid system and the foreign policies in which that
system functions, this report can articulate the procedure by which ODA requests are processed
and implemented, as simplified in Figure E above. This process can be broken down into five
phases: budgetary planning, aid proposals, project evaluation, the bidding process and finally
project implementation. Occurring outside this process, is the Eximbank’s loan cycle, which is
integrated into Figure E above because it still in involves the Department of foreign aid but this
loan cycle. These phases define the way China undertakes development aid.
In the budgetary planning phase, the DFA makes a foreign aid budget projection for the
next fiscal year based on reporting by the Department of Policy Planning (Sun 21). Policy
Planning takes into consideration requests from foreign countries, the cost of China’s volunteer
and technical assistance programs as well as their own project humanitarian aid budget, when
providing this guidance. Included in this discussion is the economic counselor’s offices, who
report directly to the DFA, from Chinese embassies overseas, who also advise Foreign aid on
what its next annual budget should be. Once a budget is determined, Foreign Aid submits the
proposal to the State Council for approval (Brautigam 108). The initial or amended sum
requested, once approved, represents MOFCOMs entire budget for foreign aid that year.
Additional ODA requests can be made to MOFCOM but they require State Council approval in
order to be funder. The approved budget is partitioned between MOFCOM, who takes the lions
share and the DFECs operating in all other functional ministries.
ODA proposals are funded through this budget. The aid proposal phase revolves around
China’s request based system, whereby Chinese agencies, firms and non-profits, having been
prompted by an African government, can submit ODA projects for DFA approval. Chinese
Ministries for example, can coordinate with African governments through their respective DFEC
On one such occasion, specialists from the Ministry of Agriculture administered the cultivation
of hybrid rice farms in Sierra Leone in 1999 on MOFCOM’s behalf (Brautigam 233). This
extends to any Chinese firm or NGO undertaking an ODA project oversees, whom can be
reached by the Economics Counselors Office in any Chinese Embassy. By this means African
governments can push their own development aid projects. The DFA evaluates projects based
on a cost-benefit analysis of how said project either improves China’s relationship with the
country in question or stimulates commerce between the host nation and China. Therefore,
Chinese companies and agencies can develop projects that fit a more localized context.
22. 21
The project evaluation process further incentivizes the specialization of ODA projects to
the local context of the recipient country. The DFA evaluates project proposals based on the
profitability of the venture in accordance with their guiding philosophy of dynamic
sustainability, which focuses on the potential of recipients to grow economically, based on
domestic market conditions and available natural resources (Brautigam 186). The thinking is that
if the loan facilitates economic growth that the recipient can repay the loan. This plays to the Zou
Chuqu strategy, as it works to develop productive capacity in the recipient state, thereby creating
markets for Chinese goods and inputs for Chinese industries. The logic is plant the seeds of
industrialization today, reap the fruits mass production tomorrow. This methodology however
contrasts the mentality of DAC nations who have increasingly determine project approval based
on the institutions and policies of the recipient governments, as opposed to the benefit of the
project itself (Carothers 56). Whereas DAC donors are more concerned with aiding an
environment conducive to growth, China opts to assist in creating an environment conducive to
growth by building economic capacity in the aid’s recipient.
Once projects are approved, Foreign Aid passes them on to Complant for the bidding
process, if they do not already have an organization responsible for their implementation
included in their initial request. Complant conducts a bidding process for each project and
contracts the project out to a Chinese company that that presents the best bid (Brautigam 110).
MOFCOM’s interests manifest in the interaction between the selection and bidding process, as
they will change the proposed project, if they see a Chinese company would benefit from
undertaking it. One such company, the Chinese Construction and Communication Company built
the Addis-Adana Expressway, pictured in Figure F (aiddata.org). Complant prefers awarding
contracts to MNCs as MOFCOM seeks to enhance their international competiveness.
MOFCOM has little oversight over the implementation of the project in question. They
defer that responsibility to the Economic Counselor’s Office at the Chinese embassy in the
recipient country, to monitor the implementation of the project in question. This office falls
outside the jurisdiction of the Chinese embassy and thus the MFA and instead reports directly to
MOFCOM (Brautigam 109). Thus, the Economic Counselors Office serves as the recipient
country’s primary connection to MOFCOM. However, the recipient government has no
influence on the actual financing of the project in question. Indeed like the Eximbank,
MOFCOM or whichever Chinese agency is funding the project reserves the right pay the
23. 22
organization undertaking the project directly as opposed to incorporating the recipient country’s
government as a middle man (Brautigam 142). This contrasts China’s DAC counterparts, giving
the recipient government minimal direct oversight of the project in question, forcing it to instead
petition MOFCOM to take any actions regarding the project in question.
The process by which China gives ODA applies to all concessional loan, grant, zero
interests’ loans and technical assistance programs, with only scholarships falling outside
MOFCOMs mandate. Indeed, as mention it plays a role in even the Eximbank’s concessional
loan cycle. It is important to note that this process is largely exclusive to Africa. Indeed, for more
politicized areas, like East and Southeast Asia, the MFA and the Chinese military play a larger
role
24. 23
China ODA Investment by Country
In Billions (USD)
$66 Million to build two
agriculture schools in
ANGOLA
$94 Million build a National
Sports Stadium in
MOZAMBIQUE
$260 Million in ODA for
Airport Expansion
MAURITIUS
$350 Million to finance
Addis-Adama Expressway
ETHIOPIA
$967 million for Fire Power
Plant and Refinery
NIGERIA
$0
$348 million to construct
Bui Hydroelectric Dam
GHANA
$15
Figure F - Geochart for the
distribution of Chinese aid
in Africa
25. 24
Section 4: Discussion
The results section of this report served to map out the motivations, methods and
structure of the Chinese Aid system as it pertains to Sub Saharan Africa. By this means it
characterized the Chinese perspective on development aid in the region. Here, however, this
report will examine Chinese ODA from the African perspective. Presenting this analysis, this
section first examines the geographic distribution of Chinese ODA in the region, examining
specifically the strategies and political conditions of the five largest recipients of Chinese
development aid in the region. By this means, this section appreciates the role of African agency
in the aid negotiation process. Examining the fruits of their labor thusly, this section identifies
patterns in Chinese Aid disbursements across economic sectors. With the detailed picture of the
Chinese aid system in Africa, it considers public perceptions of China in the countries receiving
aid to gauge the legitimacy of this system relative to its OECD counterparts. In short section
examines how well adapted the Chinese aid system is to the needs of Sub Saharan Africa based
on African perspective.
4.1 Case Studies: Where is Chinese Development Aid Going?
Sino-African relations are diverse and so the pattern of development aid disbursements
depends extraordinarily on China’s relationship with the African country in question. An
argument has been made that the natural resource endowments in an African country are the
chief determining factor in ODA disbursements. Although this is much case in a discussion of
OOF, as the three highest recipients – Angola, Nigeria and Ghana are all petroleum exporters,
this is not true in the case of ODA. To understand the pattern in Chinese ODA disbursement, one
must consider that China employs ODA facilitate it Zou Chuqu development strategy. Therefore,
where there is great interest in fostering greater economic ties with the African country in
question but also great resistance to those ties from internal or external or internal sources, there
will be greater level of ODA disbursed. The assertiveness of African states in negotiation with
the Chinese has a positive correlation to the amount of ODA received thusly. It is important to
examine this assertiveness in the context of Sub Saharan Africa’s experience with aid providers,
explored briefly in the background section. Therefore, this sub section provided five case studies
of the five largest recipients of the Chinese development aid, according to aiddata.org to examine
how these countries have handled themselves in their dealing with Chinese. When reviewing
26. 25
these studies, consider both the country’s environmental and institutional conditions as well as
their positions within African International relations.
4.1.1 Angola
Sino-Angolan aid relations underscore how the existence of parastatal organization in the
recipient states facilitates ODA negotiations with China, specifically where it concerns economic
cooperation with the Eximbank. Angola receives the highest quantity of both ODA and OOF
because it segments the aid negotiation process through multiple parastatal organizations.
Moreover, Angola has an easier time harmonizing its objectives with China because its
government also functions as a developmental state.
Although China has an intrinsic interests in Angola’s energy resources, what separates it
from other petroleum exporters is how, following the Angolan civil war, the Dos Santos
government was economically isolated. The civil war had depreciated the country’s international
credit ratings and the Dos Santos regime, condemned internationally for its human rights abuses,
rejected the conditions imposed on it by OECD governments to receive ODA (Ngongo 113).
China presented itself as the alternative to western donors thusly. The Eximbank believed,
evaluating the dynamic sustainability of investments in Angola, determined that if made
commodity for infrastructure loans it could recoup losses while simultaneously raising Angola’s
international credit rating; it succeeded in both regards by providing loans that had lower interest
rates and longer repayment times than commercial loans. (Sun 8). Consequently, trade between
Angola and China has grown exponentially, an Angola has become one fastest growing states in
Sub Saharan Africa, achieving middle income status in the early 2000s.
However, the Angolan government has leveraged its control of Chinese development aid
through its parastatal organizations. As of 2010, Angola provides 25 percent of China’s
petroleum needs (Mohan and Lampert 98). In exchange for the continual supply of petroleum,
Angola has negotiated for long-term development financial agreements, which are supplemented
by ODA agreements. Angola has gone directly to the Eximbank and other Chinese financial
institutions for multibillion-dollar credit lines (Ngongo 98). To appeal to these institutions, the
Angolan government works with MOFCOM through the working group, Grupo de Trabalho
Conjunto, which includes it and the Angolan Ministry of Finance. This working group
determines development projects to be funded by the Eximbank and other Chinese banks
27. 26
(Mohan and Lampert 98). This practice mitigates the problem of asymmetric information
between donor and recipient, as MOFCOM is directly involved in the development aid proposal
process. Yet whereas Angola includes Chinese institutions in the negotiations process, it
excludes them from the administration and implementation of the development aid projects
themselves, instead choosing to work directly with the Chinese firms carrying out the project. It
does this by centralizing administrative control in Sonogol Real Estate, formally Gabinete de
Reconstrução Nacional (Ngongo 98). This parastatal organization reports directly to the
presidency and determines how and when development aid projects are to take place.
Effectively, Angola tackles China’s development aid process like a relay race, whereby
one parastatal organization handles the negotiation process and then another handles the
implementation process where
4.1.2 Mozambique
Mozambique is an outlier in term of Chinese ODA recipients as ODA comprises more
than 86 percent of official investment received from China. This contrasts the 33, 18 and 23
percent received by Angola, Nigeria and Ethiopia respectively, the other major recipients of
Chinese ODA. China has practiced stadium diplomacy more extensively to achieve the trade
and financial preferences that came so easy to it in Angola. In Mozambique, it has had to
compete with American, European and Asian donors. Mozambique has benefitted from the
saturation of aid providers and its further integration into the SADC community. Mozambique’s
experience is more characteristic of China’s reality as a latecomer to international business.
In contrast to the other major recipients of aid, Mozambique has aligned itself more with
western donors, in terms of how it goes about the aid negotiation process and project
implementation. Indeed, in 1987 it conceded to the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and
World Bank and at the end of its civil war in 1992, agreed to a high level of involvement by the
United Nations into its democratic transition (Roque 3). Consequently, the aid landscape in
Mozambique is one characterized by the prevalence of western NGOs and international
institutions buttressing civil society and government, all heavily financed by western donors. The
liberties taken by Chinese firms in Angola while working with Sonogol Real Estate, are
strikingly absent in Mozambique thusly. In one example Chinese companies have participated in
illegal logging in northern Mozambique but face increasing resistance from civil society groups
28. 27
that have thus far limited the extent of these activities and resource extraction by Chinese firms
can take place as a whole (Roque 7). China attempts to counterbalance this influence with
massive investments made by the Eximbank and MOFCOM into the development of
Mozambique’s infrastructure. One example is when MOFCOM financed the construction of a
national sports stadium, pictured in Figure F, in Zampeto (adidata.org). With Mozambique’s
democratic transition and growing institutional capacity, Chinese firms themselves are losing
their comparative political advantage.
Yet Mozambique still works to incentivize Chinese official investment, by incorporating
Chinese firms into its own development planning. Already, Mozambique has placed a bid for
Special Economic Zone, a wholly Chinese EPZ to stimulate Chinese FDI and human
development. It has gone farther by creating institutions like the Centro de Promoção de
Investimento Desenvolvimento e Comercio China (CPIDCC), which works facilitate trade
between these China and Mozambique (Jansson and Kiala 8). These institutions balance the
challenges, China faces in Mozambique, incentivizing a more concessionary approach in its Zou
Chuqu strategy. For China, Mozambique is stepping stone to accessing the Southern African
market as whole, as member to the SADC community, it provides a means by which china can
export goods through its EPZ in Mozambique to the rest of the SADC community. Numerous
Chinese agencies have spearheaded initiatives emphasizing human development to compete with
other donors thusly. The MOA has donated two agricultural research centers and the MOH has
built a malaria research center (Jansson and Kiala 8). Here, China recognizes the services offered
by other donors, Mozambique’s demand for those services and attempts to replicate. Still, China
must context with the fact it has still not secured preference in Mozambican markets. South
Africa, for example, has still invested more in Mozambican development and has maintained
trade preference as import and export destination (Jansson and Kiala 8). South Africa is China’s
chief rival in Southern Africa and continues to use regional integration as bulwark against
Chinese inputs.
Mozambique is an example of how greater institutional capacity domestically couples
with an inclination to both garner FDI and integrate regionally creates a competitive markets
place in terms of development finance. China is forced to compete with countries like South
Africa in this example or risk losing access to not only Mozambican markets and resources but
that of all of Southern Africa.
29. 28
4.1.3 South Africa
South Africa is unlike most other recipients of Chinese ODA in several ways. Chinese
firms compete with their South African counterparts in Mozambique and Angola. Moreover,
South Africa is using regional trade agreements to exclude erecting regional trade agreements to
deter the flow of Chinese imports into the region. Nonetheless, South Africa is major recipient of
Chinese ODA for that very reason. China sees good relations with South Africa as critical to the
success of Zou Chuqu in Southern Africa. South Africa’s’ membership with BRICS and role as
regional leader reinforces China’s attitude towards it. Moreover, South Africa membership in the
BRICS gives it even greater importance to Fazhan Zonghe Guoli, by which China aims to assert
itself to a greater extent in the international community.
China perceives South Africa as a regional leader, given that it is both the largest
contributor to economic development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
(Sun 20). This role is further reinforced by the fact within SADC, South Africa supplies the
lion’s share of imports, a position only further solidified by regional integration. Moreover, like
China, South Africa plays a key role in challenging the global international order, calling for the
reformation of the World Trade Organization and cofounding of the BRICS New Development
Bank. With 100 billion in reserve currency, the new development bank presents a viable
alternative to the IMF and World Bank (Alden 72). Thus South Africa is a political priority for
Chinese government, thereby incentivizing good relations.
Despite China’s objectives in South Africa being as political as they are economic,
municipal and local governments have primarily led its involvement in South Africa in terms of
ODA. Following the collapse of Apartheid in 1994, Chinese provinces established relations with
their counterparts in South Africa for the sake of greater commercial ties (Alden 29). At the time,
China severed diplomatic relations with South Africa because it recognized Taiwan. The
proliferation of these sub-state actors is prevalent even now even now. Indeed, the migration of
Chinese immigrants to South Africa has created a lobbying force to solicit greater ODA from
China as well as FDI (Aldan and Hughes 575). Similarly, Chinese MNCs and SOEs outsourcing
and off shoring to South Africa precedes the government taking an official economic and foreign
policy stance towards South Africa. Chinese commercial banks for example have pursued a stake
in their South African counterparts, highlighted by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
purchasing a 20 percent in the South African Standard Bank (Aldan and Hughes 575). South
30. 29
Africa has, as a consequence of these sub-state actors, the largest Chinese diaspora in Africa,
creating an effective lobbying force in China’s aid system. Given the constraints China face
politically with Sub Saharan Africa, these actors have been negotiating with their South African
counterparts to implement development projects with MOFCOM reduced to an approval role
over these projects
The South African example presents a reversal of China’s development strategy, whereby
instead of the government employing ODA to create opportunities for Chinese firms, those firms
and other non-state actors are encouraging the Chinese government to give more ODA. This
presents evidence that China’s investments in Africa are self-sustaining in the long term. To
elaborate, China’s official investment encourages greater FDI and outsourcing to South Africa,
which in turn encourages greater official investment and ODA to sustain and better relations
between countries.
4.1.4 Nigeria
Nigeria and South Africa share several similarities. For one, Nigeria is like South Africa
a leader in regional politics, given its role as primary proponent of ECOWAS and the AfDB.
Similarly, Nigerian MNCs and SOEs compete with their Chinese counterparts in African
markets and for resources. Yet where these states diverge is how the symmetry of economic
relations between China and Nigeria correlates positively to the level ODA, FDI and OOF
coming from China to Nigeria. To elaborate, by Nigerian investors and firms establishing
themselves in China while Chinese investors do the same in Nigeria, it facilitates financial flows
between these states. China’s political interests moreover encourages it use ODA as a means to
smooth out relations with Nigeria, further stimulating these financial flows.
The growth of Nigeria towns in China has resulted in personal networks between Chinese
and Nigerian businesses that have in turn facilitated the flow of FDI and OOF. During the mid
1990s, Nigerian traders traveled to China to purchase cheap Chinese goods and then selling them
in Nigerian markets; these traders have become the chief competition for Chinese nationals as
they have a greater understanding of Nigerian markets (Mohan and Lampert 100). The personal
networks of these traders and establishment of Nigerian communities in China encouraged
Chinese entrepreneurs and investors to seek similar opportunities in Nigeria. As this relationship
has progressed, Nigerian firms have sourced capital goods, labor, loans and managerial expertise
31. 30
from partners in China (Mohan and Lampert 101). African firms do this because these products
well adapted to Nigeria unreliable utilities and cheaper than their European counterparts did.
Consequently, state owned and private Chinese firms invest in Nigerian commercial
development because it increases the demand for their goods. Nigeria, in these relationships has
become recipient of Chinese FDI and OOF from 2000 to 2011 (aiddata.org). Sino-Nigerian
relations demonstrate an example where Zou Chuqu occurs without government intervention.
Therefore Chinese aid policy becomes more about sustaining than provoking this
occurrence, which is distinct from cases of Mozambique and Angola. Nigeria has a high degree
of influence over the African Union, ECOWAS, and the AfDB and over voting by West African
states in the United Nations (Alden 68). Moreover, like China it seeks to challenge the
international order by taking the proposed Africa seat on the UN Security Council.
Consequently, Nigeria is an asset to China’s foreign policy of Fazhan Zonghe Guoli. Thus China
employs ODA to smooth out increasingly turbulent relations with Nigeria. Increasingly, Nigerian
firms and municipal governments in Nigeria have opposed the growing influence of Chinese
firms domestically, causing the government withdraw many of incentives to presented to
Chinese firms (Alden 69). This jeopardizes economic initiatives like the Special Economic
Zones, China’s oil interests in the Delta region and export to Nigeria. The main cause of concern
has been Chinese firms’ labor practices and influx of cheap goods. The fact, Chinese presidents,
both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping have made numerous visits to Nigeria, demanding accountability
in Chinese companies operating there, attests to the desire by the Chinese government to
maintain good relations (Gills and Reilly 47). Projects like the fire plant, pictured in Figure F, are
thus prestige projects implemented as a mean to better relations.
Sino-Nigerian relations underscores the leverage African states have over China, when
they facilitate China’s Zou Chuqu and Fazhan Zonghe Guoli. Based on the patterns in China’s
ODA disbursements, there is a serious concern by Chinese policy makers that poor relations with
one African state will have a domino effect on others. This is due relative size of African
economies to that of China so that, although Chinese policy markers do not prioritize Sino-
African relations, they see appeasing African leadership as having a low cost relative to high
rewards investment in African development. Nigeria is a prime example of this relationship.
32. 31
4.1.5 Ethiopia
Sharing many of the characteristics of the Angolan and Mozambican experiences with
Chinese development aid, the case of Ethiopia completes this list. It has created institutions to
coordinate and work with Chinese agencies and banks on development projects and is an aid
environment characterized by the saturation of aid providers. Moreover, Ethiopia has the
characteristic of a postwar economy. However, where Ethiopia diverges from it counterparts is
when it comes to natural resource endowments as it has significantly less than any of the other
countries included on this list. Nevertheless, it has been able to leverage its strategic importance
and institutional capacity to solicit greater concessions from donors in terms of loans and grants.
With China, it does this through forum style meeting between Ethiopian agencies and either
Chinese counterparts or OECD aid agencies. However, with China, this strategy has been more
effective at negotiating OOF than for ODA.
Ethiopia has exploited both international sympathies and its geostrategic importance to
western governments to create an aid environment characterized by intense competition between
the traditional donors, such as the OECD member states and nontraditional donors like China.
The United States and the European Union view Ethiopia as a platform upon which they can
exert greater influence in East Africa, given the relative stability of the current Ethiopian
government and it friendliness towards western governments (Grennhill 35). As a consequence,
development aid coming from the United States, Europe and associate NGOs has surged.
However, the Ethiopian Revolutionary People’s Democratic Front (ERPDF), the current
Ethiopian government has counterbalanced western influence by courting Chinese government,
instead of vice versa. The late president Males Zenawi heralded China as a role model for
African development and rebuked western claims that China has come to “loot Africa” (Adem
148). Given Ethiopia’s stature in the African community, Sino-Ethiopian relations have for
China become a matter of proving a Chinese-African partnership can be successful and so has
forgone short term commercial benefit for long term development goals. In essence, China wants
Ethiopia to be a model through which Zou Chuqu gains continental legitimacy. By this means,
China has pushed Ethiopia to become its “China in Africa,” capitalizing on its cheap labor costs
and role as a development state.
In contrast to Ethiopia strategy of wooing international donors, it has taken ownership of
development aid projects one aid is disbursed. One example of this is how, although Ethiopia
33. 32
rejects conditionality, it nonetheless aspires to reach the human development goals outlined by
western donors and the United Nations. In 2010 for example, the Charities and Societies
Proclamation introduced restriction on how these groups operated within Ethiopia, while also
directing development planning to reach six of human development targets outlined in the Paris
Declaration (Greenhill 35). By this means, it builds legitimacy for itself as development states in
the eyes of donors, enabling it to take greater authority of aid provided. It takes a similar route in
its dealings with the Chinese. It has incorporated Chinese agencies and banks into development
planning process to synthesize China goals in Ethiopia with Ethiopians goals for itself. It formed
the Joint Ethiopia-China Commission (JECC) with Chinese, where Ethiopian ministries meet
with their perspective Chinese counterparts to coordinate development projects (Davies 32). This
process streamlines negotiations for OOF and ODA.
By these efforts, Ethiopia takes greater agency in its relationship with aid providers. It not
only demonstrates a means by which to circumvent the conditionality employed by western
donors but also the adaptability of the Chinese aid system to the interests of African states.
4.1.6 Summary of Case Studies
The countries explored in this report have environmental advantage of either being
perceived as regional leaders in African international relations or are being courted by several aid
donors. Consequently, Chinese ODA serves more to legitimize Zou Chuqu as a mutually
beneficial developmental and foreign policy among African states, thereby increasing the
likelihood of its success. However, in all five cases, each African states has developed
institutions through which sub state actors in China can either negotiate with or funnel funds
through when it comes to matters of development aid. These institution moreover prioritize
structural transformation to facilitate industrialization and thus economic development. Thus, if
African leaders seek greater agency in aid negotiations with China, they must first develop
organizations capable of administering development finance and representing their interests to
the Chinese. In other words, to optimize Sino-African aid relations, African leaders have to
determine their development strategies, create institutions to implement strategies and then
incorporate Zou Chuqu into that strategy. The only alternative is political advantage, which is
only afforded to regional leaders like South Africa and Nigeria. These cases therefore represent
an effective intersection of China and Sub Saharan Africa’s development agenda.
34. 33
4.2 Catalysts of Industrialization: Chinese ODA across economic sectors
The previous section explored China’s motivations in Africa and the role of China’s aid
system in its development strategy. In addition, the previous section explored the agency of
African states in the implementation of this strategy through case studies of the five largest
recipients of the development aid. By this means, Chinese ODA is most typically directed to the
African states development agenda due to China’s request base system and its desire to foster
greater economic ties between Sub Saharan Africa. Sub States, actors whether they African
agencies or Chinese firms take the lead in aid negotiations. Accounting for all ODA
disbursements, it appears Chinese and African government prioritize infrastructure but if we
examine this in terms of the number ODA projects initiated, Chinese efforts are more directed to
same fields as their OECD counterparts, that being public health, government support and
agriculture. This subsection explores briefly the statistical distribution of Chinese ODA and
number projects across economic sectors to show how China ODA disbursements are more
reflection of China’s relations with each African state then overarching policy.
Aiddata.org gathered data on 2,438 development aid projects taking place or having taken
place in Sub Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2011. The majority of the 2438 projects
accounted for is in infrastructural development, as seen in Figure I. Approximately, 52 percent of
all Chinese ODA is directed to this economic sectors. Breaking it down further, around ten
percent goes to the development of energy resources, such as the construction of the Bui
Hydroelectric Dam and Fire Plan in Nigeria pictured in Figure F (aiddata.org). Conversely, 34
percent of Chinese ODA is directed towards the development of the transportation sector, with
Chinese construction firms building roadways and railways like the Addis-Adama Expressway,
pictured in Figure F (aiddata.org). Examining these projects thusly, China’s efforts in stadium
diplomacy as discussed as a part of Zou Chuqu, work to give Chinese firms experience that is
more international but also the infrastructure African states need to sustain an industrial take off.
Electricity and effective transportation are both in deficit in most African states. Since structural
adjustment, the structure of most Sub Saharan economies has leaned towards agriculture because
low input and skill costs (Oatley 113). China facilitates the growth of the manufacturing sector in
and exports from Su Saharan Africa. Thus, infrastructure is as much a part of African States’
development agenda as it is Zou Chuqu, to which the case studies attest.
35. 34
The story is however not that simple. Transportation and energy projects take up the most
ODA funding because they cost the most implement, relative to other development aid projects.
Indeed the primary provider of this funding has been the Eximbank and the project implemented
by Chinese firm to carry it out (aiddata.org). However, as expressed, there is a myriad of Chinese
agencies involved in ODA and so when we look at the number of projects as opposed to funding,
Chinese development aid is diverse. Pictured in Figure H, 109 projects undertaken are in
government related activities, 104 are in public health, while only 42 and 13 projects undertaken
are in transportation and energy respectively (aiddata.org). In terms of public health, these
projects typically involve the construction or outfitting of hospitals, like the construction of a
cardiac training facility in Tanzania; alternatively, government support projects range from the
construction of a national assembly building in Malawi to the expansion of African Union
headquarters in Ethiopia (aiddata.org). Thus, China’s involvement in other economic sectors is
also predominantly infrastructural but that is because it corresponds of expertise of Chinese
firms. It is important to note, that these firms were extensively involved in development
domestically so it is only natural that they would take their skills abroad; the Shanghai
Construction Group, who built a Senate building in Gabon was involved in several building
projects in China, most notably the Shanghai Tower (aidata.org). Thus, Chinese ODA is more
concerned matching the skills of Chinese firms to the needs of their African recipients.
Chinese firms are most involved but not limited infrastructural development. An entire
paper written on the technical assistance teams deployed by Chinese ministries to develop health,
agricultural and educational sectors in Sub Saharan Africa but their activities minute in
comparison to the number of infrastructural projects funded by the Chinese aid system. As
identified in previous sections, structural transformation is a priority for both African and the
Chinese government in African development. Resources are therefore deployed to that effect.
4.3 In the Public Eye: How the African public perceives the Chinese Aid System
This section has explored the role of African government in the Chinese aid system and
the consequential distribution of ODA across economic sectors. This however begs the question
as to whether these efforts have been received positively by the public in recipient states.
Policymakers know that how development aid received by the general public in recipient states is
mixed. The background section tackled a general history in Sub Saharan Africa and during this
36. 35
time there have been accusations of a lack of accountability in aid providers, of an inequitable
provision of aid and that development aid fosters dependency on donors. With civil society in
most African states developed to a point where it can both scrutinize and protest aid policies,
administrators and politicians are under increasing pressure legitimize aid policies. Yet the
public perception of Chinese ODA has been thus positive. More importantly, the public
perception of China’s involvement in Africa has generally been more positive than that of OECD
member states. This assertion stems from a multi-country survey based on university polling in
eight African countries – Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and
Zambia collected by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and the Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology. With three of the countries covered in the case studies featured in
these polls, this becomes a good measure of public perception towards China. This subsection
will analyze the results of these findings in the context of Chinese ODA to the region.
Having argued that Chinese allocate ODA to countries where their development agenda
aligns with the domestic agenda, data gathered in this survey suggests that the general public in
most African states would be in support of their governments harmonizing their development
goals with China. In the nine countries surveyed, respondents view China’s development model
as positive. Of three states examined in the case studies, over eighty percent of Ethiopians and
seventy percent of Nigerians survey view China’s model positively and so too do approximately
74 percent of all Africans surveyed (Sautman and Hairong 736). South Africa is the only outlier
with around 50 percent of respondents surveyed being uncertain about this model. However
while other countries surveyed, except Botswana have low income economies, South Africa is an
upper middle income economy and therefore have developmental success already and so South
Africans are reasonable skeptical. However, this polling does highlight how Zou Chuqu is
positively perceived by Africans, thus suggesting public ease with Sino-African cooperation in
development planning. Moreover, this view is held in spite of the fact the majority of Africans,
around 78 percent survey believe China exerts at least a fair amount of influence over their
country (Moyo 109). The belief that China and Africa have common interests is also prevalent in
the multi-country survey. Approximately sixty percent of respondents felt China and their
respective countries had common interests, while only thirty percent said they had few or none
(Sautman and Hairong 737). This suggests Sino-African cooperation would also be logical in the
37. 36
public eye given common interests. These statistics allude to how the structure and motivations
of Chinese aid system are suitable in the eyes of average Africans.
More to this point, when we compare public perception of China relative to the United
States in this regard it becomes clear that Chinese ODA is preferable to OECD ODA or at least
the United States. Pictured in Figure G, around 50 percent of survey respondents found China’s
polices toward Africa as less harmful to their economic and social well being than their
American counterparts (Sautman and Hairong 741). Referring back to the background section,
this perception makes sense, given the effects of Structural Adjustment are still being felt by
Africans today and the volatility in US policy toward Sub Saharan Africa overall. China
conversely has been relatively consistent though the volume of ODA disburses in the continent
have been increased; for example, whereas China just built the Tanzam Railway in 1972, now it
builds railways in Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Namibia at the same time (aiddata.org). Another
explanation for this position, is China’s perceived efficacy in implementing development
projects. Approximately 53 percent of those survey were satisfied with the work done by
Chinese firms on large scale projects, compared to 12.9 percent that were dissatisfied and thirty 4
percent who were neutral (Sautman and Hairong 742). Thus, China is perceived more positively
in terms of project implementation. Referring back to china’s advantages in Africa, touched upon
in China development strategy, this makes sense given the cheaper managerial and labor costs
associated with Chinese firms. A continual complaint raised about OECD development projects
is how money is spent on administrative costs.
These surveys do however have to be taken with a grain of salt, as they prove public
perception can shift dramatically as it has done for one outlier in this survey: Zambia. China’s
relations with Zambia have been exacerbated by strong anti Chinese sentiment in political
system, fueled by labor protests over the working conditions in Chinese owned companies. An
explosion at Chinese munitions factory in Chambishi killed 46 Zambian workers in 2005,
sparking national debate on the conduct of Chinese companies and being issue raised by Michael
Sata’s opposition party in the 2008 election (Alden 74). How public perception responded to
these incidents is accounted for in the multi-country survey. Around 50 percent of Zambian
surveyed found Chinese policies as harmful to their country as helpful and ten percent felt, those
policies were more harmful to their countries (Sautman and Hairong 740). Moreover, Zambian
reportedly felt Chinese firms and migrants were less adapted to local society, than their western
38. 37
counterparts, which is opposite perception of most other countries survey; additionally, thirty
percent of Zambian respondents classify China practices as neocolonial (Sautman and Hairong
746). Thus, the Zambian example attests to how public perception can quickly shift if China’s
development projects or activities in general are mismanaged or considered neocolonial in their
presence. African critics abound have charged China’s development practices as neocolonial and
China has made concessions to ensure good working relations in these countries. For more
information on China’s reactionary foreign policy, see Appendix C.
Public surveys like these are biased in that derive public opinion from lower to middle
class and urban Africans and for the most part and so fails to poll rural communities. These
surveys therefore do constitute a holistic evaluation of public perception towards the Chinese.
They do nonetheless provide a snapshot of what average Africans think. In addition, from this,
African policy makers should understand that for the most African perceive economic
cooperation with the Chinese in a positive light. However, the continuity of this position is
contingent upon local and national governments hold Chinese firms implementing development
aid projects accountable and ensuring a public voice in the deployment of Chinese ODA. Thus
policy progress in aid negotiations, they should be sensitive to public desires.
39. 38
Chinese ODA spent
Per Economic Sector
Infrastructure
Services and
Education
Public Health
Financial
Assistance
Agriculture
Multsectional
Unspecified
Government
Industry Infrastructure
Services and Education
Public Health
Financial Assistance
Agriculture
Multsectional
Unspecified
Government
Industry
Social and Communications
0 50 100 150 200
Number of Projects per
Sector
Figure G - Survey of African citizens on Chinese Aid policies compared to Western Equivalents
Figure H - Chinese ODA to Africa by Economic
Sector
Figure I - Number of Chinese ODA project by
Economic Sector
40. 39
Section 5: Conclusion
The objective of this report was to create road map by which African policy makers and
administrators might navigate the Chinese aid system. It has provided a holistic overview of not
just China’s objectives in Africa but Africa’s role in China’s development strategy. With that in
mind, it has presented China’s aid system as a manifestation of that strategy and thus detailed the
role of Chinese agencies and banks in powering that system. Yet it is only through analyzing
China’s aid policy in specific African states, the distribution of its ODA across economic sector
and response from African states and their polities, does the way forward in dealing with the
Chinese aid system become clear. Policy makers must determine how their state’s development
agenda aligns with that of China, how to establish or strengthen institutions to implement that
agenda and then propose key infrastructural projects to key Chinese Agencies that would
actualize it as well as consider regional cooperation in dealing with the Chinese.
Aligning the development agenda of one perspective state with China’s, the first of these
recommendations is not unique to Sino-African relations. Historically, African leaders who have
been more successful in leveraging foreign aid have presented their development agenda as in
accord with western donors. Ethiopia’s Males Zenawi managed to bypass conditionality as factor
in negotiations for western ODA by implementing a national development plan that achieved the
goals articulated in the Paris declaration. Thus, Ethiopia continued to receive aid without
undertaking the structural adjustment programs that had taken root across Africa by presenting
its interests as concurrent with that of western donors. With China, African policy maker should
behave no differently. China has heralded Angola and Ethiopia as proof of the Chinese model,
showering them with ODA in the process because these states have presented their development
plans as being modeled after China’s own development strategy. The key here for African policy
makers is to predict and preempt donor’s possible demand. Since currently, the public in Africa
believes China and their respective nations have common interests, policymakers have the
flexibility to present their development agenda such, without risking public backlash.
Beyond the diplomatic overtures however, policymakers need to address the lack of
capacity in public institutions administering aid. The absence of institutions historically has
caused ODA projects to deviate from the needs or recipient African state; this was a widespread
problem in the 1960s and 1970s. The proliferation of donors warrant the creation or
strengthening of institution that can receive aid funds as well as fund and coordinate
41. 40
development aid projects. The Mozambican case demonstrates how nontraditional donors china
will employ ODA to secure trade preference in emerging markets. Centralizing control of these
funds and all development aid received in singular agencies optimizes the benefit of competition
between aid providers. Moreover, the creation of these institutions or their matching with their
counterparts in China expedites the aid negotiation process and goes toward establishing long
term relationship with Chinese agencies. The Eximbank relationship with Sonogol Real Estate
has made long term development finance possible for Angola. Seeking a similar relationship
should be a priority for African policy makers.
Lastly, policymakers should take an active role in the proposal process itself by singling
out Chinese firms and/or agencies they feel would make effective partners and with
conceptualize infrastructural projects that make the most of their respective states and Chinese
resources. As said, MOFCOM and the Eximbank have little oversight on development project
and the way they ate implement that responsibility is instead deferred to the Chinese firm
undertaking the project with these actors merely evaluating the project for completion. This has
in the case of Nigeria and Zambia resulted in several incidents of substandard work or an
inefficient use of ODA. Considering Chinese firms ahead of time improves performance in
project management and the likelihood that China will fund said project. This method can also be
employed when petitioning China’s technical assistance programs by directly contacting the
NHFPC, MOA or MOE, remembers all these ministries have their own respective DFECs.
Lastly African policy makers need to consider regional strategies for how to deal with the
Chinese as well as all donors. Part of Zou Chuqu, is bypassing the trade barrier erected through
regional integration and trade agreements. Its efforts in this department can be harmful as they
are beneficial to African development. The flood of cheap goods in to Nigeria exemplifies how
Chinese firms can undermine local producers. However, China’s attempt to penetrate the SADC
community attests to how these efforts place the recipient in a better bargaining positions, as it
has for Mozambique and South Africa. China has consistently appeased states is perceive as
regional leaders to secure diplomatic support. Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa all exemplify
this point . Thus by African policy makers from different countries colluding during China’s
FOCACs or on their own, they can better leverage their political position for ODA.
These recommendations can be implemented separately but together they work to
maximize the amount ODA received from not just China but all donors.
42. 41
References
Annotated Bibliography
Brautigam, Deborah. The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford UP,
2009. Print. A professor of comparative politics at the School of Advanced
International Studies at John Hopkins University, Dr. Deborah Brautigam has been a
consultant for the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.K. Department for
International Development and the African Development Bank. She has become the
premier authority on Sino-African engagement. The Dragon’s Gift details and
summarizes that engagement, focusing on economic relations. Thus this book not only
tackles China’s foreign aid programs in Africa but the Chinese government’s
investments in Africa, as well as that of private firms and non-profits. It also provides
a history on Sino-African Economic relations from 1959 onward. Thus Brautigam’s
work provides a contextual framework for analyzing China’s aid system, detailing the
organizational structure of that system and its operations in Africa.
Carothers, Thomas, and Diane De. Gramont. Development Aid Confronts Politics the Almost
Revolution. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.
Print. While Thomas Carothers currently serves as vice president of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Diane De Gramont is research analyst at that
same institution. Their work, Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost
Revolution presents a retrospective of foreign aid from traditional donors, specifically
the member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.
Along those lines, it addresses the topic of development aid from a political
perspective, aiming to convey the political processes that go into disbursement of aid
and the selection of recipient nations. Consequently this works serves as a good point
of comparison, when discussing the Chinese aid system.
Greenhill, Romilly, Annalisa Prizzon, and Andrew Rogerson. The Age of Choice: How Are
Developing Countries Managing the New Aid Landscape? Rep. no. 9781909464162.
Overseas Development Institute, Mar. 2013. Web. 27 Oct. 2014. Andrew Robertson, a
senior research associate at the Overseas Development Institute, joined by research
fellows Romilly Greenhill and Annalisa Prizzon attempt to map the new international
aid regime in this report. Through a case study of Zambia, Ethiopia and Cambodia,
they address how the proliferation of nontraditional donors like China and Korea has
affected aid negotiations, projects and development schemes in developing countries
to determine how these changes have benefitted or marginalized these states.
Consequently this report provides insight on not only the Chinese aid system but
development aid in general from the recipients perspective.
43. 42
Additional References
Addison, Tony, George Mavrotas, and Mark Mcgillivray. "Development Assistance and
Development Finance: Evidence and Global Policy Agendas." Journal of International
Development 17.6 (2005): 819-36. Print.
Adem, Seifudein. "China in Ethiopia: Diplomacy and Economics of Sino-optimism." African
Studies Review 55.1 (2012): 143-60. Print.
Alden, Chris. China in Africa. London: Zed, 2007. Print.
Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. "Harmonious World and China’s Foreign Economic Policy: Features,
Implications, and Challenges." Journal of Chinese Political Science 13.2 (2008): 165-
92. Print.
Davies, Martyn, Hannah Edinger, Natasya Tay, and Sanusha Naidu. "How China Delivers
Development Assistanceto Africa." Centre for Chinese Studies (2008): n. pag. Print.
Gill, Bates, and James Reilly. "The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa." The Washington
Quarterly 30.3 (2007): 37-52. Print.
Gill, Bates. Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2007. Print.
Gore, Charles. "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing
Countries." World Development 28.5 (2000): 789-804. Web.
Jansson, Johanna, and Carine Kiala. Patterns of Chinese Investment, Aid and Trade in
Mozambique. Rep. Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, 2009. Print.
Mohan, G., and B. Lampert. "Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China-Africa
Relations." African Affairs 112.446 (2013): 92-110. Print.
Moss, Todd J. African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 2007. Print.
44. 43
Moyo, Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa.
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009. Print.
Ngongo, Francisco Kapalo. The Impasse of Post-conflict Reconstruction Economic Growth vs.
Governance in Angola. Houston: Strategic Book, 2012. Print.
Oatley, Thomas H. International Political Economy. Boston: Longman, 2012. Print.
Rimmer, D. "Learning about Economic Development from Africa." African Affairs 102.408
(2003): 469-91. Print.
Roque, Paula C. China in Mozambique: A Cautious Approach Country Case Study. Rep. no. 23.
Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2009. Print.
Sautman, Barry, and Yan Hairong. "African Perspectives on China–Africa Links." The China
Quarterly 199 (2009): 728. Print.
Strange, Austin, Michael Tierney, Brardley Parks, Andreas Fuchs, and Vijaya Ramachandran.
"Working Paper 323." China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based
Approach to Data Collection. Center for Global Development, Apr. 2013. Web. 27
Oct. 2014.
Sun, Yun. Africa in China's Foreign Policy. Rep. Brookings Institute, Apr. 2014. Web. 27 Oct.
2014.
Zhang, Baohui. "Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Trends and Implications." Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs 39.2 (2010): 39-68. Print.
