1. Case Study : Indonesian Red Cross

2. • Background
• Tsunami Early Warning System
• EQ Situation
• Challenges & Lessons

3. • Two earthquakes with 8.6 and 8.2
Richter scale magnitudes occurred at
the west coast of northern Sumatra
on April 11, 2012.
• The earthquakes were located
respectively 100 km and 200 km to
the southwest of the major subduction zone that defines the plate
boundary between the India/Australia
and Sunda plate’s offshore Sumatra
where at this location, the
India/Australia plates move northnortheast with respect to the Sunda
plate at a velocity of approximately
52 mm/year.
• These earthquakes triggered tsunami
warning for areas on the west coast
of Sumatera including Aceh and West
Sumatra provinces.

4. • The study is done on April-May, 2014, to review the
effectiveness of its Disaster Management system including the
Contingency Plan and personnel capacities; as well as for other
stakeholders including the Indonesia Red Cross (PMI-palang
Merah Indonesia) to assess the impact of its intervention in
strengthening DP-DR capacities at the community and
government levels in addition to their own institutional
capacities
• The review team consists of staff and volunteers from PMI,
Aceh Provincial Disaster Management Agency (BPBA/BPBD),
American Red Cross, and Canadian Red Cross

5. The Data Collection was done at 2 level :
• At the provincial government and PMI , the data were gathered
from PMI internal review and stakeholder review meetings, on
April 18, 2013.
• At the district and community level, the data were collected
through focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, and
observations in 13 villages in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, and Aceh
Jaya districts during April 24 – May 2, 2012. Those villages were
selected purposively with judgment sampling approach that
enabled researchers to study information rich samples.

6. 11/13/2013
Willy Wicaksono - Local Advisor
Padang
6

8. Collect Data and
Information
from Credible
External Provider
Translate and
Analysis Early
Warning into
Local Language
Disseminate
Early Warning to
the community
Mobilize
Community to
Conduct Early
Action

9. 0” (15:38)
EQ 8,5 SM
70” (16:48)
Activate siren manually in
Governor Office
5” (15:43)
BMKG Issue
First Warning
6” (15:44)
BMKG Issue
First Warning
10” (15:48)
BMKG activate
siren (fail)
19” (15:57)
Electricity Black
Out
15:38
16:38
91” (17:09)
Activate siren
manually (fail)
93” (17:12)
Activate siren
manually (fail)
101” (17:20)
Activate siren
manually
17:38
124” (17:43)
BMKG issue
First Warning
2nd EQ 8.1 SM
19:38
21:38
237” (19:45)
BMKG issue
“all-clear”
322” (22:00)
Electricity
Company turn
on the
electricity wire

10. • Newly established Regional Disaster Management
Agency (BPBA) prevented them to provide adequate
response within the first 20 minutes after the earthquake on
April 11, 2012.
• The Quick Response Team (SRC) is in place, but they had
not been provided with any training.
• Contingency Plan, Early warning System (EWS) and
Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) for earthquake and
tsunami in place but was not operationalized during the April 11,
2012 earthquakes.

11. • The absence of an approved contingency plan at the PMI chapter has
provided a gap in its capacity to response internally.
• the equipment (radio base, handhelds, hand siren, etc) were not all fully
functioning because on maintenance and electricity black out.
• With the current HF radio, PMI could only communicate internally and
monitor others but cannot exchange communication with other
stakeholders such as RAPI (Radio antar Penduduk Indonesia, People Radio
Network).
• PMI chapter and branches received the updates from village volunteers
(CBAT).
• PMI assisted the communities to evacuate to safer areas and also
provided first aid support to those injured because of accident during the
evacuation process.

12. • Most of communities knew that they need to evacuate
immediately to higher ground, but they did not have
preparedness bag or bring some supplies along with them to
evacuation point and knew which route to take too.
• Although there are 3 evacuation buildings, very few people used
the facilities but instead decided to farther location which require
more than 30 minutes to reach and would be at risk if tsunami
was to happen, not to mention the risk of being injured and stuck
in traffic.
• the communities knowledge on tsunami signs is limited to the sea
level and water retraction.

16. • Improve the effectiveness of DP/DR system…
…..Improve tsunami and Earthquake Contingency Plan, EWS and
SOP including its chain command and support system
…..Agreed radio channel managed to communicate and update
information during emergency

17. • Strengthening the effectiveness of Evacuation Shelter…
…..Review the effectiveness and capacities as well as location
of current escape buildings, and consider to build more so
that the facilities can be reached within 10 – 15 minutes.
…..Explore the possibility of utilizing escape building for other
public activities in order to help ensure its maintenance
…..Consider reviewing the road arrangement and evacuation
routes to avoid traffic jam during evacuation process in
emergency

18. • Improve PMI’s Preparedness and Response
capacities…
….Finalize its Contingency Plan, radio communication protocols
and equipment, as well as finalize the Disaster Command Post
management.
…..Review the existing capacities at the branches so that gaps can
be addressed.
…..review the SoP of hand siren utilization and placement once
they update the village contingency plan so that the
equipment can be better used in the future

19. • Strengthening the auxiliary role to the government…
…..Optimize the partnership with BPBA as defined in the MoU between the two
agencies and play an active role in strengthening the capacities of BPBD’s Quick
Response team and promoting the utilisation of its SATGANA team as well as
assisting in the contingency plan development/ review and increase its effort in
strengthening community capacities in DP/DR
…..Collect information on all community evacuation points including their GPS
coordinates and altitudes and existing facilities, capacities, and condition to
address the gaps in facilities as well as to be a reference in distributing logistic
support in emergency.
….. Facilitating the integration of DRR into the government planning and funding
mechanism, policy on district contingency plan development and regular drill,
and the link between need to combine government-funded structural
mitigation activities with community-based DRR initiative.
…..Facilitate and link the Village Committee and CBATs with BPBD and promote
their involvement in the development of the Earthquake and tsunami
contingency plan as well as to acknowledge their roles in the document.

20. • Strengthening The DP/DR System at Community Level…
…..Village contingency plans need to be revisited and simplified
and then socialized to all community members so that it can
guide them in emergency.
…..The Integration between community and school evacuation
plan (e.g. sharing responsibilities; teachers will evacuate
students and community will look after the teachers family in
the villages), link Community Contingency Plan (CCP) with the
government plan, link CBAT into PMI volunteer network and
with the government, increased frequency of awareness and
simulation

21. • Improve Community awareness to respond to disaster…
…..Include knowledge on the characteristics of earthquake that
triggers tsunami as well as the physical signs of tsunami,
evacuation routes and place, its distances to seaside and time
required to reach the safer place
….. Include the importance of having a family contingency plan
and preparedness bag.
…..the use of different media to disseminate messages on DP/DR
measures including through the use of sms and emergency
radio channel, as well as village leaders as the Government
representation who are the closest to communities