Presented by Diana Suhardiman at the Global Water Systems Project: Water in the Anthropocene Conference in Bonn, Germany 21-24 May 2013

1. Between interests and worldviews:
The narrow path of the Mekong
River Commission
Diana Suhardiman, Mark Giordano, Francois Molle
GWSP Conference Water in the Anthropocene
Bonn, Germany
21-24 May 2013

2. Structure of the presentation
• Mekong hydropower and planned
mainstream dams
• The rationale behind the MRC Strategic
Environmental Assessment
• SEA outcome and the (re)shaping of
governance alliances
• Conclusions

3. Mekong hydropower
Mekong hydropower is developing
rapidly:
• 36 dams in operation in the Lower
Mekong Basin
• 110 dams planned, under licensing or
under construction

4. Mekong hydropower
1 Pak Beng
2 Luang Prabang
3 Xayabury
4 Pak Lay
5 Sanakham
6 Pak Chom
7 Ban Koum
8 Lat Sua
9 Don Sahong
10 Thakho
11 Stung Treng
12 Sambor

5. Mekong hydropower
Mekong hydropower debate and the SEA
• Increase government review and ensure
power supply
• Social and environmental impacts
• SEA as environmental management
tool

6. The MRC Strategic
Environmental Assessment
The idea of Mekong mainstream dams dates
back to 1957
The revived in the 2000s
• signing of regional power trade
agreement under the ADB GMS
• emerging importance of private sector
actors
• construction of a series of Chinese dams
on the Upper Mekong

7. The MRC Strategic
Environmental Assessment
• MRC as an inter-governmental body
• 1995 Mekong Agreement and the
MRC’s mandate to promote sustainble
development

8. The MRC Strategic
Environmental Assessment
The SEA was to overcome the
weaknesses of the PNPCA
• Regional impacts of individual projects,
not the cumulative impacts
• The SEA was to encourage member
states’ compliance with the PNPCA

9. The MRC Strategic
Environmental Assessment
MRC Organizational Structure
Council
Joint Committee
MRC Secretariat
National Mekong
Committees
NMC Secretariats

10. SEA’s final findings and
recommendation
“The recommendations of this SEA stem from
recognition of the need for utmost caution in
making development decisions when so much
is at stake and when there are evident threats
of serious and irreversible environmental,
social, and economic damage from the
proposed mainstream projects”
(ICEM report prepared for the MRC, 2010: 25)

11. SEA’s final findings and
recommendation
The SEA followed a narrow path
• assessment lacked any decision-making
authority
• MRC cannot force its member states to
either notify or halt their development
plans

12. The MRC SEA actual significance
• Conveyed international donors’ unified
position and helped formalize their concerns
• Initiated an open discussion on the planned
dams
• The SEA translated environmental ministries’
positions from the periphery to central
decision-making stage and reshaped
bureaucratic and political alliances at both
national and transboundary level

13. Conclusions
• Scientific assessments can be politically
maneuvered to shape governance
alliances
• It can be used to democratize decision-
making processes

14. Post-SEA development
• Laos’ decision to commence
construction on the
Xayabury dam
• What is the SEA’s potential
significance?

15. Thank you for your attention
d.suhardiman@cgiar.org
Mekong River Watercolors by: http://maps.stamen.com/watercolor/