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ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                                               International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                                                   Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012



      Vulnerabilities of Wireless Security protocols
                    (WEP and WPA2)
                        Vishal Kumkar, Akhil Tiwari, Pawan Tiwari, Ashish Gupta, Seema Shrawne




Abstract - Wirelesses Local Area Networks (WLANs) have                   The traditional WLAN security mechanism is WEP. WEP
become more prevalent and are widely deployed and used                   is an encryption algorithm designed in 1999 along with
in many popular places like university campuses, airports,               802.1 lb standard to provide wireless security. It employs
residences, cafes etc. With this growing popularity, the                 RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4) algorithm from RSA Data Security.
security of wireless network is also very important. In this             However, several serious weaknesses were identified by
study we present the security mechanisms available for                   cryptanalysts and WEP was superseded by Wi-Fi Protected
WLANs. These security mechanisms are Wired Equivalent                    Access (WPA) in 2003, and then by the full IEEE 802.11i
Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and                          standard (also known as WPA2) in 2004. Despite the
802.11i (WPA2).Our aim is to show how an attack can be                   serious security flaws WEP still provides a minimal level
made on systems using the above mentioned mechanisms.                    security.
We have given a brief overview of their working, structure,              In this paper we investigated different security mechanisms
algorithms used and have tried to explore the real time                  available for WLANs and their real time vulnerabilities and
vulnerabilities by issuing successful attacks against WEP                ways of cracking them.
and WPA2 network. The attacks were done in an ad-hoc
network, using three laptops with wi-fi facility. We begin                                  II. IEEE STANDARDS
with WEP protocol which employs a flawed RC4
algorithm is very much prone to attack and is easily                     IEEE 802.11 [1] is a set of Wireless LAN standards
crackable, then listing some of its weakness. We then have               developed by working group 11 of the IEEE 802
a look on WPA as the enhanced standard of WEP, along                     committee. The first 802.11 standard released in October
with some flaws in it. Finally an attack on WPA2 is                      1997 and revised in March 1999 as 802.1lb. The 802.1la
explained. Aircrack-ng is the tool (software) that we have               standard developed in 1999 for wireless asynchronous
used to launch the attacks. The commands required for                    transfer mode (ATM) networks. 802.11g standard was
attacking are explained, along with the screen-shots to help             ratified in 2003. Successful businesses benefit from these
understand the working.                                                  standards both by actively participating in the
                                                                         standardization process and by using standards as strategic
Index Terms- WEP, 802.11, WPA, WPA2                                      market instruments. When it comes to security, a number
                                                                         of committees have made an effort including the IEEE's
                I.   INTRODUCTION                                        802.11 Task Group i (TGi), the Internet Engineering Task
                                                                         Force and the National Institute of Standards (NIST).
Wireless local area networks (WLANs) are of great                        However, the group that plays the most powerful role in
importance in network technologies. WLANs, Bluetooth                     development of WLAN security standards is the TGi.
and cellular networks gained popularity in computer and
business industry with many consequent security issues.                       A. Architecture
Especially WLAN systems like IEEE 802.11 networks
became common access networks in private and public                      802.11 network architecture consists of cells that are
environments. They have lots of benefits like mobility and               overlapped with each other. Basic Service Set (BSS)
flexibility. Unlike a traditional wired LAN, users have                  defines the coverage area of a cell. A station that is not in a
much more freedom for accessing the network. Such                        specific BSS cannot communicate with the other stations in
benefits also come with several security considerations.                 this BSS. There are two modes of 802.11 networks
Security risks in wireless environments include risks of                 Infrastructure Mode and Ad Hoc Mode. In infrastructure
wired networks plus the new risks as a result of mobility.               mode, WLANs consist of wireless stations and access
To reduce these risks and protect the users from                         points. Access points that are providing communication
eavesdropping, organizations have been adopted several                   with the wired network and managing network traffic, are
security mechanisms.                                                     connected with a distribution system (such as Ethernet)




                                               All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
                                                                                                                                            34
ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                                                 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                                                     Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012


             III. WIRELESS LAN SECURITY                                    In order to sufficiently crack a real-life WEP key of a
                                                                           wireless AP, we need to gather lots of initialization vectors
The security mechanisms for secure communications on                       (IVs). Normal network traffic does not typically generate
802.11 wireless networks have been developed in the                        these IVs very quickly. Theoretically, if you are patient,
following chronological order [2]:                                         you can gather sufficient IVs to crack the WEP key by
                                                                           simply listening to the network traffic and saving them.
* Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)                                           However, in this work, we use a technique called injection
* Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)                                             to speed up the process. Injection involves having the AP
* 802.11i (WPA2)                                                           resend selected packets over and over again very rapidly.
                                                                           This allows us to capture a large number of IVs in a short
A. Wired Equivalent Privacy                                                period of time. Once we have captured a large number of
                                                                           IVs, we can use them to determine the WEP key. In
WEP [2] is an encryption algorithm developed by an IEEE                    practice WEP cracking can easily be demonstrated using
volunteer group. The aim of WEP algorithm is to provide a                  tools such as Aircrack.
secure communication over radio signals between two end
users of a WLAN. WEP employs RC4 algorithm for                              Aircrack [7] contains four main utilities, used in the four
encryption and uses two key sizes: 40 bit and 104 bit; to                  attack phases that take place to recover the key:
each is added a 24-bit initialization vector (IV) which is                      1. airmon-ng : starts/stops the wireless network card
transmitted directly. At the transmitter side the plaintext is                      in monitor mode.
XOR'ed with the key stream, generated after KSA and                             2. airodump-ng: wireless sniffing tool used to
PRGA process of RC4 and cipher text is obtained. These                              discover WEP enabled network and capture raw
steps take place in the reverse order at the receiver side                          802.11 frames.
using the same key. WEP uses CRC-32 algorithm for data                          3. aireplay-ng : generates and injects packets into the
integrity.                                                                          network (not necessary in WEP cracking).
                                                                                4. aircrack-ng- WEP key cracker using collected
                                                                                    unique IVs.

                                                                           Procedure for Cracking WEP:

                                                                                1.   airmon-ng start wlan0



         Fig 1. WEP Encryption

                                                                                     Fig 1: Snapshot output airmon-ng

                                                                                2.   airodump-ng –w testwep mon0

                                                                                     Here, testwep is the file name where packets are
                                                                                     captured. Copy the bssid of the access point.

                   Fig 2. WEP Decryption

Attacking a WEP network

Some flaws in WEP make it crackable. The IV is sent as
plaintext with the encrypted packet. Therefore, anyone can
easily sniff this information out of the airwave and thus
learn the first three characters or the secret key. Both the
KSA and PRGA leak information during the first few
iterations of their algorithm. XOR is a simple process that
can be easily used to deduce any unknown value if the
other two values are known. The format is (B + 3, 255, x)
where B is the byte of the secret key being cracked.                                 Fig 2. Snapshot output airodump-ng




                                                All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
                                                                                                                                              35
ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                                         International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                                             Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012



3.   Now check the access point channel(here 6) and
     again restart the monitoring on this channel.                 Test Results:
     airmon-ng stop mon0
                                                                             Security Mechanism: WEP (40 bit)
     airmon-ng stop wlan0
     airmon-ng start wlan0 6                                                 Time Required: 15-20 min

                                                                             Mode: Adhoc.

                                                                             Beacon frames:10000

                                                                             IV’s captured: 15000

                                                                             Result: Successful.


       Fig 3. Snapshot output airmon-ng. i.e stopping.             WEP WEAKNESSES: [3], [4]

4.   airodump-ng –w testwep - - channel 6 mon0                              WEP does not prevent forgery of packets.

                                                                            WEP does not prevent replay attacks. An attacker
                                                                             can simply record and replay packets as desired
                                                                             and they will be accepted as legitimate.

                                                                            WEP uses RC4 improperly. The keys used are
                                                                             very weak, and can be brute-forced on standard
                                                                             computers in hours to minutes, using freely
                                                                             available software.

                                                                            WEP reuses initialization vectors. A variety of
                                                                             available cryptanalytic methods can decrypt data
                                                                             without knowing the encryption key.
      Fig 4. Snapshot output airodump-ng. i.e restart
                the interface on channel 6                                  WEP allows an attacker to undetectably modify a
                                                                             message without knowing the encryption key.
5.   Aircrack-ng –l testwep.cap
                                                                            Key management is lacking.

                                                                   B. Wi-Fi Protected Access

                                                                   The second generation security mechanism to provide more
                                                                   reliable communication is 802.11i but an intermediate
                                                                   solution called WPA has been developed as a short term
                                                                   solution. Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) [5] has
                                                                   been designed as a patch for WEP in this solution. TKIP
                                                                   also employs RC4 algorithm but it includes some important
                                                                   modifications. During the communication keys are
                                                                   changing dynamically and much larger IV (48 bit) is used.
                                                                   A key mixing function is used for different keys on every
                                                                   session. In order to provide the data integrity during
                                                                   transmission, a new algorithm called Michael is used as
                                                                   message integrity code (MIC). Shortly TKIP provides per-
                                                                   packet key mixing, a message integrity check and a re-
                                                                   keying mechanism
                                                                   WPA did an excellent job of patching the problems in
             Fig 5. Snapshot output aircrack-ng                    WEP. With only a software upgrade, it corrected almost




                                          All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
                                                                                                                                      36
ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                                               International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                                                   Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012

every security problem either created or ignored by WEP.
However, WPA also created new problems:                                  Procedure for Cracking WPA2:

       One flaw allowed an attacker to cause a denial-of-                    1.   airmon-ng start wlan0
        service attack, if the attacker could bypass several
        other layers of protection.                                                The first step is to start the wireless interface in
        A second flaw exists in the method with which                             monitor mode. Then we start airodump-ng to
        WPA initializes its encryption scheme.
                                                                                   collect the four-way authentication handshake.
        Consequently, it's actually easier to crack WPA
        than it is to crack WEP.
                                                                              2.   airodump-ng –w wpatest mon0
                                                                                     Here copy the bssid of the access point.
C. 802.11i

The long term solution designed for wireless networks by
Task Group i (TGi) is 802.11i (also called WPA2). It has
been ratified as a standard in 2004. 802.11i doesn't employ                   3.   Now check the channel and again restart the
RC4 like WEP or WPA, it uses Counter Mode with CBC-                                monitoring on channel 6
MAC Protocol (CCMP) to encrypt network traffic. CCMP                               airmon-ng stop mon0
employs Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as                                      airmon-ng stop wlan0
encryption algorithm. 802.11i is backwards compatible
                                                                                   airmon-ng start wlan0 6
with WPA but not with WEP.


Attacking a WPA/WPA2 network

Unlike WEP, where statistical methods can be used to
speed up the cracking process, usually only plain brute
force dictionary techniques may be used against
WPA/WPA2 in an attempt to determine the shared
passphrase. That is, because the key is not static, so
collecting IVs like when cracking WEP encryption does
not speed up the attack. This means that the passphrase                            Fig 6. Snapshot output airmon-ng
must be contained in the dictionary you are using to break
WPA/WPA2. The only thing that does give the information                       4.   airodump-ng –w wpatest –d (bssid access point) -
to start an attack is the handshake between client and AP.                         - channel 6 mon0
Handshaking is done when the client connects to the
network.

During the handshake the AP and each station need an
individual so-called Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) to
protect unicast communication between them. The PTK is
derived from the PMK (Pairwise Master Key), a fixed
string, the MAC address of the AP, the MAC address of the
client and two random numbers. The weakness of WPA-
PSK is based on the pairwise master key (PMK) that is
derived from the concatenation of the passphrase, SSID,
length of the SSID and nonce’s (a number or bit string used                        Fig 7. Snapshot output airodump-ng
only once in each session). This is the algorithm: PMK =
PBKDF2 (password, SSID, SSID length, 4096, 256). The
result string is hashed 4,096 times to generate a 256-bit                     5.   aireplay-ng -0 10 –a bssid –h (bssid access point)
value and then combined with nonce values. As already                              -c (station bssid) mon0
mentioned, the PTK is derived from the PMK using the 4-                            This command De-Authenticates the station from
Way Handshake and all information used to calculate its                            the access point.
value is transmitted in plain text. By capturing the 4-Way
Handshake, we have the data required to subject the
passphrase into a dictionary attack.




                                               All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
                                                                                                                                            37
ISSN: 2278 – 1323
                                                              International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
                                                                                                                  Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012

                                                                        common feel that nowadays WPA/WPA2 security
                                                                        protocols are difficult for a stranger to hack; however, our
                                                                        study depicted that any wireless network may be suffering
                                                                        from successful hacking attempts, if it is not carefully setup
                                                                        and protected.

                                                                                                V. REFERENCES:

                                                                        [1]   Guido R. Hiertz, RWTH Aachen University Dee Denteneer, Philips
                                                                              Lothar Stibor and Yunpeng Zang, RWTH Aachen University
                                                                              “The IEEE 802.11 Universe”.
 Fig 8. Snapshot output aireplay-ng. i.e disconnecting the              [2]   SANS Institute Reading Room site “The evolution of wireless
                 station from access point                                    security in 802.11 networks: WEP, WPA and 802.11 standards”.
                                                                        [3]   Alexander Gutjahr “Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
                                                                              Functionality, Weak Points, Attacks”.
                                                                        [4]   Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin and Adi Shamir “Weakness in Key
                                                                              Scheduling Algorithm Of RC4”.
    6.   aircrack-ng –w passwords.txt *.cap                             [5]   Bernard Menezes “Network Security and Cryptography”.
                                                                        [6]   G. Zeynep Gurkas, A. Halim Zaim, M. Ali Aydin “Security
         Here we are applying the Dictionary Attack on                        Mechanisms And Their Performance Impacts On Wireless Local
                                                                              Area Networks”.
         captured encrypted IV’s.                                       [7]   http://www.aircrack-ng.org/

                                                                        Vishal Kumkar holds a Diploma in Computer Engineering from
                                                                        Vivekanand Education Society’s Polytechnic, Mumbai (2009) and will be
                                                                        graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering in computer science
                                                                        from Veermata Jijabai Technological Institute, Mumbai (India) in 2012.
                                                                         He has interned as a Software Analyst at Goldman Sachs Services
                                                                        during the period May-July 2011.
                                                                         His areas of interests are Networks, Algorithms, Operating System, Data
                                                                        Structures, Data Mining .

                                                                        Akhil Tiwari will be graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering
Fig 9. Snapshot output aircrack-ng. i.e applying dictionary             in computer science from Veermata Jijabai Technological Institute,
                                                                        Mumbai (India) in 2012.
                          attack.                                        His areas of interests are Networks, Algorithms, Data structures,
                                                                        Artificial Intelligence and Web Application Development.
Test Results:
                                                                        Pawan Tiwari will be graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in
                                                                        Engineering in computer science from Veermata Jijabai Technological
         Security Mechanism: WPA2                                       Institute, Mumbai (India) in 2012.
                                                                         His areas of interests are Networks, Algorithms, Data structures,
         Mode: Infrastructure                                           Artificial Intelligence and Web Application Development.

                                                                        Ashish Gupta holds a Diploma in Computer Engineering from VPM’s
         Time Required: 10 min                                          Polytechnic, Thane (2009) and will be graduating with a Bachelor's
                                                                        Degree in Engineering in computer science from Veermata Jijabai
         Attack Type: Dictionary.                                       Technological Institute, Mumbai (India) in 2012.
                                                                        His areas of interest are Databases, Computer Networks, Operating
                                                                        Systems.
         Result: Successful.
                                                                        Mrs. Seema Shrawne graduated with a Bachelor’s Degree in Engineering
                                                                        in computer science from Government College of Engineering, Amravati,
                                                                        in 1992.
                                                                        She has been a Senior lecturer in the computer technology department at
                   IV. CONCLUSION
                                                                        Veermata Jijabai Technological Institute, Mumbai (India) for the last 11
                                                                        years. Her areas of interest are Databases, Computer Networks and
Wireless networks are becoming the most rapidly spread                  Information Retrieval, System Security.
technology over the world; thus, they should be well
protected, in order to prevent exploitation of confidential
data. In this paper we presented a brief overview of them,
focusing on three main security protocols WEP, WPA and
WPA2. We discussed and presented the overall detail
procedure for cracking WEP and WPA2. Our motivation
was the need for increased wireless security and the




                                              All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET
                                                                                                                                            38

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  • 1. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012 Vulnerabilities of Wireless Security protocols (WEP and WPA2) Vishal Kumkar, Akhil Tiwari, Pawan Tiwari, Ashish Gupta, Seema Shrawne Abstract - Wirelesses Local Area Networks (WLANs) have The traditional WLAN security mechanism is WEP. WEP become more prevalent and are widely deployed and used is an encryption algorithm designed in 1999 along with in many popular places like university campuses, airports, 802.1 lb standard to provide wireless security. It employs residences, cafes etc. With this growing popularity, the RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4) algorithm from RSA Data Security. security of wireless network is also very important. In this However, several serious weaknesses were identified by study we present the security mechanisms available for cryptanalysts and WEP was superseded by Wi-Fi Protected WLANs. These security mechanisms are Wired Equivalent Access (WPA) in 2003, and then by the full IEEE 802.11i Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and standard (also known as WPA2) in 2004. Despite the 802.11i (WPA2).Our aim is to show how an attack can be serious security flaws WEP still provides a minimal level made on systems using the above mentioned mechanisms. security. We have given a brief overview of their working, structure, In this paper we investigated different security mechanisms algorithms used and have tried to explore the real time available for WLANs and their real time vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities by issuing successful attacks against WEP ways of cracking them. and WPA2 network. The attacks were done in an ad-hoc network, using three laptops with wi-fi facility. We begin II. IEEE STANDARDS with WEP protocol which employs a flawed RC4 algorithm is very much prone to attack and is easily IEEE 802.11 [1] is a set of Wireless LAN standards crackable, then listing some of its weakness. We then have developed by working group 11 of the IEEE 802 a look on WPA as the enhanced standard of WEP, along committee. The first 802.11 standard released in October with some flaws in it. Finally an attack on WPA2 is 1997 and revised in March 1999 as 802.1lb. The 802.1la explained. Aircrack-ng is the tool (software) that we have standard developed in 1999 for wireless asynchronous used to launch the attacks. The commands required for transfer mode (ATM) networks. 802.11g standard was attacking are explained, along with the screen-shots to help ratified in 2003. Successful businesses benefit from these understand the working. standards both by actively participating in the standardization process and by using standards as strategic Index Terms- WEP, 802.11, WPA, WPA2 market instruments. When it comes to security, a number of committees have made an effort including the IEEE's I. INTRODUCTION 802.11 Task Group i (TGi), the Internet Engineering Task Force and the National Institute of Standards (NIST). Wireless local area networks (WLANs) are of great However, the group that plays the most powerful role in importance in network technologies. WLANs, Bluetooth development of WLAN security standards is the TGi. and cellular networks gained popularity in computer and business industry with many consequent security issues. A. Architecture Especially WLAN systems like IEEE 802.11 networks became common access networks in private and public 802.11 network architecture consists of cells that are environments. They have lots of benefits like mobility and overlapped with each other. Basic Service Set (BSS) flexibility. Unlike a traditional wired LAN, users have defines the coverage area of a cell. A station that is not in a much more freedom for accessing the network. Such specific BSS cannot communicate with the other stations in benefits also come with several security considerations. this BSS. There are two modes of 802.11 networks Security risks in wireless environments include risks of Infrastructure Mode and Ad Hoc Mode. In infrastructure wired networks plus the new risks as a result of mobility. mode, WLANs consist of wireless stations and access To reduce these risks and protect the users from points. Access points that are providing communication eavesdropping, organizations have been adopted several with the wired network and managing network traffic, are security mechanisms. connected with a distribution system (such as Ethernet) All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET 34
  • 2. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012 III. WIRELESS LAN SECURITY In order to sufficiently crack a real-life WEP key of a wireless AP, we need to gather lots of initialization vectors The security mechanisms for secure communications on (IVs). Normal network traffic does not typically generate 802.11 wireless networks have been developed in the these IVs very quickly. Theoretically, if you are patient, following chronological order [2]: you can gather sufficient IVs to crack the WEP key by simply listening to the network traffic and saving them. * Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) However, in this work, we use a technique called injection * Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) to speed up the process. Injection involves having the AP * 802.11i (WPA2) resend selected packets over and over again very rapidly. This allows us to capture a large number of IVs in a short A. Wired Equivalent Privacy period of time. Once we have captured a large number of IVs, we can use them to determine the WEP key. In WEP [2] is an encryption algorithm developed by an IEEE practice WEP cracking can easily be demonstrated using volunteer group. The aim of WEP algorithm is to provide a tools such as Aircrack. secure communication over radio signals between two end users of a WLAN. WEP employs RC4 algorithm for Aircrack [7] contains four main utilities, used in the four encryption and uses two key sizes: 40 bit and 104 bit; to attack phases that take place to recover the key: each is added a 24-bit initialization vector (IV) which is 1. airmon-ng : starts/stops the wireless network card transmitted directly. At the transmitter side the plaintext is in monitor mode. XOR'ed with the key stream, generated after KSA and 2. airodump-ng: wireless sniffing tool used to PRGA process of RC4 and cipher text is obtained. These discover WEP enabled network and capture raw steps take place in the reverse order at the receiver side 802.11 frames. using the same key. WEP uses CRC-32 algorithm for data 3. aireplay-ng : generates and injects packets into the integrity. network (not necessary in WEP cracking). 4. aircrack-ng- WEP key cracker using collected unique IVs. Procedure for Cracking WEP: 1. airmon-ng start wlan0 Fig 1. WEP Encryption Fig 1: Snapshot output airmon-ng 2. airodump-ng –w testwep mon0 Here, testwep is the file name where packets are captured. Copy the bssid of the access point. Fig 2. WEP Decryption Attacking a WEP network Some flaws in WEP make it crackable. The IV is sent as plaintext with the encrypted packet. Therefore, anyone can easily sniff this information out of the airwave and thus learn the first three characters or the secret key. Both the KSA and PRGA leak information during the first few iterations of their algorithm. XOR is a simple process that can be easily used to deduce any unknown value if the other two values are known. The format is (B + 3, 255, x) where B is the byte of the secret key being cracked. Fig 2. Snapshot output airodump-ng All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET 35
  • 3. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012 3. Now check the access point channel(here 6) and again restart the monitoring on this channel. Test Results: airmon-ng stop mon0 Security Mechanism: WEP (40 bit) airmon-ng stop wlan0 airmon-ng start wlan0 6 Time Required: 15-20 min Mode: Adhoc. Beacon frames:10000 IV’s captured: 15000 Result: Successful. Fig 3. Snapshot output airmon-ng. i.e stopping. WEP WEAKNESSES: [3], [4] 4. airodump-ng –w testwep - - channel 6 mon0  WEP does not prevent forgery of packets.  WEP does not prevent replay attacks. An attacker can simply record and replay packets as desired and they will be accepted as legitimate.  WEP uses RC4 improperly. The keys used are very weak, and can be brute-forced on standard computers in hours to minutes, using freely available software.  WEP reuses initialization vectors. A variety of available cryptanalytic methods can decrypt data without knowing the encryption key. Fig 4. Snapshot output airodump-ng. i.e restart the interface on channel 6  WEP allows an attacker to undetectably modify a message without knowing the encryption key. 5. Aircrack-ng –l testwep.cap  Key management is lacking. B. Wi-Fi Protected Access The second generation security mechanism to provide more reliable communication is 802.11i but an intermediate solution called WPA has been developed as a short term solution. Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) [5] has been designed as a patch for WEP in this solution. TKIP also employs RC4 algorithm but it includes some important modifications. During the communication keys are changing dynamically and much larger IV (48 bit) is used. A key mixing function is used for different keys on every session. In order to provide the data integrity during transmission, a new algorithm called Michael is used as message integrity code (MIC). Shortly TKIP provides per- packet key mixing, a message integrity check and a re- keying mechanism WPA did an excellent job of patching the problems in Fig 5. Snapshot output aircrack-ng WEP. With only a software upgrade, it corrected almost All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET 36
  • 4. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012 every security problem either created or ignored by WEP. However, WPA also created new problems: Procedure for Cracking WPA2:  One flaw allowed an attacker to cause a denial-of- 1. airmon-ng start wlan0 service attack, if the attacker could bypass several other layers of protection. The first step is to start the wireless interface in  A second flaw exists in the method with which monitor mode. Then we start airodump-ng to WPA initializes its encryption scheme. collect the four-way authentication handshake. Consequently, it's actually easier to crack WPA than it is to crack WEP. 2. airodump-ng –w wpatest mon0 Here copy the bssid of the access point. C. 802.11i The long term solution designed for wireless networks by Task Group i (TGi) is 802.11i (also called WPA2). It has been ratified as a standard in 2004. 802.11i doesn't employ 3. Now check the channel and again restart the RC4 like WEP or WPA, it uses Counter Mode with CBC- monitoring on channel 6 MAC Protocol (CCMP) to encrypt network traffic. CCMP airmon-ng stop mon0 employs Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as airmon-ng stop wlan0 encryption algorithm. 802.11i is backwards compatible airmon-ng start wlan0 6 with WPA but not with WEP. Attacking a WPA/WPA2 network Unlike WEP, where statistical methods can be used to speed up the cracking process, usually only plain brute force dictionary techniques may be used against WPA/WPA2 in an attempt to determine the shared passphrase. That is, because the key is not static, so collecting IVs like when cracking WEP encryption does not speed up the attack. This means that the passphrase Fig 6. Snapshot output airmon-ng must be contained in the dictionary you are using to break WPA/WPA2. The only thing that does give the information 4. airodump-ng –w wpatest –d (bssid access point) - to start an attack is the handshake between client and AP. - channel 6 mon0 Handshaking is done when the client connects to the network. During the handshake the AP and each station need an individual so-called Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) to protect unicast communication between them. The PTK is derived from the PMK (Pairwise Master Key), a fixed string, the MAC address of the AP, the MAC address of the client and two random numbers. The weakness of WPA- PSK is based on the pairwise master key (PMK) that is derived from the concatenation of the passphrase, SSID, length of the SSID and nonce’s (a number or bit string used Fig 7. Snapshot output airodump-ng only once in each session). This is the algorithm: PMK = PBKDF2 (password, SSID, SSID length, 4096, 256). The result string is hashed 4,096 times to generate a 256-bit 5. aireplay-ng -0 10 –a bssid –h (bssid access point) value and then combined with nonce values. As already -c (station bssid) mon0 mentioned, the PTK is derived from the PMK using the 4- This command De-Authenticates the station from Way Handshake and all information used to calculate its the access point. value is transmitted in plain text. By capturing the 4-Way Handshake, we have the data required to subject the passphrase into a dictionary attack. All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET 37
  • 5. ISSN: 2278 – 1323 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology Volume 1, Issue 2, April 2012 common feel that nowadays WPA/WPA2 security protocols are difficult for a stranger to hack; however, our study depicted that any wireless network may be suffering from successful hacking attempts, if it is not carefully setup and protected. V. REFERENCES: [1] Guido R. Hiertz, RWTH Aachen University Dee Denteneer, Philips Lothar Stibor and Yunpeng Zang, RWTH Aachen University “The IEEE 802.11 Universe”. Fig 8. Snapshot output aireplay-ng. i.e disconnecting the [2] SANS Institute Reading Room site “The evolution of wireless station from access point security in 802.11 networks: WEP, WPA and 802.11 standards”. [3] Alexander Gutjahr “Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Functionality, Weak Points, Attacks”. [4] Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin and Adi Shamir “Weakness in Key Scheduling Algorithm Of RC4”. 6. aircrack-ng –w passwords.txt *.cap [5] Bernard Menezes “Network Security and Cryptography”. [6] G. Zeynep Gurkas, A. Halim Zaim, M. Ali Aydin “Security Here we are applying the Dictionary Attack on Mechanisms And Their Performance Impacts On Wireless Local Area Networks”. captured encrypted IV’s. [7] http://www.aircrack-ng.org/ Vishal Kumkar holds a Diploma in Computer Engineering from Vivekanand Education Society’s Polytechnic, Mumbai (2009) and will be graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering in computer science from Veermata Jijabai Technological Institute, Mumbai (India) in 2012. He has interned as a Software Analyst at Goldman Sachs Services during the period May-July 2011. His areas of interests are Networks, Algorithms, Operating System, Data Structures, Data Mining . Akhil Tiwari will be graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering Fig 9. Snapshot output aircrack-ng. i.e applying dictionary in computer science from Veermata Jijabai Technological Institute, Mumbai (India) in 2012. attack. His areas of interests are Networks, Algorithms, Data structures, Artificial Intelligence and Web Application Development. Test Results: Pawan Tiwari will be graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering in computer science from Veermata Jijabai Technological Security Mechanism: WPA2 Institute, Mumbai (India) in 2012. His areas of interests are Networks, Algorithms, Data structures, Mode: Infrastructure Artificial Intelligence and Web Application Development. Ashish Gupta holds a Diploma in Computer Engineering from VPM’s Time Required: 10 min Polytechnic, Thane (2009) and will be graduating with a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering in computer science from Veermata Jijabai Attack Type: Dictionary. Technological Institute, Mumbai (India) in 2012. His areas of interest are Databases, Computer Networks, Operating Systems. Result: Successful. Mrs. Seema Shrawne graduated with a Bachelor’s Degree in Engineering in computer science from Government College of Engineering, Amravati, in 1992. She has been a Senior lecturer in the computer technology department at IV. CONCLUSION Veermata Jijabai Technological Institute, Mumbai (India) for the last 11 years. Her areas of interest are Databases, Computer Networks and Wireless networks are becoming the most rapidly spread Information Retrieval, System Security. technology over the world; thus, they should be well protected, in order to prevent exploitation of confidential data. In this paper we presented a brief overview of them, focusing on three main security protocols WEP, WPA and WPA2. We discussed and presented the overall detail procedure for cracking WEP and WPA2. Our motivation was the need for increased wireless security and the All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET 38