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Applications Under Siege:
  Defending Against Attack Outbreaks
Amichai Shulman, CTO, Imperva
Agenda


 Introduction to our Hacker Intelligence Initiative (HII)
  and Web Application Attack Report (WAAR)
 Taking a new approach
 Analyzing real-life attack traffic
      + Key findings
      + Take-aways
 Summary of recommendations




2
Amichai Shulman – CTO Imperva

 Speaker at Industry Events
   + RSA, Sybase Techwave, Info Security UK, Black Hat
 Lecturer on Info Security
   + Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
 Former security consultant to banks & financial
  services firms
 Leads the Application Defense Center (ADC)
   + Discovered over 20 commercial application
     vulnerabilities
      – Credited by Oracle, MS-SQL, IBM and others




        Amichai Shulman one of InfoWorld’s “Top 25 CTOs”
Introduction to HII and WAAR




                               CONFIDENTIAL
HII - Hacker Intelligence Initiative

 Hacker Intelligence Initiative is focused on
  understanding how attackers are operating in
  practice
      + A different approach from vulnerability research
 Data set composition
      + ~50 real world applications
      + Anonymous Proxies
 More than 18 months of data
 Powerful analysis system
      + Combines analytic tools with drill down capabilities




 5
HII - Motivation


 Focus on actual threats
   + Focus on what hackers want, helping good guys prioritize
   + Technical insight into hacker activity
   + Business trends of hacker activity
   + Future directions of hacker activity
 Eliminate uncertainties
   + Active attack sources
   + Explicit attack vectors
   + Spam content
 Devise new defenses based on real data
   + Reduce guess work
HII Reports

 Monthly reports based on data collection
  and analysis
 Drill down into specific incidents or
  attack types
 2011 / 2012 reports
   +   Remote File Inclusion
   +   Search Engine Poisoning
   +   The Convergence of Google and Bots
   +   Anatomy of a SQLi Attack
   +   Hacker Forums Statistics
   +   Automated Hacking
   +   Password Worst Practices
   +   Dissecting Hacktivist Attacks
   +   CAPCHA Analysis
WAAR – Web Application Attack Report


 Semi annual
 Based on aggregated analysis of
  6 / 12 months of data                Download Roports:
 Motivation                           WAAR Edition #1
                                       WAAR Edition #2
   + Pick-up trends                    WAAR Edition #3
   + High level take outs
   + Create comparative measurements
     over time
Taking a New Approach




                        CONFIDENTIAL
Retrospective


 Assumptions
   + Attack requests are more or less evenly spread over time
   + Applications are more or less similar
 Method
   + Count and analyze individual requests
   + Look at average over time / application
 Consequence
   + “An application experiences an attack every other minute”
Contemplation


 Observations
   + Attack traffic has a burst nature
   + Applications in our data set show some outliers
 Reflections
   + Do organizations really need to handle an alert every two
     minutes?
   + Do organizations handle a steady stream of attacks of an evenly
     distributed nature?
Resolution


 Abandon individual requests and
  look at incidents
   + 30 requests (or more) within 5 mins
   + Intensity and durability
 Further aggregate incidents into
  “battle days”
   + A day that includes at least one
     incident
Resolution (cont.)


 Then there is the man who drowned crossing a stream
  with an average depth of six inches - W.I.E. Gates
   + Distribution of web attacks is asymmetric and includes rare, yet
     extremely meaningful, outliers
   + Security professionals who would prepare for the “average
     case” will be overwhelmed by the intensity of incidents when
     these actually happen
   + We shifted away from average into other measures like median
     and quartiles
   + Use Box & Whisker charts to display data
       – Express dispersion and skewness
Box and Whisker

           Median
                    75%
                           95%




                           5%


                     25%
Data Analysis




                CONFIDENTIAL
Goals


 Frequency
   + How many incidents / battle days per
      time frame
 Persistency
   + Duration of incidents
 Magnitude
   + Volume of traffic during involved in an
      incident / battle day
 Predictability
   + Can one predict the timing of next
      incident based on analyzing the timing of
      past incidents?
Overview



                                    Typical   Worst-case
                                   (median)    (max)
    Battle days (over a 6 months
                                     59          141
    period)
    Incidents (over a 6 months
                                     137        1383
    period)
    Incident magnitude (requests
                                     195        8790
    per incident)
    Incident duration (minutes)      7.70        79
Overview – Frequency


   An incident is expected every 3rd day
   Some applications are attacked almost every day
   A battle day usually includes more than a single attack
   Expected frequency affects the resources an
    organization needs to allocate on a constant basis for
    handling attacks
Overview – Frequency




             Take-away #1:
  Find out your expected attack frequency
Overview - Magnitude


 Typical case is ~200 requests
 Average is 1 every 2 minutes
 Worst case is more than 400 times that number
 Affects the size of equipment an organization needs for
  handling attacks
 Affects the capabilities required for handling incidents
    + Aggregation and summary
    + Quickly take action based on summary
Overview - Magnitude




              Take-away #2:
   Base line for scaling should be typical
      numbers. Aim for 3rd quartile.
Granular Comparison - Frequency

                      350



                      300



                      250
amount of incidents




                      200



                      150



                      100



                       50



                        0
                            SQLi   RFI   LFI   DT   XSS   HTTP
Granular Comparison - Frequency


 SQL injection is the most prevailing attack type
   + As opposed to previous edition that showed XSS and DT
 RFI attacks much more common than indicated by just
  looking at number of requests
 Outliers indicate that some applications are heavily
  targeted by a specific type of attack
       – SQLi
       – HTTP (malformed requests of various types)
       – DT
Granular Comparison - Frequency




             Take-away #3:
Attackers would try attacks that have better
potential benefit regardless of vulnerability
               assessment.
Granular Comparison – Frequency – Battle Days

                               80



                               70



                               60
# of battle days in 6 months




                               50



                               40



                               30



                               20



                               10



                               0
                                    SQLi   RFI   LFI   DT   XSS   HTTP
Granular Comparison - Magnitude

                          1600



                          1400



                          1200
  Requests per incident




                          1000



                          800



                          600



                          400



                          200



                             0
                                 SQLi   RFI   LFI   DT   XSS   HTTP
Granular Comparison - Intensity


 LFI is typically the most intensive attack
 RFI attacks tend to be more intensive than DT and SQLi
 Incidents are usually at the lowest 100s of requests per
  incident with extreme cases at the lower thousands
Granular Comparison - Intensity




             Take-away #4:
Make sure your solution tackles SQL injection
          and RFI at large scales.
Granular Comparison - Persistence

                       40



                       35



                       30
minutes per incident




                       25



                       20



                       15



                       10



                       5



                       0
                            SQLi   RFI   LFI   DT   XSS   HTTP
Granular Comparison - Persistence


 Majority of attacks are short
   + No more than 15 mins
   + Usually below 10 mins
 DT attacks tend to last longer, while XSS attacks tend to
  be shorter
 Figures suggest that attack type does not affect the
  intensity (requests per second) of attacks
   + LFI seems to have a higher tendency to intense incidents
      (higher magnitude with lower persistence)
 Supports our assumption with respect to the bursty
  nature of attack traffic
Granular Comparison - Persistence




             Take-away #4:
 No time to analyze individual requests and
  attack vector during an ongoing attack.
Worst Case Analysis


                                 SQLi     RFI     LFI     DT      XSS



     Magnitude (requests)      359390   35276   3941    8197    16222




     Intensity (requests per
                                543.2   742.2   418.4    378    455.4
     minute)


     Intensity (requests per
                               359465   41495   8343    11549   21113
     battle day)
# Attack per week




             0
                 5
                     10
                                15
                                       20
                                                   25
                                                        30
                                                             35
                                                                  40
                                                                       45
05/06/2011

19/06/2011

03/07/2011

17/07/2011

31/07/2011

14/08/2011

28/08/2011

11/09/2011

25/09/2011

09/10/2011

23/10/2011

06/11/2011

20/11/2011

04/12/2011

18/12/2011

01/01/2012

15/01/2012

29/01/2012

12/02/2012

26/02/2012

11/03/2012

25/03/2012
                                                                            Trending – A Single Application View




08/04/2012

22/04/2012

06/05/2012

20/05/2012

03/06/2012
                                DT
                                     LFI
                                           RFI




                          XSS
                                                 SQLi
Trending – A Single Application View


 Bursty nature of attacks clearly shows in this graph
 Extreme attack load of attacks during January
 Second half (even without the January burst) shows
  more attacks than first half (576 vs. 322)
 This trend is also true for general malformed HTTP
  requests
   + Empiric evidence to the correlation between malformed HTTP
     traffic and attacks
Predictability - Goals


 Try to predict the timing of next attack / battle day
  based on history of attacks / battle days
 We’ve showed that if an application faces an incident
  during a specific day, it is likely to experience more
  incidents that same day
   + Probably due to being part of a list distributed to attack bots
   + Maybe due to a change that made it pop on the to-do list of
      attack bots
 Being able to predict would affect the ability to
  effectively allocated resources
Predictability - Method


 Looked for Linear predication between battle days
 Use Auto Correlation Function (ACF)
 We employed Wessa, a freely available online service
  that performs auto-correlation
Predictability - Results


 No apparent correlation over a simple time gat
Predictability - Results


 Unreported, periodic, vulnerability scan
Summary – Previous Advice Still Holds True



  Deploy security solutions that deter automated attacks.



  Detect known vulnerability attacks.



 Acquire intelligence on malicious sources and apply it in real time.



  Participate in a security community and share data on attacks.
Summary – The Bursty Nature of Attacks



  Deploy for the right scale – Don’t be fooled by “average” good weather



  Automated response procedures - When under attack volume is too high



  Aggregate and summarize data in real time – Too many individual attacks
  to look at individually


  Be prepared – Bursts are unpredictable. Test your team’s readiness
Imperva: Our Story in 60 Seconds




        Attack                       Usage
      Protection                     Audit

        Virtual                      Rights
       Patching                    Management

      Reputation                     Access
       Controls                      Control
Webinar Materials




42
                         CONFIDENTIAL
Webinar Materials

 Join Imperva LinkedIn Group,
 Imperva Data Security Direct, for…

                        Answers to
        Post-Webinar
                         Attendee
         Discussions
                        Questions



          Webinar
                         Join Group
       Recording Link
www.imperva.com




- CONFIDENTIAL -

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Web Applications Under Siege: Defending Against Attack Outbreaks

  • 1. Applications Under Siege: Defending Against Attack Outbreaks Amichai Shulman, CTO, Imperva
  • 2. Agenda  Introduction to our Hacker Intelligence Initiative (HII) and Web Application Attack Report (WAAR)  Taking a new approach  Analyzing real-life attack traffic + Key findings + Take-aways  Summary of recommendations 2
  • 3. Amichai Shulman – CTO Imperva  Speaker at Industry Events + RSA, Sybase Techwave, Info Security UK, Black Hat  Lecturer on Info Security + Technion - Israel Institute of Technology  Former security consultant to banks & financial services firms  Leads the Application Defense Center (ADC) + Discovered over 20 commercial application vulnerabilities – Credited by Oracle, MS-SQL, IBM and others Amichai Shulman one of InfoWorld’s “Top 25 CTOs”
  • 4. Introduction to HII and WAAR CONFIDENTIAL
  • 5. HII - Hacker Intelligence Initiative  Hacker Intelligence Initiative is focused on understanding how attackers are operating in practice + A different approach from vulnerability research  Data set composition + ~50 real world applications + Anonymous Proxies  More than 18 months of data  Powerful analysis system + Combines analytic tools with drill down capabilities 5
  • 6. HII - Motivation  Focus on actual threats + Focus on what hackers want, helping good guys prioritize + Technical insight into hacker activity + Business trends of hacker activity + Future directions of hacker activity  Eliminate uncertainties + Active attack sources + Explicit attack vectors + Spam content  Devise new defenses based on real data + Reduce guess work
  • 7. HII Reports  Monthly reports based on data collection and analysis  Drill down into specific incidents or attack types  2011 / 2012 reports + Remote File Inclusion + Search Engine Poisoning + The Convergence of Google and Bots + Anatomy of a SQLi Attack + Hacker Forums Statistics + Automated Hacking + Password Worst Practices + Dissecting Hacktivist Attacks + CAPCHA Analysis
  • 8. WAAR – Web Application Attack Report  Semi annual  Based on aggregated analysis of 6 / 12 months of data Download Roports:  Motivation WAAR Edition #1 WAAR Edition #2 + Pick-up trends WAAR Edition #3 + High level take outs + Create comparative measurements over time
  • 9. Taking a New Approach CONFIDENTIAL
  • 10. Retrospective  Assumptions + Attack requests are more or less evenly spread over time + Applications are more or less similar  Method + Count and analyze individual requests + Look at average over time / application  Consequence + “An application experiences an attack every other minute”
  • 11. Contemplation  Observations + Attack traffic has a burst nature + Applications in our data set show some outliers  Reflections + Do organizations really need to handle an alert every two minutes? + Do organizations handle a steady stream of attacks of an evenly distributed nature?
  • 12. Resolution  Abandon individual requests and look at incidents + 30 requests (or more) within 5 mins + Intensity and durability  Further aggregate incidents into “battle days” + A day that includes at least one incident
  • 13. Resolution (cont.)  Then there is the man who drowned crossing a stream with an average depth of six inches - W.I.E. Gates + Distribution of web attacks is asymmetric and includes rare, yet extremely meaningful, outliers + Security professionals who would prepare for the “average case” will be overwhelmed by the intensity of incidents when these actually happen + We shifted away from average into other measures like median and quartiles + Use Box & Whisker charts to display data – Express dispersion and skewness
  • 14. Box and Whisker Median 75% 95% 5% 25%
  • 15. Data Analysis CONFIDENTIAL
  • 16. Goals  Frequency + How many incidents / battle days per time frame  Persistency + Duration of incidents  Magnitude + Volume of traffic during involved in an incident / battle day  Predictability + Can one predict the timing of next incident based on analyzing the timing of past incidents?
  • 17. Overview Typical Worst-case (median) (max) Battle days (over a 6 months 59 141 period) Incidents (over a 6 months 137 1383 period) Incident magnitude (requests 195 8790 per incident) Incident duration (minutes) 7.70 79
  • 18. Overview – Frequency  An incident is expected every 3rd day  Some applications are attacked almost every day  A battle day usually includes more than a single attack  Expected frequency affects the resources an organization needs to allocate on a constant basis for handling attacks
  • 19. Overview – Frequency Take-away #1: Find out your expected attack frequency
  • 20. Overview - Magnitude  Typical case is ~200 requests  Average is 1 every 2 minutes  Worst case is more than 400 times that number  Affects the size of equipment an organization needs for handling attacks  Affects the capabilities required for handling incidents + Aggregation and summary + Quickly take action based on summary
  • 21. Overview - Magnitude Take-away #2: Base line for scaling should be typical numbers. Aim for 3rd quartile.
  • 22. Granular Comparison - Frequency 350 300 250 amount of incidents 200 150 100 50 0 SQLi RFI LFI DT XSS HTTP
  • 23. Granular Comparison - Frequency  SQL injection is the most prevailing attack type + As opposed to previous edition that showed XSS and DT  RFI attacks much more common than indicated by just looking at number of requests  Outliers indicate that some applications are heavily targeted by a specific type of attack – SQLi – HTTP (malformed requests of various types) – DT
  • 24. Granular Comparison - Frequency Take-away #3: Attackers would try attacks that have better potential benefit regardless of vulnerability assessment.
  • 25. Granular Comparison – Frequency – Battle Days 80 70 60 # of battle days in 6 months 50 40 30 20 10 0 SQLi RFI LFI DT XSS HTTP
  • 26. Granular Comparison - Magnitude 1600 1400 1200 Requests per incident 1000 800 600 400 200 0 SQLi RFI LFI DT XSS HTTP
  • 27. Granular Comparison - Intensity  LFI is typically the most intensive attack  RFI attacks tend to be more intensive than DT and SQLi  Incidents are usually at the lowest 100s of requests per incident with extreme cases at the lower thousands
  • 28. Granular Comparison - Intensity Take-away #4: Make sure your solution tackles SQL injection and RFI at large scales.
  • 29. Granular Comparison - Persistence 40 35 30 minutes per incident 25 20 15 10 5 0 SQLi RFI LFI DT XSS HTTP
  • 30. Granular Comparison - Persistence  Majority of attacks are short + No more than 15 mins + Usually below 10 mins  DT attacks tend to last longer, while XSS attacks tend to be shorter  Figures suggest that attack type does not affect the intensity (requests per second) of attacks + LFI seems to have a higher tendency to intense incidents (higher magnitude with lower persistence)  Supports our assumption with respect to the bursty nature of attack traffic
  • 31. Granular Comparison - Persistence Take-away #4: No time to analyze individual requests and attack vector during an ongoing attack.
  • 32. Worst Case Analysis SQLi RFI LFI DT XSS Magnitude (requests) 359390 35276 3941 8197 16222 Intensity (requests per 543.2 742.2 418.4 378 455.4 minute) Intensity (requests per 359465 41495 8343 11549 21113 battle day)
  • 33. # Attack per week 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 05/06/2011 19/06/2011 03/07/2011 17/07/2011 31/07/2011 14/08/2011 28/08/2011 11/09/2011 25/09/2011 09/10/2011 23/10/2011 06/11/2011 20/11/2011 04/12/2011 18/12/2011 01/01/2012 15/01/2012 29/01/2012 12/02/2012 26/02/2012 11/03/2012 25/03/2012 Trending – A Single Application View 08/04/2012 22/04/2012 06/05/2012 20/05/2012 03/06/2012 DT LFI RFI XSS SQLi
  • 34. Trending – A Single Application View  Bursty nature of attacks clearly shows in this graph  Extreme attack load of attacks during January  Second half (even without the January burst) shows more attacks than first half (576 vs. 322)  This trend is also true for general malformed HTTP requests + Empiric evidence to the correlation between malformed HTTP traffic and attacks
  • 35. Predictability - Goals  Try to predict the timing of next attack / battle day based on history of attacks / battle days  We’ve showed that if an application faces an incident during a specific day, it is likely to experience more incidents that same day + Probably due to being part of a list distributed to attack bots + Maybe due to a change that made it pop on the to-do list of attack bots  Being able to predict would affect the ability to effectively allocated resources
  • 36. Predictability - Method  Looked for Linear predication between battle days  Use Auto Correlation Function (ACF)  We employed Wessa, a freely available online service that performs auto-correlation
  • 37. Predictability - Results  No apparent correlation over a simple time gat
  • 38. Predictability - Results  Unreported, periodic, vulnerability scan
  • 39. Summary – Previous Advice Still Holds True Deploy security solutions that deter automated attacks. Detect known vulnerability attacks. Acquire intelligence on malicious sources and apply it in real time. Participate in a security community and share data on attacks.
  • 40. Summary – The Bursty Nature of Attacks Deploy for the right scale – Don’t be fooled by “average” good weather Automated response procedures - When under attack volume is too high Aggregate and summarize data in real time – Too many individual attacks to look at individually Be prepared – Bursts are unpredictable. Test your team’s readiness
  • 41. Imperva: Our Story in 60 Seconds Attack Usage Protection Audit Virtual Rights Patching Management Reputation Access Controls Control
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