Deutsche Bank Research Top 10 Themes 2023

Deutsche Bank
Research
#PositiveImpact
Top 10
themes for 2023

Contents
1. Which pivot is more important in 2023?.....................................................4
2. 2023: a year of relative political stability....................................................5
3. The weaponisation of trade..........................................................................6
4. Semiconductors in 2023: a not so ‘semi’ decoupling...............................7
5. If Tech is the new value, what is the new growth?....................................8
6. The new 60/40: risk exposure trumps correlations..................................9
7. A bifurcation in property market: US v Rest of the world.....................10
8. Precision agriculture: a precise solution to food security......................11
9. “Give me your data”– cyberattacks, the bigger new bully in 2023.....12
10. When to price in good news......................................................................13

Deutsche Bank Research | Top 10 themes for 2023 | December 2022 3
Top ten themes for 2023 – summary
People often ask me how we choose our themes of
the year ahead. It is not a hard science, but there
is a framework we use and it starts by asking three
questions. First, “What policies and developments
in the economic, business, and political world are
unsustainable, and what will it take for them to become
sustainable?”. Second, “Where are people anchored
to recency bias?” Third, “What is growing that people
underestimate?” Asking these three questions
always triggers an avalanche of ideas and tangential
conversations. From here we select the ten themes we
think have the most potential to affect a broad range of
markets.
What about timing? We call these our ten themes for
2023, however, when they impact markets can be
variable. Reviewing our ten ideas for 2022, six were
reasonably accurate, two were not, and the other two
are yet to play out. Of course, I do not expect the ideas
in this edition to be the exact and exclusive predictions
that dominate 2023. But our ideas are not specific
predictions per se. Rather, they are the themes around
which we think several markets may move – not just
one. So even if you disagree with any of our ideas,
we hope that they will at least provoke an interesting
discussion about the direction of markets, economics,
business, and politics next year.
Luke Templeman
Director, Thematic Research

Arguably, the two most important drivers of markets in 2022 were the Fed raising interest rates and China’s
zero-covid policy. That means 2023 may be defined by the extent to which both of these pivot.
In the end, neither the Fed, nor China, are likely to formally announce a full pivot. Rather, both will likely
manage a ‘soft pivot’ that drip feeds easier policy into their respective economies. That is because the
consequences of an abrupt change for both could be severely negative. In the US, the Fed likely cannot
let anyone think it is easing up given inflation is forecast to be at 4.7 per cent in June 2023. Meanwhile in
China, limited hospital capacity means an abrupt end to covid restrictions could overload health services.
In both countries, a ‘soft pivot’ will likely take the shape of increased tolerance for the problem, against a
backdrop of hard talk. In the US, the Fed will continue to talk a tough game on inflation, however, as inflation
falls, it may consider easing shadow rates, or accepting some above-target price growth (which would help
inflate away government debt). In China, the tolerance for new cases in certain areas may gradually rise,
particularly in key economic regions. Acquired immunity will gradually make covid less of a threat.
How will each key indicator perform after a ‘soft pivot’? By the end of next year, US inflation should fall to 4.0
per cent. Meanwhile, Chinese GDP should rise ‘just’ 3.4 per cent, a level close to multi-decade lows. In other
words, both economies are likely to miss the targets for their respective economic indicators.
Potential upside comes from how a simultaneous ‘soft pivot’ by each country might help the other. That would
be opposite to what happened this year when the actions of both countries hurt the other. Specifically, higher
interest rate expectations in the US certainly contributed to flows of foreign investment into China being cut
almost in half in the June quarter compared with the previous one . Meanwhile, China’s zero-covid policy led
to a shortage of supply of many manufactured goods in the US. The mutual reliance may act as something of a
buffer and incentive, at least in the short term.
As both pivots are likely to be gradual, markets may not experience a spectacular one-off rally. Rather, it may
be a volatile path to higher asset prices as investors struggle to pinpoint an exact pivot moment. Consider
that most people can identify 15 September 2008 as the day that sparked the full-blown financial crisis. Yet
investors disagree on whether it ended in, say, July 2009 when the US recession officially ended, in April 2013
when the S&P 500 regained its pre-crisis peak, in December 2015 when the Fed finally raised rates, or perhaps
another date altogether. So not knowing when the US and China will officially pivot is okay. In fact, it would be
an entirely normal end to an economic crisis.
Which pivot is more important
in 2023?
– Luke Templeman
Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
0
100
200
300
400
500
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. from Baker, Bloom & Davis, Deutsche Bank
1 OECD

2023: a year of relative political
stability
– Henry Allen
Number of G7 countries with a major election that year
0
1
2
3
4
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023*
Note: *assuming no snap elections
Source: Deutsche Bank
Next year may prove to be a more stable period in global politics than we have grown used to in recent
years. Barring any snap elections, 2023 will be the first of the 21st century without a general or presidential
election in any G7 country. With this in mind, a (temporary) pause is likely in election campaigns and
leadership transitions. The result: leaders will be able to spend (comparatively) more of their time addressing
current challenges.
Incentives currently favour stability. That is especially the case in light of recent global market volatility and
the prospect of a looming recession. The gilt crisis in the UK this autumn was a demonstration of how both
economies and political parties can rapidly be pushed to the brink when markets are in a febrile mood. Some
cited those events as an example of what to avoid. For instance, when Germany unveiled its plan to freeze gas
prices, Finance Minister Lindner said: “we are explicitly not following the UK’s example." Elsewhere in Europe,
newly-elected Italian Prime Minister Meloni sought to reassure partners that she will be cautious with the
public finances. Importantly, following Liz Truss’ resignation as prime minister, her replacement, Rishi Sunak
pledged to “place economic stability and confidence at the heart of this government’s agenda.” Even his
political rivals called for party unity.
With politicians having plenty on their plate at home, incentives for stability will also be evident on the
international stage. Most notably, efforts are underway to ease tensions between the US and China. At the
G20 summit in Bali, Presidents Biden and Xi met in person for the first time as leaders, and the results were
generally considered to have exceeded expectations. The White House said both leaders had “agreed to
empower key senior officials” to communicate on issues such as climate change, food security, and global
macroeconomic stability. It was agreed that US Secretary of State Blinken will make a follow-up visit to China.
The will to foster stability has been noticed in the broad reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Even
countries who have previously been closer to Russia have suggested their disquiet with the conflict and a
desire for peace. For example, in September Russian President Putin acknowledged “questions and your
concerns” as he met Xi. On top of that, Indian Prime Minister Modi publicly said to Putin that “today’s era is
not of war”. The sole fact that Russia has been internationally upbraided to the extent it has, demonstrates its
behaviour has been an outlier.
The idea that “stability is destabilising” is widely attributed to the economist Hyman Minsky. His view was
that periods of stability contribute to more risk-taking, which itself breeds future instability and crises as
individuals grow complacent. The logic can work in reverse too, since periods of instability lead to greater
caution, and themselves lay the foundations for more stability in the future. This thought can also be applied
to politics. There is a strong case that 2023 will prove to be a more stable year.

Several taboos were broken this year in how trade is used as a weapon. That sets up 2023 to be a year when
countries may test new ways to weaponise their economic advantages.
Consider the new tactics utilised in trade disputes this year. First and foremost, the US froze foreign
currency reserves held by Russia’s central bank. It also used its control of payment systems to restrict
Russia’s access to trade. In addition, wealthy Russian expats had their assets expropriated by various
western countries. Meanwhile, many western companies self-sanctioned.
In turn, Russia broke new ground in restricting commodity exports. Europe is now scrambling to find
alternative natural gas supplies On top of that, many countries have been at risk from restrictions on food
exports from ports in the Black Sea. Meanwhile, the US also upped the ante on China and implemented a
host of new restrictions on technology exports and dealing with companies tied to the military.
As we look into 2023, countries may further push the barriers on the types of economic capabilities they
can use as trade weapons. Many could be considered. Some perhaps could come in the form of new
multi-country buyer cartels, restrictions on the supply of rare earth metals and other green transition
commodities, the nationalisation of foreign companies, further restrictions on foreign workers, and adoption
of digital currencies.
What happens if other countries decide to flex their muscle against the US? Western expats living in
‘competitor’ countries are not used to having their assets expropriated. Meanwhile, any restriction on
dealing with US companies connected to the military could be very broad reaching. After all, the US
military-industrial complex is so vast that a large number of companies are either suppliers to the military or
suppliers to those suppliers.
As more economic factors are weaponised it is possible that the established sanctions strategy will move
away from ‘particularisation’. That is to say, the current sanctions playbook leans more towards restrictions
on particular individuals and companies, whilst trade continues for everyone else. But as economic
disagreements grow more intense, this will likely spread to encompass more of a country’s economy and
push the world towards a multi-polar state.
A world with three or four powers all flexing their muscle means less globalisation and less growth. Indeed,
the right-hand chart shows that economic cycles tend to be the longest when the world is dominated by
a single power. The new world means increased premiums and hedging costs on assets that cross the
multi-polar divide. It means nearshoring and friendshoring. It also means recreating industries at home that
were previously deemed too expensive to host. The worrying thing is that as countries become more self-
sufficient, there is less incentive to pursue a compromise with difficult trade partners.
Number of corporate documents by keyword, US
and Europe, quarterly
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Supply chain decoupling
Reshoring
Nearshoring
Source: AlphaSense, Deutsche Bank
Length of each post-war US economic cycle by
date the cycle ended (months)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2020 2001 1970 1991 1945 2009 1980 1965 1968 1949 1975 1961 1982
Financial crisis to covid
1990s boom to tech bubble
1980s boom to 1990s recession
Tech burst to financial crisis
Source: Federal Reserve, Deutsche Bank
The weaponisation of trade
– Luke Templeman

Amid the deglobalisation trend, two ecosystems will likely start to develop within semiconductors in 2023.
One centred around the US, the other around China. The separation of powers was brewing before the war
in Ukraine, but the conflict has likely intensified it. If two chip ecosystems do indeed develop, China could
become more important for non-US chip companies in the long-term.
The recent US ban on American companies’ exports of software and equipment for advanced computing
chips represents a shift from ‘outpacing Chinese technological advances’ to ‘targeting a decoupling of the
semiconductor supply chain’.
The US rule has also thrown upside down the supply chains of semiconductors. Until now, the industry was
well-integrated within a highly specialised global system. Each region was responsible for different stages of
the production process as it made use of its comparative advantage. This scenario only works well, however,
when there is free trade and positive geopolitical relations. Because there are more than 50 points across
the value chain where one region holds more than 65 per cent of the global market share, a failure in any can
lead to disruption in the entire industry.
One particular point in the global supply chain which will likely feel the ripple effect from the US rule is
Taiwan. The island dominates the production of advanced semiconductors. Apart from the risk caused by
export bans, the island is vulnerable to geopolitical disputes and possible natural disasters.
The global importance of TSMC, Taiwan’s large semiconductor company, is highlighted in the fact that it has
the capacity to manufacture 54 per cent of the world’s semiconductors and 90 per cent of the most advanced
chips. Regardless of its global importance, its physical presence is local. Nearly all of its long-term assets,
including its manufacturing facilities, are in Taiwan.
Taiwan continues to rely on strategic partnerships with the West – the US is its critical international supporter.
Meanwhile, China is its largest export market. Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August added pressure to the
semiconductor industry. Any future restrictions could squeeze access to inputs necessary for production and
end markets. To be sure, it is in the interest of neither China nor the US to damage Taiwanese chipmaking
capacity or cut off market access as Taiwan’s role is not easy to replace. Achieving tech parity with Taiwan
would likely take years, whilst the same cost efficiency is a long way away.
Aside from geopolitical tensions, the world’s hub for semiconductors is situated in one of the most
tectonically complex regions in the world. To address that, TSMC facilities are built with seismic activity
in mind. Yet, if a major earthquake were to cause significant damage to Taiwan’s chipmaking capacity,
the rebuild could take years. In the case that Taiwan goes offline, everything from 5G networks, to the
development of the ‘metaverse’, to the availability of dishwashers will be impacted.
Share of global revenue in 2020 of finished
semiconductor products
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
47% 18% 15% 8% 8% 4%
United States South Korea Taiwan Japan EU China
Source: IC insights, Deutsche Bank
Market share, semiconductor manufacturers
TSMC
54%
16%
6%
7%
17%
SMC
Others
Samsung
United Microelectronics Corporation
Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank
Semiconductors in 2023: a not
so ‘semi’ decoupling
– Marion Laboure, Cassidy Ainsworth-Grace

The new macro regime has yanked the ‘growth’ label away from technology stocks. Yet reports of their
deaths are greatly exaggerated. In fact, many technology companies generate considerable cash and may
move towards being considered ‘value’ investments. Inevitably, something will rise and take their place as
a ‘growth’ stocks. But instead of belonging to a specific sector, such companies will need to have a set of
characteristics that align with the new macro backdrop.
It is not just rising rates that may shift tech stocks from growth to value, or perhaps ‘quality’ investments.
Tech faces a progressively more hostile environment. Inflation and slower economic growth are, of course,
key macro headwinds. On top of that, tech companies face the risk of increased influence from anti-trust
and competition policies. That likely means lower valuation multiples. Shareholders are more demanding too
– in this year of rising rates, payouts and cost discipline have been prioritised over last decade’s “growth at
all costs” paradigm. As many technology companies mature after double-digit growth, attention thus shifts
to how much capital they can return.
So, what are the new growth leaders? The answer is not a single sector, but a number of features that can be
found across industries. They revolve around the ability to capitalise on structural shifts in the economy and
the need to increase productivity. One such trait is the ability to do well in a world with multiple geopolitical
powers and tensions. Themes such as reshoring may favour firms that can scale up near their home markets
and absorb the costs associated with that. Fracturing global supply chains is a related trend companies can
capitalise on.
A second growth area relates to being involved in the green transition, particularly renewables and
materials, as countries adjust their infrastructure and energy systems. Firms involved in efficiency-improving
technologies that boost productivity can surpass consumer-focussed tech that dominated much of the
past decade but relied heavily on low rates and greater global integration. Interestingly, corporates will
find that one does not need to be a tech firm to benefit from tech innovation, as long as you have the cash.
Contracting tech multiples can help with that.
At a sectoral level, industrial policy will give a structural boost to companies involved in clean tech,
healthcare, computing and cybersecurity. This comes with a caveat. Unlike the growth stocks of last decade,
the new growth firms will have to generate positive cash flows, not burn cash. They will need it to finance
R&D themselves and acquire new capabilities. That trait will be company-specific. The luxury of reinvesting
cash flows will be accessible only to companies with compelling growth stories driven by fundamentals.
Without the tidal wave of the Faangs, the technology sector may no longer be the leading driver of stock
market returns it was last decade. Despite that, these companies will continue to matter due to their relative
size and ability to generate cash. Still, the retreat from tech can limit market-wide gains and redefine how
investors see growth stocks. That will leave a gap for the new growth stocks to emerge.
A way to go to reprice ‘old’ growth
15
30
45
60 Aggregates for S&P 500 by sector
P/E 5Yr Avg LF
Current P/E
P/E end of '21
Tech has not always dominated ‘growth’ stocks
0%
20%
40%
60%
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Share of members by sector
S&P 500 pure growth index
IT & Communications
Industrials, energy and materials
If Tech is the new value, what is
the new growth?
– Galina Pozdnyakova

Amongst the breakdowns in tried and true portfolio heuristics this year, none has stood out quite so much as
the spectacular drop in the 60/40 portfolio. Indeed, many investors now wonder if the once-normal negative
correlation between equities and bonds will ever return. That adds to concerns over several other market
correlations that have not worked out as many investors expected, such as gold and inflation.
What investors miss in the correlation debate will become more apparent in 2023 – the correlation between
stocks and bonds may matter less to the 60/40 portfolio than asset classes’ volatility contribution amid a
more uncertain macro regime. The market drops this year mainly highlight the fact that while the market
weights of equities and bonds are split as 60/40, the risk exposure within the portfolio is much more highly
weighted towards equities – often close to 90 per cent.
This mismatch is why the drop in 60/40 portfolios and their high volatility this year more closely resembled
that of the broader equity market, although bonds also heavily sold off (see chart on the left). As the chart
on the right shows, although the correlation between equities and bonds became positive this year, the
magnitude of comovement (beta) is still low relative to other assets.
As investors rebuild their 60/40 portfolios in 2023, risk management will therefore be front of mind as the
return of beneficial cross-asset correlations can be hard to predict. First and foremost, this will involve better
diversification of equity risk. The point here is to reduce the portfolio’s equity market beta for a world of
lower growth, higher inflation and more frequent left tail events that lead to the type of turbulent cross-asset
repricing experienced in 2022.
Assuming US large-cap technology stocks no longer outperform as they once did, equity returns will
become more meagre and potentially revert to long-term averages. That means that the nearly 90 per
cent of equity risk in the classic 60/40 portfolio may extend its drag on performance, especially relative to
the heavily repriced fixed income markets. The 60/40 portfolio will therefore need to include more lowly-
correlated and less volatile assets – in other words, those with a low equity beta.
In 2023, less correlated stocks and bonds will be found in new places. Consider the themes that have
accelerated this year, such as waning globalisation, geopolitical jitters, and diverging monetary policy cycles.
These are all decoupling international assets and thus will favour geographic diversification.
For those who construct portfolios, ensuring the risk exposure of 60/40 portfolios is closer to 60/40 than
90/10 requires placing volatilities at the forefront of portfolio construction. This will keep bonds firmly as
the backbone of a portfolio and emphasise the value of active duration management as central banks fight
inflation. For equities, this will imply a move from growth to quality stocks and a shift to coupon clipping in
credit from high-yielding stocks. And finally, it will raise further questions about whether 60/40 portfolios
should be increasingly allocated to private capital.
Cross-asset volatility fuelled 60/40
underperformance (YTD return of 60/40 US
portfolios)
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 06 10 14 18 22
S&P 500 x 60%
Treasuries x 40%
Higher correlations can be countered by lower
volatility
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.5 Equity beta '10-'21
Equity beta '22
Russell
2000
US
REITs
World
ex US
EM
US
HY
US
IG
Commodities
Treasuries
Beta with S&P 500
Size of the circle
represents
correlation
The new 60/40: risk exposure
trumps correlations
– Galina Pozdnyakova

The housing market in 2023 will likely bifurcate between the US and the rest of the world. Although house
price drops appear inevitable everywhere, the stronger structure of the US housing market could add to its
broader economic advantages – namely energy self-sufficiency and a (relatively) resilient economy.
Even though some weak spots have developed in the US this year, the property market there remains
strong. Yes, with the Fed funds rate aimed at restraining the post-pandemic rush in inflation, US lenders
have responded by more than doubling the rate on a 30-year mortgage to a two-decade high of seven per
cent. However, after the last crisis, mortgage lending standards were tightened, so called NINJA loans (No
Income, No Job, No Assets) were shunned, and adjustable-rate mortgages became the exception rather
than the rule.
Efforts to prevent another property collapse have culminated in the US mortgage loan-to-value ratio
halving to a little more than 25 per cent. Moreover, the rise in house prices has so far outpaced the modest
rise in debt. As a sign of security, government-sponsored Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to act
as a backstop, buying mortgages from lenders to hold or repackage, and guaranteeing timely payment of
principal and interest.
The health of the US housing balance sheet gives it some resilience as the broader market cools. Indeed,
mortgage applications are a little more than half of what they were a year ago. Affordability has also
decreased. A homebuyer with a 20 per cent down payment, that can afford to spend $2,500 a month on
their mortgage, can now afford a home worth around $450,000. A year ago, the same person would have
bought a home worth $700,000. One group has reasons to stay calm - existing mortgage holders with years
of tolerable fixed rates ahead of them.
While the rebuilt system in the US is helping in this downturn, other countries appear riskier. Indicators such
as housing permits and housing starts are flashing amber across key economies, not just the US.
What differentiates the US from the rest of the world is the fact that other countries appear less ready to
withstand a property shock. Scandinavian, Dutch and Australian households have a debt-to-disposable
income ratio of 200 per cent or more, twice as much as in the US. With this in mind, between 40-50 per cent
of Norwegian, Dutch, Swedish and Canadian households have mortgages. Perhaps more alarming is that
the vast majority of Finnish and Norwegian mortgages are fixed for no more than a year.
In most developed countries, non-prime buyers have moved in with their parents for longer, stayed in
rentals, or borrowed from less-regulated shadow institutions with punitive rates. The consequences of these
structural shifts go beyond the typical belt-tightening that accompanies a fall in house-prices. For most
high-inflation countries, those consequences could amplify the expected recessions of 2023. That is a deep
concern considering they do not have the same economic buffers that the US currently enjoys.
A bifurcation in property market:
US v Rest of the world
– Adrian Cox
US Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio %
10
20
30
40
50
'45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70 '75 '80 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05 '10 '15 '20
The ratio has halved since the GFC peak
back to 1980s levels
Total household debt as % of net disposable
income, 2021 or latest available year
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Source: OECD, Deutsche Bank

Food security shot into the spotlight this year following the risk of shortages from Russia and Ukraine.
Indeed, it commanded its own agenda at the recent COP meeting. As a result, 2023 is shaping up as an
acceleration year for the commercialisation of ‘precision agriculture’.
Precision agriculture is the concept of tailoring farming processes to specific parcels of land by using the
proliferation of wireless connectivity, new hardware, and analysis tools. These include positioning systems
like GPS, geo-mapping, sensors, integrated electronic communications and variable rate technology. The
aim is to help solve the food problem, particularly in emerging markets, by increasing productivity and crop
yields.
Precision farming tech can roughly be separated into three categories: guiding, recording and reacting. The
former includes forms of automatic steering for tractors and self-propelled agricultural machinery, such as
driver assistance and controlled traffic farming. Recording tech helps with soil and soil moisture mapping,
as well as canopy and yield mapping. Reacting tech means variable-rate irrigation, application technologies
for nutrients and crop protecting agents, as well as precision seeding and weeding.1
Take, for example, variable rate technology. One study has shown an increase of 8 per cent in wheat yields
(for 10 per cent less nitrogen), a rise of nearly 7 per cent in yields over 4 years in winter wheat (through
variable-rate seeding) and 7 per cent growth in net income on fields that used variable rate seeding and
data-influenced management zones.2
The point of precision farming is to produce more food from specific parcels of land using fewer resources.
Indeed, one Spanish example showed a 25 per cent water savings3
. Of course, the economic benefits are
different across regions. In the US, as a share of total production, precision agriculture’s potential gross
economic benefit is of 18 per cent.4
As precision farming techniques become more widespread, they will help decarbonise the food chain. This
is critical in countries achieving their self-stated climate goals as greenhouse gas emissions from farm,
livestock, and related land use comprise up to 25 per cent of all emissions from human activities.5
The food
system as a whole is responsible for a larger share.
Carbon offsets will likely be a driving force behind the decarbonisation efforts as they help solve the issue
of lack of financial incentives from agriculture climate adaptation. With carbon credits taking centre stage
at COP27 following the US carbon offset plan, their path towards a projected $190bn market by 2030
(up from $2bn in 2021 ) will likely take a big step forward in 2023 with the help of precision agriculture
techniques. It is rare that a true win-win scenario like this is offered to investors. 2023 could be the year they
take it.
Precision agriculture: a precise
solution to food security
– Olga Cotaga
1 Soto Embodas et.al., “The contribution of precision agriculture technologies to farm productivity and the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU”, 2019
2 Business Wales of Welsh Government, “Can Precision Farming Help Mitigate Climate Change?”
3 European Parliament, “Precision agriculture: an opportunity for EU farmers – potential support with the cap 2014-2020”
4 USDA, “A case for rural broadband: Insights on rural broadband infrastructure and next generation precision agriculture technologies”, April 2019
5 FAO 8 November 2021
Global VC, PE investment in AgTech*
0
20
40
60
80
0
500
1,000
1,500
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Total value of VC/PE investments
Total number of investment rounds
$m
*Descriptions include Agriculture Tech, Agriculture Technology, Precision Farming and
Precision Agriculture
Source: Factset, Deutsche Bank
Percentage of US farms with internet access
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Source: USDA, Deutsche Bank

“Give me your data”– cyberattacks,
the bigger new bully in 2023
– Cassidy Ainsworth-Grace
The events of 2022 threw into sharp relief the two questions that may shape how corporate digital
infrastructure needs to change in 2023. First, who is to blame for cyberattacks: corporates or hackers?
Second, what will tougher cyber regulation mean for corporate responsibility?
Some distressing hacks in 2022 (example below) showed that cyberattacks can no longer be written off
as simply the cost of doing business. Indeed, the public is beginning to see corporates as being at fault.
This change in the mood follows a pivotal year for cybercrime. In 2021, cyberattacks increased 31 per cent
compared with 2020.1
And the losses are deepening. A third of central banks in developed economies have
indicated cybersecurity losses have increased by over 20 per cent since the pandemic.2
Ransomware has emerged as one of the most popular technological threats. This involves infiltrating a
victim’s network to encrypt files and hold them for ransom. The number of these incidents in the US more
than doubled in 2021.3
Globally, the number of ransomware attackers grew 151 per cent.
An example from Australia this year shows what may be in store in larger economies. The event was a hack
of Australian health insurance provider Medibank. The result was the theft and ransom of the personal
information from nearly a third of the population. Medibank did not pay the ransom, and the hackers not
only kept the data encrypted, but also published sensitive medical details on dark web forums.
Compensation discussions are ongoing but the bigger picture is that this attack is emblematic of the
growth in large scale attacks of such personal information. Given the current mood regarding corporates
in the US and Europe, if growth here continues, it will quickly spark a heavy political response with serious
ramifications for companies in question.
The impact of politics on cybersecurity took a notable step forward this year. In March, the Biden
administration mandated companies to report hacks within 72 hours of discovery, and within 24 hours if a
ransom is involved. With the US as a starting point, it is likely that similar regulation will permeate across
advanced economies. Companies are still underestimating this, but if the growth rate in hacks continues in
2023 it is only a matter of time before an influential country has to respond to a Medibank-style hack.
The concerning thing for companies is that the risk has grown with work-from-home arrangements. Identity
management and data protection have particularly suffered and hackers have moved their focus away from
the core network to end users. Better regulation to incentivise better security is therefore critical.
1 World Economic Forum
2 Bank for International Settlements
3 US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
Number and cost of ransomware incidents filed with the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
0
300
600
900
1,200
1,500
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Total
amount
in
USD
(millions)
Number
of
inidents
Number of ransomware-related incidents (lhs)
Total cumulative cost of all ransomware-related incidents filed in 2021 (rhs,
USD millions)
Source: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Deutsche Bank

Pessimism is seductive, and especially so when we look ahead to 2023. The yield curve is hideously
inverted, recession is coming, and stock markets usually bottom only after a recession has started. But when
the outlook is overwhelmingly negative, and no one is positioned for good news, markets can bounce on any
unexpected positives that do arise. And given there are several scenarios where good news on big events
could occur in 2023, that makes for the unappetising decision for investors. Should they chase what may be
another bear market rally? Or will any positive boost finally be the real deal?
First consider inflation. In the US this will likely only fall to 4.0 per cent by next December. But just as many
investors could not believe the searing growth of the US money supply in 2020 would lead to today’s level of
inflation, many find it hard to conceive that the record pace at which the money supply is currently shrinking
will impact the other way.
Second, China. The country’s financial markets and real economy have suffered from covid restrictions this
year. However, with inflation forecast to stay below three per cent next year, China can afford to further
stimulate its economy. There is upside risk if they do.
Third, the war in Ukraine. It is impossible to predict how this situation will further unfold. And, true, there
may only be a small chance that good news will emerge. However, given the overwhelming consensus for a
drawn-out conflict, any progress towards a resolution would certainly give global economies and markets a
sudden boost.
As investors try to predict the price response to any good news, they may have to contend with a market
that moves more rapidly than expected. There are a few reasons for this. One concerns the very low
positioning in risk assets which means large investors chasing rallies can cause markets to ‘crash upwards’.
A second reason comes from the simple maths of interest rates (and expectations) moving from very-low
levels. When a company’s WACC moves from, say, 5 to 10 per cent (as may have recently occurred for some
corporates), there is far more value lost than if the WACC moves the same amount but from 10 to 15 per
cent.
For technical buffs, 2022 offers further clues that markets move rapidly on good news. Despite the selloff in
2022, the S&P 500 has posted 22 days where it jumped over 2.0 per cent. That is not only the fourth most of
any year since the Great Depression, but it is also comfortably the most in any year with a relatively “small”
market drawdown. So, amidst the (justifiably) pessimistic forecasts for 2023, it appears investors are jittery
to be involved in any upside. Blame algorithmic trading, passive ETFs, or even FOMO. Whatever the cause,
when markets do eventually jump, the speed of the moves may catch investors by surprise.
When to price in good news
– Luke Templeman
3m change in M2 money supply - US
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022
Quickest decline in M2
in at least 40 years
16%
Source: Federal Reserve, Deutsche Bank

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