Ismail Fahmi presented on fake news, electronic information law, and civil society initiatives in Indonesia. He discussed how fake news has developed and spread through social media and alternative websites in Indonesia. Civil society groups like MAFINDO were formed to combat fake news through fact-checking, reporting hoaxes, and media literacy programs. However, media partisanship and clickbait headlines have also contributed to the spread of misinformation. The electronic information law has been used to target both anti-government and pro-government groups, but its broad scope has also led to persecution of legitimate critics. Moving forward, strengthening civil society, improving media standards, and increasing information literacy through education are needed to address the fake news issue in Indonesia

1. Fake News, Electronic
Information and Transaction
Law, and Civil Society
Initiatives in Indonesia
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Director Media Kernels Indonesia (Drone Emprit)
Lecturer at the University of Islam Indonesia
Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP
CSEAS KYOTO UNIVERSITY - KYOTO
22nd JULY 2019

2. Kyoto Imperial Palace
2

3. 3
1992 – 1997 Undergraduate, Electrical Engineering, ITB, Indonesia
2003 – 2004 Master, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL
2004 – 2009 Doctor, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL
2009 – Now Engineer at Weborama (Paris/Amsterdam)
2014 – Now Founder PT. Media Kernels Indonesia, a Drone Emprit Company
2015 – Now Consultant at Perpustakaan Nasional, Inisiator Indonesia OneSearch
2017 – Now Lecturer at the IT Magister Program of the Universitas Islam Indonesia
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com

4. QUESTIONS
• How fake news developed and spread in Indonesia?
• How civil society movement evolved to help combating the fake
news?
• How Electronic Information and Transaction Law implemented?
4

5. INDONESIA DIGITAL
IN A NUTSHELL

6. 6

7. 7

8. 8

9. 9

10. 10
MILLENIALSGEN Z

11. THE STORY OF THE MOST POPULAR
FAKE NEWS IN INDONESIA

12. 10 MILLIONS OF ILLEGAL CHINESE WORKERS
(DECEMBER 2016)
12

13. CLARIFICATIONS IN ONLINE MEDIA
13
15 September 2016

14. CLARIFICATIONS IN SOCIAL MEDIA
14

15. TRENDS OF THE TOPIC

16. MAINSTREAM VS
ALTERNATIVE MEDIA

17. POLARIZATION

18. GOVERNMENT SOLUTION: BLOCKS THE WEB
SITES
18
NEW DOMAIN CREATEDDOMAIN BLOCKED

19. WHAT WE LEARN?
• Massive fake news can be a part of a propaganda.
• It uses non-mainstream (alternative) web sites to support the
claims, and takes benefits from the algorithm in social media to
viralize the messages.
• Blocking the web sites is a quick solution but might not be
effective for a long term solution, as the can be created using
different names easily.
19

20. IS THERE ANY IMPACT BY LIMITING
ACCESS TO SOCIAL MEDIA?

21. PROTEST AND RIOT IN JAKARTA (21ST MAY 2019)
REJECTING PRESIDENTIAL POLL RESULT
21

22. 22

23. TREN HARIAN FACEBOOK DAN TWITTER
START STOP

24. TREN HARIAN INSTAGRAM DAN YOUTUBE
START STOP

25. IMPACT ON WHATSAPP GROUP TRAFFIC
DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS
26.84526.20825.533
21.001
10.729
18.713
15.567
-42%-30% -60%
START STOP

26. IMPACT ON CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘JOKOWI’
DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS
424
488
327 323
77 67
186
-76%-42%
START STOP

27. IMPACT ON CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘PRABOWO’
DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS
618
482
405 407
123
27
155
-70%-61% -93%
START STOP

28. TREND OF CONVERSATION ABOUT ‘VPN’
DATA FROM 229 WA PUBLIC GROUPS
23
7
9
START STOP

29. IMPACT FROM LIMITING ACCESS TO SOCIAL
MEDIA AND MESSAGING
• No significant impact on social media traffic.
• Significant impact only on WhatsApp traffic.
• VPN is now widely known by internet users in Indonesia to
bypass current and future limitation by the government (e.g.
Internet Positive).
• Suggestion:
• Limiting access could be useful during a riot, and should not be
extended after the riot is over.
29

30. CYBER TROOPS AND POLITICAL
POLARISATION IN INDONESIA

31. 31

32. JAN 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
FIRST DEBATE
32
2017
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-Sandi
Agus-Sylvi

33. 7-8 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
SECOND DEBATE
33
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-SandiAgus-Sylvi
MCA
2017

34. 17 MAR 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
BEFORE THE 2ND ROUND ELECTION
34Pro Anies
Pro Ahok

35. IDEA FLOW:
MESSAGE DIFFUSES ACROSS PLATFORMS
35

36. TRAFFIC: SEWORD (PARTISAN) SURPASSED
MAINSTREAM MEDIA
36

37. 37
Via Social Media:
Seword
Via Google:
Kompasiana
Antaranews
Tempo
MAINSTREAM MEDIA

38. FAKE NEWS TOPICS ON JOKOWI DURING THE
2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Unfulfilled Promises
Claiming other’s works Anti Islam and Ulama
PKI
China
Leadership

39. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON JOKOWI

40. FAKE NEWS TOPICS ON PRABOWO DURING THE
2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
Hoaxes
Lack of experiences
Religion
Khilafah
Temperamental
Human Rights

41. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON PRABOWO

42. WHAT WE LEARN?
• Cyber troops usually rise during political events, especially
regional or general elections.
• They create polarization to get as bigger as supports from public.
• Advanced computational propaganda techniques used by the
cyber troops incorporating web sites, SEO, and social media
algorithms will help advancing polarization.
42

43. INDONESIA ANTI-SLANDER MOVEMENT

44. In this graph of echo chambers in the Twittersphere, purple dots represent
people spreading false claims about the Truthy research project; the two
accounts that sought to debunk the false information are in orange on the
far left. (Research by Indiana University, 2016)
INDIANA UNIVERSITY: HOW TO STOP THE
SPREAD OF FAKE NEWS
Hoax Buster
https://www.inverse.com/article/24361-misinformation-
social-media-can-technology-save-us

45. INDONESIA ANTI-SLANDER SOCIETY
(MAFINDO) DECLARED IN 2017
45

46. CONVERSATION ABOUT THE MOVEMENT ‘Anti
Hoax’
46

47. 47
DISTRUST TOWARD THE
MOVEMENT

48. 48
MAFINDO ACTIVITIES
KEEP MOVING ON

49. 49

50. 50

51. HOAX CHECKING
51

52. FACT CHECKER (CEKFAKTA.ID)
52

53. IMPACT OF FACT CHECK ON FACEBOOK STORY
53

54. HOT LINES FOR REPORTING
NEGATIVE CONTENT

55. MEDIA AS INFORMATION ARBITRAGE

56. CASE STUDY: SOCIAL NETWORK DURING
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DEBATE
02
01
01 EXTRA
CYBER TROOPS

57. ONLINE NEWS: INFORMATION ARBITRAGE

58. WHAT WE LEARN?
• Media is playing an important role in the world of post-truth and
polarization.
• Media should become information arbitrate, that bridges
information between polarized worlds.
• Fact-checking by the media once used by social media platform,
can reduce the dissemination of false news.
58

59. THE PROBLEM WITH MEDIA:
CLICK BAIT AND PARTISANSHIP

60. MEDIA: CLICK BAIT, NOT COVERING RELATED
SIDES
60

61. MEDIA: COVERING PARTIAL SIDES
61

62. FOUR DAYS OF UNCERTAINTY
62

63. 63
1 2
3
4
5
1
2
Arrahmahnews.com
*Gara-gara Dukung Ahok,
Jenazah Nenek 78 Tahun
Dilarang Dishalatkan di
Mushala*
3
4
5
ONLINE MEDIA AND SOCIAL MEDIA RESONANCE
10 – 11 MARCH 2017
Kumparan.com
Kesaksian Warga Setiabudi Tentang
Jenazah Nenek Hindun yang
Disalatkan
Tabloidbintang.com
Jenazah Nenek 78 Tahun Ini
Dilarang Dishalatkan di Mushala
Karena Semasa Hidup Mendukung
Ahok

64. 64
MEDIA IS THE MAIN REFERENCE FOR
MOST PROPAGANDA/CLAIMS
POSITIVE
NEGATIVE

65. FINALLY: A MEDIA COVER ‘ALL’ SIDES
65

66. WHAT WE LEARN?
• Media plays very important role in finding facts from the real
worlds.
• Readers and even Anti-Slander Society rely heavily on the media
reports about events in the real worlds.
• Media can be a double-edged sword.
• Partisan media disseminating fake news or half-truth news could
incite polarization and hate.
• Media should cover not only both sides, but sometimes ‘all’
sides.
66

67. UU ITE / ELECTRONIC INFORMATION AND
TRANSATION LAW

68. THE STORY OF SARACEN
68

69. THE RISE OF “MCA” OR “Muslim Cyber Army”
1 Mei 2016 – 31 Desember 2016
Sebelum pertengahan Desember 2016,
penyebutan “MCA” semua merefer pada sebuah
partai uni-ras di Malaysia, yaitu Malaysian Chinese
Association.
Mulai pertengahan Desember 2016, kita
akan sering menemukan “MCA” atau
“muslim cyber army” dalam percakapan
Twitter di Indonesia.

70. MCA IN 2017
Chat HRS
Seruan HRS terkait GMBI
Saracen
Aksi Bela Palestina

71. THE STORY OF MCA GROUPS (Moslem Cyber
Army)
71
TASKS OF MCA:
• Reports opponent targets
• Take down target accounts
• Send virus
The similar tasks were also done by pro
government’s cyber troops.

72. CYBER TROOPS
72
CYBER TROOPS: government,
military or political party teams
committed to developing or
manipulating public opinion
over social media.

73. CRITICS OR DEFAMATION?
73

74. UU ITE USED EASILY BY CORPORATIONS
74

75. WHAT WE LEARN?
• UU ITE (Electronic Information and Transaction Law) of 2008
has been revised in 2016 for not violating human rights due to
excessive punishment.
• UU ITE has been used widely to fights against anti-government
groups (e.g. SARACAN and MCA).
• Individuals (pro and anti government) who were punished using
UU ITE because they disseminate false news and slander,
usually are the victims of the fake news. The first creators of the
fake news are difficult to reveal.
• The minimum understanding of the public and police about UU
ITE has caused those expressing critics or opinions to be
persecuted.
75

76. THE FUTURE

77. Current Situation:
Vicious cycle of noises
77
Government
Noise
Opposition
Noise
Buzzers Buzzers

78. OUTSOURCE OUR THINKING TO ALGORITHM
78

79. WHAT WE NEED
• Strengthen the civil society movements to combat fake news.
• We need the law against fake news in Indonesia, but we need to
increase public’s and law enforcer’s understanding about the law
(UU ITE).
• Information literacy through education since in primary school.
79

80. BOOKS “READING INDONESIA”
80

81. THANK YOU
81