Managing Dangerous Offenders

CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE

Protective Marking Confidential
Publication Scheme Y/N No
Title & version Version 1
Purpose Information and Decision Making
Relevant to SCD/TP
Summary Appraisal of Systems/Structures to manage
dangerous Offenders
Creating Branch Code and Directorate SCD3(2)
Author (plus warrant/pay no) Insp James Cooke 172077
Date Created October 2004
Review date December 2004

Managing Danger
“Joining the Dots”
A Rapid Appraisal of Current Systems & Structures

Version I

September - November 2004

Specialist Crime Reduction Team SCD 3(2)
Room 235, New Scotland Yard, Broadway, London SW1H OBG
Telephone 0207 230 (6) 4216 E mail james.cooke@met.police.uk

CONFIDENTIAL – SPECIALIST CRIME DIRECTORATE 1


CONTENTS
Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………..3

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND………….……………………………………16

OBJECTIVES …………………………………………………………………………18

METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………………..19

MAIN FINDINGS & SWOT ANALYSIS

 Danger Definitions……………………………………………………………………21
 Risk identification……………………………………………………………………..24
 Risk referral……………………………………………………………………………27
 Risk assessment……………………………………………………………………..29
 Risk Management………………….…………………………………………………32
 Risk monitoring and review………………………………………………………….34
 Personnel and Training……………………………………………………………...35
 Risk IT/Manual systems……………………………………………………………..38

CASE STUDY
Harrow Risk Management Structure and Process…………………………………41

RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………………………..43

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A - CORPORATE UNIT REVIEW
 DCC2 Corporate Strategy Unit……………………………………………58
 Bichard Project Team………………………………………………………62

APPENDIX B - SCD UNIT REVIEW
 SCD1 Homicide Prevention Unit………………………………………………….65
 SCD5 Child Abuse Investigation and Paedophile Unit………………………...69
 SCD7 Serious and Organised Crime…………………………………………….73
 SCD 8 Trident………………………………………………………………………76
 SCD 11(7) Prison Intelligence Unit………………………………………………81

APPENDIX C - TP UNIT REVIEW
 Sapphire……………………………………………………………………………84
 Community Safety Units…………………………………………………………89
 Prolific and Priority Offenders……………………………………………………94
 Jigsaw and MAPPA……………………………………………………………….101

APPENDIX D – Semi Structured Interview Format…………………………………..107
APPENDIX E – Project Reference Group. ……………………………….………….109

Glossary…..………………………………………………………………………………..110
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..111



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Danger is complex and dynamic. There are different degrees of danger
and the highest risk cases have become a major concern nationally after the
Soham murders and other examples such as Copeland. Dangers have not
been identified early enough and adhoc information sharing between police
specialist departments has exacerbated the effectiveness of our response.

1.2 The Metropolitan Police recognises these dangers and the need to identify
early signs of high risk in offenders, victims and locations alike, which together
can cause a convergence of heightened danger. This requires full and
appropriate use of NIM. Criminologists call this “joining the dots”.

1.3 This review concentrates on the internal MPS position and the
opportunities to link work and rationalise our structures and processes. This is
the first priority before considering any major changes in our working
relationship with outside agencies, and many improvements can be made
over the short to medium term. This review clearly sets out how the entire
organisation including front line policing, Crime Desks, BIU, BOCU and SCD
specialist units can be engaged in this process more effectively, linking their
work with that of YOTS, Prison and Probation Service.

2. OBJECTIVES

2.1 This appraisal has reviewed all of the main specialist units in TP and SCD
that manage aspects of high risk and danger. Assorted structures and
systems have been identified which are currently not integrated. The task now
is to introduce a new coherent framework, referred to as the “risk
management chain”, involving:

 Early risk identification by front line police units and Borough
Intelligence Units using standardised definitions of risk and danger.
 Timely and appropriate referral of those risks for assessment.
 To create a more scientifically rigorous assessment process for those
identified higher risks which uses shared information more effectively.
 To put in place a multi-agency intervention plan for high risk
situations, which is measured and appropriate.
 To properly monitor and review each case for changing
circumstances which effect the risk level.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 This report comprises an audit, appraisal and recommendation section. In
compiling the report the following method has been used:

 The identification of leading operational practitioners from each DCC,
TP and SCD business area who manage or advise on high risk
situations. These individuals form the reference group



 Desk top research behind each unit reviewed, collating annual
reports, standard operating procedures, policy and guidance notes.
 A semi-structured interview of the reference group members to help
evaluate various aspects of the risk management chain.
 A problem solving day at the John Grieve Centre, analysing key
issues connected to danger. This included a work shop on danger
domains led by Jonathan Crego, of the International Centre for Critical
Incident Analysis

4. MAIN FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Danger Definition

4.1 Findings

There is:
 No common definition of danger across specialist departments or their
main external partners
 Differing focus and prioritisation between offenders, victims and
locations by separate specialist police departments, founded on
historical and legal factors.
 Largely reactive police response to victims and offenders with very little
proactive scanning of police indices.

4.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1. That all MPS units use a standard definition of danger
meaning “ There is a state of exposure to harm, risk or peril with a probability
that the harm will occur”
Public Protection Project Board Lead (to be established). Short term

Recommendation 2. That the MPS adopts a common danger rating system
based on a formula of impact multiplied by probability for offenders, victims
and locations
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Special Police Notice. Short term.

Risk Identification

4.3 Findings

There is currently:
 Reliance on „professional judgement‟ to identify risks in certain
specialist units such as SCD7, 8 and Sapphire.
 No systematic proactive processes of scanning multiple police indices
for signs of early heightened risk
 A lack of systematic information sharing between specialist units in TP
and SCD where there are common domains of danger between them.



 Variable and unsatisfactory community intelligence infrastructure at
BOCU level to identify and collate intelligence outside the more formal
police surveillance and DSU activity.
 Lack of training for front line policing and BIU in identifying behavioural
and situational danger signs in cases such as MISPERS or mental
health where both an objective and subjective judgement is needed.
 An imbalance between tackling volume crime and proactively
distinguishing cases of high danger in victims, offenders and locations
from the mass of TNO‟s.
 A need to focus SCD1 HPU effort on producing specific indicative risk
models for front line policing and BIU‟s in different domains of danger
such as child abuse, gun and weapon criminality, hate crimes, serial
offending and organised crime.
 There is a clear opportunity to identify other dangerous high risk
prisoners in addition to sex offenders amongst the prison population.
 Proper regard needs to be given to the danger posed by psychiatric
drivers as well as alcohol and drug abuse.

4.4 Recommendations

Recommendation 3. SCD1 HPU in partnership with other specialist units to
develop and trial indicative risk models for different categories of danger
including:

o Hate Crimes
o Gun crime
o Knife and other weapon use
o Serial violent offending
o Serious sexual offending
o Child abuse
o Serious and organised crimes of violence (Kidnap, contract
killings, trafficking)

To be used for initial scanning purposes by FLP, Crime Desks and BIU‟s
SCD1 HPU to lead. Medium Term.

Recommendation 4. To support and develop the Project Asset data mining
software to help the proactive scanning of various police indices by BIU‟s and
specialist public protection units.
DCC2 to lead. Medium Term.

Recommendation 5. Bichard Project Team to compile a corporate list of the
highest risk offenders across all specialists for a strategic NIM control
strategy.
DCC2 to lead. Medium Term.

Recommendation 6. Support and develop the new DCC2 CRIS interrogation
spreadsheet which determines the proximity between victim, offender and
location in any London neighbourhood.
th
DCC2 to lead and launch at Crime Analysts Conference 11 November 2004.



Recommendation 7. SCD11(7) Prison Intelligence is tasked to scan all
prisoners in the prison system with a London address using project Asset,
OASYS and new SCD1 HPU indicative matrices.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium term .

5. Risk Referral

5.1 Findings

There is a need to:
 Establish a method of „thresholding‟ subjects and locations at which
point risks are initially assessed by the BOCU Crime Desk and/or BIU.
 The need to re-establish standards of data entry and flagging for CRIS
and CRIMINT entries which need to be assessed by the specialist
units.

5.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 8. Develop and publish a special police notice setting out a
new policy and standard operating procedures for the identification and
referral of high risks including:
o Data entry standards
o The different forms of risk and how to rate them
o Flagging and QQ code standards and requirements
o Information exchange between specialist police units
o Supervision standards on CRIS and CRIMINT
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) to develop new policy and standard
operating procedures culminating in a Special Police Notice. Short term .

Recommendation 9. SCD11(7) to promptly transfer all high risk subject
intelligence packs to local Jigsaw team where the prisoner will reside on
release.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short term .

6. Risk Assessment

6.1 Findings

Currently:
 Complete disparity in assessment tools used between MPS and its
main partners the Prison and Probation Service. MPS only use the
accredited Matrix 2000 assessment process for sex offenders whilst
our main partners in public protection use OASYS which is a generic
first stage assessment system.
 A need to focus SCD1 HPU effort on producing assessment tools
which could compliment OASYS in assessing risks in different domains
of danger as above.
 Jigsaw appears to concentrate on too narrow a band of dangerous
offender concentrating its efforts generally on sex offenders. There is a



clear opportunity to leverage in its well defined business framework for
other equally dangerous violent offenders.
 The specialist units in TP and SCD are not generally engaged in any
cross domain assessment work for their subjects.
 The PPO project has not used any scientific approach towards
selecting subjects and has concentrated on volume PSA crimes
without consulting SCD1 and DCC2
 There is enormous potential to properly assess subjects whilst they are
in prison and distinguish those that pose a significant threat in different
danger domains. Currently prisons concentrate on those that declare
themselves a risk or are category 1 sex offenders. Police are generally
not asked to provide an intelligence profile towards the assessment.

6.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 10. The formation of a new Borough based public
protection hub to realign resources and exploit opportunities for integrated
public protection work involving:
 CAIT, CSU, Sapphire, PPO, Jigsaw and other Borough based serious
crime units joining to form a new unit
 Retaining the different specialisms but ultimately making personnel
multi disciplinary and interchangeable
 Accountability for local performance to BOCU Commander
 Accountable to new central department for SOP, strategy and carrying
out consistent policy
 Enfold the new structure with the MAPPA framework of work,
categorising subjects and implementing a new system of MAPPA level
1-3 meetings across all specialist high risk units
 Expand the use of MAPPA to other danger domains in addition to sex
offenders as allowed under the legislation.
 Adopt the probation service generic OASYS assessment tool and
supplement with complimentary tools from SCD1 HPU and Matrix 2000
for assessing different specialist danger domains.
 Long term co-location of specialist units in one BOCU building for
communication purposes supplemented by key external personnel
from probation and psychiatric service clinicians.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short to Long term.

Recommendation 11. Detectives from SCD1, 5, 7, 8 and 11 to be made
responsible for their own nominals and directly supporting the new BOCU
public protection hubs by:
 Identifying high risk cases
 Entering nominals onto the local BOCU MAPPA system after release
from prison or as currently determined by their home address
 Carrying out a risk assessment with the local PP team
 Arranging multi agency MAPPA level 1-3 meetings to develop a
bespoke action plan
 Monitoring and reviewing their cases
SCD T&CG to lead with SCD OCU Intel Units and SCD11 (7). Short term .



Recommendation 12. Lobby the Home office to take away the conviction
requirement in Category 3 MAPPA offenders leaving only the need to
establish clear indicative intelligence to incorporate the subject and meet our
duty of care responsibilities to manage the subject.
MPA to lead. Short term.

Recommendation 13. The adoption of „Thresholding‟ assessment techniques
for BOCU BIU and Crime Desks to assess whether a particular case has
reached a trigger point for onward referral to professional assessment in the
proposed Public Protection hubs.
DCC2 Project Asset to lead. Medium Term.

Recommendation 14. SCD11(7) to lobby Home Office to formally allow police
intelligence to be used as an element of prisoner risk assessment by the
Prison and Probation service . Article 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Act and
the Data Protection Act allows for exchange in these circumstances to prevent
crime.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short term.

7. Risk Management Planning

7.1 Findings

Currently:
 Jigsaw and MAPPA provides the most consistent, structured and
systematic multi-agency framework to manage dangerous offenders
which needs to be exploited to its full potential.
 SCD1 HPU are developing a manual of intervention options for
different domains of danger which will compliment and extend the use
of the „critical few‟ manual produced by Jigsaw.
 Failure to prioritise offenders and victims where there is a clear pattern
of serial offending or vulnerability.
 The need to get a much clearer sign off of actions eminating from
MAPPA level 1-3 meetings. Each cooperating agency should be made
much more accountable for agreed actions regarding a balanced plan
of treatment, enforcement and diversionary measures.
 There is a need for more internal level 1 MAPPA meetings between TP
and SCD specialists about common interests in a subject and how to
target them in a co-ordinated way. This has been commenced with the
bi-weekly operational meetings. These need referring to the C&TG
where appropriate.
 There are clear opportunities to expand the use of pre release
intelligence packs on potentially dangerous offenders (PDO) in Prison.
SCD11(7) can provide Borough Jigsaw teams with these and their use
would help in compiling an appropriate and effective action plan to help
prevent further offending.



7.2 Recommendations
Recommendation 15. SCD1 HPU to complete a manual of intervention
options for high risk offenders and victims. To be produced as an intranet and
hard loose leave binder product for public protection use. It will be designed to
also cater for OSMAN type threats and „near miss‟ cases and will compliment
the Jigsaw „critical few‟ menu of options manual.
SCD1 HPU to lead. Short term.

Recommendation 16. All units gathered under the recommended new public
protection hub to commence using level 1-3 formal subject meetings for high
risk situations. This will provide a structured and regulated multi agency arena
for managing the risks. It will also harness the information exchange
obligations under the „duty to co-operate‟ clause of the Criminal Justice and
Court Services Act 2003, Human Rights and Data Protection Act.
Jigsaw to lead. Short term.

Recommendation 17. The new bi-weekly operational meeting between
SCD5, SCD7, Sapphire, CSU and Jigsaw should become a formal MAPPA
level 1 type meeting.

Recommendation 18. To incorporate a new MAPPA level 1-3 meeting sign
off arrangement for all contributing units internal and external, accepting
responsibility for agreed actions and completion deadlines.

Recommendation 19. Expand the current police MAPPA focus from just
category 1 sex offenders to consider other types of dangerousness such as
domestic violence, gun criminality or hate crimes involving violence.

Recommendation 20. Arrange supporting services to the new public
protection hub including:
 An experienced psychiatric clinician to assist the completion of OASYS
and other complimentary assessments for high risk offenders providing
the best predictive advice possible.
 Advocacy services for high risk victims to help them choose the most
appropriate protective options.
 Mentoring project officers to help divert offenders and reassure repeat
victims. (See Canadian example)
 Access to the Sapphire Havens for a wider scope of violent crime
particularly domestic violence and child abuse.
Public Protection Project Board(to be established) Lead. Medium term.

Recommendation 21. Prolific and Priority Offenders scheme to assess their
subjects with new SCD1 HPU assessment products and in high risk cases
fully assess using OASYS. This process should take the form of systematic
scanning using project Asset to identify high risk subjects. These should be
placed on MAPPA register.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) and PPO scheme. Medium term .



Recommendation 22. New SCD arrangements to provide a case officer to
each high risk subject, making them responsible to work with the prison and
local public protection unit in which they live, including:
 Initial identification of high risk subjects
 Placing subject on local MAPPA register
 Arranging formal assessments
 Arranging formal multi agency and single agency MAPPA level 1-3
meetings
 Being responsible for monitoring and review arrangements
SCD C&TG Group led. Short term.

Recommendation 23. Give the new Safer Neighbourhood Teams an active
role in helping to develop an action plan and gather intelligence on high risk
subjects living in their ward and involve them in MAPPA level 1-3 meetings.
Give them a role to monitor the subject through regular home visits.

Recommendation 24. Guidance to be provided in new public protection policy
and procedures as to how to prioritise different high risk situations, focussing
on offenders who are involved in multiple serial violent offending with multiple
victims.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Special Police Notice. Short term.

Recommendation 25. SCD11(7) to prepare PDO pre release intel packs on
all high risk prisoners before release for the information of the local Jigsaw
team where the prisoner will reside. This will help the Jigsaw team prepare a
bespoke prevention action plan based on activity and behaviour whilst in
prison.

8. Monitoring and Review

8.1 Findings

Currently:
 No consistent and structured review mechanisms are in place and only
SCD5, PPO and Jigsaw operate any formal procedures and these
were considered to have weaknesses. The Murder Review Group
(MRG) also has a role but this is a reactive in nature after the murder
has occurred.
 VISOR provided an opportunity to monitor and review cases using
automated scheduling based on time, anniversary and trigger events.

8.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 26. Segment the MAPPA level 1-3 meetings into different
domains of danger and place each existing subject onto the agenda as a
standing item to be reviewed formally and make the existing MRG
team(SCD2) responsible for assessment and management reviews.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Led. Short term .



Recommendation 27. The new VISOR IT system should be used
comprehensively by the new public protection hub to:

 View the agreed action plan against behaviour in the reporting period
 Pre set key anniversary dates into the system that may cause
heightened risk. The programme could automatically prompt the case
officer and trigger a review before and after the anniversary to help
adapt the action plan to the circumstances. The programme should
provide automated check lists.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Led. Medium term.

9. Personnel and Training

9.1 Findings

Currently:
 There is an adhoc level of compulsory and voluntary training between
different specialist units, which is either delivered centrally, by the
Crime Academy or through individual BOCU team development.
 There is a lack of front line police training in behavioural and situational
high risk danger signs.
 SCD1 HPU are developing a new module for SIO‟s to be delivered by
the Crime Academy.
 Personnel responsible for public protection are resourced differently
between BOCU‟s, with varying levels of prioritisation to PP work.
 Personnel are fixed into different specialisms at both a Borough and
central level with limited cross disciplinary co-operation leading to
missed risk identification, assessment and management opportunities.
 There is a clear view that detective and risk management expertise at
the centre in SCD is insufficiently aligned with Borough needs to
manage dangerous offenders.

9.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 28. Give CAIT, Sapphire, PPO and CSU staff Jigsaw
status (ie. enabled to use MAPPA) whilst preserving their specialisms. Pool
the staff together with the existing Jigsaw personnel into a new Borough
based public protection hub creating a centre of excellence. This should
include:
 Ring fencing personnel strengths with a new common minimum
strength and BWT for supplementary staff appropriate to demand
levels.
 Accountability to BOCU Commander for local performance standards
on local high risk situations.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium to Long term .

Recommendation 29. Make Jigsaw central responsible for co-ordinating the
new structure and developing a new policy and SOP with other key
departments such as TPHQ and SCD3(1). Place this new Business area



under DCC to overarch SCD, TP and SO commands with common standard
requirements. Supplement the central Jigsaw team with specialists from
DCC4, DCC2, Sapphire Central, PPO central and SCD5 thereby creating a
two level structure:
 Borough operational public protection department
 Central public protection department overseeing policy, SOP, training
and evaluation

Recommendation 30. Give a clear responsibility and operating standard
requirement for handling the risk management chain by developing a new
policy and SOP police notice for:
 Risk Identification, Threshold Assessment and Referral –
Response officers, CID Borough Detectives, Telephonists, Station
Reception Staff, Safer Neighbourhood Teams, Crime Desk and BIU
 Risk Assessment, Management and Review – New public protection
hub
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Police Notice. Short term .

Recommendation 31. Integrate the existing training packages for CSU,
Jigsaw, Sapphire, CAIT with the new SCD1 HPU training package into a new
public protection accredited course. This should be modular and include:
 Behavioural and situational sciences
 Risk Identification and assessment
 MAPPA processes and structures
 Multi Agency action planning
 Monitoring and review processes
 Use of VISOR IT system
 Problem solving

Recommendation 32. Pool all the training staff from SCD5, CSU, CAIT,
Sapphire and Jigsaw into a new public protection training and development
department based in the central office. Make this team responsible for
developing the course in liaison with the Crime Academy and seeking
accreditation. Deliver using Crime Academy and distance learning.

Recommendation 33. Training team to be made responsible for developing
additional modules for FLP in risk identification and threshold assessments.
To be delivered through direct area training and distance learning using
intranet.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium Term .



10. IT and Manual Management Systems

10.1 Findings
Currently there is:
 Poor data entry and flagging standards on CRIS, CRIMINT and
MERLIN IT systems
 The development of data mining tools to proactively scan for danger
signs in various police indices. This is being led by DCC2 and project
Asset.
 Over reliance in Jigsaw on Matrix 2000 as the only MPS electronically
supported assessment tool
 The opportunity of using VISOR by all the specialist units to manage
the case load of high risk subjects and share information electronically
between them and other police service units nationally.
 The need to develop electronically supported threshold assessments
for incidents. Risks can then be referred on after being filtered by the
Crime Desk and BIU.
 The need for electronically supported indicative and assessment
models from SCD1 HPU for different domains of danger.

10.2 Recommendations
Risk Identification

Recommendation 34. To develop a series of indicative risk matrices for
different domains of danger. These should be in the form of a manual form
124 series which is also electronically supported on CRIS, AWARE, CRIMINT
and MERLIN. These should set out the indicative signs and heightened risk
factors together with a simple method of quantifying them for threshold
assessment purposes.
 Knife and other weapon use
 Gun Crime
 Hate Crime
 Domestic Violence (existing 124D and SPECSS)
 Child Abuse
 Serial Crimes
 Sex Offending
 Serious and Organised Crime (Kidnap, contract killings and trafficking)

Recommendation 35. Support the development and introduction of project
Asset to enable proactive scanning of various police indices for signs of
behavioural and situational danger. Software to be provided electronically for
use of:
o Borough BIU (12 hot spot Boroughs first)
o Selected central Higher Analysts

Asset should be able ultimately to scan CAD, CRIS, CRIMINT, STOPS,
CUSTODY, HOLMES and DNA database and provide a scoring mechanism



for each incident to help make threshold assessments. This methodology
should take account of the current SCD5 “one key” data search mechanism.
DCC2 to lead. Medium term.

Risk Referral
Recommendation 36. Reinforce training and standard procedures for
entering flag and QQ codes onto CRIS and CRIMINT in order that appropriate
referrals can be made to the respective public protection department on each
Borough
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Police Notice. Short term .

Recommendation 37. Develop and introduce a new electronic docket for
threshold assessments to be used by BIU‟s to refer subjects onto public
protection department if they reach a cumulative trigger score. This should be
VISOR based eventually and a VISOR terminal should be provided to the
BIU‟s
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Short-Medium term.

Risk Assessment

Recommendation 38. Make VISOR the principal IT platform for case
management and risk assessment for the new PP hubs
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium- Long term.

Recommendation 39. Interface the OASYS assessment tool onto VISOR as
the first stage generic risk assessment model.

Recommendation 40. Interface Matrix 2000 and other complimentary risk
assessment tools being developed by SCD1 HPU and SCD8 onto VISOR.
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium term.

Risk Management and Review

Recommendation 41. Make VISOR the principal IT platform for risk
management and review of all high risk subjects held by the PP hub. This will
enable all the specialist units within the PP hub to share information and
monitor progress easily. VISOR is likely to be the only area of financial
expenditure, requiring additional network and terminal supplies to:
 Borough BIU‟s
 Sapphire
 CSU
 PPO
 SCD7 Intel
 SCD8 Intel
 SCD5 CAIT units
 SCD11(7) Prison Intelligence Unit
Public Protection Project Board (to be established) Lead. Medium-long term.



WAY FORWARD

1. Presentation of report to DAC Griffiths (SCD Operations).

2. Presentation to TP/SCD ACPO leads on the findings and
recommendations.

3. Circulation to the reference group members ASAP

4. Inclusion of key findings in MPS response to Sir Michael Bichard

5. Meeting of reference group and compilation of report to Management
Board recommending the formation of a Project Implementation Board
and Executive Team (This could potentially be the existing Bichard
Project Team) in early 2005.

6. Project Plan by end March 2005

7. Project implementation April 2005 – March 2008 (staged short, medium
and long term objectives)

8. Formation of a pilot site Harrow Borough April 2005



INTRODUCTION

The term danger means different things to different people. Wrapped up in the
expression are elements of risk, harm, injury, death together with the
likelihood they will occur. Danger is a mixture of these and is undoubtedly
complex and dynamic. What is clear however, is that there are different
degrees of danger and certain situations involving offenders, victims and
locations have a higher risk of causing serious harm or even death.

After the Soham murders many issues were identified in the collation,
maintenance and sharing of police intelligence within the police service as
well as externally. The Bichard Inquiry made a number of recommendations in
this area.

Whilst certain volume crimes have decreased, every day violence on the
streets and at home is a growing central Government concern which has now
become a priority for future activity in such schemes as the Prolific and
Priority Offenders project.

The Metropolitan Police recognises these trends and has moved vigorously to
counter them.

 Management Board commissioned work in July 2004 to profile the
threat of lethal and serious violence and how this could be better
countered. This has resulted in a report from DCC2 and development
work in proactively scanning police indices for danger signs.

 Since the beginning of 2003, before the Soham murders, SCD1 have
been engaged on a major Homicide cold case review to identify
behavioural and situational aspects which could help in the long term
prevention of murders across a number of different danger domains.

 SCD itself manages a great many of the most dangerous offenders in
London such as child abusers, gun criminals and those that exploit
distinct communities through trafficking people, drugs and firearms.
The Directorate has made the reduction of serious violence a key
priority in objectives 1, 4, 5 and 6 of their 2004-5 policing plan.

The task is immense but achievable through a structured and systematic
approach to the problem. This requires the organisation at all levels to
distinguish high risk situations from the mass of total notifiable offences, early
enough to make effective interventions. The science of this involves
identifying patterns of serial offending, victim vulnerability and locational risk
that cause a convergence of danger.

Criminologists call this “joining the dots”



BACKGROUND

On the 17th August DAC Griffiths tasked SCD 3(2) at the SCD Co-ordination
and Tasking Group Meeting to:

 Review, appraise and make recommendations as to how violent and
potentially dangerous SCD nominals could be better risk managed at a
Borough level. This would include the Borough Jigsaw (formerly Public
Protection Units) teams and MAPPA arrangements.

This was prompted by the need of SCD7 Serious and Organised Group to
identify more effective methods of managing commercial armed robbers on
release from prison.

It was quickly apparent that the review had important implications for the
entire organisation at a time when a more co-ordinated and structured
response is required to manage potentially dangerous offenders, identified in
the „Bichard‟ inquiry.

On the 11th October the appraisal was formerly integrated into the Bichard
work programme as a key piece of foundation research requiring:

 A comprehensive examination of all projects and units within the MPS
undertaking risk management responsibilities for dangerous offenders,
victims and locations
 A SWOT analysis of their relative internal strengths and weaknesses
together with the threats and opportunities apparent to the organisation
as a whole.
 Make recommendations for rationalising and improving the current
arrangements.

This appraisal highlights the immense opportunities of streamlining the entire
proactive process of identifying, referring, assessing and managing
situations that pose a high risk.

Currently there are many units, projects and systems in place across the MPS
and partner agencies used in different aspects of managing danger. These
include:

 The Homicide Prevention Unit (Commander Baker) which is profiling
offenders involved in thirteen different categories of murder including
Honour Killings, stranger attacks, mental health, gay murders, elderly
people, sex workers and knife killings. The outcome of this research
will be to help put in place some predictive models for use in assessing
offenders and the probabilities of them committing homicide in the
future.
 The PRISM system used by SCD8 to assess and prioritise gun
criminals for proactive surveillance and management
 SCD5 Child Abuse Group (DCS Peter Spindler), which manages the
Child Abuse Investigation Teams in each Borough together with two



MIT teams and the Paedophile Unit. These units use the Thornton risk
assessment model.
 SCD7 Serious and Organised Crime Group (DCS Sharon Kerr) who
are assessing and prioritising proactive police interventions for
commercial robbers and “Middle Market” drug suppliers.
 DCC2 Corporate Strategy Unit (Betsy Stanko)
o This unit is developing IT software (Project ASSET) to enable
the collation of data from several unconnected police systems
including CRIS, Custody, HOLMES, DNA match and Stops.
This will support research into prolific and dangerous offenders.
o Research to categorise different forms of “dangerousness”
 DCC4 Diversity Unit. This unit is involved closely on risk
management systems associated with domestic and mental health
violence.
 Jigsaw Team and MAPPA. There is a Jigsaw team on each Borough,
which is responsible for managing sex and other violent offenders.
They come under the Borough Commanders line management. The
team works with three categories of offender:
o Those on the sex offenders register
o Violent and sexual offenders who are not registered.
o Any other offender who poses a serious threat to the public.
 Community Safety Units. These are based on each Borough and
investigate domestic violence and hate crimes. They come under the
Borough Commanders line management.
 Sapphire Teams. These are based in each Borough and investigate
cases of sexual assault both inside and outside the family unit.
 The Prolific and Priority Offender Project. This is a three stranded
Home Office initiated project managed by TPHQ under each Borough
CDRP. It involves:
o Targeting the worst offenders in each Borough who cause most
harm. “Catch and convict”
o Rehabilitation and Re-settlement of the above offenders
o Putting in place a strategy to manage those young people who
are at risk of starting an offending lifestyle. This uses the risk
and protective model designed by Communities that Care. This
strand is called “Prevent and Deter”
There is a high degree of flexibility in the choice of offenders targeted
under this initiative and it can include violent and dangerous people,
not just those involved in low level anti social behaviour.

ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES and MAIN DEVELOPMENT AREAS

1. To establish corporate systems and training for frontline TP/SCD staff to
identify and report risks associated with victims, offenders and locations

2. To establish corporate systems and training for BOCU and SCD
designation desks to assess risks associated with victims, offenders and
locations



3. To establish a clear criteria for case referral, resource levels and training
for key high risk management hubs such as the Jigsaw network across
the MPS

4. Establish corporate information exchange protocols across MPS
commands and with key partner agencies listed under the “duty to
cooperate” provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, to enable timely
and informed decisions to be made by professionals dealing with
dangerous or at risk offenders.

5. To establish corporate risk assessment models for “devnoms” ,
“promnoms” and repeat victims formed out of the qualitative research
currently being undertaken by SCD1 Homicide Prevention, DCC2 and
other key units handling dangerous offenders.

6. To compile and maintain a corporate list of the most dangerous
offenders drawn from the nominal indices of all the key units working in
this area using an appropriate and practical selection criteria.

METHODOLOGY

In compiling this appraisal I have used the following methods:

 The formation of a reference group made up of key operational
practitioners representing each area of work. The purpose of this was
to:

o Identify suitable individuals in each area, who could be
interviewed about key aspects of their risk management work.
o Provide a group of leading practitioners, with which a future
modernisation programme could be planned.

 The use of ‘desk top’ research to collect key reference material from
open sources such as the MPS intranet and Global internet, about
each specialist area, in particular:

o Legislation on which the unit bases its operation
o Annual reports from the representative units
o Codes of practice and other good practice guidance
o Standard operating procedures

 The design of a semi structured interview format involving questions on
eight key areas of risk management including:

o General questions about the interviewees interpretation of
what dangerous meant to them.
o How risk is initially identified for offenders, victims and
locations within their remit of responsibility
o How that identified risk is referred on for more formal
assessment



o What assessment techniques were in place to quantify the
degree of risk posed.
o How was the situation then managed to remove or reduce the
apparent risks using a multi agency intervention plan.
o How was the action plan monitored and reviewed.
o Were there sufficient personnel to manage the work load and
were the trained to a competent and suitable standard.
o What IT and manual systems were in place to help the
management process.

 Twelve semi- structured interviews were completed (See Appendix
B) lasting between 1-2 hours each and a written record was made at
the time. The interviewees were given a copy of the questions at least
a week before the interview together with a briefing note on the
purpose of the project. It was explained that answers should be given
from the perspective of their own unit‟s work.

 This report contains an appraisal of each individual unit covering the
eight key areas above, drawn from the interview results and desk top
research. A case study has also been included to highlight some of
the good practice identified in the London Borough of Harrow.

 A problem solving day on „Managing Danger‟ was held on the 29th
October at the John Grieve Centre to discuss some of the key factors
and this enabled the research to be tabled and different tactical and
strategic issues were debated within a panel including:

o Professor John Grieve - Chair
o Sir Ronnie Flanagan - HMIC
o Professor Jonathan Crego – Director Centre for Study of Critical
Incidents
o Commander Andy Baker – Homicide Commander Scotland Yard
o Laura Richards – Senior Behavioural Psychologist Scotland
Yard
o Gerry Marshall – National Probation Service
o Bruce Davison – Her Majesty‟s Prison Service

 The report then assesses the overall results in the form of a SWOT
analysis comparing and cross referencing between the different units
to form an overall perspective on our corporate capacity and capability
for managing dangerous situations.

 The report concludes with a number of recommendations to
rationalise and improve our capability in managing dangerous
situations



MAIN FINDINGS & SWOT ANALYSIS

Introduction

The following section examines each component part of the risk management
process and highlights the main findings across all the specialist units
reviewed together.

Each part concludes with a brief SWOT analysis of the main areas of
importance divided into internal organisational strengths and weaknesses and
external opportunities and threats which emanate from the findings.

General Interpretation of What Constitutes Danger

Main Findings

 There is a wide interpretation on the term dangerous across all the
units reviewed with no common definition. This is further complicated
by definitions used by outside partners such as the Probation Service,
who are vital in the work to identify and contain aspects of danger.
 The main interpretations cited were:
o The threat of lethal and serious violence and danger from and to
offenders, victims and locations where there is indicative
intelligence. (DCC2 )
o Potential to render lethal or near lethal terror to a person or
group either physically or psychologically.(DCC2)
o The impact of a potential incident multiplied by the probability
that it will occur. (Jigsaw and Health & Safety)
o The risk is life threatening or traumatic and from which recovery
whether physical or psychological will be difficult or
impossible(OASYS definition used by Jigsaw, Probation
Service, Prison Service)
o Individuals that pose a significant risk to themselves or
others(Jigsaw)
o Potential lethality indicated by the severity and frequency of
violent attacks(SCD1)
o The pattern of offender attacks and the degree of victim
vulnerabilty are crucial considerations (SCD1)
 At the John Grieve centre conference on Dangerousness (Friday 29 th
October) Laura Richards (SCD1 Behavioural Psychologist) highlighted
the distinction between those that make a threat from those that are a
threat. The quality and pattern of their offending behaviour was
essential in distinguishing danger from those who commited a large
quantity of offences but were not necessarily lethally dangerous.
 John Morrison the former head of British Government Intelligence
Analysts defined threat as requiring both the capability and propensity
to carry it out.
 Some units focus on either the offender or victim, very few include
location dynamics in any meaningful way. SCD1, 7, 8, the PPO



scheme and Jigsaw are focussed on the detection and management of
offending behaviour whilst SCD5, CSU and Sapphire are primarily
focussed on the protection of the victim. Some of this difference is
probably due to the legal „duty of care‟ required to victims who are
exposed to „continuing danger‟ in the latter units. This situation is and
will change with the fundamental impact of OSMAN type situations
where a threat to a victim has been clearly identified forcing all units to
become much more proactive in their victim considerations.
 Some units particularly SCD5 and 8 felt that the application of
„professional judgement‟ was required to assess the degree of danger
particularly with regard to issues of capability and propensity. This
involved for instance offenders access to guns and the degree of
vulnerability of the victim. This judgement should be based on
experience and knowledge and not on detailed systems of risk analysis
and management. This view appeared to be backed up by the
statement from Jonathan Crego (Director of International Centre for the
study of Critical Decision Making) at the John Grieve Centre
conference that “More experienced decision makers make better
decisions if they learnt the lessons from previous incidents”. The latter
part of this is crucial. Less experienced and knowledgeable decision
makers may be in positions of responsibility.
 SCD5 felt that a problem solving approach should be taken to danger
in individual cases rather than a more bureacratic risk management
systems led approach. This allowed for a multi agency consensus on
the levels of danger and how to control them.
 SCD5 Paedophile Unit also made it clear that many highly dangerous
offenders they managed were not violent but were engaged in the
systematic „grooming‟ of children for consensual sex or sexual
exploitation. Should this nevertheless be considered dangerous?
 The full dynamics of the relationship between the victim, offender and
location within a formal problem analysis triangle approach had not
been incorporated within any of the operational units reviewed. DCC2
and the Homicide Prevention Unit were the only units who were
examining this relationship. DCC2 neatly described this as:
o Locations are the facilitators where dangers converge
o Victims levels of vulnerability
o Offenders behavioural signs of irrationality
DCC2 are now actively pursuing this approach with a new CRIS
interrogation spreadsheet which highlights the „proximity‟ levels
between these factors for any given area of London.
o Jigsaw provides a very powerful framework of approach to dangerous
offenders involving multi agency action planning and information
exchange. However categories of offender inclusion are partly based
on conviction history rather than indicative intelligence.



SWOT Summary

Strengths

o In individual cases the application of „professional judgement‟ as to the
degree of danger posed by the offender and the comparitive
vulnerability of the victim. This was based on experience and
knowledge of the area.

Weaknesses

o No common definition of what dangerous means and how to apply it to
police work.
o Focus on separate offender and victim approaches with limited
locational considerations. No combined analytical work on the
dynamics between all three parts of the Problem Analysis Triangle.
o The largely reactive response to individual incidents to assess the
continued risk to both the offender and victim. There is very little
proactive scanning to assemble patterns of offending from separate
police indices.

Opportunities

o To develop a more generic and dynamic definition of danger which
includes:
o Potential of serious harm to both individuals and the public as a
whole
o The likelihood that the harm will occur
o Serious harm can include physical or psychological damage
which is difficult to recover from
o The danger involves a threat which is credible ie capability and
propensity
o Danger should include victim, offender AND locational issues
o The degree of danger should be categorised based on the
patterns and severity of preceding incidents connected to each
part of the PAT.
o There is a real opportunity to realign with the OASYS definition used by
Probation and Prison Service under which would be police application
standards and methods involving victim, offender and location
elements.
o To adjust the category 3 MAPPA offender criteria dropping the
conviction requirement and clarifying the second criteria factor about
risk of serious harm.

Threat

o The disparity between police specialist unit danger definitions and
those of outside agencies with a prime responsibility for dealing with
aspects of danger, particularly Probation and Prison Service. They both
use the OASYS interpretation.



Identification of Risk

Main Findings

o There is a clear need to develop further indicative risk models and NIM
compliant knowledge and profile products for different categories of
danger. The value of this had been highlighted for Domestic Violence
using the SPECSS and 124D. This now needed to be expanded into
areas such as armed criminality, child abuse, hate crime and homicide
prevention. There was enthusiasm to get such products from the SCD1
HPU and SCD8 Analyst „upstream‟ to FLP where they could be used.
o There was general agreement that front line policing needed training in
the behavioural and situational signs of danger which could be properly
identified using the products discussed above. All parts of FLP should
be included in this such as Station Reception Staff, telephonists,
response teams and the new Safer Neighbourhood Teams
o There was a clear distinction between proactive and reactive risk
identification with most units relying on post incident research and
analysis to identify further risks. Systematic proactive scanning of
different police indices did not take place looking for signs of
behavioural and situational danger sufficient to distinguish individuals
and locations of particular risk. DCC2 had started to address this area
with Project Asset and the CRIS interrogation spreadsheet. BIU‟s
would need new standards of operation and training to meet these
challenges.
o It was evident that the specialist units reviewed were NOT in any
structured and systematic relationship with each other with a marked
lack of linked working practices and information sharing. An example of
this is the interlinked work of CAIT, CSU and Sapphire in dealing with
different aspects of domestic violence.
o DCC2 and the plenary session of the John Grieve Centre conference
emphasised the need to address „disproportionality‟ and „wheat from
the Chaff‟ issues by concentrating on those offenders who were
involved in different domains of serious offending thereby focussing
resources in areas of best return. The art and science of this would be
identification of those cases out of the volume of TNO‟s.
o Several units highlighted the appalling state of data entry standard,
particularly onto CRIS, which compromised the research techniques
described above.
o Non of the SCD operational units reviewed used any formal risk
identification model. However SCD7 MIU monitored SCD7‟s response
to OSMAN warnings which are graded into 8 categories of response
thereby allowing an assessment of proactivity effectiveness to manage
the danger. SCD8 and Sapphire used a matrix to prioritise cases which
had already been identified to allow efficient deployment of police
resources. SCD 5 relied heavily on the timely submission of form 78‟s
and social service referrals.
o SCD 8 highlighted concerns over culpability if risks were more formally
analysed and documented whereby the police were held accountable



in cases of death and serious injury where the danger had been
correctly identified but the attack had occurred nevertheless.
o SCD1 highlighted, at the John Grieve Conference, the need to
o Develop systems that were not dependent just on the
experience and motivation of individuals
o The need to look for patterns in different police indices which
together indicated danger
o To allow the victim to play an active part in identifying the
danger and degree of risk.
o Identify the key signs of danger which included capability,
emotional triggers, organised, credible threat and family
knowledge
o CSU and Jigsaw highlighted the need for documented defensible
decision making using models such as SPECSS and not just
„professional judgement‟
o The PPO scheme could have a vitally important role in identifying
offenders whose offending behaviour was not just of concern because
of its volume impact on the community but also those offenders who
showed signs of dangerousness. Currently this was not the case and
no scientific models had been included to the selection criteria.
Selection was based on PSA targets regarding street crime, vehicle
crime, residential burglary and domestic violence. The original
government guidelines allow for a broader criteria of violent offending
and also driving factors such as mental health, a key HPU concern.
o Jigsaw and the MAPPA framework provided an excellent model of
multi agency work and information sharing which all the units reviewed
respected and admired. However there was one caveat being the
restrictive nature of category 3 offender requiring a conviction
indicating potential for serious harm rather than just indicative
intelligence. Many Jigsaw teams had overcome this by including such
cases as an additional agendas item in their level 1 and 2 meetings.
o Jigsaw is predominantly focussed on category 1 sex offenders but
there is a clear opportunity to broaden out the different types of
dangerous offender they manage. For example gun criminals have
been included in Harrow and Waltham Forest and SCD7 are planning
to include commercial armed robbers released from prison onto
Borough MAPPA.
o DCC2 highlighted the need for a new community intelligence
infrastructure to allow effective engagement and collection of
intelligence and information from different sources such as tenant
associations, housing officers and Hospitals/GP surgeries. Currently
we are reliant on police surveillance operations and DSU‟s to collect
this. The entire community needs to be harnessed and galvanised. The
Safer Neighbourhood Teams should have a pivotal role in co-ordinating
this.



SWOT Summary

Strengths

o OSMAN identified threats to victims requiring graded response to help
prevent harm
o The effective use of the Domestic Violence Indicative risk matrix
SPECSS
o The developing knowledge, profile and indicative risk products being
prepared by SCD1 HPU and SCD8
o The strength of the MAPPA process in allowing a formal statutory
arena for information exchange and co-ordinated multi agency action
planning.

Weaknesses

o Over reliance on individuals personal skills, knowledge and experience
in exercising professional judgement. Growing need to put in place
structures and systems not so dependent on this but are resilient to
staff turnover which is huge in the MPS.
o No systematic proactive scanning of police indices to identify danger
signs and assembles a comprehensive picture.
o No community Intelligence infrastructure integrated into the MPS
CRIMINT system to identify dangerous offenders, vulnerable victims
and problematic locations.
o Lack of co-working and information sharing between specialist units at
TP and SCD level
o Lack of training for FLP and Specialist Units in basic behavioural
sciences to pick up danger signs in individuals who come into contact
with police

Opportunities

o Expansion and exploitation of the MAPPA structure and process to
deal with a broader range of dangerous offenders under police
management. Lobby to take away the category three conviction
requirement.
o SCD to lobby the PPO scheme and Borough CDRP‟s to include some
dangerous offenders on their list AND to build in indicative risk models
from SCD1 HPU and 8 into their monitoring arrangements to flag up
individuals who could pose a serious lethal risk in the future.
o Develop data mining tools such as project Asset to scan separate
indices automatically using defined ontology on danger signs.

Threats

o Inability of the organisation to adopt a balanced approach between
tackling volume crimes and managing offenders, victims and locations
which pose the greatest threat and danger. There is a clear opportunity



to do both at the same time with the right structures, training and
systems.
o The probation and prison service use a generic first stop risk
identification tool called OASYS for all offenders coming under their
control. The police do not and are now relying on the Thornton Matrix
2000 to carry out this role. This is designed for sex offenders alone and
the likelihood of further conviction.

Risk Referral

Main Findings

 The two main systems used for internal referral of cases to the
specialist units reviewed are CRIMINT and CRIS. However, there are
considerable inconsistencies and variations.
 SCD5 rely on the timely and appropriate completion of form 78 by FLP
concerning all incidents directly or indirectly involving children which
indicate that they are exposed to risk or harm. These are meant to be
put on the MERLIN database within the AWARE system. The ICG
scoping study 2004 highlighted the adhoc nature of this with many
appropriate cases not being reported due to cited work loads and lack
of understanding of the criteria and process. What makes this worse is
that there are few CRIMINT entries about child abuse albeit there is a
clear QQ code and the indices is scanned daily by SCD5 Intel. Most of
the current work load is referred in from local social services
departments using a form 87 docket. Of concern is the high number of
domestic violence incidents attended which have children on the same
premises. Proportionately such incidents are not being reported on
Form 78.
 CSU, Sapphire, SCD8 and SCD7 require the completion of a CRIS
report and referral to them using the CRIS flag markers in cases of
specific threat or clear crime. Only in fast time situations involving
critical incidents are referrals made via SCD Reserve or the local MIT
by telephone and even then this needs to be followed up with CRIS
and CRIMINT entries.
 The PPO scheme and Jigsaw rely on CRIMINT entries to report
intelligence about any subject already on the case file or with whom
there is concern. QQPPO, QQPPU and QQMHO applies.
 The Borough crime desk has a pivotal role in screening CRIS reports
and ensuring that they are allocated and referred appropriately but due
to the sheer work load there is a need to ensure FLP are trained,
supervised and process incidents correctly at source to avoid major
gaps in referral.
 There appears to be a major practical issue in FLP partly due to work
pressures and partly awareness of the appropriate use of both
CRIMINT and CRIS. CRIS is given the priority with limited time
available leading to vital intelligence being missed or not recorded. This
is then not available for the specialist units. Both DCC2 and SCD1
HPU expressed serious concern about these issues whilst reiterating
the need for vastly improved standards of data entry on both systems.



SWOT Summary

Strengths

 The ability of the crime desks in each borough and the specialist Unit
Intel Units to scan CRIS and CRIMINT for appropriate cases either
directly referred to them or which should be managed by that unit but is
not flagged.
 The growing willingness of outside agencies to refer appropriate cases
to the police to investigate.

Weaknesses

 FLP not following any SOP‟s with regard to:
o Data entry standards on CRIS or CRIMINT
o Flagging CRIS and CRIMINT appropriately
o Not making CRIS and/or appropriate CRIMINT entries where
required in the circumstances
This puts a heavy onus on the crime desk and BIU to correct these
issues later which is impossible to control effectively due to work load
volume.
 No clear Standard Operating Practices or policy in this area
 Specialist Units are not referring appropriate cases between
themselves so they are aware of connected issues and work together.

Opportunities

 New SOP and Policy developed by TPHQ and SCD3(1)
 New training programme for FLP based on SOP and Policy involving
initial training, regular training days and distance learning. This could
be connected to enhanced competency payments on successful
completion.
 An incentive scheme is devised for quality and appropriate CRIS and
CRIMINT completion by FLP
 Front line supervisors are held to account for quality standards.
 If CRIS is being given the priority on FLP the BIU needs to take an
active and structured role in scanning reports for intelligence and
completing CRIMINT reports where they are absent.

Threats

 Due to the adhoc nature of current referral mechanisms it is inevitable
that key signs of danger will be missed.



Assessment of Risk

Main Findings

 DCC2 emphasised the need for SCD1 HPU to develop the knowledge,
profile, indicative and assessment products for different domains of
danger and get these out for Borough use as soon as possible in a
similar way to the SPECSS model for DV.
 DCC2 interestingly made comment on the need for the CDRP‟s to take
a much more active role in co-ordinating different agency risk
assessments thereby sharing the work load but ensuring focus and
consistency on the main areas of danger.
 HPU mentioned the opportunity of utilising experienced clinicians in the
MAPPA arrangements at Borough level to allow more predictive
capacity on the case load. This was already in operation within certain
areas such as Brent and Enfield.
 SCD5 and the new London Child Protection Procedures used a very
interesting concept called „Thresholding‟ whereby Police and Social
Services scanned their respective lists of reported allegations for
„Threshold Characteristics‟. If the case revealed a requisite number of
characteristics the case was referred on for „Initial and Core
Assessment. These assessments were operated under the „Common
Framework of Assessment‟ involving a multi agency case conference
to assess:
o Childs development needs
o Parents Capacity to respond to a care plan
o Impact of wider family and environment factors
 SCD 8, Sapphire and the PPO scheme operate a different form of
prioritisation assessment for their subjects. This is designed to select
cases which warrant the most urgent police attention but indirectly they
allow for a certain degree of generic assessment about risk. Selection
however is on vastly varying criteria between them and SCD1 HPU
have not been involved in their design.
 SCD8 expressed the desire that some of their „less dangerous‟ gun
nominals are managed on Borough with early intervention programmes
or go onto the PPO scheme. This would allow SCD8 to concentrate on
the most dangerous who move between Boroughs.
 Although Sapphire deal with the most dangerous sex offenders they do
not use Matrix 2000 for risk assessment purposes as Jigsaw do. The
only assessments are made reactively by the IO who completes a
decision log in critical incidents, within which he is expected to consider
victim protection measures. Only the SIO‟s are properly trained in this
aspect.
 Apart from SPECSS the CSU uses Form 2 of the DV model to
interview victims about various aspects of their situation. This
enhances the initial scanning under SPECSS and allows for a more
considered grading of the threat from standard to high.
 Harrow put some of their PPO subjects onto the MAPPA framework to
allow for multi agency action planning and assessment.



 PPO uses no formal ongoing risk assessment models scientifically
devised except the second strand work on deter and prevent which
uses the CtC Risk and Protective risk model
 Jigsaw assessments are founded on the quality of the local information
exchange about subjects and does not use any other assessment tool
except Matrix 2000. This is specifically designed for category 1 sex
offenders.
 Jigsaw is particularly interesting as the other two responsible
authorities Probation and Prison Service use the OASYS assessment
tool. This is a first stage generic assessment from which other more
specialist assessments such as matrix 2000 can be recommended. It
could be well argued that the police should also be using this alongside
an expansion in the different categories of dangerous offender they
manage. Reliance on matrix 2000 is caused by the predominant focus
of most Jigsaw teams on Category 1 sex offenders. OASYS could be
interfaced with the new VISOR case management system together with
Matrix 2000. Police training would be needed.
 Project RAMP (Risk Assessment Management Panel) was mentioned
by SCD1 HPU, CSU and Jigsaw as being a potential mechanism for
dealing with risk cases which did not meet the MAPPA criteria,
particularly category 3 type cases. Each Borough would have such a
panel which would be non statutory and multi agency in nature
providing the function of MAPPA but on cases where there was only
indicative intelligence and not necessarily conviction history. This was
discussed at the John Grieve Centre Conference and the following
points were made:
o The bureaucracy of setting up another tier using probably the
same people as in the MAPPA framework
o The non statutory nature of the structure which could leave it
under powered and unaccredited
o The opportunity of lobbying government to change the definition
of category 3 offenders dropping the conviction requirement or
creating a new category.
o The current expanded use of level 2 MAPPA meetings to deal
with other cases not strictly within the definition. There was a
clear „duty of care‟ to do this.

SWOT Summary

Strengths

o SCD5 use of „Threshold‟ scanning techniques to determine which
cases went on for further assessment. This performed the function of a
filter allowing defensible decision making.
o Jigsaw and MAPPA framework for assessing cases using respected
and accredited tools such as Matrix 2000, OASYS and ASSET
o SCD 1 HPU new assessment tools being developed for Borough use
o CSU SPECSS and form 2 model use for assessing risks in DV cases
with initial and secondary screening by FLP and IO.



o Police resource prioritisation matrices used by SCD8, Sapphire and
PPO to grade subject importance and risk.

Weaknesses

o Jigsaw concentrates on too narrow a band of dangerous offending
dealing primarily with category1 offenders. This is reinforced by the use
of only one specialist assessment tool Matrix 2000 for sex offenders
o Apart from Matrix 2000 and SPECSS there are no accredited and
bespoke police assessment tools that can be used by the specialist
unit hubs to comprehensively assess their danger and propensity for
further lethal offending behaviour.
o Non of the units work together except within the context of MAPPA and
MPS has largely confined itself to managing sex offenders in this
framework.
o There is a distinct lack of information exchange between MPS
specialist units internally let alone the wider external exchange needs.
This has become a particularly dysfunctional weakness requiring
urgent action.

Opportunities

o The need for a combined hub at Borough level managing the
assessment requirements of identified dangerous offenders with
accredited tools and procedures. This should include:
o Co- location and/or linking of CSU, CAIT, Sapphire, PPO and
Jigsaw teams and work areas.into a new hub of integrated
public protection. These hubs should be linked to SCD1, 7, 8,
DCC2 and DCC4 using VISOR as the primary IT platform
o Establishing a new SOP for information exchange between the
above units with one shared case file on each subject used by
all units possibly using the VISOR IT system as a platform for all
cases that pass a threshold of risk characteristics.
o Introduce a new universal threshold standard for high risk cases
used by all specialist units in TP and SCD
o Introduction of new risk assessment tools to these hubs from
SCD1 HPU overlaid on the OASYS basic system of
assessment.
o Put OASYS and HPU models onto new VISOR system.
o Making MAPPA the main framework for all the high risk units to
work within utilising its established information exchange system
and multi agency arena for action planning
o Make the specialist units personnel multi disciplinary whilst
keeping the specialist desks thereby allowing personnel to
circulate to create a large pool of public protection expertise.

Threat

o Project RAMP may create an unnecessary tier which will divert
resources and destabilise common systems within the existing MAPPA



arrangement. Re-configuration of MAPPA and new PP hubs will
address most of the issues RAMP would be set up for.

Managing the Risks

Main Findings

o DCC2, SCD8, SCD7 and DCC4 CSU made it clear that they
considered that MAPPA provided an excellent opportunity of managing
different categories of dangerous offender ranging from DV offenders,
gun criminals and others identified within the DCC2 and SCD1 HPU
police indices scanning recommendations.
o SCD1 HPU were preparing a menu of intervention options for different
categories of danger which could be used by the MAPPA and the other
specialist units. This could also be used for OSMAN and other „Near
Miss‟ cases
o Only SCD5 and Jigsaw used formal statutory multi agency forums to
manage high risk cases. The others used informal forums such as the
Domestic Violence Forum, Homicide Strategic Working Group, or PPO
CDRP meetings. Others such as SCD8 and Sapphire relied on Police
Gold Groups or SOIT officers to co-ordinate an action plan albeit that
outside agencies were sometimes invited.
o CSU DCC4 stated that there was a clear role for the new Safer
Neighbourhood teams in being an active participant in developing the
action plan and then being responsible for victim and offender official
visits for monitoring purposes.
o The PPO scheme was heavily reliant on the maturity and effectiveness
of the local CDRP in developing and co-ordinating the action plan. In
reality the CJS and YJS was largely responsible for this area with fast
tracking and intervention planning.
o CSU reiterated the DCC2 perspective of „disproportionality‟ and the
need to prioritise those subjects involved in multiple serious violent
offending.
o Jigsaw had a very well defined multi agency management plan process
at three levels:
o Level 1 Ordinary single agency directed interventions
o Level 2 Local Inter Agency Co-ordinated meetings to develop a
bespoke intervention plan
o Level 3 Full MAPPP to manage the most dangerous „Critical
Few‟ at multi agency CEO level
Comment was made that the multi agency action plan needed more
formal sign off by individual agencies against agreed actions.
o Jigsaw had also developed a very comprehensive manual of options to
help the intervention plan for all three levels although it was originally
designed for the critical few.
o Sapphire had established three safe „Havens‟ at key hospitals in the
region providing 24/7 services for sexual assault victims. This provided
a form of one stop service with medical care, forensic examination,
investigation and counselling provision. This was their main multi
agency forum in a very practical sense of the word.



o A new Operational Bi-weekly meeting had been established between
Jigsaw, SCD5, SCD7, Saphire and CSU to select targets for proactive
police attention
o DCC4 mentioned advocacy services in some Boroughs to help victims
select care and protection options and these could be used in a new
PP hub

SWOT Summary

Strengths

o Jigsaw and MAPPA currently provide the most consistent, structured
and systematic multi agency framework to manage dangerous
offenders. This needs full exploitation with MPS expanding the types of
danger categories included, as allowed in the legislation and
government guidelines.
o Bi weekly operational meeting between specialist units to prioritise
targets for proactive police action.
o SCD1 HPU Menu of interventions developed out of HSWG‟s for use in
MAPPA and other specialist units

Weaknesses

o Jigsaw concentration on sex offenders and need to give the MPS an
effective internal forum to discuss level 1 MAPPA type cases across all
the specialist units
o PPO intervention plans not consistently of a high standard and reliant
on effectiveness of CDRP
o Failure to prioritise and manage offenders with multiple offending
patterns policed by different specialist MPS units.
o Varied focus between victim and offender action planning. The offender
is key as the more dangerous subjects are involved in various violent
offending domains with multiple victims.
o Some units work largely alone such as SCD8 and Sapphire but have
identified offending patterns which cross domains such as Burglary and
Rape and Trident crime with sexual offending. This needs multi internal
unit coordination as well as multi external agency co-ordination

Opportunities

o The creation of a new public protection hub on each Borough co-
locating and integrating specialist units CSU, CAIT, Jigsaw and
Sapphire.
o New MAPPA level 1 structure to allow high risk subjects listed by
multiple specialist police units to be discussed internally formalising the
Bi weekly meetings within the statutory MAPPA structure.
o New sign off mechanism for agreed actions in level 2 and 3 multi
agency meetings to formalise process and make agencies
accountable.



o SCD5, 7 and 8 high risk targets to be identified and placed on new
Borough public protection hub where they live. SCD case officer to be
made responsible for identifying subjects, assessing and co-ordinating
the action plan process thereby supplementing the Borough hub with
SCD resources and expertise.
o Consider placing medium and high risk PPO subjects onto MAPPA for
close supervision, tailored action plan and close monitoring.

Threat

o Unidentified subject commits homicide due to lack of internal
coordination and effective information exchange with external partners.

Monitoring and Review

Main Findings

 Out of all the units reviewed only the PPO scheme, SCD5 and Jigsaw
undertakes any meaningful review and monitoring work on their cases
 The PPO scheme requires:
o Monthly return from all the PPO Borough liaison officers to PPO
Central Office detailing the current CJS status of the subject,
offending behaviour and review of the intervention plans
effectiveness
o An ongoing review requirement is in place between the liaison
officer and the local police tasking and coordinating group for
police activity and the CDRP for overall performance
o The review determines whether existing subjects should stay on
the scheme or if new subjects should join all dependent on
fluctuating offending patterns.
 Jigsaw Teams are accountable to the London Strategic Management
Board and both are required to:
o Provide a quarterly report on level 3 subjects.
o The Board itself is responsible for monitoring training and
development needs.
o The Board has to complete an Annual report on activity
o The Jigsaw teams have a standing agenda item to review
existing cases at level 2 and 3 at the regular inter agency
meetings. However the effectiveness of this was questioned by
Jigsaw central.
It is hoped that the new VISOR system will provide a much more
effective case monitoring and review mechanism.

 SCD5 Child abuse cases are reviewed every six months as a
requirement under the new London Children Protection Procedures.
This process is led by the Social Services Department locally.
 Sapphire were undertaking a form of review into historical rape cases
going back to 1995 to re investigate incidents where there had been a
clear DNA identification made by SCD4.



 All the other units are largely dependent on the standard and skilled
commitment of their respective supervisors in putting in place informal
local review arrangements. This was clearly very adhoc and
unsatisfactory.

SWOT Summary

Strengths
 PPO, SCD5 and Jigsaw monitoring and review arrangements were
partly successful with some areas still needing improvement.

Weaknesses

 No structured and systematic procedures in place for other units and
largely dependent on quality of local supervision at that time.
 Jigsaw inter agency actions not signed off formerly to hold respective
agency to account for its agreed actions

Opportunities

 Expand the implementation of VISOR to ALL specialist units grouped in
a new public Protection hub on Borough. This could then automatically
remind case officers to review and set out a structure to complete this
with on screen check lists.
 Place review firmly into the context of a formal NIM monthly meeting of
all the specialist units with tactical and strategic assessments including
a review section.

Threat

 Circumstances with dangerous offenders change constantly and a
trigger event could raise their risk level dramatically without anyone
noticing.

Personnel and Training

Main Findings

 All the units reviewed undertook training for their staff except SCD8
and SCD7 who relied on the experience and knowledge of their staff
being determined before they were selected to join. The training
provided however varied dramatically in type, duration and quality.
 DCC2 made it very clear that initial training was required for FLP and
BIU staff at Borough level in basic behavioural and situational sciences
to identify and isolate those people and locations they encountered as
being high risk or showing signs of danger. Distinguishing the
„extraordinary from the ordinary‟. This training should include:
o Asking the right questions
o Actively involving the victim in assessing the degree of danger
they felt



o Understanding and being aware of multiple offending behaviour
 SCD1 HPU were preparing a training package in homicide prevention
and risk management for the Crime Academy targeted at SIO‟s. HPU
highlighted the need for FLP and specialist units to be aware of the
various indices that could be used for assessing dangers.
 CSU and Jigsaw provided formal accredited training with a four week
course in two parts for CSU staff and a two module course for Jigsaw
staff including a written exam. The latter was delivered by the Crime
Academy.
 Sapphire and SCD5 had central training officers who provided a
comprehensive development training programme to their respective
Borough teams. In Sapphire case this was voluntary with a varied
uptake. The SOIT officers received basic training which was also given
to staff manning the „Havens‟
 The PPO liaison officers only received training in problem solving and
operating the CJS J track IT system. This is of concern as they have an
integral role in identifying and assessing different forms of danger in a
wide spectrum of offenders. Some of the Boroughs have established a
focus desk with a Superintendent, DS and Intel officer. The CDRP‟s
have been asked to appoint a multi agency coordinator but most have
so far declined often relying on the police liaison officer to undertake
this complicated role.
 DCC4 made it clear that they would like to see the creation of a new
centre of excellence in public protection on each Borough with bespoke
training, career path and ring fenced resources.
 All of the units except SCD 5, 7 and 8 were reliant on the support of
their respective BOCU to resource them properly and this commitment
varied widely from Borough to Borough. Although strategy and policy
was determined at TPHQ in these cases, standards of actual
operational delivery was determined at a local level. The ongoing team
development of these BOCU specialist units was very much dependent
on the quality of the officer i/c.
 Many respondents also commented on the fluctuating work loads in
different specialisms and between Boroughs. This often meant the
teams were overwhelmed and had to resort to reactive „fire brigade‟
tactics. FLP, crime desks and BIU had a key role in filtering cases and
only referring on those cases of high risk to help regulate the flow of
work

SWOT Summary

Strengths

o Jigsaw and CSU core accredited initial training for staff
o Centrally delivered development training for Sapphire and CAIT
Borough teams. In the latter case this is based on „learning and
demonstrating competence‟ criteria
o Experience and knowledge of SCD8 Intel and Operational staff



Weaknesses

o No training for FLP, crime desks and BIU in behavioural and situational
danger awareness which would enable them to scan and filter high risk
cases for onward referral.
o Heavy reliance on professional judgement in SCD8 and 7 with no
documented systems to demonstrate defensible decision making.
o Voluntary nature of some development training for specialist units
o Wide fluctuation in staffing levels between Borough specialist units with
comparable work loads.
o No specialist input to the identification, assessment and management
of PPO subjects except CSU on DV subjects.
o Lack of CDRP input to share the personnel and training requirements
of public protection work across agencies in their respective Borough

Opportunities

o The creation of a new Borough Public Protection Unit linking all the
specialist units such as CSU, CAIT, Jigsaw and Sapphire into one
integrated hub but retaining the specialisms. This will provide a pool of
specialists who should be ring fenced. A new BWT should be
developed for each Borough based on population and offending profile.
o The new PP unit should operate under common SOP‟s and policy
determined in a new central unit within DCC. Borough Commanders
will remain responsible for acting on the assessments of the new units.
o A new training programme should be developed but tailored to different
parts of an integrated PP function:
o Training for FLP, Crime Desks and BIU in identifying and
reporting signs of high risk in victims, offenders, and locations.
This should include SOP for entries onto CRIS and CRIMINT
with standardised flagging. The training should include modules
from SCD1 HPU and DCC2 on risk indicative models and
indices scanning. (This should be developed by the Crime
Academy and delivered through the Borough Training Units)
o Training for the new Borough PP Unit personnel in assessing,
managing and reviewing high risk cases. Developed and
delivered by the Crime Academy)
o Make the central specialist units such as SCD1, 7 and 8 responsible for
placing identified dangerous subjects onto the respective Borough PP
unit indices (where the subject lives) and overseeing elements of the
MAPPA assessment and management planning with other agencies.
This will counter the concern of centralised detective expertise away
from the Boroughs.

Threat

o The increased vulnerability of the MPS to an unidentified or
mismanaged high risk situation „exploding‟ with enormous public
confidence implications such as the Climbie incident. Currently there is
a focus on PSA volume crimes leading to a demand led culture. The



signs of danger need to be distinguished quickly and referred on for
professional management.

IT / Manual Risk Management Systems

Main Findings

 One of the biggest constraints in scanning and identifying the signs of
danger is the incompatibility and varied application of automated
databases and management systems. This extends into a wide variety
of informal and formal manual systems used at different levels of the
organisation.
 The best way of illustrating this is by differentiating between the risk
management stages reviewed in this report:

Risk Identification

 Reactive:
o CRIS and CAD remain the central tools for reporting crimes and
managing incidents involving danger. By its very nature CRIS is
predominantly victim driven as most entries are made after an
allegation of crime by the victim.
o CRIS is important as its function is prioritised by FLP who are
under very heavy demand work loads but reporting crime
remains a core duty whereas CRIMINT is secondary.
o If CRIS is completed to a high standard with appropriate flagging
it provided an invaluable research source to identify offending,
victim and location patterns
o MERLIN based on AWARE contains a missing persons and
child incident reporting function (form 78) This is however
dependent on the motivation and diligence of the reporting
officer as in many cases form 78 is not completed
o Form 124D provides a manual form for FLP to report and initially
investigate DV incidents. This contains a risk identification
matrix.
 Proactive:
o CRIMINT is the predominant FLP IT system for reporting
proactive intelligence about the community in general,
individuals or specific locations. However proactive intelligence
gathering becomes secondary in intense demand led FLP.
o CRIMINT, CRIS, CAD and MERLIN can be scanned proactively
for „signs of danger‟ and identifying patterns of incident and
behaviour. This is best performed by the BIU or at central
Intelligence focus desks
o Project Asset will provide an artificial intelligence data mining
tool using ontology to search automatically for signs and
patterns in CAD, CRIS, CRIMINT, HOLMES, DNA and STOP
databases.
o DCC2 are developing a CRIS interrogation spreadsheet to help
link victims, offenders and locations on the basis of proximity


Managing Dangerous Offenders

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