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CUMULUS - A CLOUD EXPLOITATION
TOOLKIT
Javier Godinez
CUMULUS
2
A Cloud Exploitation Toolkit
• Collection of Metasploit modules
• Creating IAM users
• Launching workloads
• Locking users out
• Techniques for getting a foothold and pivoting in the Cloud
• Currently only supports AWS
FOOTHOLD IN THE CLOUD
3
• Demo Cloud Attack Surface
• Weak authentication - SSH
• Insecure configurations - Jenkins
• Misconfiguration - Squid Proxy
• Application vulnerabilities - XXE
THE MODULES
CREATE IAM USER MODULE
5
• Allows for the creation of a user
with Admin Privileges to the AWS
account
• Needs access to AWS Access Keys
or Instance Role with:
• iam:CreateUser
• iam:CreateGroup
• iam:PutGroupPolicy
• iam:AddUserToGroup
• iam:CreateAccessKey
LAUNCH INSTANCES MODULE
6
• Auto detects configuration for
launching EC2 instances
• Can launch one or multiple
instances
• Can execute setup scripts
LOCKOUT USERS MODULE
7
• Requires an IAM admin role (created
by previous module)
• Enumerates all users and access keys
• Accepts a user to keep
• Locks out all other accounts
DISCLAIMER
8
• This is not an Amazon Web Services issue
• This is a DevOps education issue
• It is the user’s responsibility to understand the technology being used
• With power user privileges comes great responsibilities
DEMO
GETTING A FOOTHOLD
DEMO
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
DEMO NETWORK
11
VPC
Peering
AWS API
Attacker
3
10.0.0.0/16
Jenkins
4
IGWIGW
Account A
Proxy
1
2
SSH API
10.10.0.0/16
Account B
DEMO NETWORK
12
VPC
Peering
AWS API
Attacker
10.0.0.0/16
Jenkins
IGWIGW
Account A
Proxy
1
SSH /
API
API
10.10.0.0/16
Account B
DEMO NETWORK
13
VPC
Peering
AWS API
3
10.0.0.0/16
Jenkins
IGWIGW
Account A
Proxy
1
2
SSH /
API
API
10.10.0.0/16
Account B
DEMO NETWORK
14
VPC
Peering
AWS API
Attacker
3
10.0.0.0/16
Jenkins
4
IGWIGW
Account A
Proxy
1
2
SSH /
API
API
10.10.0.0/16
Account B
REFERENCES
15
• Cumulus - A Cloud Exploitation Toolkit
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Ka7F_6TetSNFdfbkI1cnJHUTQ
• See cumulus branch: https://github.com/godinezj/metasploit-framework
HOW APPLY THIS KNOWLEDGE
16
• Read the AWS IAM Best Practices Documents:
• http://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/best-practices.html
• Monitor IAM actions using AWS CloudTrail
• Audit your AWS Account IAM Policies and Roles
• Red Team your applications and instances: https://www.metasploit.com
• Think to yourself: “How would an attacker use this against me?”
• Use repeatable secure patterns: https://github.com/devsecops
• Help build awareness through community: http://www.devsecops.org
THANKS FOR WATCHING!
Javier Godinez
APPENDIX
UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGY YOU
USE
19
• How fast can I move while still staying safe?
• Always develop in separate account (Blast Radius Containment)
• Read the docs for everything and make conscious choices
• Attackers will try to leverage everything against you
• Bleeding edge does not mean stable and secure. However, it can be with enough
testing
INSTANCE
20
• Virtual host
• Virtual environment on Xen hypervisor
• Feels very much like a host running on bare metal
METADATA SERVICE
21
• Internal HTTP service that provides Instances information about its environemt
• Available from host at http://169.254.169.254/
• Also provides temporary credentials to host
INSTANCE PROFILE
22
• AWS construct that maps a
role to an instance
• Instance may or may not
have a profile associated with
it Instance
AWS IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT
OVERVIEW
23
• Users
• Groups
• Roles
• Policies
• Effect
• Actions
• Resources
• Condition
THE GOOD
24
Policy is specifically created for
the application
Least privilege
Made to be as granular as
possible
THE BAD
25
• ec2:*
• iam:*
• anything:*
THE UGLY
26
• All Access
• Great for Development
• Really Bad for Security
UPCOMING MODULES AND PROJECTS
27
• Metasploit AWS Lambda module
• Metasploit AWS s3 enumeration module
• Cumulus Cloud Attack Toolkit
• AWS
• Google Cloud Platform
• DevSecOps.org Community
EC2 INSTANCE METADATA
28
• Retrieves information from
metadata service
• Includes API credentials
• Account information
• Regional information

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Blackhat Arsenal 2017 - The Cumulus Toolkit

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. Work for Intuit and presenting under devsecops.org where I am a founding member.
  2. The Cumulus toolkit is the culmination of some of my research and actual events l’ve seen during the last couple years while operating in the public Cloud. It is my attempt at automating and helping the RedTeam at Intuit move faster. The cumulus toolkit is not only a set of Metasploit modules, but also a set of techniques that we use to get a foothold in the Cloud.
  3. When it comes to penetrating and escalating privileges the Cloud, the first thing you need is a foothold. There are many ways to do this and we will go through several techniques during the demo. 
  4. The first module we will be going through is the CIAMU module, it is a post exploitation module which can be used to create IAM users in an account where you have a foothold. Given that the instance you are attacking has an over privileged role attached to it.
  5. The Launch instances module as the name implies can be used to launch instances. At times we have limited privileges, but have the capability to launch instances with higher privileges that we currently posses. So we can use this module to perform privilege escalation as well as to launch unauthorized workloads in the Cloud.
  6. The lockout users module is by far the most evil module. It can be used to lock other users out of an account. Because at times we may need to prove that we have complete control over an account.
  7. As a disclaimer, this is not an AWS issue it is a devops education issue because AWS and other Cloud providers give you all the necessary controls to protect your infrastructure.
  8. Having a technical grasp of how the technologies you leverage is imperative. Jumping in with both feet and no plan is not a good move to make Reading the API documents and best practices documents can get you on the right path We got to where we are now by really digging in and looking at how AWS Identity and Access Management policies work and how they can be abused through the lens of an attacker
  9. This is a very quick overview of AWS IAM. Our intention is not to show you the best practices but give you enough information to understand the rest of the story AWS IAM can be extremely complicated if not understood in context and set up with clear and crisp plans Allows for very granular control over access to specific parts of the AWS API These are essentially the keys to the kingdom and can be both used and abused Users can be added and removed from an account Users can be added to groups Roles can be assigned to groups, users and roles Policies can be attached to groups From our perspective there are three types of IAM policies: