1. IAFF 1005: INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Sleight of Hand: The
Triggers and Catalysts of
World War II in Europe
Juan Pablo Poch
Juan Pablo Poch
29/04/2015

2. 1
Introduction
After reconstructing the European house of cards for two decades, one of the most infamous conflicts in
human history was sparked the moment Hitler set his boot heel over Poland on September 1st, 1939.
However, if history repeating itself is not a craft of pure coincidence, there is room to inquire what caused
the spark of World War II in Europe. This paper seeks to address this question by conducting a
comprehensive assessment of international relations theories, with an emphasis on the features of the
international system – or third image. This investigation conceptualizes the explanations for the onset of
World War II through two separate categories of triggers and catalysts. The former act as the necessary
cause of conflict: explanations or implications without which there would not have been such an event.
Meanwhile, catalysts operate as factors or conditions that force an escalation of tensions leading to the
trigger or its build-up.
The main catalysts that contributed to the escalation of tensions leading up to World War II can
be summed up in liberalist and realist hypotheses. From the liberalist perspective, the lack of economic
interdependence between European states and the United States exemplifies the dissociation of interstate
trade relations, while the collapse of neoliberal institutionalism explains the hopeless attempt to contain
bellicose states. Once the international regime devolved into anarchy, the rationalist explanations for war
delineate states’ calculations to endure the costs of ineffective war. All of the above being catalysts, this
assessment endorses an offensive realist trigger of the inciting event of World War II as a product of Nazi
Germany’s power maximization and the Allied counterparts buck-passing.
Background
Following World War I, the power distribution shifted drastically, with the collapse of the former
Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires and the deterioration of the German Second Reich into
the Weimar Republic. Internationally, Soviet communism and Western democracy emerged as the
dominant ideologies of global politics. The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 celebrated the long-awaited
end of World War I and the leaders of the victor states gathered to shape the future foreign policy and
“peace” outlined in the Treaty of Versailles. The beginning portion established the creation of the League
of Nations, the first international political organization assembled to oversee global security and settle

3. 2
future interstate disputes. The remainder of the treaty, though, focused on sanctioning Germany for
starting the war. It condemned the beaten state to pay 132 billion marks (US $442 billion in 2012 dollars)
as reparation for damages caused during the war, to renounce to its colonies in Africa and to forfeit
Alsace-Lorraine and West Prussia ("The Treaty of Versailles"). Additionally, the charter reduced the
German military to a 100,000 men with no advanced weaponry (Kissenger 1994, 293). The settlement
was repudiated by the German state and people, yet it was enforced to the letter, only with minimal
reductions to the reparations. German domestic collapse was imminent not only because of the hyper-
inflated economy that led to the years of the Great Depression, but also due to the stigma of the “war
guilt” that degraded German identity. The transition of the Weimar Republic paved the way for the rise of
Hitler to chancellor in 1934 and totalitarian control of the ultra-right-winged Nazi party, following the
surging fascist wave that had already swept through Italy and placed Mussolini at the top of the executive
in 1925.
The agitated nationalist political theatre in central and southern Europe tested the legitimacy of
the Treaty of Versailles, where charisma subdued the legal basis of the pact, reassured the expansionist
and vindictive interests of the incipient Axis, and permeated several alerting transgressions to the accord.
Among these was the reconstruction of the German army, including the reestablishment of the Luftwaffe,
the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the frontier with France in 1936, and the annexation of Austria
and Czechoslovakia two years later. The omens of the rebirth of Germany and the Axis to challenge their
neighboring Western great powers were increasingly conspicuous as they engaged in more ambitious
political courses like the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the weapons tests in the midst of the
Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This resolve was widely magnified ensuing the alliance and mutual
apportionment of territory with the USSR, another sleeping giant, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in
1939. The uproar of the challengers posed a concern if not a threat to the British and the French;
nonetheless, they opted to preserve temporary peace with the signing of the 1938 Munich Pact. It was
only a matter of time that the boiling contention would escalate against the interests of the Allies, which
neither the Munich Pact nor the League of Nations could avert from the inevitable spark of war. The

4. 3
world would not see an official end to the war until September 2, 1945, after the Allies marched
victoriously through the streets of Berlin and dropped two atomic bombs on Japan.
Literature and Hypotheses
The lack of economic interdependence among European states and with the US catalyzed the degradation
of diplomatic relations. This theory originates from the liberal assumption that states in the international
system seek not to preserve their security but instead to maximize their utility. As a consequence, the
theory postulates that “[high] trade and investment flows can lead to peace by giving states an incentive to
avoid militarized conflict and war” (Copeland 1993, 27). However, the volatility of the international
economic panorama undermines the ideal interdependence, and often drives states to seek shelter in
protectionist policies. When interdependence fails, “[the] restraint [from coercive actions] is taken away,
unleashing domestic forces and pathologies that may be lurking in the background” (Copeland 1993, 34).
In order to explain this drawback, Copeland (1993) introduces the trade expectations theory, which
reconciles liberal utilitarianism and realist security concerns by incorporating an additional variable: “a
dependent actor’s expectation of the future trade and investment environment” (Copeland 1993, 27). This
“determines when high dependence will push states toward either relatively peaceful behavior or hard-
line policies and war” (Copeland 1993, 27). In another review of the theory, Copeland formulates the
following mechanism:
“If highly interdependent states expect that trade will be severely restricted - that is, if their
expectations for future trade are low - realists are likely to be right: the most highly dependent
states will be the ones most likely to initiate war, for fear of losing the economic wealth that
supports their long-term security. In short, high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or
war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade” (Copeland 1996, 10)
The theory effectively explains the nuance between peace- and war-prone circumstances on the basis of a
comprehensive analysis of realism and liberalism. Nonetheless, it struggles to explain the behavior of the
less dependent state and the scenarios in which they may engage in coercive – or even imperial –
diplomacy and actions that develop into a war, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.1
1
According to Scott Sagan, Japan launched an offensive on Pearl Harbor as a responseto the U.S. oil embargo. This would have
crippled the Imperial Navy, for they were considerably dependent on US petroleumimports. Sagan, Scott D. "TheOrigins of the
Pacific War." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18.4 (1988): 908.

5. 4
The core postulate of neoliberal institutionalism is that “from the deficiency of the ‘self-system’
[a cornerstone of realism] we derive a need for international regimes” (Keohane 1984, 88). According to
Keohane (1984), regimes “resemble conventions that actors conform to, not because they are uniquely
best, but because others conform to [such conventions] as well” (Keohane 1984, 89). In order to achieve
this scenario of mutually beneficial agreements, Keohane suggests a translation of the Coase theorem
from the field of economics into the arena of international relations. This rationale provides a mechanism
to reach cooperation by reducing transaction costs, enforcing property rights and easing uncertainty
between parties.2
In the first instance, transaction costs are initially reduced “[by] making it cheaper for
governments to come together [and] negotiate”; by providing a negotiating table, an international
institution automatically relieves governments from substantial arrangement expenses. Within the bargain
itself, “linkages and side-payments among issues grouped in the same regime” facilitate lesser
bureaucratic costs (Keohane 1984, 91), while a reinforcement of these practices through iteration cuts
“the marginal cost of dealing with each additional issue” (Keohane 1984, 90). Secondly, Keohane
advocates that international institutions would oversee and sanction the agreement as the legitimate
authority, so that none of the parties would default on the agreement. This legal framework operates on
the basis of incentives and sanctions, for imposing a consistent rule of law poses an immense challenge to
state sovereignty: “costs of reneging on commitment is increased, and the costs of operating within this
framework [regime] are reduced” (Keohane 1984, 89). In other words, the international community
cannot police states without breaching domestic sovereignty and, ironically, perpetuating an act of war.
For the latter condition, Keohane suggests that these organizations could hurdle the barrier of uncertainty
“by promoting negotiations in which transparency is encouraged [and] dealing with a series of issues over
many years and under similar rules, thus encouraging honesty in order to preserve future reputation”
(Keohane 1998, 86). Thus, uncertainty would be undermined on the basis of values and incentives that
reaffirm the regime’s legitimacy and expectations.
2
Under ideal conditions, Keohane’s argument would serve as solution to Fearon’s “Rationalist Explanations for War”: it
“surmounts the[private] barrier to communication” (Fearon 1995, 400), solves the deceptive commitment problems and unbinds
seemingly indivisible issues.

6. 5
John Mearshimer’s offensive realism lays foundation on the concept of international anarchy,
defined as “the absence of a governing authority over the great powers” (Mearshimer 2001, 19), to
support the states’ necessity for power in the quest for survival in a lawless system. Although structural
realists, offensive and defensive, believe in the balance of power among states, Mearshimer’s assessment
suggests a different measure of the amount of power required to balance. While Kenneth Waltz’s
defensive realism identifies states as “power preservers” – assuming a stable status quo –, offensive
realism brands them as “power maximizers”, for there exist persuasive incentives to aggrandize their
capabilities “to be the hegemon of the system” (Mearshimer 2001, 21). For Mearshimer, power
distribution and incentives to buck-pass varies according to bipolar (two great powers), balanced
multipolar (many states with equal power) or unbalanced multipolar (many states with asymmetrical
power) international ordering. Consequently, these arrangements prescribe the tendency of states to
balance or buck-pass against a threat to the status quo. Oftentimes, “buck-passing is preferred over
balancing, because the successful buck-passer does not have to fight the aggressor if deterrence fails”
(Mearshimer 2001, 267). This is the luxury of balanced multipolarity, where there is always a “potential
buck-catcher”, and the tragedy of bipolarity, where there is none. However, in the case of unbalanced
multipolarity, variation occurs according to “relevant distribution of power and geography” (Mearshimer
2001, 268), and the existence of a potential hegemon.3
States would form what Mearshimer calls a
“balancing coalition” against the latter menace under the possibility of a hegemonic war that threatens
with a mercurial transformation of the status quo. Yet, “costs of containment are likely to be great,” and
states will pass the buck at the expense of others bearing such costs (Mearshimer 2001, 271). Secondly,
geography influences certain courses of action on the basis of proximity to the threat, as well as the
presence of obstacles. While adjacent states are forced to defend themselves from being the aggressor’s
prey (balance), separate countries regard the threat as an outlier and opt to buck-pass. In a similar manner,
a state shielded by physical obstacles (e.g. water masses, mountains, marshes) that create a difficult
3
Such variations “facilitated buck-passing against Napoleon (1792) and Hitler (1939), but not against Kaiser Wilhelm”
(Mearshimer 2001, 269), who had to face the TripleEntente even before the July Crisis of 1914.

7. 6
access for the attacker’s military can safely assume that a rational tactician would venture through a more
favorable terrain, so the buck is passed to states without natural barriers.4
In his “Rationalist Explanations of War,” James Fearon submits the international disputes to Carl
von Clausewitz’s Bargaining Model of War in which a variety of statistical outcomes from the political
tug-of-war – including but not limited to absolute victory or defeat – leads up either to a bellicose conflict
or a diplomatic settlement of the issue. Based on this reference frame, Fearon proposes three major
mechanisms through which states rationally opt to fight wars rather than engage in diplomatic bargains to
international disputes: private information and incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems and
issue indivisibilities. The former establishes that the lack of private information about a state’s relative
power and capabilities, summed up with incentives to misrepresent the available knowledge about their
rival’s intent, means that states cannot always use subtle conciliation to discover mutually preferable
settlements. “Since the bargaining range is determined not just by relative power but also by states' values
for the issues at stake relative to the costs of fighting”, states would forego the alternative of a diplomatic
solution in order to obtain a stronger leverage in the bargaining table (Fearon 1995, 395). On second
instance, the explanation of commitment problems implies that a state cannot fully compromise to uphold
an agreement in the future under specific circumstances, particularly those that would conflict with its
vital interests. Fearon (1995) notes that the unstable “structural condition of anarchy” derives from an
“unfortunate combination of state preferences and opportunities for action [that] imply that one or both
sides in a dispute have incentives to renege on peaceful bargains” (Fearon 1995, 401); the negotiating
range changes unprecedentedly as well as the probabilities of war as an outcome. Such situation arises,
for example, over a territorial concession that could arrange a short-term entente, but would provide
crucial strategic or economic advantage to the recipient over the grantor in the occasion of a future
bargain. The latter complication of issue indivisibilities emerges from the vital and fundamental interests
that a state would tag as non-negotiable.5
Therefore, the likelihood of war augments, for “the issue allows
4
The two antipodes of this same argument are theUK, with its “splendid isolation”, and Poland, characterized by its flat terrain
and neighbor of two great powers, which the Nazis were able to conquer in a month.
5
An example of this sort of issue is thedisputeover Alsace-Lorraine in 1914 between Germany and France.

8. 7
only a finite number of resolutions, [and] it might be that none falls within the range that both prefer
[instead of] fighting” (Fearon 1995, 382).
Evidence
The adoption of protectionist measures in the United States such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930 not
only disrupted the influx of products from struggling European economies – especially Germany –, but
also raised the prices of US exports needed in the German manufacturing sector. The ensuing wave of
domestic barriers from the “tariff wars” plunged the economies in need of recovery – to repay war debts
to the US, among other reasons – into a tighter recession, as not only were they deprived from selling
competitively in the open market, but also from producing for their own domestic needs. International
economic interdependence collapsed, yet Germany grew excessively dependent on US raw materials. In
Charles Kindleberger’s words, “the gain for one country was a loss for all” (Kindleberger 1986, 291).
Thus, in line with the trade expectations theory, the overwhelming hyperinflation fomented by
protectionist measures decreased the incentives for engaging in global trade. In the middle of German
economic distress, “the more than six million unemployed grasped for any promise of an active program
to replace the confusion of the Weimar Republic” (Eubank 1969, 23). Consequently, Hitler seized the
opportunity to gather popular support and convinced the masses of his nationalist-expansionist goals.
And, without a doubt, “the German people hailed this military rebirth with great joy” (Eubank 1969, 38).
Nevertheless, unlike Copeland’s liberalist view, the crisis led Germany to embrace autarky and even
Hitler’s advocacy for Lebensraum in Eastern Europe to “lessen German dependency on foreign sources
for raw materials and [to] make the army and the economy ready for his blitzkrieg campaigns” (Eubank
1969, 39).6
Furthermore, trade expectations theory fails to explain the compliance of the American
government to local agricultural producers’ demands, even while being in a position of low dependence
but favorable returns from trade. If the US would have remained a defendant of open economic policy,
there exists a promising probability that the German fascism and rearmament would have been avoided or
easily mitigated through economic incentives.
6
This economic reorientation served in a similar as theKaiser’s Flottenpolitik, which, according to German Foreign Minister
Prince von Bülow, was a “policy that mobilized the best patrioticforces (…) that appealed to the highest national emotions.”
Wawro, Geoffrey, Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (London: Routlege, 2000), 180.

9. 8
Provided Wilson’s idealistic collective security prevailed – an assumption that “all the nations in
the world had equal interest in peace and would therefore unite to punish those who disturbed it”
(Kissinger 1994, 51) –, the League of Nations should had stepped up to repress the Nazi threat or at least
compel the member states to balance against the rogue state. Nevertheless, the League failed to fulfill at
least two of the provisions suggested by Copeland. From its most structural aspects, the League’s legal
framework and legitimacy was not backed up by the major powers and industrial economies of the
interwar period: the US, a major power already, refused to sign the Covenant in 1919 – ironic given that it
was President Wilson’s initiative to create it –, while Germany and the USSR remained excluded until
1926 and 1934 respectively:
“Idealists imagined that the League would be the supreme arbiter of international affairs, but the
great powers who dominated the League would not permit it to handle matters vital to their
national interests. They were willing to use the League when it suited them—when the disputes
were minor affairs involving less powerful nations” (Eubank 1969, 14)
The League imposed no credible restraint for violent member states, since its power was limited to a
public disapproval of violence rather than its actual containment or eradication. Such was the case in the
1935 Ethiopian Crisis, when “the failure of the League members to compel Mussolini to halt his invasion,
which was clearly contrary to the Covenant, doomed the League of Nations” (Eubank 1969, 55).
Secondly, regarding transaction costs, a major internal issue was the expeditious determination, for “all
decisions of the Council, as well as the Assembly, had to be unanimous” (Eubank 1969, 14). The failure
to reach a timely consensus over major issues and execute decisive action turned into another bureaucratic
loop, and implied not necessarily an explicit cost to the involved nations, but a substantial opportunity
cost from foregone self-help. John Maynard Keynes question of the institution’s efficiency remains
relevant: “does not this provision reduce the League, so far as concerns an early reconsideration of any of
the terms of the Peace Treaty, into a body merely for wasting time?” (Keynes 1920, 124)
Concerning the distribution of power, despite that the unbalanced multipolar system resembled to
a considerable extent that of pre-World War I era, it had two fundamental differences: a seemingly
weaker Central Power (Nazi Germany) and a consequently disbanded Entente (Britain, France and the
Soviet Union). In an attempt to prevent a future uprising, the Treaty imposed a multitude of conditions to

10. 9
reduce German military capabilities, from the “reduction of total effective force to 100,000 men” (Article
163) to the surrender of all offensive or specialized weaponry (Art. 164), and the “demobilization of all
the personnel of the Air Services” (Art. 198) (Tardieu 1921, 131-133). Yet, “Germany certainly had the
requisite population and wealth [resources] to build the mightiest army of Europe” (Mearshimer 2001,
305). And, once Hitler rose to power in 1933, he concealed this latent power from the naive European
powers to incite them to pass the buck among each other. Under the illusion of German lack of
hegemonic potential in the early 1930s, “the United Kingdom passed the buck to France, which tried to
push Hitler eastward against smaller states of eastern Europe and possibly the Soviet Union, which in turn
tried to pass the buck to the United Kingdom and France” (Mearshimer 2001, 308).7
In terms of
geography, the UK and the USSR had incentives to buck-pass: the former was detached from continental
Europe by the English Canal – “splendid isolation” –, and the latter used Poland as a buffer zone from any
Nazi threat. On the other hand, France shared borders with Germany, for they were not separated by a
buffer state. Instead, between them lay the Rhineland, a de-militarized zone controlled by the French – at
least until 1935. However, after the 1925 Locarno Pact, the French recognized the possibility of a future
German invasion, which motivated the adoption of contingent defensive strategies, such as the
construction of the Maginot Line in 1929.
The morning of January 30, 1933, when Hitler was appointed German Chancellor, meant a
radical change of the country’s foreign policy from Gustav Stresemann’s acquiescent cooperation to the
Fürher’s devious demands. Throughout the past decades, the British appeasement of Hitler during the
1930s has inspired many leaders in international affairs to refer to the Munich analogy as one of “lessons
learned” from awarding concessions to an imperialistic power. Even now, there exists a heated debate
over the aims of the of the British appeasement policy: while the orthodox school claims it aimed to
satiate Hitler’s lust for power, the revisionist view suggests it bought time for British rearmament.
Nonetheless, the chain of events that eventually led to the outbreak of war suggests that the policy’s
objective evolved from a mere satisfaction of Hitler’s requests to a realist calculus of power under a
limited time frame. Before the Munich Conference in 1938, Britain miscalculated Nazi Germany’s
7
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearshimer portrays asimilar “pattern of balancing and buck-passing displayed by
[Napoleon’s] rivals between 1789 and 1815” (Mearshimer 2001, 288).

11. 10
willingness to fight, for “the appeaser [saw] in the successive demands of the imperialistic power,
rationally limited objectives” (Dimuccio 1998, 247). Contrary to the Allies beliefs:
“Concessions over German rearmament, the Rhineland, Austria, and Sudeten Czechoslovakia not
only failed to appease Hitler, but made war even more likely by whetting his appetite for
aggression and by undermining the credibility of Britain and France and the utility of their
subsequent guarantee of Poland” (Ripsman and Levy 2008, 149)
Hitler acted under the pretext of self-determination to justify the annexation of neighboring weak states
with German nationals, while reserving his true intention to overthrow the status quo in the long run to his
inner circle: “The Reich Chancellor again stressed that for the next 4-5 years the main principle must be:
everything for the armed forces. Germany's position in the world was decisively dependent upon the
position of the German armed forces” (Cabinet Discussion on Budget Priorities, February 8, 1933).
Notwithstanding, Fearon’s argument of incentives to misrepresent works in the opposite way, for the
Nazis were incited “to conceal their capabilities or resolve, if they are concerned that revelation would
make them militarily (and hence politically) vulnerable or would reduce the chances for a successful first
strike” or “persuade the other side to make [further] concession” (Fearon 1995, 396).
Even so, the moment Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia en masse in 1938 – while claiming only to
occupy the former Reich’s Sudetenland – he subdued a portion of the Czech national group, and, thus,
breached the principle of self-determination: “he had crossed the line of what was morally tolerable (…)
British public opinion would tolerate no further concessions” (Kissinger 1994, 317). At this point, the
Allies had the necessary evidence to confirm the Hitler’s expansionist motives, which turned the
appeasement into a means for accelerated rearmament. Meanwhile, naive to underlying implications of
Munich, German minister of propaganda celebrated: “The world is filled with a frenzy of joy. Germany’s
prestige has grown enormously. Now we are really a world power again” (Cavendish 2008). Although
the French and the Soviets had kept large standing armies as a preventive measure, the Brits “believed
that with a major rearmament effort the military imbalance [vis-à-vis Germany] could be corrected by the
late 1930s” (Ripsman and Levy 2008, 150). Yet, the reality of this explanation is challenged by “Britain’s
economic problems [that] were compounded by the world economic crisis of the early 1930s, to the point

12. 11
that a military rearmament program was perceived as an unnecessary luxury” (Ripsman and Levy 2008,
159).
Even though Hitler’s anti-Semitism and charismatic fascism are often credited for precipitating
World War II in Europe, his ruthless pragmatism to pursue vital international security goals for Germany
reflect a set of rational power calculations. In Mein Kampf, Hitler fostered a Hobbesian perspective of the
world that appealed to a domestic solution to an international problem: “Because Germany does not
defend itself in any other way except by the flamboyant protests of our parliamentarian elect, there is no
reason why the rest of the world should take up the fight in our defense” (Hitler 1943, 475). From an
international regime that had placed the country against the wall ever since Versailles (1919), the Fürher
decisively concluded that “Germany will either become a world power or will not continue to exist at all”
(Hitler 1943, 500).8
Beyond paranoid speculation, the German leadership sustained compelling
geographical arguments to reinforce its homeland security: “[Germany] is located in the center of Europe
with few natural defensive barriers on either its eastern or western flanks, which make it vulnerable to
invasion” (Mearshimer 2001, 181). To achieve survival through hegemony, Hitler professed
“Lebensraum, or ‘living space,’ was needed if Germany was to have sufficient population, food, and
natural resources to dominate Europe” (Eubank 1969, 28). Hence, the Wehrmacht aimed to rebuild its
military might throughout the 1930s from the spoils of the Weimer Republic. Accordingly, it enhanced
the military industry, reestablished the Luftwaffe (Air Force) and enlarged the infantry sevenfold. At long
last, the Third Reich became a potential hegemon of Europe by the Munich crisis in mid-1938. Soon, by
1939, Hitler triggered his war machine and began expanding the German frontiers; first, it fed off its weak
neighboring states and, by July of 1941, the Germans marched under the Arc du Triumph. Thus, in line
with the offensive realist doctrine, the Nazis embraced the necessity for maximizing power in order to
favorably shift the balance of power and assure survival as the hegemon of the anarchic system.
Conclusion
8
Hitler’s ideas were similar to those of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Weltpolitik, which “[were] founded on the Social Darwinist belief
that Germany had either to expand or stagnate.” Wawro, Geoffrey, Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (London:
Routlege, 2000), 176.

13. 12
The lack of economic interdependence and the institutional void of the prewar years contributed to the
forsaking of incentives of mutual gains and peaceful cooperation among states. Protectionism doomed the
global free trade while powerlessness within the international regime wrecked the inefficient League of
Nations. A second image perspective suggests that the Great Depression and the subsequent social unrest
instigated nationalist movements that paved the way for aggressive fascist regimes across Europe.
Nonetheless, these arguments were not sufficient causes for the spark of the Second World in Europe, for
the nationalist movements endorsed domestic reforms – interstate conflicts were not openly promoted. On
the other hand, the failure of institutions demonstrated war in defense of collective security stood not
among the great powers’ vital interests – for instance, the League lost credibility after its inaction during
crises in Manchuria and Ethiopia. In this way, the end of cooperation meant not the outbreak of war, but
rather the first step of an escalating conflict.
In view of the restoration of the anarchic system, the European unbalanced multipolarity
intensified, for the Treaty of Vienna failed at changing significantly the power distribution of the pre-
World War I stage. A first image argument could be made that certain leaders contributed to the further
destabilization of the international system. For instance, Hitler was an unpredictable amalgamation of
Kaiser Wilhelm’s hegemonic ambitions – as noted in Mein Kampf – and Bismarck’s Machiavellian
statesmanship. As mentioned by Mearshimer, “he not only played his adversaries off against each other,
but he went to considerable lengths to convince them that Nazi Germany had benign intentions”
(Mearshimer 2001, 216). Nonetheless, his concern for German security and consolidation as a powerful
nation within the international system was no different from those of his predecessors. In line with this
common intent, the figure of Hitler alone was not the cause for World War II, in the same way that
Wilhelm II was unable to declare war on the Triple Entente before finding a reason to do so in the murder
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
Realism provides a thorough third image assessment of the systematic features that triggered
World War II. The rationalist explanations for war illustrate the appeasement situation based on the
Hitler's incentives to hide private information and to deliberately drive his adversaries to miscalculate his
willingness to fight. Yet, in this particular case, the private information and incentives to misrepresent it

14. 13
meant not to unleash hostilities, but to postpone them until the Reich reached its rearmament prospects. In
this measure,Fearon’s argument justifies Germany’s concealed and accelerated preparation for war – and
even the belated Allied rearmament at the brink of conflict –, along with Hitler’s accomplished military
advantages through the appeasement. Notwithstanding, this rationale caveat is the assumption that actors
hold no particular motivations, for Nazi Germany pursued both protectionist and expansionist enterprise.
Contrary to the previous theory, Mearshimer’s offensive realism accomplishes to integrate both
the Axis’ and the Allies’ motives to the international system’s vices that resulted in World War II. The
lack of consensus over the balance of power in Europe’s asymmetrical multipolar structure explains the
German power maximizing conduct to achieve security objectives as the dominant state in the system.
Additionally, buck-passing illustrates the Allied powers non-responsive behavior during the time the
Central Power remained an unlikely hegemon to them. Offensive realism demonstrates that, once Nazi
Germany had acquired sufficient military capabilities to overwhelm the other European powers, it would
commence hostilities to expand across the continent. Nevertheless, this line of thought leaves an inquiry
unanswered: why did not the Allies launch a preventive strike against the Axis anytime between the
Munich Conference (mid-1938) and the Poland Blitzkrieg in September of 1939?
Hitherto, the world has lived in a relatively stable long peace. Following the end of World War II,
the Cold War presented another instance of conflict within the US-USSR bipolar system, yet it never
escalated to the levels of intensity of either world war. Even though several conflicts emerged around the
globe, these were minor in comparison to the means employed in total war. Has warfare finally become a
taboo to humanity, a topic resented even when considered a viable option? Have international institutions
and trade, as well as a universal creed of democracy, kept states from exterminating one another? Or, has
the alternative of nuclear lethality driven us to draw a thin line between our private interests and
extinction? Philosopher George Santayana claims that “those who cannot learn from history are doomed
to repeat it.” But those who are not prepared for history repeating itself, might as well end up being part
of it, hunted by those with sleight of hand.

15. 14
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