The document discusses lessons from the euro area crisis and ongoing challenges for monetary policy. It notes that while the ECB effectively dealt with liquidity issues, solvency problems involving banks and sovereigns were postponed. This led to a correlation between bank and sovereign risk that hindered the real economy. Current challenges include dealing with bank restructuring and maintaining accommodative financial conditions to support recovery, as interest rates remain too tight.
Monetary policy in the euro area: lessons from the crisis and challenges ahead
1. Monetary policy in the euro area:
lessons from the crisis and
challenges ahead
Lucrezia Reichlin
London Business School
September 2013
2. Lessons from the crisis and challenges ahead
• The euro area has the tools to deal with a generalized liquidity crisis
• The role of the euro-system (ES) as intermediary of last resort in the inter-bank
market [provision of unlimited liquidity against good collateral ] was key after
Lehman for financial stability and the real economy (see quantitative work by
Giannone, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin EJ 2012)
• However, imperfect euro area architecture led to postponement of action to solve
underlying solvency issues involving banks and sovereign
• Persistence of solvency risks led to the balkanization of the financial market: the
inter-bank first, the sovereign later
• This led to a correlation of sovereign and bank risk, particularly detrimental for the
real economy since the euro area financial system is based on banks
• The second LTRO was not as successful as the first as a tool to sustain credit to the
real economy
• Challenges today are how to deal with bank capital (the asset quality review) in the
absence of a backstop
• But sustaining the incipient recovery also important (and related to the first
challenge) – financing conditions are to tight in the euro area and the ECB need to
get back in control of interest rates in the new global context
3. The past five years have been tough for the EMU as a whole
US and euro area recessions 2006-2012
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Q1-2006
Q2-2006
Q3-2006
Q4-2006
Q1-2007
Q2-2007
Q3-2007
Q4-2007
Q1-2008
Q2-2008
Q3-2008
Q4-2008
Q1-2009
Q2-2009
Q3-2009
Q4-2009
Q1-2010
Q2-2010
Q3-2010
Q4-2010
Q1-2011
Q2-2011
Q3-2011
Q4-2011
Q1-2012
Q2-2012
Q3-2012
Q4-2012
Q1-2013
Q2-2013
GDP growth, QoQ
US recession EUR recession US gdp growth Euro Area gdp growth
Source: OECD
5. ECB ACTION IN SECOND RECESSION NOT EFFECTIVE IN
SUSTAINING LOANS - LIQUIDITY PROVISION AND LOANS TO
CORPORATES: The second recession is different!
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
-25
-15
-5
5
15
25
35
45
55
2001Jan
2001Oct
2002Jul
2003Apr
2004Jan
2004Oct
2005Jul
2006Apr
2007Jan
2007Oct
2008Jul
2009Apr
2010Jan
2010Oct
2011Jul
2012Apr
2013Jan
Eurobillions
Loan flows (6m MA) and industrial
production
NFC
Industrial production (right)Source: ECB
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1998W53
1999W29
2000W06
2000W35
2001W12
2001W41
2002W18
2002W47
2003W24
2004W01
2004W30
2005W06
2005W35
2006W12
2006W41
2007W18
2007W47
2008W24
2009W01
2009W30
2010W06
2010W35
2011W12
2011W41
2012W18
2012W47
Main refinancing operation
6. To understand current challenges need to look
at what happened in the financial sector in the
second recession
7. Leverage in the banking sector: not much has
happened yet
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bank capital to assets ratio (%)
United Kingdom United States Euro area
Source: World Bank
8. Bank, government and ESCB liabilities
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2006Q1
2006Q3
2007Q1
2007Q3
2008Q1
2008Q3
2009Q1
2009Q3
2010Q1
2010Q3
2011Q1
2011Q3
2012Q1
2012Q3
2013Q1
EA liabilities (normalized by
GDP)
MFIs excluding ESCB Eurosystem
General Government
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2006Q1
2006Q3
2007Q1
2007Q3
2008Q1
2008Q3
2009Q1
2009Q3
2010Q1
2010Q3
2011Q1
2011Q3
2012Q1
2012Q3
2013Q1
EA liabilities
MFIs excluding ESCB Eurosystem
General Government
9. In both recessions banks increased their holding of
government securities:
MFI (excl. ESCB) holdings of government securities / total assets
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
2006Jan
2006Mar
2006May
2006Jul
2006Sep
2006Nov
2007Jan
2007Mar
2007May
2007Jul
2007Sep
2007Nov
2008Jan
2008Mar
2008May
2008Jul
2008Sep
2008Nov
2009Jan
2009Mar
2009May
2009Jul
2009Sep
2009Nov
2010Jan
2010Mar
2010May
2010Jul
2010Sep
2010Nov
2011Jan
2011Mar
2011May
2011Jul
2011Sep
2011Nov
2012Jan
2012Mar
2012May
2012Jul
2012Sep
2012Nov
2013Jan
2013Mar
2013May
CEPR recessions Government securities of EA / total assets (%)Source: ECB
10. … but in the second is all domestic
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2006Q1
2006Q2
2006Q3
2006Q4
2007Q1
2007Q2
2007Q3
2007Q4
2008Q1
2008Q2
2008Q3
2008Q4
2009Q1
2009Q2
2009Q3
2009Q4
2010Q1
2010Q2
2010Q3
2010Q4
2011Q1
2011Q2
2011Q3
2011Q4
2012Q1
2012Q2
2012Q3
2012Q4
2013Q1
BillionsofEuro
MFI (excl. ESCB) assets: gov.securities, different counterparts
CEPR recessions Extra Euro area Other Euro area DomesticSource: ECB
11. Questions
• Does the banks’ accumulation of domestic sovereign debt eventually
intensify the vicious spiral between banks and sovereigns and thereby
prove counterproductive over the longer term? This issue goes beyond the
crisis itself
• Two scenarios can be envisaged:
(a) provided that a combination of OMT and fiscal consolidation end up
improving the public finances, you can look to a win-win if the banks’
capital rises on account of the capital gain on bond holdings; or
(b) if fiscal situation worsens, the next iteration of the feedback is yet
more magnified
CHALLENGE AHEAD IS TO DEAL WITH SOLVENCY ISSUES! NEED AGENTS
OTHER THAN THE CENTRAL BANK FOR THAT
12. Interest rates
Difficult to control them through words only (ECB version of
forward guidance)
• Money market rates are determined by demand of
liquidity by banks – banks are now giving back liquidity …
• Long rates determined by global factors
Once can argue that without further action on the policy
rate the stance of monetary policy is excessively restrictive
given the outlook