This document summarizes Ted Schoneberger's response to three letters defending a study by Howard et al. (2005) that compared intensive behavior analytic treatment to eclectic treatments for young children with autism. Schoneberger argues that the letters from Smith (2007), Howard et al. (2007), and Wright (2007) do not adequately address the methodological limitations he previously raised regarding Howard et al.'s study, including its non-random assignment of participants and lack of treatment detail. He maintains that these flaws undermine the credibility of the positive results reported in Howard et al. (2005).

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Autism Research Controversy:
A Response to Howard et al.’s (2005) Defenders
Ted Schoneberger
Two years ago Jane Howard and colleagues published their quasi-experimental study “A
comparison of intensive behavior analytic and eclectic treatments for young children with autism”
(Howard, Sparkman, Cohen, Green, & Stanislaw, 2005). A year later my paper (Schoneberger, 2006)--
which, in part, raised some serious questions about the methodology of their study--appeared in this
journal. Since it publication, my paper has received a number of positive appraisals--some from local
public school employees, some from members of local agencies serving special needs children (e.g.,
Valley Mountain Regional Center, an agency which played a role in Howard et al.’s research), and some
from other professionals across the nation. As an example of the latter, consider the comments of Andy
Bondy, a prominent behavior analyst and co-founder of the Picture Exchange Communication System
(PECS). With regard to the issue of “how to best describe” Howard et al.’s methodology and results,
Bondy found my paper (2006) “astute and helpful” (personal communication, September 27, 2006).
However, others have attempted to counter my criticisms. Specifically, this journal recently published two
letters to the editor offering spirited defenses of Howard et al. (2005): one by the researchers themselves
(Howard, Sparkman, Cohen, Green, & Stanislaw, 2007) and the other by Tristram Smith (2007). Further,
this current issue contains a third letter (Wright, 2007) which also offers a defense of Howard et al. In
what follows I respond to all three letters, beginning with the more substantive of the three (Smith, 2007),
and then concluding with Howard et al. (2007) and Wright (2007).
Response to Smith (2007)
Drawing largely on a paper by Tristram Smith and colleagues (Smith, Groen, & Wynn, 2000), my
paper (2007) identified three guidelines to be followed by studies assessing the treatment efficacy of
behavior analytic approaches to young children with autism. These guidelines are: “(1) random
assignment of participants to treatment conditions; (2) use of uniform assessment protocols across all
participants; and (3) documentation of sufficient methodological detail to allow for independent
replication” (Schoneberger, 2006, p. 208). Further, in my paper I reported Tristram Smith’s (personal
communication, July 25, 2005) critical commentary on Howard et al.’s (2005) study; namely, that the
study’s “limitations” included (a) its use of nonrandom assignment and (b) its providing “limited
information about the interventions.” The logical implications of Smith’s criticisms are that Howard et al.
(2005) failed to adhere to the first and third guidelines.
In his letter to the editor defending Howard et al.’s (2005) study, Smith (2007) does not dispute
the accuracy of my citations of his personal communication to me. However, Smith (2007) does assert
that “this characterization of our correspondence is quite one-sided and misleading” (p.146), apparently
because I did not include his favorable comments about Howard et al.’s study that were contained in his
personal correspondence to me. Indeed, in my paper I did not report Smith’s statement to me that Howard
et al.’s study “is a very useful contribution to the literature.” Further, I did not include his comments that
“the groups appear fairly comparable prior to treatment, and the comprehensive assessments and use of
independent examiners are strengths. Also, the results are impressive” ( T. Smith, personal
communication, July 25, 2005). Thus, to the charge that my characterization of his correspondence was
“one-sided” I plead guilty with an explanation. However, I disagree that I was thereby misleading.
Consider the following explanations of my “guilty” plea.
In selectively quoting Smith’s correspondence with me, I was arguing for a particular point of
view. So, of course it was one-sided. Smith’s criticizing me for being one-sided is like criticizing a

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participant in a formal debate for being one-sided. Isn’t that the point of a debate? I was not attempting to
characterize the totality of Smith’s responses to the Howard et al. study. Had I been claiming to be
attempting that, then I would agree that my selective quotations were misleading. But I was not, so my
quotes were not. Rather, by quoting Smith, as well as other sources, I was arguing that Howard et al.’s
results should be questioned because of the study’s methodological weaknesses. Such selective quotation
in mounting an argument is part of the “bread and butter” of scholarly discourse. Indeed, Smith himself is
“guilty” of this. For example, consider the following from Smith (2007, p. 146):
Although Schoneberger (2006) enumerates the potential problems with non-random
assignment, he does not mention that a design with matched groups (as in the Howard et
al., 2005 study) is generally considered to be the next best approach (Cook & Campbell,
1979). Howard et al.’s use of this design (2005) is justified because random assignment
was not possible.
Several points need to be made here. First, nowhere in the Howard et al. study do its authors report that
they used a matching procedure when assigning participants to groups (I will have more to say about this
later). Second (and to the issue at hand), Smith (2007) employs a one-sidedness when he cites Cook and
Campbell (1979) in support of his claim that “a design with matched groups (as in the Howard et al., 2005
study) is generally considered to be the next best approach” when random assignment is “not possible”(p.
146) . To be sure, Cook and Campbell (1979) acknowledge that sometimes problems arise, which make
random assignment “not feasible” (p. 344). However, they are also much less tolerant of using such
problems to justify nonrandom assignment than Smith’s citation of their book suggests. Indeed, Cook and
Campbell (1979) caution us against “persons who use these problems to justify their reluctance to
randomize”(p. 350) and go to great lengths to provide strategies for making the putatively impossible--
i.e., random assignment--possible (see Cook & Campbell, 1979, pp. 346-371). Why didn’t Smith also
make reference to these passages? Let me hazard a guess: Because, had he done so, he would have
weakened his claim that “Howard et al.’s use of this design is justified because random assignment was
not possible” (Smith, 2007, p. 146). In arguing his viewpoint, Smith made a one- sided use of Cook and
Campbell. But since he was not trying to summarize the totality of Cook and Campbell’s views on
randomization, he was not (in my opinion) misleading the reader. And neither was I when I selectively
quoted Smith’s correspondence to me.
Further, Smith’s positive comments about Howard et al.’s study do nothing to lessen the import
of its limitations identified by him. For example, his opining that the results were “impressive” does not
mitigate its methodological weaknesses. Consider the following analogy. Suppose I know that you are
looking for a dependable, fuel-efficient car, and you mention a particular model that you are pondering.
Suppose I then tell you that, based on a review appearing in a respected consumer’s advocate magazine,
the car is reportedly a gas guzzler and needs frequent repairs. Would you then have a legitimate grievance
against me if you later discovered that I had failed to tell you that the magazine also found that the car in
question has an impressive exterior (e.g., a great paint job) and interior (e.g. leather seats)? I think not.
Just as the car’s “impressive” looks are irrelevant in light of the essential features it lacks (i.e.,
dependability and fuel efficiency), so too Howard et al.’s impressive results are irrelevant when stacked
up against its methodological flaws. These research design flaws raise doubts about the study’s results,
and thereby militate against the impressiveness of same.
Response to Howard, Sparkman, Cohen, Green, and Stanislaw (2007)
In the opening paragraph of their letter to the editor, Howard and colleagues (Howard et al.,
2007) indicate their intention to “correct some misrepresentations” of their study (Howard et al., 2005)--
misrepresentations which allegedly appeared in this journal as well as “elsewhere” (Howard et al., 2007,
p. 144). In the next paragraph they decry the supposed “dissemination of unfounded statements and

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insinuations about the study and those involved in it” (p. 144). Unfortunately, the systematic ambiguity
which plagued the published account of their study also plagues their letter. By systematic ambiguity, I
mean an inexactness (which I assume is unintentional) in their statements at numerous critical points in
their writing, making understanding and evaluation difficult. Specifically, in their letter they are vague
about whose “misrepresentations” they intend to be countering; further, they do not tell us which
statements are “unfounded” nor who has authored the “insinuations.” In offering this ambiguous
complaint, they appear to be engaging in the very practice they decry; namely, disseminating
insinuations--in this case, insinuations directed at those who have critiqued their study.
In their letter, Howard et al. (2007) claim that nonrandom assignment was used in their study
“because of serious ethical and practical constraints” and because it would have violated “state and
federal laws governing special education placement and procedures” (p. 144). Given the distinct
advantages of random assignment, Howard et al (2007) need to be specific here; unfortunately, they are
not. However, I shall make some brief comments on their justification--sketchy as it is--for not employing
random assignment. Howard et al. (2007) assert that their agency (Therapeutic Pathways) never refused
service to a child “as long as there were adequate resources to staff and supervise the program” (p. 144).
Of course, like the “therapist availability” criterion used by Lovaas (1987) in assigning participants to
conditions (see Smith, Groen, & Wynn, 2000), this represents a potential source of bias. However, it is
understandable, given the challenges facing Therapeutic Pathways as an agency serving in the dual, often
conflicting roles of being both a business enterprise and a research entity. However, Cook and Campbell
(1979) have opined that when resources are insufficient, random assignment--far from being unethical--
may well be the ethical course. According to Cook and Campbell (1979), “Random assignment
sometimes serves . . . as a means of solving the ethical issues that arise when we must distribute valuable
but scarce resources” (p. 342). Similarly, Boruch (1997) identifies “a kind of fundamental ethical rule in
deciding whether to randomize” (p. 66)--a rule which he believes was first enunciated by Campbell and
Stanley (1966). “The rule, simply put, is that when there is an oversupply of eligible recipients for scarce
program services, randomized assignment of candidates for the resource is fair”(Boruch, 1997, pp. 66-
67).
Next consider the supposed legal constraints which reportedly discouraged Howard et al. (2005)
from employing random assignment. Every special education student is entitled to a free and appropriate
education (FAPE). As long as this legal right is respected, it appears there is a lot of room for offering
other, voluntary options (e.g., participation in a randomized experiment) as well. Given the well
documented history of the use of random assignment in clinical trials of medical interventions involving
issues of life-and-death, I suggest that parents, educators, and service providers--in consultation with
special education attorneys--could, in good faith, meet all the relevant legal and ethical constraints while
conducting randomized clinical trials of the differing approaches to the treatment of autism in young
children.
In the published account of their study (Howard et al., 2005), the most serious ambiguity
concerns Howard et al.’s account of how participants were “assigned” to groups. Other than telling us that
a nonrandom assignment procedure was used in which parental preferences “weighed heavily” (Howard
et al., 2005, p. 6), no information was provided in Howard et al. (2005) on the participant assignment
procedure. Thankfully, Howard et al.’s (2007) letter has resolved some of this ambiguity. Specifically, in
their letter we now learn for the first time that a matching procedure was used. Nowhere in the study
(2005) is this stated. In their letter, Howard et al. (2007) inform us that “participants were selected for our
study from larger pools of children . . . in such a way as to constitute matched treatment and comparison
groups”(2007, p. 144). Although this information is clearly helpful, there remains some lingering
ambiguity which raises important questions. Matching in quasi-experimental, between-group designs
occurs after participants have been assigned to their respective groups. So, the first question is: At what
point during the experiment were the subjects matched? Second, was the matching conducted by an

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individual blind to the individual participants’ responses to treatment? Obviously, to reduce the chances
of bias, blind matching is important if the matching occurred after initial measures of the dependent
variable--or other indicators of responses to treatment--were available.
As previously noted, parental preferences reportedly “weighed heavily” when assigning
participants to the treatment conditions. However, another ambiguity inherent in this process concerns
what influence the other members of the IEP/IFSP teams had in making these educational placement
decisions. Howard et al. (2005) do not tell us. Again, in their letter (2007) they attempt to remove some of
this ambiguity. Specifically, they report that the “nonpublic agency” (i.e., Therapeutic Pathways, an
agency for which the first and second authors serve as directors) that provided the intensive behavior
analytic treatment in the study has “never refused to serve a child with autism who was referred to its . . .
programs . . . as long as there were adequate resources to staff and supervise the programming” (Howard
et al, 2007, p. 144). Fair enough. In my paper (Schoneberger, 2006) I never claimed that they had refused
serving children referred to them, so I do not take issue with this statement.
Further clarifying the role of the other members of the IEP/IFSP teams, Howard et al. (2007) also
assert in their letter that “neither the staff of the nonpublic agency nor any Regional Center staff person
ever directed <italics added> a child to be placed in any particular intervention program”(p. 144). This is
an important assertion. In their manual “In-home Programs for Young Children with Autism,”
Therapeutic Pathways (June 1999) states that, “Therapeutic Pathways clinical group has final decision
making authority regarding the scope and content of my child’s program, including school placement” (p.
2). Based on this statement, in my paper (2006) I concluded that a “reasonable assumption is that
Therapeutic Pathways staffers used this power to place in the IBT <i.e., intensive behavior analytic
treatment> condition those participants who, in their professional judgment, were more likely to benefit
from the program, and to refer the other participants to the other conditions” (Schoneberger, 2006, p.
211). Howard et al. (2007) are now stating that this was not the case. I accept their correction. However,
some of the parent advocacy groups serving the same catchment area as Therapeutic Pathways have a
different view of the educational placement process used with early intervention autism children.
For example, in their brochure, “Coalition Against the ‘EIBT Program Procedures and
Guidelines,’ the Coalition Against the “4-Way Agreement” (2005) takes a different view. They assert that
the decision making process used to determine whether or not a nonpublic agency will serve a child
“discriminates against low-functioning autistic children” (unpaginated). They also assert that children
who are accepted, but then fail to make adequate progress, are exited from some of the programs. Similar
assertions are made by other advocacy groups (e.g., Concerned Parents of Children with Autism,
abbreviated “CPCA,” personal communication, June 5, 2006). Indeed, the CPCA has called for an
independent, fact-finding inquiry into the process by which young children with autism have been
educationally placed under auspices of the collaboration between Regional Centers, SELPAs, nonpublic
agencies/schools, and parents (CPCA, personal communication, June 5, 2006). In my paper
(Schoneberger, 2006) I raised a number of questions about how IEP/IFSP members may have influenced
the placement decision in a manner that, though appropriate in their role as fiduciaries, nonetheless
yielded selection bias.
Perhaps Howard and colleagues will join me, CPCA, and other concerned individuals and
advocacy groups in asking an independent agency (e.g., the Area 6 Developmental Disabilities Board) to
investigate the parent advocacy groups’ claims, as well as the questions raised by me, in a manner that
assures the confidentiality of those who are questioned. Based on concerns raised by the advocacy groups,
here are two critical questions that need to be addressed: (1) Were all parents of young children with
autism provided information on all of the educational placement options available? and (2) Did Regional
Center and/or SELPA staffers encourage parents to accept particular educational placements while
discouraging them from choosing other options? Embracing a variant of the principle of charity (Mackie,

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1995), I assume that answering these and other questions will further resolve ambiguities inherent in
Howard et al.’s (2005) study, so that the latter can take its place along side other quasi-experimental
treatment efficacy studies--setting the stage for subsequent true (i.e., randomized) experiments.
Response to Wright (2007)
As a practicing behavior analyst serving special needs students, I share Ms. Wright’s desire to
provide these children with effective treatment. Unfortunately, this appears to be where our agreement
ends (however, it may hopefully be that one or both of us is simply misunderstanding the other). For
example, Ms. Wright reports being “appalled” by my paper (Schoneberger, 2006) apparently because of
the “potential negative affects such an article may have on severely disabled children throughout this
state.” Green (1999) has observed that “the goals of science are not to assume but to test, to seek not to
confirm but to disconfirm hunches and beliefs” while pseudoscientific approaches “resist scrutiny and
objective testing of their claims by others” (p. 12). I see my paper as an exemplar of the “scrutiny and
objective testing” which typifies science. My critique of Howard et al. (2005) is part of the normal,
ongoing peer review of research that is intrinsic to any empirical science.
Ms. Wright begins her specific responses to my paper by defending Howard et al.’s (2005) use of
nonrandom participant assignment. Since I addressed this issue above, I will add nothing more here. In
my paper (2006, pp. 210-211) I entertain two alternative hypotheses that may account for the
experimental results reported in Howard et al. (2005). Ms. Wright takes issue with each alternative. My
first hypothesis is that perhaps the parents who chose non-EIBT treatment did so because they lacked the
motivation to comply with what the EIBT programs require of them--and that this represents a confound
challenging treatment efficacy. Wright apparently interprets this as my claiming that these parents “do
not care enough about their children to provide them with intensive intervention.” I, of course, am not
claiming this. Being insufficiently motivated and note caring enough have different meanings. Indeed, the
issue of parental motivation is one that the EIBT programs typically address. For example, the document
“Guidelines for Early Intensive Behavior Treatment Programs (EIBT) for Children with Autistic
Spectrum Disorder (Region 6 Autism Connection, 1999) outlines the procedures employed by the
collaborating agencies referring children to Therapeutic Pathways (i.e., the program providing EIBT
treatment in Howard et al, 2005) as well as other EIBT programs. This document includes among the
“EIBT entrance criteria” that the child’s “family environment supports an EIBT program,” reflecting the
importance of sufficiently motivated parents. Further, Therapeutic Pathway’s (1999) manual “In-home
Programs for Young Children with Autism” identifies a number of responsibilities which are required of
parents as a condition of their children receiving treatment. Failure to live up to these responsibilities can
lead to the cessation of treatment.
My second hypothesis --and a second major area of disagreement between Ms. Wright and me--
concerns how IEP/IFSP teams make educational placement decisions. Consider the following passage
from my paper (2006, p. 211) regarding the role IEP/IFSP team members play in placement decisions:
As fiduciaries within a federally mandated special education process <italics added>,
these team members had both a legal and ethical responsibility to advocate assigning to
the IBT group only those children for whom such a placement would be “appropriate”
based on the child's IEP/IFSP. An “appropriate” placement is one which permits the child
to “benefit educationally” from the instruction (Bateman & Linden, 1992/1998, pp. 143-
144). So, although the parents' choice of treatment conditions may have, according to
Howard et al., “weighed heavily,” the other members of the team doubtless used their
expertise to influence the eventual decision <italics added>.

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In her letter Ms. Wright references my statement (cited above) that other members of the team doubtless
use their expertise to influence the final decision. According to Wright, “not only does this statement
malign the conduct of Regional Center and school staff, it is contradictory to earlier statements.” How
does this statement possibly malign these individuals? I have been attending IEP/IFSP meetings for
twenty seven years and find member routinely attempting to influence the team’s decision. Indeed, this is
part of their job. They are expected to function as active participants, not “potted plants.” When
placement is being discussed, assessment drives the decision making process. Individuals with differing
areas of expertise--e.g., teachers, autism specialists, speech/language pathologists, school psychologists,
and behavior specialists--present assessment data to the team and make recommendations including,
especially, recommendations about placement. Ideally, all team members “weigh in” during the process
of deciding upon an appropriate educational placement.
In addition to the charge that the aforementioned statement maligns members of the IEP/IFSP
teams, Wright also argues that it contradicts my earlier statements. In the above passage, I assert that
IEP/IFSP members have a fiduciary responsibility to advocate intensive behavioral treatment only for
those who would benefit educationally from such a placement. The supposed contradiction? For Wright,
“given that competently delivered early intensive ABA has been shown to produce substantial benefits
for the majority of children who receive it, the staff would be required to advocate for every child with
autism” intensive behavioral treatment. In my judgment, this is a non sequitur. Let’s assume that the
majority of children who receive early intensive, behavioral treatment experience substantial treatment
benefits. Part of the reason why EIBT treatment may be effective is that children with autism are
carefully screened before being assigned to such treatment. As a result of such screenings, IEP/IFSP
teams frequently decide that a child with autism will not benefit--not at present or perhaps never--from
EIBT programs such as employed in Howard et al. (2005). For such students, other placement options are
appropriate.
For example, the aforementioned “Guidelines for Early Intensive Behavior Treatment Programs
(EIBT) for Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (Region 6 Autism Connection, 1999) outlines the
procedures employed by the collaborating agencies when referring children to EIBT programs.
According to these guidelines, the “EIBT entrance criteria” stipulate that “between 48 and 66 months of
age child must have been 20 and 25 functional expressive words.” Failure to meet these guidelines
presumably provides a rationale for recommending non-EIBT placement. In my experience serving
children with autism in the same catchment area, other reasons for recommending non-EIBT placement
include the presence of (1) excessive self-stimulatory behavior, and/or (2) serious physical aggression,
and/or (3) little or no imitative responding. Employing such criteria to recommend non-EIBT placements
is generally laudable within the context of an IEP/IFSP process; however, from an experimental
perspective, it exemplifies selection bias and thereby threatens the validity of the research outcomes.
Those children who meet EIBT entrance criteria are likely to profit from the treatment and show gains in
IQ, while those who are enrolled in other placements receive treatment (e.g., self-care skills) which,
though appropriate, is often unlikely to produce substantial gains in IQ.
In addition to Ms. Wright’s response to my two alternative hypotheses, she raises some additional
issues. I shall now respond to four of these further concerns. First, Ms. Wright draws attention to the
disclaimer appearing at the end of my paper in which I note that my views are not necessarily those of my
employer or my fellow employees. She appears to infer from this that my employer and fellow employees
do not question the process or treatments described in Howard et al. (2006). No such inference is
justified. The reason I provided this disclaimer is the same reason why I do not write letters of
recommendation using stationery with my employer’s letterhead: To avoid the inference that my
employer (or fellow employees) share my opinions. But by failing to use my employee’s letterhead, one
is also wrong in inferring that my employer disagrees with my recommendations. The same applies with

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the disclaimer in my paper (2006). In both cases one should not infer either an endorsement, or a lack of
endorsement, of my opinions by my employer or fellow employees.
Second, Ms. Wright responds to my criticizing Howard et al.’s (2005) lack of a uniform
assessment protocol. She states that “a knowledgeable evaluator must choose testing instruments based
on a child’s chronological age, developmental level, and overall functioning, as well as whether the test is
normed for children of that age and has been shown to produce valid results with children with autism.” I
have no argument with this. However, in my paper I argue that, even given the need to use different tests,
a much more uniform assessment protocol could have been achieved. Indeed, a case in point is the
superior assessment uniformity achieved by Sallows and Graupner (2005; see Schoneberger, 2006, p.
215).
Third, Ms. Wright reports that she does not know what my “agenda” was when I wrote the article,
but speculates that it might have been a “personal one.” Specifically, she states that “the fact that Mr.
Schoneberger provides consultation to some of the eclectic programs referenced in the study seems a
likely source of at least some of his obvious personal biases.” Several points need to be made here. First,
my primary agenda was (and remains) that of promoting effective behavioral treatment by advancing the
cause of well-designed experimental studies. Secondly, most of my career (19 out of 27 years) as a
behavior analyst has been as an independent contractor and not as employee of the public schools-- so a
more likely charge is that I am biased in favor of independent agencies. Specifically, I provided
behavioral consultation for years serving: (1) Valley Mountain Regional Center as an independent
contractor (i.e., a “vendor”) and (2) the public schools, first with my own nonpublic agency, and later as a
Senior Behavior Analyst employed by Applied Behavior Consultants (Sacramento, CA), one of the
nonpublic agencies/schools which has serviced the same catchment as Therapeutic Pathways.
Fourth, Ms. Wright also appears to question my qualifications for critiquing Howard et al.’s
research when she suggests that I may lack research experience. At the risk of engaging in shameless self-
promotion, let me set the record straight. As an adjunct faculty member of the psychology department at
California State University, Stanislaus, I taught a research methodology course at least once (but almost
always twice) a year for 16 years. Indeed, I was initially hired to teach this course by Jane Howard (in her
capacity as department chair). Part of my responsibilities included overseeing literally hundreds of
student research projects. Further, as a member of the editorial board, I have also routinely served as a
reviewer of research articles for the journal The Analysis of Verbal Behavior.
In closing, I thank those tireless individuals who have managed to read my original paper, the
three letters in response, and this letter responding in kind. I hope that, personal differences aside, the
exchanges have advanced the cause of providing well-designed experimental studies demonstrating
efficacious treatment of autism spectrum disorders. These children and their suffering families deserve no
less.
References
Bateman, B. D., & Linden, M. A. (1992/1998). Better IEPs: How to develop legally correct and
educationally useful programs (3rd ed.). Longmont, CO: Sopris West.
Boruch, R. F. (1997). Randomized experiments for planning and evaluation: A practical guide. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Coalition Against the “4-Way Agreement”(2005). Coalition against the “EIBT program procedures and
guidelines. Available: http://www.no4way.org.

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Campbell, D. T. & Stanley, J. C. (1966). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research.
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Cook, T. D. & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis for field settings.
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Green, G. (1999). Science and ethics in early intervention for autism. In P. M. Ghezzi, W. L. Williams,
and J. E. Carr (Eds.), Autism: Behavior-analytic perspectives (pp. 11-28). Reno, NV: Context
Press.
Howard, J. S., Sparkman, C. R., Cohen, H. G., Green, G., & Stanislaw, H. (2005). A comparison of
intensive behavior analytic and eclectic treatments for young children with autism. Research in
Developmental Disabilities, 26, 359-383.
Howard, J. S., Sparkman, C. R., Cohen, H. G., Green, G., & Stanislaw, H (2007). Letter to the editor:
Correction concerning Howard et al. (2005). Journal of Speech-Language Pathology and Applied
Behavior Analysis, 1.4-2.1 (compiled),144-145.
Lovaas, O. I. (1987). Behavioral treatment and normal educational and intellectual functioning in autistic
children. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55, 3-9.
Mackie, P. (1995). Principle of charity. In T. Honderich (Ed.), The Oxford companion to philosophy (p.
130). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Region 6 Autism Connection (1999). Guidelines for early intensive behavior treatment programs (EIBT)
for children with autistic spectrum disorder. Stockton, CA: Author.
Sallows, G. O, and Graupner, T. D. (2005). Intensive behavioral treatment for children with autism: Four-
year outcome and predictors. American Journal of Mental Retardation, 110, 417-438.r
Schoneberger, T. (2006). EIBT research after Lovaas (1987): A tale of two studies. Journal of Speech-
Language Pathology and Applied Behavior Analysis, 1, 210-217.
Smith, T. (2007). Letter to the editor: Contributions of Howard and colleagues (2005) to early intensive
behavioral treatment. Journal of Speech-Language Pathology and Applied Behavior Analysis,
1.4-2.1 (compiled),146-147. Therapeutic Pathways
Smith, T., Groen, A. D., & Wynn, J. W. (2000). Randomized trial of intensive early intervention for
children with pervasive developmental disorder. American Journal of Mental Retardation, 105,
269-285.
Therapeutic Pathways (June 1999, version 4). In-home program for young children with autism manual.
Wright, D. J. (2007). Letter to the editor: Response to Schoneberger (2006): “EIBT research after Lovaas
(1987): A tale of two studies.” Journal of Speech-Language Pathology and Applied Behavior
Analysis, this issue, ~.
Author’s Note

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Disclaimer: The views expressed here are not necessarily shared by my employer, the Stanislaus County
Office of Education (Modesto, CA), nor by my fellow employees.
Author Contact Information
Ted Schoneberger, BCBA
Behavioral Intervention Case Manager
Stanislaus County Office of Education
1100 H Street
Modesto, CA
Phone: (209) 556-5655
e-mail: TSberger@aol.com
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If you wish to run the same ad in multiple issues for the year, you are eligible for the
following discount:
1/4 Pg.: $40 - per issue
1/2 Pg.: $75 - per issue
Full Page: $150.00-per issue
An additional one-time layout/composition fee of $25.00 is applicable
For more information, or to place an ad, contact Halina Dziewolska by phone at
(215) 462-6737 or e-mail at: halinadz@hotmail.com