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© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
James Goel
MIPI Technical Steering Group Chair
Rick Wietfeldt, PhD
MIPI Security Group Co-Chair
Latest Developments within MIPI Automotive
SerDes Solutions (MASS)
1
MIPI®, CSI-2®, and I3C® are registered trademarks of MIPI Alliance. A-PHYSM, C-PHYSM, CCSSM, CSESM, D-
PHYSM, DCSSM, DSESM, DSI-2SM, MASSSM and PALSM are service marks of MIPI Alliance. VESA® is a registered
trademark of the Video Electronics Standards Association.
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 2
Industry Trends Advancing
Automotive Functional Safety and Security
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
MASS Functional Safety Application
Digital Side Mirror Replacement
3
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
MIPI Automotive SerDes Solutions (MASS)
Sensor and display endpoints with integrated long-reach connectivity (integrated A-PHYSM SerDes) connect to the ECU without
intermediate bridges. Application-level functional safety and security data protection. HDCP for protecting premium content.
Camera
Radar
Lidar
MIPI DSI-2SM
and/or VESA
eDP-DP
Displays
Vision for Full SerDes Integration
4
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 5
ISO26262 Part 5: Product development at the Hardware Level
• ISO26262 automotive functional safety standard
– Reference for automotive safety lifecycle
– Automotive-specific risk-based analysis for Automotive Safety Integrity
Levels (ASILs)
– Uses ASILs to specific applicable requirements
• Part 5: Hardware level
– Specification of hardware safety requirements
– Evaluation of safety goal violations due to random failures
– Annex D: informative guidelines for appropriate safety mechanisms
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 6
ISO26262-5 Annex D – Communications Bus
Annex D – Communication bus safety mechanisms:
• One-bit hardware redundancy
• Multi-bit hardware redundancy
• Read back of sent message
• Complete hardware redundancy
• Inspection using test patterns
• Transmission redundancy
• Information redundancy
• Frame counter
• Timeout monitoring
• Combination of information redundancy, frame counter
and timeout monitoring
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 7
Adding Service Extensions Packets (SEPs)
MIPI DSE℠ v1.0, MIPI PAL℠/DSI-2℠ v1.0
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 8
MIPI DSE℠ v1.0, MIPI PAL℠/DSI-2℠ v1.0
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
MASS Display Services Extension (DSE 1.0)
Services Extensions Protocol (SEP) Header and Footer
• eDT – extended Data
Type
– CSI, DSI
– VESA eDP/DP
• Message Counter
• CRC-32
– Hamming distance
of 3 or more
MIPI DSE℠ v1.0
9
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
Incorporating Solutions for Data Protection
Bridge-to-Bridge Data Protection
End-to-End Data Protection (Integrated SerDes)
10
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 11
Detailed
Display
Protocol
Stack
Asymmetric Bi-Direction
High Speed Data
ECU Display Source
ECU Pixel Frame Buffer
Generate SEP Packet
Payload (Optional HDCP)
Generate SEP
Header and Footer
Generate DSI-2
Long/Short Packet
C-/D-PHY Tx
Lane Management
Pixels
Data
Data
Control
Control
Control
Data Control
A-PHY
Bridge
C-/D-PHY Rx
Lane Management
DSIA-SRC
Data Control
A-PHY Source
Data+Control
APPI
Data Control
Display Sink
DSI-2 Display Controller
Unpack SEP Packet
Payload (Optional HDCP)
Unpack SEP from DSI-2
Payload
Parse DSI-2
Long/Short Packet
C-/D-PHY Rx
Lane Management
Control
Control
Data
Data
Control
Data
A-PHY
Bridge
Lane Management
DSIA-SNK
C-/D-PHY Tx
Control
Data
A-PHY Sink
Data+Control
APPI
Control
Data
Control
Data
Data
0
Data
WC-2
Data
WC-1
Data
1
Display Pixels
Data
0
Data
WC-2
Data
WC-1
Data
1
ePH0 ePH1
Opt.
ePH7
Opt.
ePF1
Opt.
ePF0
L
P
S
S
o
T
Data
ID
Word
Cou
nt
(W
C)
ECC
Data
0
Data
WC-2
Data
WC-1
Data
1
ePH0 ePH1
Opt.
ePH7
Opt.
ePF1
Opt.
ePF0
EoT LPS
16-
ChkSum
Data
0
Data
WC-2
Data
WC-1
Data
1
ePH0 ePH1
Opt.
ePH7
Opt.
ePF1
Opt.
ePF0
A-PHY
Packet
Header
A-PHY
Packet
Footer
A-
Packet
Payload
A-PHY
Packet
Header
A-PHY
Packet
Footer
A-
Packet
Payload
A-PHY
Packet
Header
A-PHY
Packet
Footer
A-
Packet
Payload
11
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 12
ECU Display Source and Sink
ECU Display Source
ECU Pixel Frame Buffer
Generate SEP Packet
Payload (Optional HDCP)
Generate SEP
Header and Footer
Generate DSI-2
Long/Short Packet
C-/D-PHY Tx
Lane Management
Pixels
Data
Data
Control
Control
Control
Data Control
Display Sink
DSI-2 Display Controller
Unpack SEP Packet
Payload (Optional HDCP)
Unpack SEP from DSI-2
Payload
Parse DSI-2
Long/Short Packet
C-/D-PHY Rx
Lane Management
Control
Control
Data
Data
Control
Data
Control
Data
Data
0
Data
WC-2
Data
WC-1
Data
1
Display Pixels
Data
0
Data
WC-2
Data
WC-1
Data
1
ePH0 ePH1
Opt.
ePH7
Opt.
ePF1
Opt.
ePF0
L
P
S
S
o
T
Data
ID
Word
Count
(W
C)
ECC
Data
0
Data
WC-2
Data
WC-1
Data
1
ePH0 ePH1
Opt.
ePH7
Opt.
ePF1
Opt.
ePF0
EoT LPS
16-
ChkSum
DSI-2℠ v2.0, DCS℠ v1.5, DSE℠ v1.0,
MIPI PAL℠/DSI-2℠ v1.0, C-PHY/D-PHY℠
Previous versions of existing specifications are also
compatible with MASS
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
Detailed A-PHY Bridge PAL
Asymmetric Bi-Direction
High Speed Data
A-PHY
Bridge
C-/D-PHY Rx
Lane Management
DSIA-SRC
Data Control
A-PHY Source
Data+Control
APPI
Data Control
A-PHY
Bridge
Lane Management
DSIA-SNK
C-/D-PHY Tx
Control
Data
A-PHY Sink
Data+Control
APPI
Control
Data
Data
0
Data
WC-2
Data
WC-1
Data
1
ePH0 ePH1
Opt.
ePH7
Opt.
ePF1
Opt.
ePF0
A-PHY
Packet
Header
A-PHY
Packet
Footer
A-
Packet
Payload
A-PHY
Packet
Header
A-PHY
Packet
Footer
A-
Packet
Payload
A-PHY
Packet
Header
A-PHY
Packet
Footer
A-
Packet
Payload
MIPI A-PHY℠ v1.0,
PAL℠/DSI-2℠ v1.0, C-PHYSM/D-PHY℠
13
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
MASS Legacy ECUs with an External A-PHY Bridge
DSI-2
Protocol
Adaptation
Layer with
DSE 1.0
A-PHY
Data Link
Layer
A-PHY
Physical
Layer
Transmit
Receiver
C-PHY or
D-PHY
Lane
Manage-
ment
MIPI DSI-2 Receiver to A-PHY Transmitter Bridge
DSI-2
Display
Source
(Pixels)
DSI-2
Protocol
Display
Command
Services
DCS
Display Command
and Control
Transmitter
C-PHY or
D-PHY Tx
ECU MIPI Display Source
Lane
Manage-
ment
Pixel to Byte
Packing
Display Pixel Data Path
VESA
eDP/DP
Protocol
Adaptation
Layer with
DSE 1.0
A-PHY
Data Link
Layer
A-PHY
Physical
Layer
Transmit
VESA
Receiver
eDP/DP
PHY Tx
Lane
Manage-
ment
VESA Receiver to A-PHY Transmitter Bridge
VESA
Display
Source
(Pixels)
VESA
eDP/DP
Protocol
Display Command
and Control
VESA
Transmitter
eDP/DP
PHY Tx
ECU VESA Display Source
Lane
Manage-
ment
Display Pixel Data Path
14
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
MASS New ECU with Integrated A-PHY
DSI-2
Display
Source
(Pixels)
DSI-2
Protocol
Adaptation
Layer with
DSE 1.0
Display
Command
Services
Command Bytes
Display Pixel Data Path
Display Command
and Control
ECU DSI-2 Display Source with integrated A-PHY
Pixel to Byte
Packing
A-PHY
Data Link
Layer
A-PHY
Physical
Layer
Transmit
DSI-2 Display Sink with Integrated A-PHY
DSI-2
Protocol
Adaptation
Layer with
DSE 1.0
Display
A-PHY
Physical
Layer
Receiver
Lane
Manage-
ment
VESA
Display
Source
(Pixels)
VESA
eDP/DP
Protocol
Adaptation
Layer with
DSE 1.0
Display Pixel Data Path
Display Command
and Control
ECU VESA Display Source with integrated A-PHY
A-PHY
Data Link
Layer
A-PHY
Physical
Layer
Transmit
VESA Display Sink with Integrated A-PHY
VESA
eDP/DP
Protocol
Adaptation
Layer with
DSE 1.0
Display
A-PHY
Physical
Layer
Receiver
Lane
Manage-
ment
15
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
Security within the MASS Guiding Principles
• MASS Guiding Principles
– The Extent
– The Protocols (CSI-2SM
, DSI-2SM
)
– The PHY (A-PHYSM
)
• MIPI Security is implemented as
extensions to CSI-2 and DSI-2
protocols.
• This enables the Security to
achieve an “end-to-end” extent,
or reach.
The
Extent
The
Protocols
The PHY
16
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
MASS Collection of Specifications
Updated mobile
protocols
Protocol extensions
for safety & security
Updated
Command Set
for automotive control
The new PHY
(“Digital PHY”)
Adaptation layers
to the new PHY
Primary current developments:
• MIPI CSESM, MIPI DSESM specifications add security with target completion mid-2022.
17
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 18
High-Level System and Security Requirements
• Security includes:
– Device authentication, message integrity, confidentiality (encryption).
• We refer to data protections according to the MIPI 1:5 Model shown below (more on
next page).
• Security is managed by the Controller engaging with each Component 1:1, this is not a
“peer-to-peer” model of security (n-to-m)
• For example:
– Display security may be initiated from #1 or #2 and terminated in #4 or #5.
– Camera security may be initiated from #5 or #4 and terminated in #2 or #1.
MIPI 1-5 Topology Model
18
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
MASS System Model: The 1:5 Model
Security Model Components
• #1: Controller (SoC)
• #2: Controller Bridge (C.Bridge)
• #3: Forwarding Element (aka Repeater)
• #4: Target Bridge (T.Bridge)
• #5: Target (Camera or Display)
Security Requirements
• Device Mutual Authentication (SoC as Root-of-trust)
• Message Integrity (MAC)
• Confidentiality (encryption)
System Requirements (End-to-end)
• Multiple system topologies (e.g., 15, 1245, 145, 125)
• End-to-end extent via protocol extensions
• Security for Data plane, and Control plane in-band/sideband
• Highly flexible operation, such as Heterogenous operation for displays,
supporting DSI-2 and DP on a daisy chain.
Long-reach PHY network
Camera
SoC Display
#1 #5 #5
#2 TX #4 RX
#2 RX #4 TX
#3
#3
Short-reach
Native interface
Short-reach
Native interface
19
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc.
C-Level provisions authentication credentials
(an Integrator function)
MIPI Security Framework
B-Level (SSMC, System Security Management
Controller) manages the capabilities, algorithms,
and session keys.
A-Level executes the data protection under
control of the B-Level.
• SEP provides in-band data plane security
• CCI and A-PHY security are also provided.
A
B
C
20
#1
Controller
#5
Target
(C/D/DP-
PHY)
A-PHY A-PHY
(C/D/DP-
PHY)
Sideband
PHY
Sideband
PHY (Opt)
#2
C.Bridge
#3
A-PHY
Forwarding
Element
#4
T.Bridge
SSMC
Camera Control Interface (CCI) Security
SSMT
SSMT
SSMT
SSM Suite
SSMT
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 21
MIPI Security leverages DMTF.org SPDM Spec
• DMTF now used within multiple Org specs
– PCI-SIG, CXL, NVMe, and MIPI
• SPDM – Modeled after TLS.
– Fundamentally used to establish authenticated session keys
• KEY_EXCHANGE flow: based on certificates and/or raw public
keys
• PSK_EXCHANGE flow: based on PSKs, no DHE, constrained
devices
– Session-key keys can then be used to secure data.
• SPDM messages are carried across DSI-2, CSI-2 and
CCI (I2C) to protect each transport individually.
SPDM Rsp SPDM Req SPDM Rsp
SPDM Rsp
NVMe/PCIe
CSI-2
CXL/PCIe
SPDM 1.0
SPDM 1.1
SPDM
secure
handshake
21
SPDM: Security Protocol & Data Model
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 22
MIPI SEP Format (Service Extensions Packet)
SEP Data Protection
SEP Format consists of a SEP
Header and SEP Footer that
encapsulate the payload, where:
– Header identifies all security
controls
– Footer includes the MAC (and CRC
for functional safety).
– The payload nominally consists of
a single CSI-2/DSI-2 packet and
may be transmitted immediately.
Encryption provides payload confidentiality
Integrity check provides message confidentiality
Security controls
HDCP controls
CRC
ICV (MAC)
#4
T.Bridge
#5
Target
#1
Controller
#2
C.Bridge
Native Protocol Payload (data protected)
(e.g. CSI-2, DSI-2)
Native
Packet
Header
Native
Packet
Footer
SEP
Footer
SEP
Header
SEP Identifier
Data Type
CSI-2 DT=0x3E
DSI-2 DT=0x25
Native
Packet
Footer
Native
Packet
Header
Native Protocol Payload
(e.g. CSI-2, DSI-2)
Message Counter
FuSa controls
Confidentiality, Authentication
Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication
Message Counter prevents against replay attacks; CRC provides FuSa message
integrity check
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 23
End-to-End Application-Level Safety & Security
Safety & Security
over Native C/D-PHY
Safety & Security
over A-PHY
MIPI leverages TLS security
principals and places the
MIPI Service extensions at
the application layer
source/sink.
– Essentially as “end-to-end” as
possible, from the pixel-
source to the pixel-sink.
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 24
Summary
• The MASS specifications provide functional safety solutions for automotive cameras and
displays within the first versions of MIPI CSE and DSE.
– These specifications are complete and available to MIPI members.
• The CSE v1.0 and DSE v1.0 specifications are being updated to support security (device
authentication, message integrity and optional encryption) over MIPI CSI-2, DSI-2 and
CCI (I2C) sideband.
• Placement of security in the CSI-2/DSI-2 protocols allows end-to-end data protection
with or without intermediate bridges.
– This allows application layer security like TLS, contrasted to link layer security like MACsec.
© 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 25

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MIPI DevCon 2021: Latest Developments within MIPI Automotive SerDes Solutions (MASS)

  • 1. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. James Goel MIPI Technical Steering Group Chair Rick Wietfeldt, PhD MIPI Security Group Co-Chair Latest Developments within MIPI Automotive SerDes Solutions (MASS) 1 MIPI®, CSI-2®, and I3C® are registered trademarks of MIPI Alliance. A-PHYSM, C-PHYSM, CCSSM, CSESM, D- PHYSM, DCSSM, DSESM, DSI-2SM, MASSSM and PALSM are service marks of MIPI Alliance. VESA® is a registered trademark of the Video Electronics Standards Association.
  • 2. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 2 Industry Trends Advancing Automotive Functional Safety and Security
  • 3. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. MASS Functional Safety Application Digital Side Mirror Replacement 3
  • 4. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. MIPI Automotive SerDes Solutions (MASS) Sensor and display endpoints with integrated long-reach connectivity (integrated A-PHYSM SerDes) connect to the ECU without intermediate bridges. Application-level functional safety and security data protection. HDCP for protecting premium content. Camera Radar Lidar MIPI DSI-2SM and/or VESA eDP-DP Displays Vision for Full SerDes Integration 4
  • 5. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 5 ISO26262 Part 5: Product development at the Hardware Level • ISO26262 automotive functional safety standard – Reference for automotive safety lifecycle – Automotive-specific risk-based analysis for Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) – Uses ASILs to specific applicable requirements • Part 5: Hardware level – Specification of hardware safety requirements – Evaluation of safety goal violations due to random failures – Annex D: informative guidelines for appropriate safety mechanisms
  • 6. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 6 ISO26262-5 Annex D – Communications Bus Annex D – Communication bus safety mechanisms: • One-bit hardware redundancy • Multi-bit hardware redundancy • Read back of sent message • Complete hardware redundancy • Inspection using test patterns • Transmission redundancy • Information redundancy • Frame counter • Timeout monitoring • Combination of information redundancy, frame counter and timeout monitoring
  • 7. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 7 Adding Service Extensions Packets (SEPs) MIPI DSE℠ v1.0, MIPI PAL℠/DSI-2℠ v1.0
  • 8. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 8 MIPI DSE℠ v1.0, MIPI PAL℠/DSI-2℠ v1.0
  • 9. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. MASS Display Services Extension (DSE 1.0) Services Extensions Protocol (SEP) Header and Footer • eDT – extended Data Type – CSI, DSI – VESA eDP/DP • Message Counter • CRC-32 – Hamming distance of 3 or more MIPI DSE℠ v1.0 9
  • 10. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. Incorporating Solutions for Data Protection Bridge-to-Bridge Data Protection End-to-End Data Protection (Integrated SerDes) 10
  • 11. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 11 Detailed Display Protocol Stack Asymmetric Bi-Direction High Speed Data ECU Display Source ECU Pixel Frame Buffer Generate SEP Packet Payload (Optional HDCP) Generate SEP Header and Footer Generate DSI-2 Long/Short Packet C-/D-PHY Tx Lane Management Pixels Data Data Control Control Control Data Control A-PHY Bridge C-/D-PHY Rx Lane Management DSIA-SRC Data Control A-PHY Source Data+Control APPI Data Control Display Sink DSI-2 Display Controller Unpack SEP Packet Payload (Optional HDCP) Unpack SEP from DSI-2 Payload Parse DSI-2 Long/Short Packet C-/D-PHY Rx Lane Management Control Control Data Data Control Data A-PHY Bridge Lane Management DSIA-SNK C-/D-PHY Tx Control Data A-PHY Sink Data+Control APPI Control Data Control Data Data 0 Data WC-2 Data WC-1 Data 1 Display Pixels Data 0 Data WC-2 Data WC-1 Data 1 ePH0 ePH1 Opt. ePH7 Opt. ePF1 Opt. ePF0 L P S S o T Data ID Word Cou nt (W C) ECC Data 0 Data WC-2 Data WC-1 Data 1 ePH0 ePH1 Opt. ePH7 Opt. ePF1 Opt. ePF0 EoT LPS 16- ChkSum Data 0 Data WC-2 Data WC-1 Data 1 ePH0 ePH1 Opt. ePH7 Opt. ePF1 Opt. ePF0 A-PHY Packet Header A-PHY Packet Footer A- Packet Payload A-PHY Packet Header A-PHY Packet Footer A- Packet Payload A-PHY Packet Header A-PHY Packet Footer A- Packet Payload 11
  • 12. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 12 ECU Display Source and Sink ECU Display Source ECU Pixel Frame Buffer Generate SEP Packet Payload (Optional HDCP) Generate SEP Header and Footer Generate DSI-2 Long/Short Packet C-/D-PHY Tx Lane Management Pixels Data Data Control Control Control Data Control Display Sink DSI-2 Display Controller Unpack SEP Packet Payload (Optional HDCP) Unpack SEP from DSI-2 Payload Parse DSI-2 Long/Short Packet C-/D-PHY Rx Lane Management Control Control Data Data Control Data Control Data Data 0 Data WC-2 Data WC-1 Data 1 Display Pixels Data 0 Data WC-2 Data WC-1 Data 1 ePH0 ePH1 Opt. ePH7 Opt. ePF1 Opt. ePF0 L P S S o T Data ID Word Count (W C) ECC Data 0 Data WC-2 Data WC-1 Data 1 ePH0 ePH1 Opt. ePH7 Opt. ePF1 Opt. ePF0 EoT LPS 16- ChkSum DSI-2℠ v2.0, DCS℠ v1.5, DSE℠ v1.0, MIPI PAL℠/DSI-2℠ v1.0, C-PHY/D-PHY℠ Previous versions of existing specifications are also compatible with MASS
  • 13. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. Detailed A-PHY Bridge PAL Asymmetric Bi-Direction High Speed Data A-PHY Bridge C-/D-PHY Rx Lane Management DSIA-SRC Data Control A-PHY Source Data+Control APPI Data Control A-PHY Bridge Lane Management DSIA-SNK C-/D-PHY Tx Control Data A-PHY Sink Data+Control APPI Control Data Data 0 Data WC-2 Data WC-1 Data 1 ePH0 ePH1 Opt. ePH7 Opt. ePF1 Opt. ePF0 A-PHY Packet Header A-PHY Packet Footer A- Packet Payload A-PHY Packet Header A-PHY Packet Footer A- Packet Payload A-PHY Packet Header A-PHY Packet Footer A- Packet Payload MIPI A-PHY℠ v1.0, PAL℠/DSI-2℠ v1.0, C-PHYSM/D-PHY℠ 13
  • 14. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. MASS Legacy ECUs with an External A-PHY Bridge DSI-2 Protocol Adaptation Layer with DSE 1.0 A-PHY Data Link Layer A-PHY Physical Layer Transmit Receiver C-PHY or D-PHY Lane Manage- ment MIPI DSI-2 Receiver to A-PHY Transmitter Bridge DSI-2 Display Source (Pixels) DSI-2 Protocol Display Command Services DCS Display Command and Control Transmitter C-PHY or D-PHY Tx ECU MIPI Display Source Lane Manage- ment Pixel to Byte Packing Display Pixel Data Path VESA eDP/DP Protocol Adaptation Layer with DSE 1.0 A-PHY Data Link Layer A-PHY Physical Layer Transmit VESA Receiver eDP/DP PHY Tx Lane Manage- ment VESA Receiver to A-PHY Transmitter Bridge VESA Display Source (Pixels) VESA eDP/DP Protocol Display Command and Control VESA Transmitter eDP/DP PHY Tx ECU VESA Display Source Lane Manage- ment Display Pixel Data Path 14
  • 15. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. MASS New ECU with Integrated A-PHY DSI-2 Display Source (Pixels) DSI-2 Protocol Adaptation Layer with DSE 1.0 Display Command Services Command Bytes Display Pixel Data Path Display Command and Control ECU DSI-2 Display Source with integrated A-PHY Pixel to Byte Packing A-PHY Data Link Layer A-PHY Physical Layer Transmit DSI-2 Display Sink with Integrated A-PHY DSI-2 Protocol Adaptation Layer with DSE 1.0 Display A-PHY Physical Layer Receiver Lane Manage- ment VESA Display Source (Pixels) VESA eDP/DP Protocol Adaptation Layer with DSE 1.0 Display Pixel Data Path Display Command and Control ECU VESA Display Source with integrated A-PHY A-PHY Data Link Layer A-PHY Physical Layer Transmit VESA Display Sink with Integrated A-PHY VESA eDP/DP Protocol Adaptation Layer with DSE 1.0 Display A-PHY Physical Layer Receiver Lane Manage- ment 15
  • 16. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. Security within the MASS Guiding Principles • MASS Guiding Principles – The Extent – The Protocols (CSI-2SM , DSI-2SM ) – The PHY (A-PHYSM ) • MIPI Security is implemented as extensions to CSI-2 and DSI-2 protocols. • This enables the Security to achieve an “end-to-end” extent, or reach. The Extent The Protocols The PHY 16
  • 17. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. MASS Collection of Specifications Updated mobile protocols Protocol extensions for safety & security Updated Command Set for automotive control The new PHY (“Digital PHY”) Adaptation layers to the new PHY Primary current developments: • MIPI CSESM, MIPI DSESM specifications add security with target completion mid-2022. 17
  • 18. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 18 High-Level System and Security Requirements • Security includes: – Device authentication, message integrity, confidentiality (encryption). • We refer to data protections according to the MIPI 1:5 Model shown below (more on next page). • Security is managed by the Controller engaging with each Component 1:1, this is not a “peer-to-peer” model of security (n-to-m) • For example: – Display security may be initiated from #1 or #2 and terminated in #4 or #5. – Camera security may be initiated from #5 or #4 and terminated in #2 or #1. MIPI 1-5 Topology Model 18
  • 19. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. MASS System Model: The 1:5 Model Security Model Components • #1: Controller (SoC) • #2: Controller Bridge (C.Bridge) • #3: Forwarding Element (aka Repeater) • #4: Target Bridge (T.Bridge) • #5: Target (Camera or Display) Security Requirements • Device Mutual Authentication (SoC as Root-of-trust) • Message Integrity (MAC) • Confidentiality (encryption) System Requirements (End-to-end) • Multiple system topologies (e.g., 15, 1245, 145, 125) • End-to-end extent via protocol extensions • Security for Data plane, and Control plane in-band/sideband • Highly flexible operation, such as Heterogenous operation for displays, supporting DSI-2 and DP on a daisy chain. Long-reach PHY network Camera SoC Display #1 #5 #5 #2 TX #4 RX #2 RX #4 TX #3 #3 Short-reach Native interface Short-reach Native interface 19
  • 20. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. C-Level provisions authentication credentials (an Integrator function) MIPI Security Framework B-Level (SSMC, System Security Management Controller) manages the capabilities, algorithms, and session keys. A-Level executes the data protection under control of the B-Level. • SEP provides in-band data plane security • CCI and A-PHY security are also provided. A B C 20 #1 Controller #5 Target (C/D/DP- PHY) A-PHY A-PHY (C/D/DP- PHY) Sideband PHY Sideband PHY (Opt) #2 C.Bridge #3 A-PHY Forwarding Element #4 T.Bridge SSMC Camera Control Interface (CCI) Security SSMT SSMT SSMT SSM Suite SSMT
  • 21. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 21 MIPI Security leverages DMTF.org SPDM Spec • DMTF now used within multiple Org specs – PCI-SIG, CXL, NVMe, and MIPI • SPDM – Modeled after TLS. – Fundamentally used to establish authenticated session keys • KEY_EXCHANGE flow: based on certificates and/or raw public keys • PSK_EXCHANGE flow: based on PSKs, no DHE, constrained devices – Session-key keys can then be used to secure data. • SPDM messages are carried across DSI-2, CSI-2 and CCI (I2C) to protect each transport individually. SPDM Rsp SPDM Req SPDM Rsp SPDM Rsp NVMe/PCIe CSI-2 CXL/PCIe SPDM 1.0 SPDM 1.1 SPDM secure handshake 21 SPDM: Security Protocol & Data Model
  • 22. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 22 MIPI SEP Format (Service Extensions Packet) SEP Data Protection SEP Format consists of a SEP Header and SEP Footer that encapsulate the payload, where: – Header identifies all security controls – Footer includes the MAC (and CRC for functional safety). – The payload nominally consists of a single CSI-2/DSI-2 packet and may be transmitted immediately. Encryption provides payload confidentiality Integrity check provides message confidentiality Security controls HDCP controls CRC ICV (MAC) #4 T.Bridge #5 Target #1 Controller #2 C.Bridge Native Protocol Payload (data protected) (e.g. CSI-2, DSI-2) Native Packet Header Native Packet Footer SEP Footer SEP Header SEP Identifier Data Type CSI-2 DT=0x3E DSI-2 DT=0x25 Native Packet Footer Native Packet Header Native Protocol Payload (e.g. CSI-2, DSI-2) Message Counter FuSa controls Confidentiality, Authentication Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication Message Counter prevents against replay attacks; CRC provides FuSa message integrity check
  • 23. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 23 End-to-End Application-Level Safety & Security Safety & Security over Native C/D-PHY Safety & Security over A-PHY MIPI leverages TLS security principals and places the MIPI Service extensions at the application layer source/sink. – Essentially as “end-to-end” as possible, from the pixel- source to the pixel-sink.
  • 24. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 24 Summary • The MASS specifications provide functional safety solutions for automotive cameras and displays within the first versions of MIPI CSE and DSE. – These specifications are complete and available to MIPI members. • The CSE v1.0 and DSE v1.0 specifications are being updated to support security (device authentication, message integrity and optional encryption) over MIPI CSI-2, DSI-2 and CCI (I2C) sideband. • Placement of security in the CSI-2/DSI-2 protocols allows end-to-end data protection with or without intermediate bridges. – This allows application layer security like TLS, contrasted to link layer security like MACsec.
  • 25. © 2021 MIPI Alliance, Inc. 25