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State of the ATT&CK
Adam Pennington
ATT&CK Lead
@_whatshisface
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
System Owner/User Discovery (T1033)
adamp$ whoami
• He/him/his
• Lead of MITRE ATT&CK
• 13 years with MITRE
• Focused on threat intel and deception
• Past defender and CTI analyst
• Involved with ATT&CK since it was a spreadsheet with no &
• SCUBA diver certified for decompression and rebreather diving
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
MITRE ATT&CK
Remains Strong
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Almost 2.5 years since ATT&CKcon 2.0!
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
We’d already come a long way
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Impact
Data Destruction
Data Encrypted for Impact
Defacement
Disk Content Wipe
Disk Structure Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Runtime Data Manipulation
Service Stop
Stored Data Manipulation
Transmitted Data
Manipulation
© 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. Matrix current as of May 2019.
Command and Control
Commonly Used Port
Communication Through
Removable Media
Connection Proxy
Custom Command and
Control Protocol
Custom Cryptographic
Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Domain Fronting
Domain Generation
Algorithms
Fallback Channels
Multiband Communication
Multi-hop Proxy
Multilayer Encryption
Multi-Stage Channels
Port Knocking
Remote Access Tools
Remote File Copy
Standard Application Layer
Protocol
Standard Cryptographic
Protocol
Standard Non-Application
Layer Protocol
Uncommonly Used Port
Web Service
Exfiltration
Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Data Encrypted
Data Transfer Size Limits
Exfiltration Over Other
Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Command
and Control Channel
Exfiltration Over Alternative
Protocol
Exfiltration Over
Physical Medium
Scheduled Transfer
Collection
Audio Capture
Automated Collection
Clipboard Data
Data from Information
Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network
Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man in the Browser
Screen Capture
Video Capture
Lateral Movement
AppleScript
Application Deployment
Software
Distributed Component
Object Model
Exploitation of
Remote Services
Logon Scripts
Pass the Hash
Pass the Ticket
Remote Desktop Protocol
Remote File Copy
Remote Services
Replication Through
Removable Media
Shared Webroot
SSH Hijacking
Taint Shared Content
Third-party Software
Windows Admin Shares
Windows Remote
Management
Credential Access Discovery
Network Sniffing
Account Manipulation Account Discovery
Bash History Application Window
Discovery
Brute Force
Credential Dumping Browser Bookmark
Discovery
Credentials in Files
Credentials in Registry Domain Trust Discovery
Exploitation for
Credential Access
File and Directory Discovery
Network Service Scanning
Forced Authentication Network Share Discovery
Hooking Password Policy Discovery
Input Capture Peripheral Device Discovery
Input Prompt Permission Groups Discovery
Kerberoasting Process Discovery
Keychain Query Registry
LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
and Relay
Remote System Discovery
Security Software Discovery
Password Filter DLL System Information
Discovery
Private Keys
Securityd Memory System Network
Configuration Discovery
Two-Factor Authentication
Interception
System Network
Connections Discovery
System Owner/User
Discovery
System Service Discovery
System Time Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox
Evasion
Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion
Scheduled Task Binary Padding
Launchctl Access Token Manipulation
Local Job Scheduling Bypass User Account Control
LSASS Driver Extra Window Memory Injection
Trap Process Injection
AppleScript DLL Search Order Hijacking
CMSTP Image File Execution Options Injection
Command-Line Interface Plist Modification
Compiled HTML File Valid Accounts
Control Panel Items Accessibility Features BITS Jobs
Dynamic Data Exchange AppCert DLLs Clear Command History
Execution through API AppInit DLLs CMSTP
Execution through
Module Load
Application Shimming Code Signing
Dylib Hijacking Compiled HTML File
Exploitation for
Client Execution
File System Permissions Weakness Component Firmware
Hooking Component Object Model
Hijacking
Graphical User Interface Launch Daemon
InstallUtil New Service Control Panel Items
Mshta Path Interception DCShadow
PowerShell Port Monitors Deobfuscate/Decode Files
or Information
Regsvcs/Regasm Service Registry Permissions Weakness
Regsvr32 Setuid and Setgid Disabling Security Tools
Rundll32 Startup Items DLL Side-Loading
Scripting Web Shell Execution Guardrails
Service Execution .bash_profile and .bashrc Exploitation for
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for
Defense Evasion
Signed Binary
Proxy Execution
Account Manipulation
Authentication Package SID-History Injection File Deletion
Signed Script
Proxy Execution
BITS Jobs Sudo File Permissions
Modification
Bootkit Sudo Caching
Source Browser Extensions File System Logical Offsets
Space after Filename Change Default
File Association
Gatekeeper Bypass
Third-party Software Group Policy Modification
Trusted Developer Utilities Component Firmware Hidden Files and Directories
User Execution Component Object
Model Hijacking
Hidden Users
Windows Management
Instrumentation
Hidden Window
Create Account HISTCONTROL
Windows Remote
Management
External Remote Services Indicator Blocking
Hidden Files and Directories Indicator Removal
from Tools
XSL Script Processing Hypervisor
Kernel Modules
and Extensions
Indicator Removal on Host
Indirect Command Execution
Launch Agent Install Root Certificate
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition InstallUtil
Login Item Launchctl
Logon Scripts LC_MAIN Hijacking
Modify Existing Service Masquerading
Netsh Helper DLL Modify Registry
Office Application Startup Mshta
Port Knocking Network Share Connection
Removal
Rc.common
Redundant Access NTFS File Attributes
Registry Run
Keys / Startup Folder
Obfuscated Files
or Information
Re-opened Applications Port Knocking
Screensaver Process Doppelgänging
Security Support Provider Process Hollowing
Shortcut Modification Redundant Access
SIP and Trust Provider
Hijacking
Regsvcs/Regasm
Regsvr32
System Firmware Rootkit
Systemd Service Rundll32
Time Providers Scripting
Windows Management
Instrumentation Event
Subscription
Signed Binary
Proxy Execution
Signed Script
Proxy Execution
Winlogon Helper DLL
SIP and Trust Provider
Hijacking
Software Packing
Space after Filename
Template Injection
Timestomp
Trusted Developer Utilities
Virtualization/Sandbox
Evasion
Web Service
XSL Script Processing
Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise
Exploit Public-Facing
Application
External Remote Services
Hardware Additions
Replication Through
Removable Media
Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Spearphishing via Service
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
The real shape of
ATT&CK at
ATT&CKcon 2.0
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK today (really)
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
What’s new since ATT&CKcon 2.0?
ATT&CK for ICS
Enterprise Sub-techniques
PRE Platform
Network Platform
New Cloud and Containers Platforms
Enterprise Data Sources
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK for ICS
• Released January 7, 2020
• Adversary behaviors on
Industrial Control Systems
• Unique space
• Unique adversaries
• Parallel updates in own site
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Enterprise Sub-techniques
• Released July 8, 2020
• Added a new level to techniques
• Most happy with the change
• Most have made the switch
• Coming over time to rest of ATT&CK
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
PRE Platform
• Released October 27, 2020
• Replaced Pre-ATT&CK with two Tactics
• Describes left of Initial Access
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Network Platform
• Released October 27, 2020
• Covers network infrastructure devices
• Routers/Switches
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
New Cloud and Containers Platforms
• Released April 29, 2021
• New Containers Platform
• New Google Workspace Platform
• IaaS replaced AWS, GCP, and Azure
https://media.giphy.com/media/r3Yeh3aAjsyYGObizC/giphy.gif
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Enterprise Data Sources
Data Sources Before
• Just a list of text strings
• Inconsistent application
• No details beyond the name
• No descriptions behind them
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Enterprise Data Sources in ATT&CK v9
Released April 29, 2021
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Enterprise Data Sources in ATT&CK v10
Released October 21, 2021
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Enterprise Data Sources in ATT&CK v10
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK’s Community
• ATTACK started with adversary data from MITRE deception ops
• ATT&CK released to the public in May 2015
• ATT&CK’s community has kept us going ever since
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK’s Contributors
@ionstorm
Abel Morales, Exabeam
Achute Sharma, Keysight
Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
Alan Neville, @abnev
Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks
Alex Soler, AttackIQ
Alexandros Pappas
Alfredo Abarca
Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro
Allen DeRyke, ICE
Anastasios Pingios
Andrew Smith, @jakx_
Antonio Villani, @LDO_CyberSec, Leonardo's Cyber Security Division
Arie Olshtein, Check Point
Ariel Shuper, Cisco
Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG
Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Atul Nair, Qualys
Aviran Hazum, Check Point
Avneet Singh
Ayan Saha, Keysight
Barry Shteiman, Exabeam
Bart Parys
Bartosz Jerzman
Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD)
Bernaldo Penas Antelo
Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
Bobby, Filar, Elastic
Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman
Brent Murphy, Elastic
Brian Wiltse @evalstrings
Bryan Lee
Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP
Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne
Casey Smith
Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID)
Chen Erlich, @chen_erlich, enSilo
Chris Roffe
Chris Ross @xorrior
Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
Christoffer Strömblad
Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer
Cody Thomas, SpecterOps
Craig Aitchison
CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus
Dan Borges, @1njection
Dan Nutting, @KerberToast
Daniel Oakley
Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks
Daniel Stepanic, Elastic
Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project
Daniyal Naeem, BT Security
Darren Spruell
Dave Westgard
David Ferguson, CyberSponse
David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro
David French, Elastic
David Lu, Tripwire
David Routin
Deloitte Threat Library Team
Diogo Fernandes
Dor Edry, Microsoft
Doron Karmi, @DoronKarmi
Drew Church, Splunk
Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
Edward Millington
Elastic
Elger Vinicius S. Rodrigues, @elgervinicius, CYBINT Centre
Eli Salem, @elisalem9
Elia Florio, Microsoft
Elly Searle, CrowdStrike — contributed to tactic definitions
Emile Kenning, Sophos
Emily Ratliff, IBM
Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas
Erik Schamper, @Schamperr, Fox-IT
Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black
Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks
ESET
Expel
ExtraHop
Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus
Filip Kafka, ESET
FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG
FS-ISAC
Gaetan van Diemen, ThreatFabric
Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd.
George Allen, VMware Carbon Black
Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax
Hans Christoffer Gaardløs
Harry Kim, CODEMIZE
Harry, CODEMIZE
Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys
Heather Linn
Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation
Ibrahim Ali Khan
Idan Frimark, Cisco
Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Isif Ibrahima
Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom
Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
Ivan Sinyakov
Jacob Wilkin, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT
James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY
Jan Miller, CrowdStrike
Jan Petrov, Citi
Janantha Marasinghe
Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
Jaron Bradley @jbradley89
Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks
Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
Jeff Felling, Red Canary
Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
Jen Burns, HubSpot
Jeremy Galloway
Jesse Brown, Red Canary
Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black
Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics
Johann Rehberger
John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
John Strand
Jon Sheedy
Jon Sternstein, Stern Security
Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada
Jonathan Shimonovich, Check Point
Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r
Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited
Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE
Jose Luis Sánchez Martinez
Josh Abraham
Josh Campbell, Cyborg Security, @cyb0rgsecur1ty
Josh Day, Gigamon
Josh Liburdi, @jshlbrd
João Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__
Justin Warner, ICEBRG
Jörg Abraham, EclecticIQ
Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen
Kaspersky
Katie Nickels, Red Canary
Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications
Kobi Eisenkraft, Check Point
Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps
Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet
Kyoung-ju Kwak (S2W)
Lab52 by S2 Grupo
Lacework Labs
Lee Christensen, SpecterOps
Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
Leo Zhang, Trend Micro
Lior Ribak, SentinelOne
Loic Jaquemet
Lorin Wu, Trend Micro
Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP
Lukáš Štefanko, ESET
Maarten van Dantzig, @MaartenVDantzig, Fox-IT
Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro
Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé, ESET
Maril Vernon @shewhohacks
Mark Wee
Martin Jirkal, ESET
Martin Smolár, ESET
Martin Sohn Christensen, Improsec
Mathieu Tartare, ESET
Matias Nicolas Porolli, ESET
Matt Brenton, Zurich Global Information Security
Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group
Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft
Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
Matt Kelly, @breakersall
Matt Snyder, VMware
Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos
Matthieu Faou, ESET
Mayuresh Dani, Qualys
McAfee
Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber
Michael Cox
Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Michal Dida, ESET
Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART)
Microsoft Security
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
Mike Burns, Mandiant
Mike Kemmerer
Milos Stojadinovic
Mnemonic
Mnemonic AS
Mugdha Peter Bansode
Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks
Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul)
Netskope
Nick Carr, Mandiant
Nik Seetharaman, Palantir
Nino Verde, @LDO_CyberSec, Leonardo's Cyber Security Division
Nishan Maharjan, @loki248
Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
Ofir Almkias, Cybereason
Ohad Mana, Check Point
Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
Oleksiy Gayda
Omkar Gudhate
Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11
Patrick Sungbahadoor
Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro
Pedro Harrison
Phil Stokes, SentinelOne
Philip Winther
Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India
Praetorian
Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee
Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response
Engineering Team
Prashant Verma, Paladion
Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International
Red Canary
RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs
Regina Elwell
Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera
Ricardo Dias
Richard Gold, Digital Shadows
Richie Cyrus, SpecterOps
Rick Cole, Mandiant
Rob Smith
Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
Robert Falcone
Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos
Robert Wilson
Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary
Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Romain Dumont, ESET
Rory McCune, Aqua Security
Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101
Ryan Becwar
Ryan Benson, Exabeam
Ryo Tamura, SecureBrain Corporation
Sahar Shukrun
Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc
Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black
Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
Sebastian Salla, McAfee
Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee
Sergey Persikov, Check Point
Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
Shane Tully, @securitygypsy
Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne
Shotaro Hamamoto, NEC Solution Innovators, Ltd
Shuhei Sasada, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc
Silvio La Porta, @LDO_CyberSec, Leonardo's Cyber Security Division
SOCCRATES
Stan Hegt, Outflank
Stefan Kanthak
Steven Du, Trend Micro
Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
Sunny Neo
Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team
Swapnil Kumbhar
Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee
Sylvain Gil, Exabeam
Sébastien Ruel, CGI
Takuma Matsumoto, LAC Co., Ltd
Tatsuya Daitoku, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.
Ted Samuels, Rapid7
Teodor Cimpoesu
The DFIR Report, @TheDFIRReport
Thijn Bukkems, Amazon
Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
Tim MalcomVetter
Toby Kohlenberg
Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
Tony Lambert, Red Canary
Travis Smith, Tripwire
Trend Micro Incorporated
Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
Vadim Khrykov
Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.
Varonis Threat Labs
Veeral Patel
Vikas Singh, Sophos
Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus
Vincent Le Toux
Viren Chaudhari, Qualys
Vishwas Manral, McAfee
Walker Johnson
Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept
Wes Hurd
Will Thomas, Cyjax
William Cain
Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct
Yoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation
Yossi Nisani, Cymptom
Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team
Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications
Yusuke Niwa, ITOCHU Corporation
Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks
Zaw Min Htun, @Z3TAE
Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom
308 orgs and
individuals
82 in 2019
130 in 2020
155 in 2021
4.5pt font
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
The Future
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK for Mobile
• Sub-technique beta coming in next ATT&CK release (April)
• Final release this summer (depending on feedback)
• Next up: Data Sources
Blog post at https://bit.ly/ATTMob
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK Update Presentations
Defensive ATT&CK
Campaigns
ICS ATT&CK
Mac/Linux ATT&CK
ATT&CK’s Open Source
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK Updates: Defensive ATT&CK
• Today – 1:30pm EDT
• Lex Crumpton
• Refactoring detections in Enterprise
• Today a text blob
• Soon structured and tied to data sources
• Dealing with multiple platform sources
• Upcoming changes to CAR
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK Updates: Campaigns
• Today – 3:45pm EDT
• Matt Malone
1. Grouping of intrusion activity
2. Specific period of time
3. Common targets, objectives
• Enable unnamed activity
• Retain nuance from reporting
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK Updates: ICS ATT&CK
• Tomorrow – 10:15am EDT
• Otis Alexander
• Moving to attack.mitre.org in v11
• Expanding assets
• Adding detections
• Improving Enterprise parity
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK Updates: Mac/Linux ATT&CK
• Tomorrow – noon EDT
• Cat Self
• Unique spaces getting focused attention
• Ongoing review improvement of Mac techniques
• Starting in on similar improvements to Linux
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
ATT&CK Updates: ATT&CK’s Open Source
• Tomorrow – 2:15pm EDT
• Jared Ondricek
• Many resources from us that you can use
• ATT&CK Navigator
• Layer manipulation scripts
• Our website
• More at https://github.com/mitre-attack/
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
There’s one more thing…
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
Next ATT&CK release April 25!
Miss Congeniality (2000)
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
https://attack.mitre.org
attack@mitre.org
@mitreattack
Adam Pennington
@_whatshisface
©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.

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State of the ATT&CK

  • 1. State of the ATT&CK Adam Pennington ATT&CK Lead @_whatshisface ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 2. System Owner/User Discovery (T1033) adamp$ whoami • He/him/his • Lead of MITRE ATT&CK • 13 years with MITRE • Focused on threat intel and deception • Past defender and CTI analyst • Involved with ATT&CK since it was a spreadsheet with no & • SCUBA diver certified for decompression and rebreather diving ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 3. MITRE ATT&CK Remains Strong ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 4. Almost 2.5 years since ATT&CKcon 2.0! ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 5. We’d already come a long way ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 6. Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation © 2019 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. Matrix current as of May 2019. Command and Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multiband Communication Multi-hop Proxy Multilayer Encryption Multi-Stage Channels Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Credential Access Discovery Network Sniffing Account Manipulation Account Discovery Bash History Application Window Discovery Brute Force Credential Dumping Browser Bookmark Discovery Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Domain Trust Discovery Exploitation for Credential Access File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Forced Authentication Network Share Discovery Hooking Password Policy Discovery Input Capture Peripheral Device Discovery Input Prompt Permission Groups Discovery Kerberoasting Process Discovery Keychain Query Registry LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery Password Filter DLL System Information Discovery Private Keys Securityd Memory System Network Configuration Discovery Two-Factor Authentication Interception System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Scheduled Task Binary Padding Launchctl Access Token Manipulation Local Job Scheduling Bypass User Account Control LSASS Driver Extra Window Memory Injection Trap Process Injection AppleScript DLL Search Order Hijacking CMSTP Image File Execution Options Injection Command-Line Interface Plist Modification Compiled HTML File Valid Accounts Control Panel Items Accessibility Features BITS Jobs Dynamic Data Exchange AppCert DLLs Clear Command History Execution through API AppInit DLLs CMSTP Execution through Module Load Application Shimming Code Signing Dylib Hijacking Compiled HTML File Exploitation for Client Execution File System Permissions Weakness Component Firmware Hooking Component Object Model Hijacking Graphical User Interface Launch Daemon InstallUtil New Service Control Panel Items Mshta Path Interception DCShadow PowerShell Port Monitors Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Regsvcs/Regasm Service Registry Permissions Weakness Regsvr32 Setuid and Setgid Disabling Security Tools Rundll32 Startup Items DLL Side-Loading Scripting Web Shell Execution Guardrails Service Execution .bash_profile and .bashrc Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Defense Evasion Signed Binary Proxy Execution Account Manipulation Authentication Package SID-History Injection File Deletion Signed Script Proxy Execution BITS Jobs Sudo File Permissions Modification Bootkit Sudo Caching Source Browser Extensions File System Logical Offsets Space after Filename Change Default File Association Gatekeeper Bypass Third-party Software Group Policy Modification Trusted Developer Utilities Component Firmware Hidden Files and Directories User Execution Component Object Model Hijacking Hidden Users Windows Management Instrumentation Hidden Window Create Account HISTCONTROL Windows Remote Management External Remote Services Indicator Blocking Hidden Files and Directories Indicator Removal from Tools XSL Script Processing Hypervisor Kernel Modules and Extensions Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Launch Agent Install Root Certificate LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition InstallUtil Login Item Launchctl Logon Scripts LC_MAIN Hijacking Modify Existing Service Masquerading Netsh Helper DLL Modify Registry Office Application Startup Mshta Port Knocking Network Share Connection Removal Rc.common Redundant Access NTFS File Attributes Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Obfuscated Files or Information Re-opened Applications Port Knocking Screensaver Process Doppelgänging Security Support Provider Process Hollowing Shortcut Modification Redundant Access SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32 System Firmware Rootkit Systemd Service Rundll32 Time Providers Scripting Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Winlogon Helper DLL SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Software Packing Space after Filename Template Injection Timestomp Trusted Developer Utilities Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Web Service XSL Script Processing Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts The real shape of ATT&CK at ATT&CKcon 2.0 ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 7. ATT&CK today (really) ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 8. What’s new since ATT&CKcon 2.0? ATT&CK for ICS Enterprise Sub-techniques PRE Platform Network Platform New Cloud and Containers Platforms Enterprise Data Sources ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 9. ATT&CK for ICS • Released January 7, 2020 • Adversary behaviors on Industrial Control Systems • Unique space • Unique adversaries • Parallel updates in own site ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 10. Enterprise Sub-techniques • Released July 8, 2020 • Added a new level to techniques • Most happy with the change • Most have made the switch • Coming over time to rest of ATT&CK ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 11. PRE Platform • Released October 27, 2020 • Replaced Pre-ATT&CK with two Tactics • Describes left of Initial Access ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 12. Network Platform • Released October 27, 2020 • Covers network infrastructure devices • Routers/Switches ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 13. New Cloud and Containers Platforms • Released April 29, 2021 • New Containers Platform • New Google Workspace Platform • IaaS replaced AWS, GCP, and Azure https://media.giphy.com/media/r3Yeh3aAjsyYGObizC/giphy.gif ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 14. Enterprise Data Sources Data Sources Before • Just a list of text strings • Inconsistent application • No details beyond the name • No descriptions behind them ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 15. Enterprise Data Sources in ATT&CK v9 Released April 29, 2021 ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 16. Enterprise Data Sources in ATT&CK v10 Released October 21, 2021 ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 17. Enterprise Data Sources in ATT&CK v10 ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 18. ATT&CK’s Community • ATTACK started with adversary data from MITRE deception ops • ATT&CK released to the public in May 2015 • ATT&CK’s community has kept us going ever since ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 19. ATT&CK’s Contributors @ionstorm Abel Morales, Exabeam Achute Sharma, Keysight Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security Alan Neville, @abnev Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks Alex Soler, AttackIQ Alexandros Pappas Alfredo Abarca Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro Allen DeRyke, ICE Anastasios Pingios Andrew Smith, @jakx_ Antonio Villani, @LDO_CyberSec, Leonardo's Cyber Security Division Arie Olshtein, Check Point Ariel Shuper, Cisco Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security Atul Nair, Qualys Aviran Hazum, Check Point Avneet Singh Ayan Saha, Keysight Barry Shteiman, Exabeam Bart Parys Bartosz Jerzman Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD) Bernaldo Penas Antelo Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender Bobby, Filar, Elastic Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman Brent Murphy, Elastic Brian Wiltse @evalstrings Bryan Lee Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne Casey Smith Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID) Chen Erlich, @chen_erlich, enSilo Chris Roffe Chris Ross @xorrior Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek Christoffer Strömblad Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer Cody Thomas, SpecterOps Craig Aitchison CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus Dan Borges, @1njection Dan Nutting, @KerberToast Daniel Oakley Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks Daniel Stepanic, Elastic Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project Daniyal Naeem, BT Security Darren Spruell Dave Westgard David Ferguson, CyberSponse David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro David French, Elastic David Lu, Tripwire David Routin Deloitte Threat Library Team Diogo Fernandes Dor Edry, Microsoft Doron Karmi, @DoronKarmi Drew Church, Splunk Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs Edward Millington Elastic Elger Vinicius S. Rodrigues, @elgervinicius, CYBINT Centre Eli Salem, @elisalem9 Elia Florio, Microsoft Elly Searle, CrowdStrike — contributed to tactic definitions Emile Kenning, Sophos Emily Ratliff, IBM Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas Erik Schamper, @Schamperr, Fox-IT Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks ESET Expel ExtraHop Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus Filip Kafka, ESET FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG FS-ISAC Gaetan van Diemen, ThreatFabric Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security Gareth Phillips, Seek Ltd. George Allen, VMware Carbon Black Gordon Long, Box, Inc., @ethicalhax Hans Christoffer Gaardløs Harry Kim, CODEMIZE Harry, CODEMIZE Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys Heather Linn Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation Ibrahim Ali Khan Idan Frimark, Cisco Idan Revivo, @idanr86, Team Nautilus Aqua Security Isif Ibrahima Itamar Mizrahi, Cymptom Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach Ivan Sinyakov Jacob Wilkin, Trustwave, SpiderLabs Jacques Pluviose, @Jacqueswildy_IT James Dunn, @jamdunnDFW, EY Jan Miller, CrowdStrike Jan Petrov, Citi Janantha Marasinghe Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson Jaron Bradley @jbradley89 Jay Chen, Palo Alto Networks Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET Jeff Felling, Red Canary Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services) Jen Burns, HubSpot Jeremy Galloway Jesse Brown, Red Canary Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics Johann Rehberger John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center John Strand Jon Sheedy Jon Sternstein, Stern Security Jonathan Boucher, @crash_wave, Bank of Canada Jonathan Shimonovich, Check Point Jonhnathan Ribeiro, 3CORESec, @_w0rk3r Jorell Magtibay, National Australia Bank Limited Jorge Orchilles, SCYTHE Jose Luis Sánchez Martinez Josh Abraham Josh Campbell, Cyborg Security, @cyb0rgsecur1ty Josh Day, Gigamon Josh Liburdi, @jshlbrd João Paulo de A. Filho, @Hug1nN__ Justin Warner, ICEBRG Jörg Abraham, EclecticIQ Karim Hasanen, @_karimhasanen Kaspersky Katie Nickels, Red Canary Kiyohito Yamamoto, RedLark, NTT Communications Kobi Eisenkraft, Check Point Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet Kyoung-ju Kwak (S2W) Lab52 by S2 Grupo Lacework Labs Lee Christensen, SpecterOps Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek Leo Zhang, Trend Micro Lior Ribak, SentinelOne Loic Jaquemet Lorin Wu, Trend Micro Lucas da Silva Pereira, @vulcanunsec, CIP Lukáš Štefanko, ESET Maarten van Dantzig, @MaartenVDantzig, Fox-IT Magno Logan, @magnologan, Trend Micro Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé, ESET Maril Vernon @shewhohacks Mark Wee Martin Jirkal, ESET Martin Smolár, ESET Martin Sohn Christensen, Improsec Mathieu Tartare, ESET Matias Nicolas Porolli, ESET Matt Brenton, Zurich Global Information Security Matt Brenton, Zurich Insurance Group Matt Burrough, @mattburrough, Microsoft Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps Matt Kelly, @breakersall Matt Snyder, VMware Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward Matthew Molyett, @s1air, Cisco Talos Matthieu Faou, ESET Mayuresh Dani, Qualys McAfee Menachem Shafran, XM Cyber Michael Cox Michael Katchinskiy, @michael64194968, Team Nautilus Aqua Security Michal Dida, ESET Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) Microsoft Security Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) Mike Burns, Mandiant Mike Kemmerer Milos Stojadinovic Mnemonic Mnemonic AS Mugdha Peter Bansode Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) Netskope Nick Carr, Mandiant Nik Seetharaman, Palantir Nino Verde, @LDO_CyberSec, Leonardo's Cyber Security Division Nishan Maharjan, @loki248 Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe Ofir Almkias, Cybereason Ohad Mana, Check Point Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB Oleksiy Gayda Omkar Gudhate Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11 Patrick Sungbahadoor Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center Pawan Kinger, @kingerpawan, Trend Micro Pedro Harrison Phil Stokes, SentinelOne Philip Winther Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India Praetorian Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee Prasanth Sadanala, Cigna Information Protection (CIP) - Threat Response Engineering Team Prashant Verma, Paladion Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International Red Canary RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs Regina Elwell Rex Guo, @Xiaofei_REX, Confluera Ricardo Dias Richard Gold, Digital Shadows Richie Cyrus, SpecterOps Rick Cole, Mandiant Rob Smith Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3 Robert Falcone Robert Simmons, @MalwareUtkonos Robert Wilson Rodrigo Garcia, Red Canary Roi Kol, @roykol1, Team Nautilus Aqua Security Romain Dumont, ESET Rory McCune, Aqua Security Ruben Dodge, @shotgunner101 Ryan Becwar Ryan Benson, Exabeam Ryo Tamura, SecureBrain Corporation Sahar Shukrun Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC) SarathKumar Rajendran, Trimble Inc Scott Knight, @sdotknight, VMware Carbon Black Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black Sebastian Salla, McAfee Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee Sergey Persikov, Check Point Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army) Shane Tully, @securitygypsy Shlomi Salem, SentinelOne Shotaro Hamamoto, NEC Solution Innovators, Ltd Shuhei Sasada, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc Silvio La Porta, @LDO_CyberSec, Leonardo's Cyber Security Division SOCCRATES Stan Hegt, Outflank Stefan Kanthak Steven Du, Trend Micro Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C Sunny Neo Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team Swapnil Kumbhar Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee Sylvain Gil, Exabeam Sébastien Ruel, CGI Takuma Matsumoto, LAC Co., Ltd Tatsuya Daitoku, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc. Ted Samuels, Rapid7 Teodor Cimpoesu The DFIR Report, @TheDFIRReport Thijn Bukkems, Amazon Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown Tim MalcomVetter Toby Kohlenberg Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure Tony Lambert, Red Canary Travis Smith, Tripwire Trend Micro Incorporated Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence Vadim Khrykov Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o. Varonis Threat Labs Veeral Patel Vikas Singh, Sophos Vinayak Wadhwa, Lucideus Vincent Le Toux Viren Chaudhari, Qualys Vishwas Manral, McAfee Walker Johnson Wayne Silva, F-Secure Countercept Wes Hurd Will Thomas, Cyjax William Cain Yaniv Agman, @AgmanYaniv, Team Nautilus Aqua Security Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct Yoshihiro Kori, NEC Corporation Yossi Nisani, Cymptom Yossi Weizman, Azure Defender Research Team Yusuke Kubo, RedLark, NTT Communications Yusuke Niwa, ITOCHU Corporation Yuval Avrahami, Palo Alto Networks Zaw Min Htun, @Z3TAE Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security Ziv Kaspersky, Cymptom 308 orgs and individuals 82 in 2019 130 in 2020 155 in 2021 4.5pt font ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 20. The Future ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 21. ATT&CK for Mobile • Sub-technique beta coming in next ATT&CK release (April) • Final release this summer (depending on feedback) • Next up: Data Sources Blog post at https://bit.ly/ATTMob ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 22. ATT&CK Update Presentations Defensive ATT&CK Campaigns ICS ATT&CK Mac/Linux ATT&CK ATT&CK’s Open Source ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 23. ATT&CK Updates: Defensive ATT&CK • Today – 1:30pm EDT • Lex Crumpton • Refactoring detections in Enterprise • Today a text blob • Soon structured and tied to data sources • Dealing with multiple platform sources • Upcoming changes to CAR ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 24. ATT&CK Updates: Campaigns • Today – 3:45pm EDT • Matt Malone 1. Grouping of intrusion activity 2. Specific period of time 3. Common targets, objectives • Enable unnamed activity • Retain nuance from reporting ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 25. ATT&CK Updates: ICS ATT&CK • Tomorrow – 10:15am EDT • Otis Alexander • Moving to attack.mitre.org in v11 • Expanding assets • Adding detections • Improving Enterprise parity ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 26. ATT&CK Updates: Mac/Linux ATT&CK • Tomorrow – noon EDT • Cat Self • Unique spaces getting focused attention • Ongoing review improvement of Mac techniques • Starting in on similar improvements to Linux ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 27. ATT&CK Updates: ATT&CK’s Open Source • Tomorrow – 2:15pm EDT • Jared Ondricek • Many resources from us that you can use • ATT&CK Navigator • Layer manipulation scripts • Our website • More at https://github.com/mitre-attack/ ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 28. There’s one more thing… ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 29. Next ATT&CK release April 25! Miss Congeniality (2000) ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.
  • 30. https://attack.mitre.org attack@mitre.org @mitreattack Adam Pennington @_whatshisface ©2022 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited 21-00706-27.