ph Executive - fiscal's

POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

EXECUTIVE POWER
- is the power of the President to
carry out or implement laws
enacted by Congress.
- the Executive Secretary, Sec. of
Finance, Sec. Defense, Sec. of
Justice, Sec. of Interior and
Local Government, Bureau of
Immigration, Bureau of
Customs, and other executive
agencies implement and
execute laws in the name, and
subject to the control of the
President.

Executive Power as a Duty
- Section 17, Article VII provides: “He
(President) shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.”
- the Chief Executive cannot refuse to execute
laws on any grounds unless there is judicial
declaration of unconstitutionality thereof.

ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE
- Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency
- the acts of the executive officials
are acts of the President unless
reprobated by him/her.
- the President may modify or
nullify acts done by executive
officials in the name of the
President, or substitute his
judgment with that of his/her
subordinates.

Query:
Over the objection of the Liberal Party (LP), a minority bloc,
Congress, controlled by Lakas Party (Lakas), passed a bill imposing
Value-Added Tax (VAT) on sale of goods, including books. The
President, who is a member of Lakas, signed the said bill.
Immediately thereafter, national election was held and a LP President
assumed the presidency. Pressured by massive demonstrations the
new President declared that the law which imposed taxes on sale of
books is unconstitutional being an abridgment of the freedom of
expression.
1.) Can the President order the Bureau of International Revenue
not to collect VAT on sale of books?
2.) What remedies are available to the people if they believe that
the said law is unconstitutional?

Answer:
1.) No. The power of the President to execute law does not
include authority not to execute it. Implementation of law is not
only a power but also a duty on the part of the President. The law
is considered valid unless the judiciary declared it
unconstitutional. Prior to judicial declaration of
unconstitutionality, the President has no other option but to
enforce it.
2.) The remedies of the people are to lobby in Congress to repeal
the said law, to directly exercise the power to repeal the said law
through the system of initiative or referendum, or to file a
taxpayer’s suit with the judiciary questioning the constitutionality
of the said law.
(Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455)

APPOINTING POWER
Section 16, Article VII provides: “The President shall nominate and,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointment, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointment are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The
President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.”

Appointment Procedure
Congress in
Session
Nomination by
President
Confirmation
of Nomination
by Commission
Appointment
by President
Acceptance by
Appointee

Appointment Procedure
Congress not in
Session
Ad Interim
Appointment by
the President
Acceptance by
Appointee
Confirmation of
Appointment by
Commission
Disapproved by
Commission
By-passed by
Commission
Immediately
Invalidated
Invalidated on
the Next
Adjournment of
Congress

Query:
The provision of Republic Act No. 7227
provides that the Mayor of Olongapo City
shall be appointed as Chairman of the Subic
Bay Metropolitan. Constitutional or not?

Answer:
Unconstitutional. When Congress clothes the
President with the power to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Once the power of
appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of
whom to appoint.
(Flores vs Drilon and Gordon, G.R. No. 104732)

Query:
President Estrada appointed Panfilo “Ping” Lacson
as Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Sen. Roco questioned such appointment since it was
not submitted to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation. According to him, appointment of
officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain constitutionally requires
confirmation by the Commission. The rank of PNP
chief is equivalent to that of a general of the AFP.
Did the appointment of Lacson require confirmation
by the Commission?

Answer:
Directors and chief superintendents of the PNP are
not officers of the AFP, and thus, they do not belong
to the first group of officers (officers of the AFP
from the rank of colonel or naval captain).
(Manalo vs Siztoza, 312 SCRA 239)

REMOVAL POWER
- implied from the express power of appointment of the President.
- the terms of the Presidential appointees are co-terminus with the
President.
- 2 kinds:
a.) Absolute Power of Removal – Department Heads and other
officials of cabinet rank hold positions at the pleasure of the
President. Their terms are co-terminus with the term of the
President.
b.) Restricted Power of Removal – Members of the Career
Executive Service such as undersecretary, assistant secretary,
etc., shall be subject to the President’s power of removal.
However, the President may only remove them with a valid
cause and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law.

POWER OF CONTROL
- Section 17, Article VII provides: “The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.”
- The power of control is the power of an officer to alter,
modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
- The power of control extends only to the acts but not to
the actor.

POWER OF SUPERVISION
- Section 4, Article X provides: “The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments.”
- supervision vs control
- the control power of the President is limited to executive
departments, bureaus and offices, and does not extend to
local governments.
- the power of supervision is the power of the President to see
to it that local officers perform their functions in accordance
with law. (Drilon vs Mayor Lim, G.R. No. L-17169)

Query:
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) came
out with a traffic regulation closing certain
streets to traffic of tricycle. Can the
President set aside such regulation?

Answer:
Yes. The LTO is under the Office of the President.
The President exercises control over its acts.
He/She may reverse and set aside acts of the LTO.

Query:
The City of Manila passed an Ordinance
prohibiting smoking in public places. Can the
President reverse said ordinance?

Answer:
No. The President has no control power over the
local government units. He/she cannot alter,
modify, reverse, and set aside acts of a local
government.

Query:
Can the President order the investigation of a
City Mayor for being a gambling protector
and impose disciplinary measure if found
guilty?

Answer:
Yes. The President has supervisory power over local
government units. The President must see to it that
local officers perform their functions in accordance
with law. Disciplinary power is within the scope of
power of supervision.

MILITARY POWER
- As a implement of the doctrine of civilian supremacy over
the military, the Constitution grants military power to the
President. Section 18, Article VII provides: “The President
shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines.
- He usually exercises it through the Department of
National Defense.

MILITARY POWER (cont.)
a. Power to Establish Military Courts
- these courts have jurisdiction to try and decide
cases involving members of the AFP for function-
related crimes and military personnel of the enemy
state for war crimes.
- in time of Martial Law, the President has no
authority to confer jurisdiction on military courts over
civilians where civil courts are able to function.

b. Power to Call the Armed Forces
- The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or supress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion.

c. Power to Suspend the Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
Writ of Habeas Corpus – is a writ directed to the person
detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of
the prisoner at a designated time and place and requiring
him to explain the cause of such detention.
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus – is privilege of the
detainee or prisoner to be release by order of the court in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus where it is found that his
detention is illegal.

c. Power to Suspend the Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
- this only applies to rebellion or invasion-connected
offenses.
e.g. A suspect for the crime of rape can avail of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

d. Power to Declare Martial Law
- in case of invasion, when public safety requires it, the
President may place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.

Cases to be digested:
a. Ruffy vs Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875
b. Kuroda vs Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171
c. Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. 54558
and 59882
d. Mitra vs Commission on Elections, L-56503, 104 SCRA 69
e. Javellana vs Executive Secretary, L-36142, 50 SCRA 271
f. Garcia vs Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 75025
g. Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190
h. Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455
i. Flores vs Drilon and Gordon, G.R. No. 104732
j. Manalo vs Siztoza, 312 SCRA 239

RUFFY VS CHIEF OF STAFF
75 Phil. 875
Facts: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines,
military men were assigned at designated camps or military
bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro
thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains
and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A
certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of
their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new
authority vested upon him because of the recent change of
command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy
and his fellow petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military
law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the
time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

Ruling: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to
military law since members of the Armed Forces were still
covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and
other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming
of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of
95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction
and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes
them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171
Facts:
Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of
the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese
forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was
tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes
and other atrocities committed against military and civilians.
The military commission was establish under Executive Order
68.
Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is
unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not
have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:
- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague
Convention (War Crimes)

Issue:
Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military
tribunal jurisdiction is valid.

Ruling:
EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was
enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution
which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance
with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague
Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence
established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian)
guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation
of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2
conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on
the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by
the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan).
Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision
of this special law.

Olaguer etal. v. Military Commission, G.R. No.
L-54558, May 22, 1987
Facts: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of
subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-Staff of the AFP created a
military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal
case against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have
been imposed a penalty of death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners
filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from taking further
action on their case for the tribunal should be considered null and
void. Respondents invoked that the creation of Military Commission
is constitutional as ruled upon in a previous case – Aquino v.
Military Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme
Court. However, petitioners contend that such ruling must be
overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable since Martial Law
has already been lifted.

L-54558, May 22, 1987
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military
Commission be abandoned and/or modified in so far as the
case at bar is concerned?

L-54558, May 22, 1987
HELD: Yes.
REASONING: First, the Court considered that since the martial law has
been lifted during the case is still pending, military tibunals, which were
created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already since the
law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting views of some
justices in Aquino v. MilComm, stating that ‘…Civilians like the petitioner
placed on tiral for civil offenses under general law are entited o trial by
judicial process, not by executive or military process…xxx..Judicial power
exist only in courts’.1Moreover, the Court emphasized that “Reverence for
precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and
the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be
abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified accordingly.
after all, more important than anything else is that this Court should be
right.’

GARCIA VS COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman
at the Bureau of Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing some
materials in their company. Thus, public respondents filed a criminal case
against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground
respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner was
found guilty and was later dismissed from the service. With respect to the
criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted by the court due to insufficiency
of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now
claiming before the COA for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal
up to present. But COA on the other hand reluctantly denied his pleadings.
Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute
pardon) by the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give
due course to petitioners claim.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back
wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of
executive clemency.

Holding:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19
Article VII of the Constitution and further articulates that the
bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect
completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty
and ordered his separation from the service. This can be
inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating
petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby
directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by
the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no
longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is
restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemency.

MONSANTO VS FACTORAN
Facts:
Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was
charged for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced
to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then
wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be
reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant.
She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of
Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and
Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto
must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by
reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to
answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her
former post.

HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by
the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to
make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil
liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is
not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.

POWER OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Section 19, Article VII provides: “Except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of al the
Members of Congress.”

Remission of Fines and Forfeitures
- is the condonation of the financial obligation and the
return of properties confiscated by reason of the commission
of the offense and conviction of the offender.
Reprieve
- means temporary relief from or postponement of
execution of criminal punishment or sentence. It does no
more than stay the execution of a sentence for a time being,
and it is ordinarily an act of clemency extended to a prisoner
to afford him an opportunity to procure some amelioration
of the sentence imposed.

Commutation
- is an executive clemency that changes a punishment to
one which is less severe; as from execution to life
imprisonment.
Pardon
- an act of grace that sets aside punishment for a crime.
- is an act of forgiveness, thus, it relieves the person
pardoned from penal consequences of the crime but it did
not obliterate the crime itself.

Amnesty
- is a sovereign act of forgiveness for past acts, granted
by a government to all persons who have been guilty of
crime, generally political offenses, such as treason, sedition,
rebellion, and often conditioned upon their return to
obedience and duty within a prescribed crime. Both the
crime and punishment are abrogated.
- considered as full/absolute pardon.

FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER
- as head of state, the President is the representative of
the Philippines in dealing with other states.
Power of Recognition
- The Philippines may or may not extend recognition to a
newly established state or government.
Power to Send and Receive Diplomatic Missions
- right of legation
- the President has the authority to appoint ambassadors
and other public ministers and consuls.

Power to Enter Treaty or International Agreement
- Section 21, Article VII provides: “No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate”
- subject to Senatorial Concurrence and Judicial Power of
Review.

Executive Agreement vs Treaty
Executive Agreement is an agreement made purely as an
executive act affecting external relations independent of or
without legislative authorization.
Treaties are international agreements involving political
issues or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character.

Cases to be digested:
a. SANTOS VS. EXEC. SEC., APRIL 10, 1992
b. MONDANO VS. SILVOSA, 97 PHIL. 143
c. BARRIOQUINTO VS. FERNANDEZ, 82 PHIL. 642
d. VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152
e. GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA, 9 SCRA 280
f. BLAS OPLE VS. RUBEN TORRES, ET AL. G.R. No. 127685,
July 23, 1998

SANTOS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
April 10, 1992
Facts:
Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On
her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which provided that she could
bring someone with her so she brought with her her adopted daughter.
Some of her co-workers complained because they thought that Santos
used government fund to finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found
out that the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less than the amount
that was given to Santos to be used for her expenses for the trip.
Nevertheless, because of her refusal to appear before the disciplinary
board, she was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office
of the President and after review, then president Corazon Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty.
She was then removed from her post and was replaced.

April 10, 1992
Issue:
Whether or not Santos should reinstated to her office.

April 10, 1992
Held:
No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which showed that Santos
was not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty as in fact what she did of securing a
ticket which was 50% the cost of what was allotted for her travel expense for
tickets and thus was beneficial to the government (for she helped save and
lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall done
to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal
power of the president is solely her prerogative. Further, the position held by
Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of the
president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is not actually removed
from her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also, her position
involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC cannot
inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of such prerogative. Thus,
the assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the
President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the
interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.

MONDANO VS. SILVOSA, 97 Phil. 143
Facts:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed
against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the
Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate
the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned
Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa
suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining
the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which
provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given
by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control, direction,
and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . .”
and to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in
connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official
or person who shall conduct such investigations.

Issue:
Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the
power of control over a mayor.

Held:
No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive
Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the
power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but
not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power
of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as
agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the
Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction.

BARRIOQUINTO VS. FERNANDEZ, 82 Phil. 642
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with murder. Jimenez learned of Proclamation
No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with a felony in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
personas aiding the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during
December 8, 1941, to the date when each particular area of the country
where he offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy
control and occupation. Petitioners submitted their case to the Guerilla
Amnesty Commission (GAC), presided by the respondents. The GAC
remanded the same to the CFI without rendering a decision on WON the
petitioners are entitled to amnesty. Petitioners filed an action to
mandate the GAC to proceed with presiding over their application for
amnesty. GAC said for it to be able to preside over such cases, it must be
held that the petitioners (those who have applied for amnesty) have
admitted having committed the offense. As such, petitioners cannot
invoke the benefits of amnesty.

Held:
It is not necessary for the petitioners to admit having committed the
felony charged to them in order for the GAC to preside over their case
and ultimately qualify for amnesty. It is enough that the evidence shows
that the offense committed is a felony that qualifies for amnesty as
provided in the proclamation. The performance of the summary hearings
by the GAC is not dependent on the confession on the part of the
accused. The GAC must conduct these hearings regardless of confession,
in pursuance of the provisions of the proclamation. Amnesty is a public
act which the courts, including the GAC, must take cognizance of.

Pardon vs Amnesty
[1] Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice.
[2] Pardon is granted to one after conviction (of ordinary crimes) ;
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who
may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction.

Pardon vs Amnesty
[3] Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does “”nor
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon,” and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence” article 36, Revised
Penal Code). while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
[4] Pardon is complete with the act of the President while Amnesty is
valid only with the concurrence of the majority of the members of all
the members of Congress.

VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152
Facts:
Teofilo Santos was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to six (6) months
of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law. He was imprisoned
from March 14 to August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding costs of
trial. Despite his conviction and imprisonment, Santos continued to be a
registered voter in his municipality and was, between 1934 and1937, the
municipal president of that municipality. He applied for pardon in view
of a newly promulgated Election Code which “disqualifies the respondent
from voting for having been ‘declared by final judgment guilty of any
crime against property.’” He was granted pardon on December 24, 1939.
Miguel Cristobal filed an action on November 16, 1940 to exclude the
name of Santos from the list of voters in their municipality. Effect of
pardon granted to Santos restored his “full civil and political rights,
except that with respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which
are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property
responsibility.”

VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152
Held:
Santos cannot be excluded for the list of voters since he has already been
granted pardon. While the pardon in the case at bar is conditional in the
sense that it limits the positions he may occupy or be eligible for, it is
still absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full civil and
political rights.” Right of suffrage is expressly restored by the pardon.
The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action.

GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA, 9 SCRA 280
Facts:
Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Thereupon,
herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition herein,
averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of
foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents “are acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,” because Republic Act No. 2207,
explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the “Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency.”

Issue:
Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

Ruling:
The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative
by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court
may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question.” In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.

Blas F. Ople vs Ruben D. Torres, et al.
293 SCRA 141
Facts:
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System," was issued by President
Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition
seeking to invalidate A.O. No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that:
The establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No.308 by the
President is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of
congress. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He
alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was issued
within the executive and administrative powers of the president without
encroaching on the legislative powers of congress.

293 SCRA 141
Issue:
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate.

293 SCRA 141
Ruling:
AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and
therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it, not
by an Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative Power, which
is supposed to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the
foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance
issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of the government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative
policy. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to
issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.

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