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CFA Institute Research Challenge
Hosted by
Local Challenge (e.g., CFA Society, New York, NY)
Team B.
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Table of Contents:
Business Description..............................................................................................................................................................8
Valuation. ...............................................................................................................................................................................8
Management & Governance. ................................................................................................................................................9
Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning. ...............................................................................................................9
Financial Analysis................................................................................................................................................................10
Investment Risks..................................................................................................................................................................12
Figure 8: Income Statement............................................................................................................................................14
Figure 9: Balance Sheet...................................................................................................................................................15
Figure 1-: Statement of Cash Flows ...............................................................................................................................16
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NYSSA Student Research
This is report is published for educational purposes only
by students competing in the New York Society of Security
Analysts Investment Research Challenge
Team B.
Highlights.
 Valuation: Several valuation metrics strongly support a probative BUY rating for Dominion
Resources. The following sum of parts valuation—including, dividend discount model, 2017
price to sales projection estimates, and earnings valuation estimates—indicate undervaluation.
Moreover, revenues appear to shrink in recent years. Still, net income, counterintuitively, seem to
thrive. If accurate, the abovementioned metrics, bolstered by supporting evidence of Dominion—
a highly diversified, vertically integrated company—dominating both energy and utilities
industries, strengthens this conclusion.
 Competitive: Dominion outpaces the energy and utilities industries as with top competitors
for both sectors in various measurable categories including:
(1) Profitability;
(2) Dividends;
(3) Shareholder Returns.
If accurate, these metrics further support the plausible inference of Dominion as a buy, with
anticipated growth bolstered by market perception to recent political influences. Dominion’s
apparent diversification strategy catalyzes its competitive advantage, which, may decrease its
susceptibility to losses from possible interest rate increases. Additionally, while excess debt
ranks among Dominion’s noted weaknesses, its vulnerability to insolvency, if anything
buttresses a buy consistent with value investment principles.
Source. iii
Ticker: ● D (NYSE) Recommendation: ● BUY
Price: ● $75.81 Price Target: $77
Earnings/Share
Mar. Jun. Sept. Dec. Year P/E
Ratio
AV2014A $1.03 $.60 $.95 $.46 $3.05 22.45
2015A $.91 $.70 $1.00 $.60 $3.20 19.68
2016E $.88 $.73 $1.10 $.94 $3.65 19.77
2017E $1.10 $.80 $1.15 $.95 $4.00 19.61
Figure 1 – Per Share Overview. i
Date
12-mos
Rolling
EPS
Dividend
P/E
Ratio
09/2016 3.32 0.700 22.37
06/2016 3.22 0.700 24.20
03/2016 3.18 0.700 23.62
12/2015 3.21 0.648 21.07
09/2015 3.01 0.648 23.38
06/2015 2.92 0.648 22.90
03/2015 2.50 0.648 28.35
12/2014 2.24 0.600 34.33
Figure 2 – Annual Summary Data
(Millions). ii
Year Sales
Net
Income
EPS
12/2011 13,765.00 1,408.00 2.45
12/2012 12,835.00 302.00 0.57
12/2013 13,120.00 1,697.00 3.09
12/2014 12,436.00 1,310.00 2.24
12/2015 11,683.00 1,899.00 3.21
Growth Rates -4.02 7.77 6.99
Dominion Resources Inc.
52 Week Price Range 67.58 - 78.97
Average Daily Volume, After 30 days 2,360,000
Beta 0.21
Earnings Per Share, EPS, 5-years -9.25
Payout Ratio 63.62%
Dividend Growth Rate, 5-Year 7.19%
Dividend Yield (Estimated) 3.69%
Shares Outstanding 626,750,000
Market Capitalization 47,260,000,000
Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WAAC 3.30%
Institutional Holdings 67%
Book Value per Share (9/2016) $23.86
Current Ratio, Liquidity 0.42
Return on Equity (9/2016) 18.9%
Market Profile
Industry: Electric Utilities
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Introduction.
Dominion Resources, Inc., (“Dominion”) headquartered in Richmond, Virginia, reputedly ranks among, “the
largest U.S. energy producers and transporters.” Dominion’s massive reach encompasses 14 different states
revealing a diversified mix of business operations. These include but are not subject only to the selling,
generation, transmission, transportation, distribution of electrical energy and natural gas. Established in 1787,
Dominion reportedly became a major electricity supplier by 1909. Some of Dominion’s ostensible features
include:
• Regulated electric transmission & distribution operations;
• Residential, commercial, industrial, governmental services in VA & NC;
• Merchant fleet, energy marketing, & price risk management for its assets;
• Gathering & processing natural gas, with liquefied natural gas operations;
• Wholesale electricity market prices for electric cooperatives & municipalities.
A. Primary Trade Exchange.
Dominion (D) operates as a publicly traded holding company on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
allegedly trading since 1983. iv
B. Primary Sector/Industry Operation.
Dominion specializes in bulk power transmission & control electric services. v
C. Investment Recommendation.
Several valuation metrics strongly support a buy rating for Dominion.
D. Current Stock Price.
As of Jan. 25, 2017, Dominion allegedly closes at $75.81. vi
E. Market Capitalization.
Yahoo Finance! alleges a market cap of $47.5 billion for Dominion on Jan. 20, 2017.
F. Target Stock Price.
NASDAQ estimates Dominion’s 12-month target price at $77.
G. Major Shareholders.
According to Yahoo! Finance, the following major shareholders comprise Dominion:
 “.39%” of shares from insiders & 5% owners;
 “61.3%” of shares from institutional & mutual fund owners;
 “61.54%” of total shares available for institutional & mutual fund trading;
 “964” institutional shareholders. vii
Accordingly, Figure 3 – Dominion Shareholders, memorializes Dominion’s shareholders.
Figure 3—Stock Ownership. viii
Type Date No. Owners
Shares Held
(000s)
% Own
Institutional 09/30/16 1040 411,610 65.67
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DIRECT HOLDERS Shares Date Reported
FARRELL THOMAS F II 989,013 3-Feb-16
MCGETTRICK MARK F 282,242 3-Feb-16
KINGTON MARK J 38,366 20-Feb-15
KOONCE PAUL D 137,122 3-Feb-16
CHRISTIAN DAVID A 131,375 3-Feb-16
LEOPOLD DIANE 37,171 1-May-16
DRAGAS HELEN E 27,124 10-Mar-15
BARR WILLIAM P 35,419 11-May-16
BLUE ROBERT M 37,561 5-Feb-16
HEACOCK DAVID A 29,814 3-Feb-16
TOP INSTITUTIONAL HOLDERS Shares Date Reported
Vanguard Group, Inc. (The) 39,489,005 29-Jun-16
Capital Research Global Investors 34,842,509 29-Jun-16
State Street Corporation 29,919,066 29-Jun-16
Wellington Management Company, LLP 29,222,869 29-Jun-16
Capital World Investors 25,312,923 29-Jun-16
Bank of America Corporation 18,056,405 29-Jun-16
Franklin Resources, Inc 16,949,508 29-Jun-16
BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A. 16,309,679 29-Jun-16
BlackRock Fund Advisors 14,346,101 29-Jun-16
Northern Trust Corporation 7,650,177 29-Jun-16
TOP MUTUAL FUND HOLDERS Shares Date Reported
Capital Income Builder, Inc. 15,773,888 29-Jun-16
Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund 12,223,352 29-Jun-16
Washington Mutual Investors Fund 10,267,000 29-Jun-16
Franklin Custodian Funds-Income Fund 10,000,000 29-Jun-16
Vanguard/Wellington Fund Inc. 9,856,740 30-May-16
Investment Company Of America 8,996,324 29-Jun-16
Select Sector SPDR Fund-Utilities 8,200,112 30-Jul-16
Vanguard 500 Index Fund 8,083,673 29-Jun-16
Income Fund of America Inc 7,335,000 29-Jun-16
Vanguard Institutional Index Fund-Institutional Index Fund 6,587,114 30-May-16 ix
Investment Summary.
A. Dominion—Investment Profile.
Over the past decade, Dominion experienced exponential price growth, which remained largely steady through
2014, though plateauing, increasing at diminished rates from 2015 to present. x
If true, the evidence suggests
potential pinnacle prices for Dominion as it perhaps progresses to market maturity. Though such a conclusion
may appear conjectural, perhaps too premature to espouse, the following evidence comports with this inference.
B. Valuation Summary.
In February 2016, Dominion received an underweight rating due ostensibly to capital expenditure escalation.xi
Capital expenditures include fixed asset investments such as preserving land, building, and/or equipment. xii
Underweight implies projected company underperformance—an undervalued price—compared to competitors
in the same industry. xiii
If accurate, Dominion presumably constitutes a strong buy because it supposedly trades
lower than industry average projections. Why? If true, lower comparative trade prices imply potential growth
on the assumption of buying lower now to advantage an upswing on possible price surges later.
Figure 4 – Dominion Resources, Inc.—Shareholders
Th
ere are no sources in the current document.
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Conversely, Dominion’s ratings reversed by April 2016. xiv
Indeed, underweight appeared 18 times from
January 31, 2013–November 9, 2015. But the incidence of 15 marketweight and 4 overweight referenced
throughout this period plausibly offset underweight classifications. xv
If accurate, this offsetting effect may
suggest an overall neutral “marketweight” average, plausibly suggesting prices aligned with general “market
expectations.” xvi
C. Significant Recent Developments.
On Nov. 10, 2016, after the election, a first indication of buy manifested as Dominion’s price fell to $70.98,
perhaps consistent with initial market reaction. xvii
Additionally, analysts predict a buy. A buy/sell indication
might appear too premature, perhaps speculative to infer at present with the assumed confluence of emerging
political and social change imminently approaching. Nevertheless, several significant events—Hurricane
Matthew, the 2016 election, and Federal Reserve interest rate spikes—transpired to plausibly influence
Dominion’s valuation, which collectively, support a buy.
(a) Hurricane Matthew.
Initially, late 2016 trends showed recent price declines for Dominion. On Aug. 8, 2016, Dominion’s price
target diminished from $82 to $79. Since Sept. 22, 2016 Dominion’s price declined from $77.04 to $74.27 by
Sept. 30. Prices continued to decrease, staggering between $72 and $73 throughout Oct. 2016. Hurricane
Matthew may correlate as a contributing factor to Dominion’s struggles surpassing the near $73 mark in
October. xviii
But Dominion’s declivity since July 1, 2016 from nearly $78 to a stagnant $72-$73, supports, in
the short-run, under $78, assuming this short-term pattern continues. xix
Interestingly, Dominion’s price soared
to $75.31 for Oct. 31 and $75.50 on Nov. 8, 2016, consistently remaining around $74, before dramatically
plummeting after Nov. 8th
. However, evidence of rising prices over time combined with allegedly low implied
volatility may suggest a long-term valuation exceeding $75.
Dominion almost closed its price-target threshold on Dec. 29, 2016, and as of Jan. 4, 2017, hovered near
$76.6. xx
From Jan. 5-9, prices remained in the high $76 range, before plummeting to $75.42 by Jan. 10, 2017.
If true, the latest trends most strongly support a valuation of at least $75, assuming no anomalous changes.
Several contributing factors, including, the election, and hopes of a stronger economy consistent with regime
change, plausibly correlate with this recent growth phenomenon. Yet, many variables may impact value
fluctuations.
(b) 2016 Election.
Politics questionably correlates to this sudden slide, specifically, initial ambivalence perhaps about the
ideological impact of President-elect Trump with a Republican congressional majority. The Dow Jones
dropping nearly “650 points” on Nov. 8-9 plausibly suggests probative psychological response to market
uncertainty—regime change presumably correlated with apprehensive perceptions. xxi
Apparently, the election
took some by surprise. xxii
Typically, U.S. elections remotely affect market outcomes, particularly, one energy
company, since Congress “repealing solar ITC and Wind PTC,” constitutes a “highly unlikely,” scenario. xxiii
Despite unwarranted fears, likely an overreaction—“climbing the wall of worry,” with “unfolding election
uncertainties”—concern presumably abounds about “renewable energy.” xxiv
If true, these uncertainties may
reflect Dominion’s initial downward path from Nov. 8–14 2016. xxv
This assumed ambivalence, however,
appears to contradict reality, because analysts appear optimistic about Trump “removing regulatory
impediments,” while “emphasizing expanded U.S. oil and gas production.” xxvi
Contrariwise, Dominion’s valuation appeared to largely skyrocket from Nov. 14–Dec. 2, 2016. Prices reached
$76.11 on Nov. 29, 2016, before trailing $74 into early December. The Thanksgiving-week Black-Friday and
Cyber-week deals might account for some of this price hypertrophy. But accelerated growth apparently
resumed throughout Dec. 2016, attenuating the inference of post-election paranoia. For example, Dec. 8–13,
Dominion’s price presumably climbed from $73.50 to $76.51 by Dec. 19th
, pinnacling at $76.99 on Dec. 29,
2016, before closing the year with $76.59. xxvii
The Dow Jones nearly eclipsing 20,000 points in an epic
historic record, post-2016 election, might partially explain Dominion’s recent momentum. The holiday season
perhaps also contributed, assuming heightened utility expense plausibly inferred from weather and/or travel.
But the Dow transcending 20,000 on 1/25/2017 strengthens a conclusion of correlation, plausibly influencing
Dominion’s latest soar to $75.86 at 11:43 A.M. that day. xxviii
The historic 2017 post-inaugural event during
Trump’s first week as President strengthens this inference, if attributed to hopes of successful capitalistic
growth from laissez-faire tax-cuts. If accurate, this assumption of energy expansion in reduced tax and
occupational opportunities comports with Dominion’s growth projection potential, plausibly reinforcing a buy.
(c) Energy Expansion.
However, the unified Republican party majority in an incumbent Trump administration supports continued
growth for Dominion, assuming heightened domestic investments, tax cuts, and employment. Furthermore,
Dominion appears more apt to hypertrophy from the unprecedented potential of alternative energy exploration
as the North Dakota Bakken in subsidizing these domestic incentives. The largely untapped Bakken
presumably harbors at minimum 4.3 billion barrels of shale oil, a copious energy cornucopia to enhance
natural gas production, if efficaciously harnessed through fracking. xxix
This conclusion comports with
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Dominion’s recent company developments. xxx
Apparently, Dominion secured a “$2.5 billion acquisition with
Bakken,” in 2007, presumably the historically highest energy deal at that time. xxxi
If accurate, this inference—
accompanied by Dominion’s alleged 2016 Questar acquisition—plausibly supports an upward surge,
strengthening the conclusion of a buy. If true, assuming energy exploration escalates and Dominion
strategically advantages this opportunity, attempts to differentiate by diversifying resources may embolden its
assumed dominant competitive position. President Trump’s Keystone Pipeline Executive Order on 1/24/17—
abrogating Obama’s restrictions—if successfully implemented with Congress’ sanctioning—arguably
catalyzes “energy resources expansion” and job creation. xxxii
Assuming the promise of energy expansion,
providing no force majeure events—terrorism, natural disasters, etc.—Dominion appears favorably disposed
to growth in a plausibly buy.
(d)Federal Reserve.
On Dec. 15, 2016, the Federal Reserve reportedly announced its decision to raise interest rates .25%, with
further increases projected in 2017. xxxiii
If true, this development may suggest uncertainty for utilities
companies. On the one hand, utilities companies may struggle if higher costs of capital assumed in a Fed rate
rise risks deterring investors from supporting them. xxxiv
However, utilities companies may advantage a presumably stronger economy, potentially eliciting possibly
greater “natural gas and electricity” consumption to spur exponential growth.xxxv
Economic improvement
might also incidentally incentivize higher rent rates, which may amplify effect of increased demand,
aggrandizing revenue, if accompanied by augmented utilities costs. If achieved, utilities companies may
ameliorate stock prices. But this inference assumes, providing economic trends continue, the assumed gains
overshadow possible long-run investment losses.
Nevertheless, Dominion constitutes a “well-diversified utilities company”—purportedly, “producing over 12%
returns,” by late November 2016—likely equipped to withstand “high-interest rates and turbulent markets.”
xxxvi
For example, Dominion’s diversification record referenced in derivative contracts, combining futures,
options, and swaps, to mitigate “price sensitivity risks,” strengthens this inference. xxxvii
If accurate, Dominion
possesses an opportunity to strategically steepen its alleged competitive edge, assuming less diversified
companies sustain investment losses while Dominion inversely proliferates. If so, disparities may deepen,
possibly polarizing Dominion’s dominance over the energy and utilities industries, plausibly outpacing
competitors. Therefore, assuming this rationale, Dominion may hedge these risks, potentially arbitraging
industry losses to its advantage diversifying derivatives, possibly hybridizing options agreements. For
example, option collars may offset costs by combining the option to call (buy) and put (sell) assets together
under contract. xxxviii
Likewise, Dominion may also integrate option collars with swap arrangements that trade
volatile flotation for fixed interest rates to further stabilize costs against risk of loss. Less diversified
companies in the industry may lack this luxury, and if so, proportionately perish. Hence, the totality of
evidence supports a probative buy for Dominion.
Figure 5: Dominion Trading Price Fluctuations—FY 2016
Source: See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources Inc., Stock Report, NASDAQ Report, © 2016 EDGAR®, Dec. 30, 2016,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/stock-report.
Figure 5. Recent political paradigmatic transitions plausibly influencing market reaction suggest a
shift in shareholder perception from former sell to sudden buy following 11-9-2016.
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Business Description.
A. Dominion Services.
As a leading U.S. energy distributor, Dominion’s preeminent portfolio presumably accommodates
approximately 25,700 megawatts of generation. xxxix
Dominion’s natural gas storage systems distinguishes
among the nation’s largest. Currently, its estimated 1 trillion cubic feet storage capacity allegedly surpasses
6 million customers in utility and retail energy services throughout 14 states. xl
Other services include:
 14,400 miles in natural gas transmission; xli
 Gathering & storage pipeline;
 6,500-mile electric transmission lines;
 57,300 miles of electric distribution lines. xlii
B. Dominion Financials.
Forecasts estimate P/E Ratio declines for Dominion from actual 2015 results in every year after 2015. xliii
The
P/E ratio refers to stock price divided by earnings; price/earnings. Generally, lower P/E means the stock price
diminished compared to earnings, and vice versa for higher P/E. For example, if denominator earnings
increase while price remains unchanged, the P/E ratio diminishes consistent with mathematical logic, e.g., ½
> ¼. Conceptually, price per earnings, P/E, estimates what an investor typically wishes to pay proportionately
for the stock’s price. Dominion Resources presently purports a 22.9 P/E. xliv
If true, a high P/E reveal stock
prices increasing compared to earnings by investor valuations.
Valuation.
A. Sum of Parts.
Several valuation metrics strongly support a BUY rating for Dominion Resources. The following sum of
parts valuation—including, dividend discount model, 2017 price to sales projection estimates, and earnings
valuation estimates—indicate undervaluation. For example, the dividend discount model purports an
estimated 2017 valuation for Dominion of $93 despite prices within the $74-$76 range by Jan. 25, 2017. xlv
Wells Fargo’s estimated valuation range between $77 and $80 strengthens this inference since Dominion
presently staggers between $75-76, pinnacling at $76.99 on Dec. 29, 2016.xlvi
Currently, Dominion’s 2015
projections for 2017 estimate price to sales at $78.27, excluding the presently unavailable 2016 reports. xlvii
Similarly, 2017 sales projections estimate $13.3682 billion compared to $11.683 billion for actual 2015 sales.
xlviii
Additionally, earnings valuation estimates $82.15, with NASDAQ’s current conservative 12-month
target price listed at $77. xlix
Present trends suggest Dominion trading at a premium compared to its
competitors, specifically, “15x” vis-à-vis the “10.5x industry average.” l
Dominion’s stock presumably rose
“13%” and yields “3.7%,” a stock which Hedge Fund Analyst Correspondent Jim Cramer apparently
endorsed among his portfolio picks. li
Growth prospects suggest virtually, “10% recovery since the election,”
with a “3% premium to it both 50-day and 200-day moving averages by Jan. 4, 2017.” A moving average
forecasts growth from the arithmetic average of most recent data periods. If true, these prospects plausibly
suggest strong growth, assuming Dominion remains within moving average levels because stocks surpassing
moving average levels typically portend bullishness.
B. Dividend-Growth.
Additionally, the earnings potential assumed in new growth projects reported plausibly support attractive
dividend growth. lii
For example, Dominion’s quarterly cash dividend presumably grew “by nearly 8.1% to
$.70 per share,” in Dec. 2015. liii
From these reports, Dominion estimates its dividend payout target between
“70-75% of operating earnings,” projecting an “8% annual dividend growth rate from 2014 to 2020.” liv
Moreover, Dominion reported a dividend yield of “3.77% on Oct. 21, 2016,” maintaining 3% minimum over
five years, steadily distributed “every quarter since Nov. 2011.” lv
Investopedia reportedly ranks Dominion
among the top 3 dividend utilities stocks, strengthening the inference of competitive investment growth.lvi
Ultimately, if accurate, Dominion’s steady dividend growth reflects its overall growth—solvency assumed in
an ability to pay shareholders—strengthening the inference of buy. The projected growth potential implies
progressive valuation increase with time, assuming this pattern continues. Accordingly, this prospective
growth pattern comports with present trends, assuming political predictions attributed to a predominantly
Republican Congress and incumbent Trump administration unifies conservative de-regulation. If so,
Dominion likely benefits purportedly from the laissez faire environment of diminished energy regulations,
possible tax-rate attenuation, and/or subsidized domestic energy initiatives incentivizing business.
While the energy and utilities sectors stand to benefit at large from relaxed regulation, Dominion’s alleged
competitive edge, again, positions it strategically for proportionate gains. Therefore, assuming the above,
Dominion’s reputed record of outpacing rivals likely continues, and possibly broadens if its diversification
strategy further mitigates losses perhaps otherwise incurred.
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C. Rapid Revenue Reductions.
Moreover, Dominion’s revenues reportedly shrank steadily from $13.06 Billion in June 2014 to $11.05
Billion by June 2016. Dominion’s assumed excess debt perhaps correlates with reduced revenue. lvii
If
anything, assuming the above, reduced revenue more strongly supports a buy consistent with general value
investment principles, buying low to advantage potential upswing growth. Likewise, Dominion’s ability as a
utilities monopoly to securitize practical services, discontinuing services of customers defaulting on monthly
bills, presumably distinguishes it among “value investments.” lviii
Management & Governance.
A. Corporate Governance.
Corporate governance refers to a regulatory system that balances company, stakeholder, and government
interests. lix
It assumes an agency relationship whereby one or multiple persons, including companies—
agents—provide services on another’s behalf—principals. lx
Here, principal beneficiaries entrust agents with a requisite fiduciary responsibility—relationship based on
duty, loyalty, and obedience—trust in confidence—to act on their behalf. On Oct. 1, 2016, Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance QuickScore assigned Dominion an overall Corporate Governance
rating of 6. lxi
According to ISS QuickScore, 6 falls just shy of high-corporate governance risks. lxii
However, Dominion also respectively received “8”—high governance risks—for “Board” and “Shareholder
Rights” subsets as an assumed arithmetic average factored into this rating. lxiii
QuickScore Methodology
presumably evaluates company “governance structure” through annual, “year-round,” data-driven
inspections, incorporating nearly “200 factors,” to analyze risks, assigning weights based on the following:
 “Input from ISS’ global governance experts;”
 Perceived “impact of governance practices,”
 “ISS voting policy” consistent with “prevailing” regional “governance standards.” lxiv
Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning.
The energy industry as inferred from high metrics appears competitive, presumably catalyzed by
technological advances. Dominion appears to outpace its competitors and the overall industry as inferred
from its financials including:
2016-17 BUSINESS RATIOS—DOMINION v. Energy Competitors. lxv
2016-17 BUSINESS RATIOS—DOMINION v. Electric Utilities Competitors. lxx
Financial Ratios: Dominion American Electric Power DTE Energy Industry Average
12-month Dividend Yield 3.69% 3.63% 3.12% 3.25%
Return on Equity, ROE 15.38% 15.38% 10.35% 9.78%
EV/EBITDA 15.28 lxvi
15.71 lxvii
11.48 lxviii
12.35 lxix
Market Capitalization $ 47.57 Billion $ 30.79 Billion $ 17.57 Billion $ 14.98 Billion
Financial Ratios: Dominion National Grid Exelon Industry
12-month Dividend Yield 3.7% 4.7% 5.0% 3.59%
Return on Equity, ROE 15.38% 16.07% 4.80% 8.93%
EV/EBITDA 15.28 lxxi
10.10 lxxii
8.22 lxxiii
11.57 lxxiv
Market Capitalization $ 47.3 B 43.92B 33.05B $6.75 B lxxv
10
The following SWOT summary itemizes Dominion’s comparable industry competitiveness:
For Dominion’s industry competitiveness, please see p. 11, Figure 7, DOMINION—PORTER’S FIVE FORCES.
Financial Analysis.
A. Analyst Summary.
Current projections depending on market conditions, might suggest declining growth for Dominion, possibly
stemming from market cycle maturity. If true, the “bullish” analyst summary leaning toward “buy,” plausibly
supports this inference because declines may suggest short-term upswing growth opportunity, if prices later
climb. lxxvii
The last shareholder exchange filed on 11/15/16 indicating “purchase,” may support this conclusion.
lxxviii
If so, shareholders plausibly perceive an opportunity for continued growth, presumably advantaging
Dominion’s latest upswing growth consistent with overall political and economic trends. If true, de-regulation
inferred from impending regime change may support this conclusion, assuming shareholders factored market
perception into their investment decision.
B. Competitive Comparables.
Consider Dominion’s metrics versus its rivals. Recall our foregoing P/E discussion. Historically, Dominion
boasts a P/E ratio greater than 20 over the past few years. If accurate, analysts’ buy indication might appear
optimistic because value investing principles suggest buying low, and selling high to avoid risk of loss.
Typically, a P/E ratio exceeding “17” may signal danger. lxxix
But the energy industry average indicates a 19.8 P/E as of 12/16/16. Even so, Dominion’s P/E presumably
ranks highest among its 10 competitors at 21.89. But this conclusion assumes P/E constitutes the primary
valuation benchmark. Ultimately, valuation metrics accompanied by key shareholder behavior consistent with
politicized psychological influence on present market trends correlate to buy, justifying “A- buy street rating.”
lxxx
After all, Dominion’s competitiveness evidenced in its # 1 return on equity, 15.38% ROE, demonstrates
growth potential, which if true, plausibly reinforces a buy. To strengthen this conclusion, Dominion’s 3Q 2016
Net Income reportedly grew “21.54% faster than the average growth of its competitors.” lxxxi
Assuming the
pattern persists, Dominion’s growth potential suggests a buy given its opportunity for sizeable gains.
Conversely, Dominion’s maturity, high-debts, and possible struggles increasing, “15% ROE faster than 15%,
without borrowing funds or selling more shares,” might mitigate this inference. lxxxii
However, Dominion’s
purported “15.38%” ROE dominates the energy industry. Likewise, reported revenue losses reveal
opportunities for significant long-term growth compared to competitors, advantaging potential upswing growth,
perhaps further precipitated by politicized energy expansion initiatives. Additionally, Dominion’s attempts to
differentiate with diversified derivatives, as abovementioned, reduces investment loss risks, plausibly
enhancing competitiveness if upswing growth materializes. Dominion also purportedly boasts the highest
market capitalization. While companies with high market capitalization may yield limited short-term returns,
“they generally reward investors,” providing “consistent share value increases and dividend payments.” lxxxiii
Additionally, Dominion’s alleged lower net income compared to the industry supports a buy consistent with
value investment, with opportunities for growth if energy expansion accelerates. Dominion’s exhibited metrics
support this conclusion. Consider the following financial ratios as additional evidence to Dominion’s buy-
rating consistent with upswing growth assumed in continued competitiveness:
Strengths.
 Energy/Utilities Leader
 Highly Diversified.
 Pipeline Capacity.
 Customer Expansion.
 Sustained Growth.
Weaknesses.
 Excess Debt.
 Governance Issues.
 Mature Company.
 High P/E Ratios.
 Analyst Optimism.
Opportunities.
 U.S. Regime-change.
 Nuclear /Solar-Wind Power.
 Globalization.
 Climate Change.
 Technological Innovations
Threats.
 Environmental Policies.
 Global Competitors.
 Volatile Sector. lxxvi
 Weather Sensitivity.
 Force Majeure:
(Terrorism, natural disaster, etc.).
11
2016 -17 BUSINESS METRICS—DOMINION V. ENERGY PEERS. lxxxiv
2016-17 BUSINESS METRICS—DOMINION v. INDUSTRY PEERS. lxxxv
C. Revenues.
According to Business 2016-17 Metrics, Dominion’s 5-year revenue Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
referenced 5.1% decline—almost inversely proportionate with the industry, which revealed 5.6% gains. FY
2012 serves as a benchmark year elucidating Dominion’s alarming revenue decline after abandoning the
unregulated market for both electric and natural gas services. As FY 2015 concluded, Dominion’s unregulated
electric revenue presumably plummeted 45.73% compared to 2012. Total revenues reportedly declined every
year since 2010, ostensibly at an average rate of 5%. If accurate, these progressive, annual declines reported
plausibly correlate with Dominion’s excess debts, perhaps reflected in a “large capital investment plan,” and
“high consolidated leverage.” lxxxvi
See below, Figure 5. But Fitch also projects “consolidated leverage
improvement,” over the next several years. lxxxvii
If true, that assertion assumes debt-reduction in a more
balanced capital structure, which assuming so, implies growth potential, strengthening the buy-rating inference.
Political trends comport with this conclusion.
Furthermore, Questar’s regulated gas operations purportedly comprise 35% of Dominion’s EBITDA,
strengthening a buy-rating inferred from operation expansion if Dominion allegedly acquires Questar.lxxxix
If
accurate, however, attempts to strategically diversify long-term investment risks with excess debts securitized
via self-regulated operation expansion and acquisition reasonably support Dominion’s revenue loss. But loss
may avail upswing cyclical growth consistent with value investment principles. If true, the evidence
strengthens a buy-rating because investors may buy Dominion low now and advantage subsequent
exponential growth, assuming it remunerates its debts.
D. Sales Growth
Dominion Virginia Power’s infrastructural investment, if successful, support substantial growth. Capital
expenditures serve to subsidize underground program plans for electricity distribution in locations where
Dominion operations. These plans include a Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) of $113 million to 4,000 miles in
underground tap lines. xc
If successfully administered, perhaps further precipitated by plausible political
support, total electrical distribution may yield Growth CAPEX of the following from 2016-2020:
 Dominion Virginia Power: $6.1 Billion;
 Dominion Generation: $ 4.1 Billion;
 Dominion Energy: $ 5.5 Billion;
 Total Dominion Capex: $15.7 Billion. xci
Financial Ratios: Dominion Nextera Energy Southern Company Industry Average
12-month Dividend Yield 3.71% 2.92% 4.56% 3.59%
Return on Equity, ROE 15.38% 15.38% 10.35% 9.78%
Market Capitalization $47.57 billion $57.06 billion 47.75 billion $6.75 Billion
Financials Dominion National Grid, PLC Exelon Industry Average
Net Income $2.023 Billion $2.048 Billion $1.240 Billion $3.484 Billion
5-Yr Rev CAGR -5.1% +1.1% +9.6% +5.6%
Market Capitalization $ 47.57 Billion $46.009 Billion $45.046 Billion $12.71 Billion.
Figure 6 – Key Financial Ratios and Statistics. lxxxviii
Profitability 2015 Leverage 2015
Net Inc/Common Equity 0.28 Total Liability/Total Assets 0.78
Net Inc/Total Assets 0.03 Curr Debt/Equity 0.45
Net Inc/Inv Cap 0.04 Total Debt/Equity 2.31
12
E. Cash Flow
Cash flow from investment activities report losses since 2015, with losses expected continue, assumed in
capital expenditure investment. Nevertheless, financing activities reveal steady growth since 2012. For
additional information, see Appendix, Figure 10—Cash Flows, p. 14.
Investment Risks.
A. Financial Risk—High Debt.
Dominion’s purported high-leverage appears troubling. xcii
High leverage assumes an unbalanced capital
structure, specifically, disproportionate debt investment compared to equity—high debt/equity ratio. High-
leverage means the company takes on higher debt expense compared to equity in financing operations.
Generally, high-leverage implies high-default risk. xciii
Assuming this conclusion, if Dominion’s debt
exceeds its cash flows, the company may become unviable, specifically, insolvent, if unable to repay
creditors.
Additionally, Dominion’s record reveals a BBB Moody’s rating. xciv
BBB satisfies the minimum threshold
for investment grade bonds. xcv
If accurate, Dominion’s BBB rating indicates high-risk, possibly suggesting a
suboptimal investment compared to competitors.
Furthermore, “rising bond yields,” assuming the pattern continues, might pose “negative implications for
electric companies,” like Dominion because potentially “higher borrowing costs,” suggest more debt. xcvi
Again, more debt, if applicable to Dominion as an electric company, typically exacerbates default risk—
possible struggles repaying creditors—assuming money owed exceeds cash flows. Default evinced in non-
payment generally implies surmounting debt—failure to repay because money owed exceeds cash inflow—
assuming no fraudulent motive. Risk means the company’s vulnerability to certain threats, which if
unaddressed, may jeopardize its continued viability. Higher risk may aggravate volatility. If true, elevated
default potential assumed in higher debt may offset a regarded leading energy company’s high valuation.
Accordingly, these factors may collectively strengthen the conclusion of volatility evidenced in Dominion’s
historical record, namely, unpredictable fluctuations from underweight to marketweight or higher.
Nevertheless, Market Realist lists Dominion among utility stocks evincing “low implied volatility,” namely,
a year-to-date return (YTD) allegedly of “8.2%.” xcvii
Implied volatility estimates a security’s price
volatility. xcviii
If accurate, Dominion’s estimated low implied volatility suggests lower risk—less
susceptibility to price fluctuation—which, assuming this conclusion, supports increased valuation over time.
Therefore, stable prices plausibly assumed in low price volatility may signal investors to infer a higher price
for Dominion in the future. Hence, the decision to buy now appears ripe in exploiting these benefits.
B. Legal Risks—Corporate Governance.
Dominion’s above corporate governance numbers, if true, prove troubling because they suggest possible
conflict of interest fiduciary violations. Why? Officers maintain a requisite fiduciary responsibility to
company shareholders, entrusted with advancing their vested interest in the corporation. Fiduciary violations
result when a company acts adversely—contrary to its shareholders’ obligations—by corporate waste and/or
conflicts of interests—advantaging at the shareholders’ detriment. This same fiduciary relationship of trust
also applies to agent officers toward the principal corporation. Therefore, even if Dominion allegedly acts
adversely to its legal, financial responsibility, the company’s alleged liability risks brand damage. If accurate,
assuming this conclusion, even alleged liability risks discrediting Dominion, possibly denigrating its
reputation, and by greater extension, viability compared to industry competitors. Ultimately, Dominion’s
alleged failure appointing an “independent environmental expert,” for its board under SEC Rules 14a-8(i)(3)
plausibly substantiates QuickScore’s ratings of high corporate governance risks. xcix
Assuming these
considerations, Dominion’s price may diminish, which if so, possibly justifies a lower valuation than
prevailing projections. Advocating a price on these influences presently appears too speculative to
sufficiently correlate. Indeed, financial analysts reportedly “ranked Dominion # 1 among Fortune’s 2015
‘Most Admired’ electric and gas utilities,” vis-à-vis asset investment, operation, and/or allocation. c
If true,
Dominion’s assumed respectable reputation weakens the inference of reported corporate governance issues
correlating with diminished valuation. If true, these factors support a plausible buy, affording a potential
opportunity to possibly capitalize a low price from presumably diminished value. But time may tell.
13
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E
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r
a
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s
APPENDIX.
Figure 7—DOMINION: PORTER’S FIVE FORCES. ci
Porter’s 5
Forces
 Local power source
limitations.
 Limited individual price
influence.
 Consumer Size.
Threat of Rivalry – Low.
Threat of Entrants – High.
Threat of Substitutes – Low but Growing.
Buyer Bargaining Power – Low.
Supplier Bargaining Power – High.
 Impractical
to self-create energy source.
 Finite energy resources.
 Commoditization.
 Solar/ wind power
generation imminent.
 Geographic Limits
(e.g. contract).
 Large competitors.
 Large Set-up Costs.
 Passing Regulations.
 Solar Energy (Sunrun
& Tesla in suburbs).
Oil, coal, & other resource
risks.
Larger company implies larger
order size.
Future suggests solar, wind, &
other renewable resource
capability.
14
Figure 8: Income Statement
$ in millions
DOMINION RESOURCES INC (D) INCOME STATEMENT
Fiscal year ends in December. USD in millions except per share data.2011-12 2012-12 2013-12 2014-12 2015-12 TTM
Revenue 14379 13093 13120 12436 11683 11207
Cost of revenue 6412 5312 5574 5116 3606 2871
Gross profit 7967 7781 7546 7320 8077 8336
Operating expenses
Operation and maintenance 3483 4868 2459 2765 2595 2853
Depreciation and amortization 1069 1186 1208 1292 1395 1470
Other operating expenses 554 571 563 542 551 567
Total operating expenses 5106 6625 4230 4599 4541 4890
Operating income 2861 1156 3316 2721 3536 3446
Interest Expense 869 882 877 1193 904 945
Other income (expense) 179 223 265 250 196 258
Income before income taxes 2171 497 2704 1778 2828 2759
Provision for income taxes 745 146 892 452 905 672
Net income from continuing operations 1426 351 1812 1326 1923 2087
Net income from discontinuing ops -22 -92
Other -18 -27 -23 -16 -24 -64
Net income 1408 302 1697 1310 1899 2023
Net income available to common shareholders1408 302 1697 1310 1899 2023
Earnings per share
Basic 2.46 0.53 2.93 2.25 3.21 3.32
Diluted 2.45 0.53 2.93 2.24 3.2 3.31
Weighted average shares outstanding
Basic 573 573 579 583 592 609
Diluted 575 574 580 584 594 610
EBITDA 4328 2822 4971 4531 5401 5448
*Morningstar Financials. cii
15
Figure 9: Balance Sheet
$ in millions
DOMINION RESOURCES INC (D) BALANCE SHEET
Fiscal year ends in December. USD in millions except per share data.2011-12 2012-12 2013-12 2014-12 2015-12
Assets
Current assets
Cash
Cash and cash equivalents 102 248 936 605 623
Total cash 102 248 936 605 623
Receivables 2035 1717 1836 1633 1369
Inventories 1348 1259 1176 1410 1348
Prepaid expenses 262 326 192 167 198
Other current assets 1683 1590 1800 1800 653
Total current assets 5430 5140 5940 5615 4191
Non-current assets
Property, plant and equipment
Gross property, plant and equipment 42990 44321 46969 51406 57776
Accumulated Depreciation -13320 -13548 -14341 -15136 -16222
Net property, plant and equipment 29670 30773 32628 36270 41554
Equity and other investments 3844 3888 5102 5561 5774
Goodwill 3141 3130 3086 3044 3294
Intangible assets 637 536 560 570 570
Prepaid pension costs 681 702 942 956 943
Regulatory assets 1382 1717 1228 1642 1865
Other long-term assets 829 952 610 669 606
Total non-current assets 40184 41698 44156 48712 54606
Total assets 45614 46838 50096 54327 58797
Liabilities and stockholders' equity
Liabilities
Current liabilities
Short-term debt 3293 4635 3446 4150 5335
Accounts payable 1250 1137 1168 952 726
Accrued liabilities 678 636 609 566 515
Other current liabilities 1741 1355 1771 1530 1544
Total current liabilities 6962 7763 6994 7198 8120
Non-current liabilities
Long-term debt 17394 16851 19330 21805 23616
Deferred taxes liabilities 5216 5800 7114 7444 7414
Pensions and other benefits 962 1831 481 1296 1199
Regulatory liabilities 1324 1514 2001 1991 2285
Minority interest 57 57 402 938
Other long-term liabilities 2253 2454 2534 2636 2561
Total non-current liabilities 27206 28507 31460 35574 38013
Total liabilities 34168 36270 38454 42772 46133
stockholders' equity
Additional paid-in capital 5359 5655 5783 5876 6680
Retained earnings 6697 5790 6183 6095 6458
Accumulated other comprehensive income -610 -877 -324 -416 -474
Total stockholders' equity 11446 10568 11642 11555 12664
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity 45614 46838 50096 54327 58797
*Morningstar Financials.ciii
16
Figure 1-: Statement of Cash Flows
$ in millions
DOMINION RESOURCES INC (D) Statement of CASH FLOW
Fiscal year ends in December. USD in millions except per share data.2011-12 2012-12 2013-12 2014-12 2015-12 TTM
Cash Flows From Operating Activities
Net income 1426 329 1720 1326 1923 2087
Depreciation & amortization 1288 1443 1390 1560 1669 1744
Investment/asset impairment charges 283 2089 48
Deferred income taxes 756 246 737 449 854 632
Accounts receivable 365 292 -98 131 294 84
Inventory -185 33 -29 -43 -26 -33
Prepaid expenses -19 -85 123 24 -25 1
Accounts payable -413 -61 50 -202 -199 -66
Accrued liabilities -216 -12 -27 -41 -52 166
Interest payable -12 -27
Other working capital -98 271 -198 -211 103 -137
Other non-cash items -204 -396 -256 446 -66 -70
Net cash provided by operating activities 2983 4137 3433 3439 4475 4408
Cash Flows From Investing Activities
Investments in property, plant, and equipment -3652 -4145 -4104 -5345 -5575 -6479
Property, plant, and equipment reductions 60 79 9
Acquisitions, net 625 272 -497 -4372
Purchases of investments -1828 -1392 -1493 -1447 -1744 -1631
Sales/Maturities of investments 1757 1356 1476 1235 1340 1412
Other investing activities 402 341 38 44 -106 -121
Net cash used for investing activities -3321 -3840 -3458 -5181 -6503 -11182
Cash Flows From Financing Activities
Debt issued 2320 1500 4535 6485 3562 8230
Debt repayment -637 -1675 -1903 -4393 -1292 -2386
Common stock issued 38 265 278 205 786 2148
Redemption of preferred stock -259
Repurchases of treasury stock -601
Cash dividends paid -1146 -1225 -1319 -1409 -1536 -1673
Other financing activities 404 984 -1498 1115 797 468
Net cash provided by (used for) financing activities 378 -151 93 1744 2317 6787
Net change in cash 40 146 68 2 289 13
Cash at beginning of period 62 102 248 316 318 238
Cash at end of period 102 248 316 318 607 251
Free Cash Flow
Operating cash flow 2983 4137 3433 3439 4475 4408
Capital expenditure -3652 -4145 -4104 -5345 -5575 -6479
Free cash flow -669 -8 -671 -1906 -1100 -2071
Supplemental schedule of cash flow data
Cash paid for income taxes -58 56 72 75
Cash paid for interest 913 852 889 843
*Morningstar Financials. civ
17
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18
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xxxii
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19
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xlviii
See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24,
2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/.
xlix
See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24,
2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/; See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources, Inc.
Stock Research Analyst Summary, Zacks Investment Research, NASDAQ, Dec. 9, 2016,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/analyst-research.
l
See Kruger, Vincent, Dominion Resources: Analyzing Stock and Growth Prospects in 2017, Part I of V, Jan. 5,
2017, Market Realist, p. 3-4, http://marketrealist.com/2017/01/chart-indicators-short-interest-dominion-
hint/?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=feed&yptr=yahoo.
li
See Rutt, Scott, Seems Like This Bull Can Take Any Hit: Cramer’s ‘Mad Money’ Recap (Wednesday 1/4/17),
TheStreet, Jan. 4, 2017, © 1996-2017 TheStreet, Inc., p. 4, https://www.thestreet.com/story/13942716/1/seems-
like-this-bull-can-take-any-hit-cramer-s-mad-money-recap-wednesday-1-4-17.html.
lii
Seeking Alpha, Why Should Dominion Resources Be the Pick on Further Weakness?, Oct. 10, 2016, © 2017
Seeking Alpha, p. 1, http://seekingalpha.com/article/4011126-dominion-resources-pick-weakness.
liii
See Zacks Investment Research, Zacks Equity Research Report for D—Dominion Resources, Inc., Jan. 18,
2017, © 2017 Zacks Investment Research, p. 3, https://www.zacks.com/zer/report/D?t=D&ticker=D.
liv
See Id.at 3.
lv
See Id.at 3.
lvi
See Edwards, John, The Three Best Dividends Stocks in the Utility Sector, (DUK, FE), Oct. 28, 2015, © 2017,
Investopedia, LLC, p. 3, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/102815/3-best-dividend-stocks-utility-
sector.asp.
lvii
See Market Mad House, Dominion Resources are Utilities Still a Value Investment, Oct. 22, 2016, © 2017
Market Mad House, p. 4, http://marketmadhouse.com/dominion-resources-utilities-still-value-investment/.
lviii
See Id. at 2.
20
lix
See Carver, John, Carver, Miram, Basic Principles of Policy Governance, The Carver Guide Series on Effective
Board Governance, No. 1, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996, p. 1; See Investopedia, LLC, Corporate
Governance, 2016, p. 1, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporategovernance.asp.
lx
See Besley & Brigham, Essentials of Managerial Finance, 14th
Edition, Thomson South-Western, 2008, 2005, p
17.
lxi
See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc. Oct. 19, 2016, p. 1,
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D/profile?p=D.
lxii
See Id. at 1; see also Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), ISS Governance QuickScore—Methodology, ©
2016, p.1, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/quickscore/#.
lxiii
See Id. at p.1; see also Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), ISS Governance QuickScore—
Methodology, © 2016, p.1, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/quickscore/#.
lxiv
See Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), ISS Governance QuickScore—Methodology, © 2016, p.1,
https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/quickscore/#.
lxv
See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24,
2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/.
lxvi
See Guru Focus, Dominion Resources, Inc. EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru
Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/NYSE:D/EVEBITDA/Dominion-Resources-
Inc.
lxvii
See Guru Focus, American Electric Company Power, Inc. (AEP) EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, ©
2004-2017, Guru Focus.com, LLC, p. 1,
http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/NYSE:AEP/EVEBITDA/American-Electric-Power-Co-Inc.
lxviii
See Guru Focus, DTE Energy, Co. EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru Focus.com,
LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/NYSE:DTE/EVEBITDA/DTE-Energy-Co.
lxix
See New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business, Enterprise Value Multiples by Sector, Jan. 2017,
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/vebitda.html.
lxx
See Zacks Investment Research, Utility Electric Power, © 2017 Zacks Investment Research, p. 1-2,
https://www.zacks.com/stocks/industry-rank/industry/utility-electric-power-193; See Zacks Investment Research,
Dominion Resources, Inc. (D), Jan. 25, 2017, p.1-2, https://www.zacks.com/stock/quote/D?q=D (except numbers
individually cited in chart by the immediately following endnote).
lxxi
See Guru Focus, Dominion Resources, Inc. EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru
Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/NYSE:D/EVEBITDA/Dominion-Resources-
Inc.
lxxii
See Guru Focus, National Grid, PLC., EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru
Focus.com, LLC, p. 1,
http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/OTCPK:NGGTF/EV%252FEBITDA/National%2BGrid%2BPLC.
lxxiii
See Guru Focus, Exelon, Corp (EXC), EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru
Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/EXC/EV%252FEBITDA/Exelon%2BCorp.
lxxiv
See New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business, Enterprise Value Multiples by Sector, Jan. 2017,
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/vebitda.html.
lxxv
See Zacks Investment Research, Zacks Equity Research Report for D—Dominion Resources, Inc., Jan. 18,
2017, © 2017 Zacks Investment Research, p. 6, https://www.zacks.com/zer/report/D?t=D&ticker=D.
lxxvi
Davis, Mark, The 8 Most Volatile Sectors, July 6, 2012, © 2017 Investopedia, LLC,
http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0712/the-8-most-volatile-sectors.aspx.
lxxvii
See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources, Inc. Stock Research Analyst Summary, Zacks Investment Research,
NASDAQ, Dec. 9, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/analyst-research.
lxxviii
See Insidercow.com, Dominion (D), Insider Transactions—Profit from Insider Trading, visited on Jan. 1,
2017, p. 1, http://insidercow.com/.
lxxix
See Richard Koch, “The 80/20 Principle: The Secret to Achieving More With Less,” 2008, Crown Business, a
division of Random House, p. 213.
lxxx
See TheStreet, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D), © 1996-2017 TheStreet, Inc., Jan. 25, 2017, p. 1,
https://www.thestreet.com/quote/D.html.
lxxxi
CSI Market, Inc., D Sales vs. Its Competitors Q 3, Jan. 25, 2017 © 2017 CSI Market, Inc., p. 1-2,
http://csimarket.com/stocks/compet_glance.php?code=D.
21
lxxxii
See McClure, Ben, How Return on Equity Can Help You Find Profitable Stocks, Aug. 11, 2014, 6.M., E.T., ©
Investopedia, LLC, p. 4, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/03/100103.asp?lgl=bt1tn-no-widget.
lxxxiii
Investopedia, Market Capitalization, © 2017, Investopedia, LLC, p. 1-2,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp.
lxxxiv
See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24,
2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/.
lxxxv
See Morningstar, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Valuation Multiples Top Competitors & Peers, © 2017
Morningstar, Inc., Jan. 25, 2017, p. 1-3, http://financials.morningstar.com/competitors/industry-peer.action?t=D.
lxxxvi
See FitchRatings, Fitch Upgrade Dominion Resources’ Remarketed Junior Sub Notes Rating to ‘BBB,’” May
18, 2016, p. 3-4, https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1004719.
lxxxvii
See Id. at 4.
lxxxviii
See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources Inc., Stock Report, NASDAQ Report, © 2016 EDGAR®, Dec. 30,
2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/stock-report.
lxxxix
See Dominion Resources, Inc., Investor Relations Reference Book—Dominion and Question to Combine,
Questar Corporation Overview, Dominion Resources, May 2016, p. 99, 103-104,
file:///C:/Users/Michael/AppData/Local/Temp/Investor%20Relations%20Reference%20Book-
May%202016%20(FINAL)%20(1).pdf.
xc
Bacque, Peter, Dominion Virginia Power Launching $2 Billion to Underground Outage-Prone Power Lines,
Richmond Times-Dispatch, © 2017 BH Media Group, Inc., Blox Content Management System, TownNews.com,
p. 1-2, http://www.richmond.com/business/local/article_008d25a4-a78c-5811-a336-e76554f8f494.html.
xci
See Dominion Resources, Inc., Investor Relations Reference Book—Dominion and Question to Combine,
Questar Corporation Overview, Dominion Resources, May 2016, p. 18-21,
file:///C:/Users/Michael/AppData/Local/Temp/Investor%20Relations%20Reference%20Book-
May%202016%20(FINAL)%20(1).pdf.
xcii
See Quinn, Peter D., CFA, Dominion Resources, Inc.—D: Raising Relative Value Ratings on Dominion
Resources, Summary Profile, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, April 7, 2016, p. 7.
xciii
See Westerfield, Ross, Jordan, Jaffe, Corporate Finance 11th
Edition, McGraw Hill Education, 2016, p. 406.
xciv
See Quinn, Peter D., CFA, Dominion Resources, Inc.—D:‘D is for Downgrade as More Capital is Committed
to Chase Elusive EPS growth, Summary Profile, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Feb. 8, 2016, p. 9.
xcv
See Madura, Jeff, Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th
Edition, © 2015, 2012, Cengage Learning, p. 50.
xcvi
See Chin, Brian, Allan, Stuart A. , Dominion Resources—Cove Point LNG Field Trip Notes, Bank of
America, Merrill Lynch, Mar. 20 2016, p. 2; see Seabury, Chris, How Interest Rates Affect The U.S. Markets,
Mar. 17, 2016, © 2016, Investopedia LLC, p. 1, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/09/how-interest-
rates-affect-markets.asp
xcvii
Scott, Robert, Returns of Utility Stocks with High and Low Implied Volatility, Market Realist, Oct. 20, 2016,
9:58 A.M. EDT, p. 2, http://marketrealist.com/2016/10/returns-utility-stocks-high-low-implied-volatility-
12/?utm_source=market-watch-
headline&utm_medium=feed&utm_content=main_permalink&utm_campaign=returns-utility-stocks-high-low-
implied-volatility-12.
xcviii
See Investopedia, Implied Volatility - IV, © 2016, Investopedia LLC, p. 1,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/iv.asp.
xcix
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Submittal Letter for Joyce Loving, Feb. 11, 2016, p. 1-2, Dec. 29,
2015, p. 3-4, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2016/joyceloving021116-14a8.pdf.
c
Farrell, Thomas, F., II, Dominion CEO Letter to Investors—2015 Summary Annual Report, 2015, p.9,
https://www.dom.com/library/domcom/pdfs/investors/annual-reports/dom-annual-2015/ceo-letter.pdf?la=en
ci
See Su, Yifeng, Kauffman, Graham, McVey, Scott, Li, Tianning, Porter’s five forces analysis, Ohio State
University, Fisher College of Business, PowerPoint, 2014, Slide 10,
https://fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/9163/SP14%20-%20Utilities%20Sector%20Presentation.pdf.
cii
See Morningstar financials for Income Statement, Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement,
http://financials.morningstar.com/income-statement/is.html?t=D&region=USA&culture=en_US.
ciii
See Id.
civ
See Id.

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DOMINION RESOURCES REPORT - FINAL

  • 1. 1 CFA Institute Research Challenge Hosted by Local Challenge (e.g., CFA Society, New York, NY) Team B.
  • 2. 2 Table of Contents: Business Description..............................................................................................................................................................8 Valuation. ...............................................................................................................................................................................8 Management & Governance. ................................................................................................................................................9 Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning. ...............................................................................................................9 Financial Analysis................................................................................................................................................................10 Investment Risks..................................................................................................................................................................12 Figure 8: Income Statement............................................................................................................................................14 Figure 9: Balance Sheet...................................................................................................................................................15 Figure 1-: Statement of Cash Flows ...............................................................................................................................16
  • 3. 3 NYSSA Student Research This is report is published for educational purposes only by students competing in the New York Society of Security Analysts Investment Research Challenge Team B. Highlights.  Valuation: Several valuation metrics strongly support a probative BUY rating for Dominion Resources. The following sum of parts valuation—including, dividend discount model, 2017 price to sales projection estimates, and earnings valuation estimates—indicate undervaluation. Moreover, revenues appear to shrink in recent years. Still, net income, counterintuitively, seem to thrive. If accurate, the abovementioned metrics, bolstered by supporting evidence of Dominion— a highly diversified, vertically integrated company—dominating both energy and utilities industries, strengthens this conclusion.  Competitive: Dominion outpaces the energy and utilities industries as with top competitors for both sectors in various measurable categories including: (1) Profitability; (2) Dividends; (3) Shareholder Returns. If accurate, these metrics further support the plausible inference of Dominion as a buy, with anticipated growth bolstered by market perception to recent political influences. Dominion’s apparent diversification strategy catalyzes its competitive advantage, which, may decrease its susceptibility to losses from possible interest rate increases. Additionally, while excess debt ranks among Dominion’s noted weaknesses, its vulnerability to insolvency, if anything buttresses a buy consistent with value investment principles. Source. iii Ticker: ● D (NYSE) Recommendation: ● BUY Price: ● $75.81 Price Target: $77 Earnings/Share Mar. Jun. Sept. Dec. Year P/E Ratio AV2014A $1.03 $.60 $.95 $.46 $3.05 22.45 2015A $.91 $.70 $1.00 $.60 $3.20 19.68 2016E $.88 $.73 $1.10 $.94 $3.65 19.77 2017E $1.10 $.80 $1.15 $.95 $4.00 19.61 Figure 1 – Per Share Overview. i Date 12-mos Rolling EPS Dividend P/E Ratio 09/2016 3.32 0.700 22.37 06/2016 3.22 0.700 24.20 03/2016 3.18 0.700 23.62 12/2015 3.21 0.648 21.07 09/2015 3.01 0.648 23.38 06/2015 2.92 0.648 22.90 03/2015 2.50 0.648 28.35 12/2014 2.24 0.600 34.33 Figure 2 – Annual Summary Data (Millions). ii Year Sales Net Income EPS 12/2011 13,765.00 1,408.00 2.45 12/2012 12,835.00 302.00 0.57 12/2013 13,120.00 1,697.00 3.09 12/2014 12,436.00 1,310.00 2.24 12/2015 11,683.00 1,899.00 3.21 Growth Rates -4.02 7.77 6.99 Dominion Resources Inc. 52 Week Price Range 67.58 - 78.97 Average Daily Volume, After 30 days 2,360,000 Beta 0.21 Earnings Per Share, EPS, 5-years -9.25 Payout Ratio 63.62% Dividend Growth Rate, 5-Year 7.19% Dividend Yield (Estimated) 3.69% Shares Outstanding 626,750,000 Market Capitalization 47,260,000,000 Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WAAC 3.30% Institutional Holdings 67% Book Value per Share (9/2016) $23.86 Current Ratio, Liquidity 0.42 Return on Equity (9/2016) 18.9% Market Profile Industry: Electric Utilities
  • 4. 4 Introduction. Dominion Resources, Inc., (“Dominion”) headquartered in Richmond, Virginia, reputedly ranks among, “the largest U.S. energy producers and transporters.” Dominion’s massive reach encompasses 14 different states revealing a diversified mix of business operations. These include but are not subject only to the selling, generation, transmission, transportation, distribution of electrical energy and natural gas. Established in 1787, Dominion reportedly became a major electricity supplier by 1909. Some of Dominion’s ostensible features include: • Regulated electric transmission & distribution operations; • Residential, commercial, industrial, governmental services in VA & NC; • Merchant fleet, energy marketing, & price risk management for its assets; • Gathering & processing natural gas, with liquefied natural gas operations; • Wholesale electricity market prices for electric cooperatives & municipalities. A. Primary Trade Exchange. Dominion (D) operates as a publicly traded holding company on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), allegedly trading since 1983. iv B. Primary Sector/Industry Operation. Dominion specializes in bulk power transmission & control electric services. v C. Investment Recommendation. Several valuation metrics strongly support a buy rating for Dominion. D. Current Stock Price. As of Jan. 25, 2017, Dominion allegedly closes at $75.81. vi E. Market Capitalization. Yahoo Finance! alleges a market cap of $47.5 billion for Dominion on Jan. 20, 2017. F. Target Stock Price. NASDAQ estimates Dominion’s 12-month target price at $77. G. Major Shareholders. According to Yahoo! Finance, the following major shareholders comprise Dominion:  “.39%” of shares from insiders & 5% owners;  “61.3%” of shares from institutional & mutual fund owners;  “61.54%” of total shares available for institutional & mutual fund trading;  “964” institutional shareholders. vii Accordingly, Figure 3 – Dominion Shareholders, memorializes Dominion’s shareholders. Figure 3—Stock Ownership. viii Type Date No. Owners Shares Held (000s) % Own Institutional 09/30/16 1040 411,610 65.67
  • 5. 5 DIRECT HOLDERS Shares Date Reported FARRELL THOMAS F II 989,013 3-Feb-16 MCGETTRICK MARK F 282,242 3-Feb-16 KINGTON MARK J 38,366 20-Feb-15 KOONCE PAUL D 137,122 3-Feb-16 CHRISTIAN DAVID A 131,375 3-Feb-16 LEOPOLD DIANE 37,171 1-May-16 DRAGAS HELEN E 27,124 10-Mar-15 BARR WILLIAM P 35,419 11-May-16 BLUE ROBERT M 37,561 5-Feb-16 HEACOCK DAVID A 29,814 3-Feb-16 TOP INSTITUTIONAL HOLDERS Shares Date Reported Vanguard Group, Inc. (The) 39,489,005 29-Jun-16 Capital Research Global Investors 34,842,509 29-Jun-16 State Street Corporation 29,919,066 29-Jun-16 Wellington Management Company, LLP 29,222,869 29-Jun-16 Capital World Investors 25,312,923 29-Jun-16 Bank of America Corporation 18,056,405 29-Jun-16 Franklin Resources, Inc 16,949,508 29-Jun-16 BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, N.A. 16,309,679 29-Jun-16 BlackRock Fund Advisors 14,346,101 29-Jun-16 Northern Trust Corporation 7,650,177 29-Jun-16 TOP MUTUAL FUND HOLDERS Shares Date Reported Capital Income Builder, Inc. 15,773,888 29-Jun-16 Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund 12,223,352 29-Jun-16 Washington Mutual Investors Fund 10,267,000 29-Jun-16 Franklin Custodian Funds-Income Fund 10,000,000 29-Jun-16 Vanguard/Wellington Fund Inc. 9,856,740 30-May-16 Investment Company Of America 8,996,324 29-Jun-16 Select Sector SPDR Fund-Utilities 8,200,112 30-Jul-16 Vanguard 500 Index Fund 8,083,673 29-Jun-16 Income Fund of America Inc 7,335,000 29-Jun-16 Vanguard Institutional Index Fund-Institutional Index Fund 6,587,114 30-May-16 ix Investment Summary. A. Dominion—Investment Profile. Over the past decade, Dominion experienced exponential price growth, which remained largely steady through 2014, though plateauing, increasing at diminished rates from 2015 to present. x If true, the evidence suggests potential pinnacle prices for Dominion as it perhaps progresses to market maturity. Though such a conclusion may appear conjectural, perhaps too premature to espouse, the following evidence comports with this inference. B. Valuation Summary. In February 2016, Dominion received an underweight rating due ostensibly to capital expenditure escalation.xi Capital expenditures include fixed asset investments such as preserving land, building, and/or equipment. xii Underweight implies projected company underperformance—an undervalued price—compared to competitors in the same industry. xiii If accurate, Dominion presumably constitutes a strong buy because it supposedly trades lower than industry average projections. Why? If true, lower comparative trade prices imply potential growth on the assumption of buying lower now to advantage an upswing on possible price surges later. Figure 4 – Dominion Resources, Inc.—Shareholders Th ere are no sources in the current document.
  • 6. 6 Conversely, Dominion’s ratings reversed by April 2016. xiv Indeed, underweight appeared 18 times from January 31, 2013–November 9, 2015. But the incidence of 15 marketweight and 4 overweight referenced throughout this period plausibly offset underweight classifications. xv If accurate, this offsetting effect may suggest an overall neutral “marketweight” average, plausibly suggesting prices aligned with general “market expectations.” xvi C. Significant Recent Developments. On Nov. 10, 2016, after the election, a first indication of buy manifested as Dominion’s price fell to $70.98, perhaps consistent with initial market reaction. xvii Additionally, analysts predict a buy. A buy/sell indication might appear too premature, perhaps speculative to infer at present with the assumed confluence of emerging political and social change imminently approaching. Nevertheless, several significant events—Hurricane Matthew, the 2016 election, and Federal Reserve interest rate spikes—transpired to plausibly influence Dominion’s valuation, which collectively, support a buy. (a) Hurricane Matthew. Initially, late 2016 trends showed recent price declines for Dominion. On Aug. 8, 2016, Dominion’s price target diminished from $82 to $79. Since Sept. 22, 2016 Dominion’s price declined from $77.04 to $74.27 by Sept. 30. Prices continued to decrease, staggering between $72 and $73 throughout Oct. 2016. Hurricane Matthew may correlate as a contributing factor to Dominion’s struggles surpassing the near $73 mark in October. xviii But Dominion’s declivity since July 1, 2016 from nearly $78 to a stagnant $72-$73, supports, in the short-run, under $78, assuming this short-term pattern continues. xix Interestingly, Dominion’s price soared to $75.31 for Oct. 31 and $75.50 on Nov. 8, 2016, consistently remaining around $74, before dramatically plummeting after Nov. 8th . However, evidence of rising prices over time combined with allegedly low implied volatility may suggest a long-term valuation exceeding $75. Dominion almost closed its price-target threshold on Dec. 29, 2016, and as of Jan. 4, 2017, hovered near $76.6. xx From Jan. 5-9, prices remained in the high $76 range, before plummeting to $75.42 by Jan. 10, 2017. If true, the latest trends most strongly support a valuation of at least $75, assuming no anomalous changes. Several contributing factors, including, the election, and hopes of a stronger economy consistent with regime change, plausibly correlate with this recent growth phenomenon. Yet, many variables may impact value fluctuations. (b) 2016 Election. Politics questionably correlates to this sudden slide, specifically, initial ambivalence perhaps about the ideological impact of President-elect Trump with a Republican congressional majority. The Dow Jones dropping nearly “650 points” on Nov. 8-9 plausibly suggests probative psychological response to market uncertainty—regime change presumably correlated with apprehensive perceptions. xxi Apparently, the election took some by surprise. xxii Typically, U.S. elections remotely affect market outcomes, particularly, one energy company, since Congress “repealing solar ITC and Wind PTC,” constitutes a “highly unlikely,” scenario. xxiii Despite unwarranted fears, likely an overreaction—“climbing the wall of worry,” with “unfolding election uncertainties”—concern presumably abounds about “renewable energy.” xxiv If true, these uncertainties may reflect Dominion’s initial downward path from Nov. 8–14 2016. xxv This assumed ambivalence, however, appears to contradict reality, because analysts appear optimistic about Trump “removing regulatory impediments,” while “emphasizing expanded U.S. oil and gas production.” xxvi Contrariwise, Dominion’s valuation appeared to largely skyrocket from Nov. 14–Dec. 2, 2016. Prices reached $76.11 on Nov. 29, 2016, before trailing $74 into early December. The Thanksgiving-week Black-Friday and Cyber-week deals might account for some of this price hypertrophy. But accelerated growth apparently resumed throughout Dec. 2016, attenuating the inference of post-election paranoia. For example, Dec. 8–13, Dominion’s price presumably climbed from $73.50 to $76.51 by Dec. 19th , pinnacling at $76.99 on Dec. 29, 2016, before closing the year with $76.59. xxvii The Dow Jones nearly eclipsing 20,000 points in an epic historic record, post-2016 election, might partially explain Dominion’s recent momentum. The holiday season perhaps also contributed, assuming heightened utility expense plausibly inferred from weather and/or travel. But the Dow transcending 20,000 on 1/25/2017 strengthens a conclusion of correlation, plausibly influencing Dominion’s latest soar to $75.86 at 11:43 A.M. that day. xxviii The historic 2017 post-inaugural event during Trump’s first week as President strengthens this inference, if attributed to hopes of successful capitalistic growth from laissez-faire tax-cuts. If accurate, this assumption of energy expansion in reduced tax and occupational opportunities comports with Dominion’s growth projection potential, plausibly reinforcing a buy. (c) Energy Expansion. However, the unified Republican party majority in an incumbent Trump administration supports continued growth for Dominion, assuming heightened domestic investments, tax cuts, and employment. Furthermore, Dominion appears more apt to hypertrophy from the unprecedented potential of alternative energy exploration as the North Dakota Bakken in subsidizing these domestic incentives. The largely untapped Bakken presumably harbors at minimum 4.3 billion barrels of shale oil, a copious energy cornucopia to enhance natural gas production, if efficaciously harnessed through fracking. xxix This conclusion comports with
  • 7. 7 Dominion’s recent company developments. xxx Apparently, Dominion secured a “$2.5 billion acquisition with Bakken,” in 2007, presumably the historically highest energy deal at that time. xxxi If accurate, this inference— accompanied by Dominion’s alleged 2016 Questar acquisition—plausibly supports an upward surge, strengthening the conclusion of a buy. If true, assuming energy exploration escalates and Dominion strategically advantages this opportunity, attempts to differentiate by diversifying resources may embolden its assumed dominant competitive position. President Trump’s Keystone Pipeline Executive Order on 1/24/17— abrogating Obama’s restrictions—if successfully implemented with Congress’ sanctioning—arguably catalyzes “energy resources expansion” and job creation. xxxii Assuming the promise of energy expansion, providing no force majeure events—terrorism, natural disasters, etc.—Dominion appears favorably disposed to growth in a plausibly buy. (d)Federal Reserve. On Dec. 15, 2016, the Federal Reserve reportedly announced its decision to raise interest rates .25%, with further increases projected in 2017. xxxiii If true, this development may suggest uncertainty for utilities companies. On the one hand, utilities companies may struggle if higher costs of capital assumed in a Fed rate rise risks deterring investors from supporting them. xxxiv However, utilities companies may advantage a presumably stronger economy, potentially eliciting possibly greater “natural gas and electricity” consumption to spur exponential growth.xxxv Economic improvement might also incidentally incentivize higher rent rates, which may amplify effect of increased demand, aggrandizing revenue, if accompanied by augmented utilities costs. If achieved, utilities companies may ameliorate stock prices. But this inference assumes, providing economic trends continue, the assumed gains overshadow possible long-run investment losses. Nevertheless, Dominion constitutes a “well-diversified utilities company”—purportedly, “producing over 12% returns,” by late November 2016—likely equipped to withstand “high-interest rates and turbulent markets.” xxxvi For example, Dominion’s diversification record referenced in derivative contracts, combining futures, options, and swaps, to mitigate “price sensitivity risks,” strengthens this inference. xxxvii If accurate, Dominion possesses an opportunity to strategically steepen its alleged competitive edge, assuming less diversified companies sustain investment losses while Dominion inversely proliferates. If so, disparities may deepen, possibly polarizing Dominion’s dominance over the energy and utilities industries, plausibly outpacing competitors. Therefore, assuming this rationale, Dominion may hedge these risks, potentially arbitraging industry losses to its advantage diversifying derivatives, possibly hybridizing options agreements. For example, option collars may offset costs by combining the option to call (buy) and put (sell) assets together under contract. xxxviii Likewise, Dominion may also integrate option collars with swap arrangements that trade volatile flotation for fixed interest rates to further stabilize costs against risk of loss. Less diversified companies in the industry may lack this luxury, and if so, proportionately perish. Hence, the totality of evidence supports a probative buy for Dominion. Figure 5: Dominion Trading Price Fluctuations—FY 2016 Source: See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources Inc., Stock Report, NASDAQ Report, © 2016 EDGAR®, Dec. 30, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/stock-report. Figure 5. Recent political paradigmatic transitions plausibly influencing market reaction suggest a shift in shareholder perception from former sell to sudden buy following 11-9-2016.
  • 8. 8 Business Description. A. Dominion Services. As a leading U.S. energy distributor, Dominion’s preeminent portfolio presumably accommodates approximately 25,700 megawatts of generation. xxxix Dominion’s natural gas storage systems distinguishes among the nation’s largest. Currently, its estimated 1 trillion cubic feet storage capacity allegedly surpasses 6 million customers in utility and retail energy services throughout 14 states. xl Other services include:  14,400 miles in natural gas transmission; xli  Gathering & storage pipeline;  6,500-mile electric transmission lines;  57,300 miles of electric distribution lines. xlii B. Dominion Financials. Forecasts estimate P/E Ratio declines for Dominion from actual 2015 results in every year after 2015. xliii The P/E ratio refers to stock price divided by earnings; price/earnings. Generally, lower P/E means the stock price diminished compared to earnings, and vice versa for higher P/E. For example, if denominator earnings increase while price remains unchanged, the P/E ratio diminishes consistent with mathematical logic, e.g., ½ > ¼. Conceptually, price per earnings, P/E, estimates what an investor typically wishes to pay proportionately for the stock’s price. Dominion Resources presently purports a 22.9 P/E. xliv If true, a high P/E reveal stock prices increasing compared to earnings by investor valuations. Valuation. A. Sum of Parts. Several valuation metrics strongly support a BUY rating for Dominion Resources. The following sum of parts valuation—including, dividend discount model, 2017 price to sales projection estimates, and earnings valuation estimates—indicate undervaluation. For example, the dividend discount model purports an estimated 2017 valuation for Dominion of $93 despite prices within the $74-$76 range by Jan. 25, 2017. xlv Wells Fargo’s estimated valuation range between $77 and $80 strengthens this inference since Dominion presently staggers between $75-76, pinnacling at $76.99 on Dec. 29, 2016.xlvi Currently, Dominion’s 2015 projections for 2017 estimate price to sales at $78.27, excluding the presently unavailable 2016 reports. xlvii Similarly, 2017 sales projections estimate $13.3682 billion compared to $11.683 billion for actual 2015 sales. xlviii Additionally, earnings valuation estimates $82.15, with NASDAQ’s current conservative 12-month target price listed at $77. xlix Present trends suggest Dominion trading at a premium compared to its competitors, specifically, “15x” vis-à-vis the “10.5x industry average.” l Dominion’s stock presumably rose “13%” and yields “3.7%,” a stock which Hedge Fund Analyst Correspondent Jim Cramer apparently endorsed among his portfolio picks. li Growth prospects suggest virtually, “10% recovery since the election,” with a “3% premium to it both 50-day and 200-day moving averages by Jan. 4, 2017.” A moving average forecasts growth from the arithmetic average of most recent data periods. If true, these prospects plausibly suggest strong growth, assuming Dominion remains within moving average levels because stocks surpassing moving average levels typically portend bullishness. B. Dividend-Growth. Additionally, the earnings potential assumed in new growth projects reported plausibly support attractive dividend growth. lii For example, Dominion’s quarterly cash dividend presumably grew “by nearly 8.1% to $.70 per share,” in Dec. 2015. liii From these reports, Dominion estimates its dividend payout target between “70-75% of operating earnings,” projecting an “8% annual dividend growth rate from 2014 to 2020.” liv Moreover, Dominion reported a dividend yield of “3.77% on Oct. 21, 2016,” maintaining 3% minimum over five years, steadily distributed “every quarter since Nov. 2011.” lv Investopedia reportedly ranks Dominion among the top 3 dividend utilities stocks, strengthening the inference of competitive investment growth.lvi Ultimately, if accurate, Dominion’s steady dividend growth reflects its overall growth—solvency assumed in an ability to pay shareholders—strengthening the inference of buy. The projected growth potential implies progressive valuation increase with time, assuming this pattern continues. Accordingly, this prospective growth pattern comports with present trends, assuming political predictions attributed to a predominantly Republican Congress and incumbent Trump administration unifies conservative de-regulation. If so, Dominion likely benefits purportedly from the laissez faire environment of diminished energy regulations, possible tax-rate attenuation, and/or subsidized domestic energy initiatives incentivizing business. While the energy and utilities sectors stand to benefit at large from relaxed regulation, Dominion’s alleged competitive edge, again, positions it strategically for proportionate gains. Therefore, assuming the above, Dominion’s reputed record of outpacing rivals likely continues, and possibly broadens if its diversification strategy further mitigates losses perhaps otherwise incurred.
  • 9. 9 C. Rapid Revenue Reductions. Moreover, Dominion’s revenues reportedly shrank steadily from $13.06 Billion in June 2014 to $11.05 Billion by June 2016. Dominion’s assumed excess debt perhaps correlates with reduced revenue. lvii If anything, assuming the above, reduced revenue more strongly supports a buy consistent with general value investment principles, buying low to advantage potential upswing growth. Likewise, Dominion’s ability as a utilities monopoly to securitize practical services, discontinuing services of customers defaulting on monthly bills, presumably distinguishes it among “value investments.” lviii Management & Governance. A. Corporate Governance. Corporate governance refers to a regulatory system that balances company, stakeholder, and government interests. lix It assumes an agency relationship whereby one or multiple persons, including companies— agents—provide services on another’s behalf—principals. lx Here, principal beneficiaries entrust agents with a requisite fiduciary responsibility—relationship based on duty, loyalty, and obedience—trust in confidence—to act on their behalf. On Oct. 1, 2016, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Governance QuickScore assigned Dominion an overall Corporate Governance rating of 6. lxi According to ISS QuickScore, 6 falls just shy of high-corporate governance risks. lxii However, Dominion also respectively received “8”—high governance risks—for “Board” and “Shareholder Rights” subsets as an assumed arithmetic average factored into this rating. lxiii QuickScore Methodology presumably evaluates company “governance structure” through annual, “year-round,” data-driven inspections, incorporating nearly “200 factors,” to analyze risks, assigning weights based on the following:  “Input from ISS’ global governance experts;”  Perceived “impact of governance practices,”  “ISS voting policy” consistent with “prevailing” regional “governance standards.” lxiv Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning. The energy industry as inferred from high metrics appears competitive, presumably catalyzed by technological advances. Dominion appears to outpace its competitors and the overall industry as inferred from its financials including: 2016-17 BUSINESS RATIOS—DOMINION v. Energy Competitors. lxv 2016-17 BUSINESS RATIOS—DOMINION v. Electric Utilities Competitors. lxx Financial Ratios: Dominion American Electric Power DTE Energy Industry Average 12-month Dividend Yield 3.69% 3.63% 3.12% 3.25% Return on Equity, ROE 15.38% 15.38% 10.35% 9.78% EV/EBITDA 15.28 lxvi 15.71 lxvii 11.48 lxviii 12.35 lxix Market Capitalization $ 47.57 Billion $ 30.79 Billion $ 17.57 Billion $ 14.98 Billion Financial Ratios: Dominion National Grid Exelon Industry 12-month Dividend Yield 3.7% 4.7% 5.0% 3.59% Return on Equity, ROE 15.38% 16.07% 4.80% 8.93% EV/EBITDA 15.28 lxxi 10.10 lxxii 8.22 lxxiii 11.57 lxxiv Market Capitalization $ 47.3 B 43.92B 33.05B $6.75 B lxxv
  • 10. 10 The following SWOT summary itemizes Dominion’s comparable industry competitiveness: For Dominion’s industry competitiveness, please see p. 11, Figure 7, DOMINION—PORTER’S FIVE FORCES. Financial Analysis. A. Analyst Summary. Current projections depending on market conditions, might suggest declining growth for Dominion, possibly stemming from market cycle maturity. If true, the “bullish” analyst summary leaning toward “buy,” plausibly supports this inference because declines may suggest short-term upswing growth opportunity, if prices later climb. lxxvii The last shareholder exchange filed on 11/15/16 indicating “purchase,” may support this conclusion. lxxviii If so, shareholders plausibly perceive an opportunity for continued growth, presumably advantaging Dominion’s latest upswing growth consistent with overall political and economic trends. If true, de-regulation inferred from impending regime change may support this conclusion, assuming shareholders factored market perception into their investment decision. B. Competitive Comparables. Consider Dominion’s metrics versus its rivals. Recall our foregoing P/E discussion. Historically, Dominion boasts a P/E ratio greater than 20 over the past few years. If accurate, analysts’ buy indication might appear optimistic because value investing principles suggest buying low, and selling high to avoid risk of loss. Typically, a P/E ratio exceeding “17” may signal danger. lxxix But the energy industry average indicates a 19.8 P/E as of 12/16/16. Even so, Dominion’s P/E presumably ranks highest among its 10 competitors at 21.89. But this conclusion assumes P/E constitutes the primary valuation benchmark. Ultimately, valuation metrics accompanied by key shareholder behavior consistent with politicized psychological influence on present market trends correlate to buy, justifying “A- buy street rating.” lxxx After all, Dominion’s competitiveness evidenced in its # 1 return on equity, 15.38% ROE, demonstrates growth potential, which if true, plausibly reinforces a buy. To strengthen this conclusion, Dominion’s 3Q 2016 Net Income reportedly grew “21.54% faster than the average growth of its competitors.” lxxxi Assuming the pattern persists, Dominion’s growth potential suggests a buy given its opportunity for sizeable gains. Conversely, Dominion’s maturity, high-debts, and possible struggles increasing, “15% ROE faster than 15%, without borrowing funds or selling more shares,” might mitigate this inference. lxxxii However, Dominion’s purported “15.38%” ROE dominates the energy industry. Likewise, reported revenue losses reveal opportunities for significant long-term growth compared to competitors, advantaging potential upswing growth, perhaps further precipitated by politicized energy expansion initiatives. Additionally, Dominion’s attempts to differentiate with diversified derivatives, as abovementioned, reduces investment loss risks, plausibly enhancing competitiveness if upswing growth materializes. Dominion also purportedly boasts the highest market capitalization. While companies with high market capitalization may yield limited short-term returns, “they generally reward investors,” providing “consistent share value increases and dividend payments.” lxxxiii Additionally, Dominion’s alleged lower net income compared to the industry supports a buy consistent with value investment, with opportunities for growth if energy expansion accelerates. Dominion’s exhibited metrics support this conclusion. Consider the following financial ratios as additional evidence to Dominion’s buy- rating consistent with upswing growth assumed in continued competitiveness: Strengths.  Energy/Utilities Leader  Highly Diversified.  Pipeline Capacity.  Customer Expansion.  Sustained Growth. Weaknesses.  Excess Debt.  Governance Issues.  Mature Company.  High P/E Ratios.  Analyst Optimism. Opportunities.  U.S. Regime-change.  Nuclear /Solar-Wind Power.  Globalization.  Climate Change.  Technological Innovations Threats.  Environmental Policies.  Global Competitors.  Volatile Sector. lxxvi  Weather Sensitivity.  Force Majeure: (Terrorism, natural disaster, etc.).
  • 11. 11 2016 -17 BUSINESS METRICS—DOMINION V. ENERGY PEERS. lxxxiv 2016-17 BUSINESS METRICS—DOMINION v. INDUSTRY PEERS. lxxxv C. Revenues. According to Business 2016-17 Metrics, Dominion’s 5-year revenue Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) referenced 5.1% decline—almost inversely proportionate with the industry, which revealed 5.6% gains. FY 2012 serves as a benchmark year elucidating Dominion’s alarming revenue decline after abandoning the unregulated market for both electric and natural gas services. As FY 2015 concluded, Dominion’s unregulated electric revenue presumably plummeted 45.73% compared to 2012. Total revenues reportedly declined every year since 2010, ostensibly at an average rate of 5%. If accurate, these progressive, annual declines reported plausibly correlate with Dominion’s excess debts, perhaps reflected in a “large capital investment plan,” and “high consolidated leverage.” lxxxvi See below, Figure 5. But Fitch also projects “consolidated leverage improvement,” over the next several years. lxxxvii If true, that assertion assumes debt-reduction in a more balanced capital structure, which assuming so, implies growth potential, strengthening the buy-rating inference. Political trends comport with this conclusion. Furthermore, Questar’s regulated gas operations purportedly comprise 35% of Dominion’s EBITDA, strengthening a buy-rating inferred from operation expansion if Dominion allegedly acquires Questar.lxxxix If accurate, however, attempts to strategically diversify long-term investment risks with excess debts securitized via self-regulated operation expansion and acquisition reasonably support Dominion’s revenue loss. But loss may avail upswing cyclical growth consistent with value investment principles. If true, the evidence strengthens a buy-rating because investors may buy Dominion low now and advantage subsequent exponential growth, assuming it remunerates its debts. D. Sales Growth Dominion Virginia Power’s infrastructural investment, if successful, support substantial growth. Capital expenditures serve to subsidize underground program plans for electricity distribution in locations where Dominion operations. These plans include a Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) of $113 million to 4,000 miles in underground tap lines. xc If successfully administered, perhaps further precipitated by plausible political support, total electrical distribution may yield Growth CAPEX of the following from 2016-2020:  Dominion Virginia Power: $6.1 Billion;  Dominion Generation: $ 4.1 Billion;  Dominion Energy: $ 5.5 Billion;  Total Dominion Capex: $15.7 Billion. xci Financial Ratios: Dominion Nextera Energy Southern Company Industry Average 12-month Dividend Yield 3.71% 2.92% 4.56% 3.59% Return on Equity, ROE 15.38% 15.38% 10.35% 9.78% Market Capitalization $47.57 billion $57.06 billion 47.75 billion $6.75 Billion Financials Dominion National Grid, PLC Exelon Industry Average Net Income $2.023 Billion $2.048 Billion $1.240 Billion $3.484 Billion 5-Yr Rev CAGR -5.1% +1.1% +9.6% +5.6% Market Capitalization $ 47.57 Billion $46.009 Billion $45.046 Billion $12.71 Billion. Figure 6 – Key Financial Ratios and Statistics. lxxxviii Profitability 2015 Leverage 2015 Net Inc/Common Equity 0.28 Total Liability/Total Assets 0.78 Net Inc/Total Assets 0.03 Curr Debt/Equity 0.45 Net Inc/Inv Cap 0.04 Total Debt/Equity 2.31
  • 12. 12 E. Cash Flow Cash flow from investment activities report losses since 2015, with losses expected continue, assumed in capital expenditure investment. Nevertheless, financing activities reveal steady growth since 2012. For additional information, see Appendix, Figure 10—Cash Flows, p. 14. Investment Risks. A. Financial Risk—High Debt. Dominion’s purported high-leverage appears troubling. xcii High leverage assumes an unbalanced capital structure, specifically, disproportionate debt investment compared to equity—high debt/equity ratio. High- leverage means the company takes on higher debt expense compared to equity in financing operations. Generally, high-leverage implies high-default risk. xciii Assuming this conclusion, if Dominion’s debt exceeds its cash flows, the company may become unviable, specifically, insolvent, if unable to repay creditors. Additionally, Dominion’s record reveals a BBB Moody’s rating. xciv BBB satisfies the minimum threshold for investment grade bonds. xcv If accurate, Dominion’s BBB rating indicates high-risk, possibly suggesting a suboptimal investment compared to competitors. Furthermore, “rising bond yields,” assuming the pattern continues, might pose “negative implications for electric companies,” like Dominion because potentially “higher borrowing costs,” suggest more debt. xcvi Again, more debt, if applicable to Dominion as an electric company, typically exacerbates default risk— possible struggles repaying creditors—assuming money owed exceeds cash flows. Default evinced in non- payment generally implies surmounting debt—failure to repay because money owed exceeds cash inflow— assuming no fraudulent motive. Risk means the company’s vulnerability to certain threats, which if unaddressed, may jeopardize its continued viability. Higher risk may aggravate volatility. If true, elevated default potential assumed in higher debt may offset a regarded leading energy company’s high valuation. Accordingly, these factors may collectively strengthen the conclusion of volatility evidenced in Dominion’s historical record, namely, unpredictable fluctuations from underweight to marketweight or higher. Nevertheless, Market Realist lists Dominion among utility stocks evincing “low implied volatility,” namely, a year-to-date return (YTD) allegedly of “8.2%.” xcvii Implied volatility estimates a security’s price volatility. xcviii If accurate, Dominion’s estimated low implied volatility suggests lower risk—less susceptibility to price fluctuation—which, assuming this conclusion, supports increased valuation over time. Therefore, stable prices plausibly assumed in low price volatility may signal investors to infer a higher price for Dominion in the future. Hence, the decision to buy now appears ripe in exploiting these benefits. B. Legal Risks—Corporate Governance. Dominion’s above corporate governance numbers, if true, prove troubling because they suggest possible conflict of interest fiduciary violations. Why? Officers maintain a requisite fiduciary responsibility to company shareholders, entrusted with advancing their vested interest in the corporation. Fiduciary violations result when a company acts adversely—contrary to its shareholders’ obligations—by corporate waste and/or conflicts of interests—advantaging at the shareholders’ detriment. This same fiduciary relationship of trust also applies to agent officers toward the principal corporation. Therefore, even if Dominion allegedly acts adversely to its legal, financial responsibility, the company’s alleged liability risks brand damage. If accurate, assuming this conclusion, even alleged liability risks discrediting Dominion, possibly denigrating its reputation, and by greater extension, viability compared to industry competitors. Ultimately, Dominion’s alleged failure appointing an “independent environmental expert,” for its board under SEC Rules 14a-8(i)(3) plausibly substantiates QuickScore’s ratings of high corporate governance risks. xcix Assuming these considerations, Dominion’s price may diminish, which if so, possibly justifies a lower valuation than prevailing projections. Advocating a price on these influences presently appears too speculative to sufficiently correlate. Indeed, financial analysts reportedly “ranked Dominion # 1 among Fortune’s 2015 ‘Most Admired’ electric and gas utilities,” vis-à-vis asset investment, operation, and/or allocation. c If true, Dominion’s assumed respectable reputation weakens the inference of reported corporate governance issues correlating with diminished valuation. If true, these factors support a plausible buy, affording a potential opportunity to possibly capitalize a low price from presumably diminished value. But time may tell.
  • 13. 13 T h r e a t o f N e w E n t r a n t s APPENDIX. Figure 7—DOMINION: PORTER’S FIVE FORCES. ci Porter’s 5 Forces  Local power source limitations.  Limited individual price influence.  Consumer Size. Threat of Rivalry – Low. Threat of Entrants – High. Threat of Substitutes – Low but Growing. Buyer Bargaining Power – Low. Supplier Bargaining Power – High.  Impractical to self-create energy source.  Finite energy resources.  Commoditization.  Solar/ wind power generation imminent.  Geographic Limits (e.g. contract).  Large competitors.  Large Set-up Costs.  Passing Regulations.  Solar Energy (Sunrun & Tesla in suburbs). Oil, coal, & other resource risks. Larger company implies larger order size. Future suggests solar, wind, & other renewable resource capability.
  • 14. 14 Figure 8: Income Statement $ in millions DOMINION RESOURCES INC (D) INCOME STATEMENT Fiscal year ends in December. USD in millions except per share data.2011-12 2012-12 2013-12 2014-12 2015-12 TTM Revenue 14379 13093 13120 12436 11683 11207 Cost of revenue 6412 5312 5574 5116 3606 2871 Gross profit 7967 7781 7546 7320 8077 8336 Operating expenses Operation and maintenance 3483 4868 2459 2765 2595 2853 Depreciation and amortization 1069 1186 1208 1292 1395 1470 Other operating expenses 554 571 563 542 551 567 Total operating expenses 5106 6625 4230 4599 4541 4890 Operating income 2861 1156 3316 2721 3536 3446 Interest Expense 869 882 877 1193 904 945 Other income (expense) 179 223 265 250 196 258 Income before income taxes 2171 497 2704 1778 2828 2759 Provision for income taxes 745 146 892 452 905 672 Net income from continuing operations 1426 351 1812 1326 1923 2087 Net income from discontinuing ops -22 -92 Other -18 -27 -23 -16 -24 -64 Net income 1408 302 1697 1310 1899 2023 Net income available to common shareholders1408 302 1697 1310 1899 2023 Earnings per share Basic 2.46 0.53 2.93 2.25 3.21 3.32 Diluted 2.45 0.53 2.93 2.24 3.2 3.31 Weighted average shares outstanding Basic 573 573 579 583 592 609 Diluted 575 574 580 584 594 610 EBITDA 4328 2822 4971 4531 5401 5448 *Morningstar Financials. cii
  • 15. 15 Figure 9: Balance Sheet $ in millions DOMINION RESOURCES INC (D) BALANCE SHEET Fiscal year ends in December. USD in millions except per share data.2011-12 2012-12 2013-12 2014-12 2015-12 Assets Current assets Cash Cash and cash equivalents 102 248 936 605 623 Total cash 102 248 936 605 623 Receivables 2035 1717 1836 1633 1369 Inventories 1348 1259 1176 1410 1348 Prepaid expenses 262 326 192 167 198 Other current assets 1683 1590 1800 1800 653 Total current assets 5430 5140 5940 5615 4191 Non-current assets Property, plant and equipment Gross property, plant and equipment 42990 44321 46969 51406 57776 Accumulated Depreciation -13320 -13548 -14341 -15136 -16222 Net property, plant and equipment 29670 30773 32628 36270 41554 Equity and other investments 3844 3888 5102 5561 5774 Goodwill 3141 3130 3086 3044 3294 Intangible assets 637 536 560 570 570 Prepaid pension costs 681 702 942 956 943 Regulatory assets 1382 1717 1228 1642 1865 Other long-term assets 829 952 610 669 606 Total non-current assets 40184 41698 44156 48712 54606 Total assets 45614 46838 50096 54327 58797 Liabilities and stockholders' equity Liabilities Current liabilities Short-term debt 3293 4635 3446 4150 5335 Accounts payable 1250 1137 1168 952 726 Accrued liabilities 678 636 609 566 515 Other current liabilities 1741 1355 1771 1530 1544 Total current liabilities 6962 7763 6994 7198 8120 Non-current liabilities Long-term debt 17394 16851 19330 21805 23616 Deferred taxes liabilities 5216 5800 7114 7444 7414 Pensions and other benefits 962 1831 481 1296 1199 Regulatory liabilities 1324 1514 2001 1991 2285 Minority interest 57 57 402 938 Other long-term liabilities 2253 2454 2534 2636 2561 Total non-current liabilities 27206 28507 31460 35574 38013 Total liabilities 34168 36270 38454 42772 46133 stockholders' equity Additional paid-in capital 5359 5655 5783 5876 6680 Retained earnings 6697 5790 6183 6095 6458 Accumulated other comprehensive income -610 -877 -324 -416 -474 Total stockholders' equity 11446 10568 11642 11555 12664 Total liabilities and stockholders' equity 45614 46838 50096 54327 58797 *Morningstar Financials.ciii
  • 16. 16 Figure 1-: Statement of Cash Flows $ in millions DOMINION RESOURCES INC (D) Statement of CASH FLOW Fiscal year ends in December. USD in millions except per share data.2011-12 2012-12 2013-12 2014-12 2015-12 TTM Cash Flows From Operating Activities Net income 1426 329 1720 1326 1923 2087 Depreciation & amortization 1288 1443 1390 1560 1669 1744 Investment/asset impairment charges 283 2089 48 Deferred income taxes 756 246 737 449 854 632 Accounts receivable 365 292 -98 131 294 84 Inventory -185 33 -29 -43 -26 -33 Prepaid expenses -19 -85 123 24 -25 1 Accounts payable -413 -61 50 -202 -199 -66 Accrued liabilities -216 -12 -27 -41 -52 166 Interest payable -12 -27 Other working capital -98 271 -198 -211 103 -137 Other non-cash items -204 -396 -256 446 -66 -70 Net cash provided by operating activities 2983 4137 3433 3439 4475 4408 Cash Flows From Investing Activities Investments in property, plant, and equipment -3652 -4145 -4104 -5345 -5575 -6479 Property, plant, and equipment reductions 60 79 9 Acquisitions, net 625 272 -497 -4372 Purchases of investments -1828 -1392 -1493 -1447 -1744 -1631 Sales/Maturities of investments 1757 1356 1476 1235 1340 1412 Other investing activities 402 341 38 44 -106 -121 Net cash used for investing activities -3321 -3840 -3458 -5181 -6503 -11182 Cash Flows From Financing Activities Debt issued 2320 1500 4535 6485 3562 8230 Debt repayment -637 -1675 -1903 -4393 -1292 -2386 Common stock issued 38 265 278 205 786 2148 Redemption of preferred stock -259 Repurchases of treasury stock -601 Cash dividends paid -1146 -1225 -1319 -1409 -1536 -1673 Other financing activities 404 984 -1498 1115 797 468 Net cash provided by (used for) financing activities 378 -151 93 1744 2317 6787 Net change in cash 40 146 68 2 289 13 Cash at beginning of period 62 102 248 316 318 238 Cash at end of period 102 248 316 318 607 251 Free Cash Flow Operating cash flow 2983 4137 3433 3439 4475 4408 Capital expenditure -3652 -4145 -4104 -5345 -5575 -6479 Free cash flow -669 -8 -671 -1906 -1100 -2071 Supplemental schedule of cash flow data Cash paid for income taxes -58 56 72 75 Cash paid for interest 913 852 889 843 *Morningstar Financials. civ
  • 17. 17 BIBLIOGRAPHY CITATIONS. i See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources Inc., Stock Report, NASDAQ Report, © 2016 EDGAR®, Dec. 30, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/stock-report. ii See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources Inc., Stock Report, NASDAQ Report, © 2016 EDGAR®, Dec. 30, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/stock-report. iii See Google Finance, Dominion Resources, Google © 2017, Jan. 20, 2017, https://www.google.com/finance?cid=10020 (includes: 52 Week Price Range, Average Daily Volume, After 30 days, Beta, Shares outstanding, Market Capitalization, Dividend-Yield, and Institutional Holdings); See Financial Times, Dominion Resources, © The Financial Times, LTD, Jan. 21, 2017, https://markets.ft.com/data/equities/tearsheet/financials?s=D:NYQ (includes Earnings Per Share, Payout Ratio, Dividend Growth Rate, 5-Year, and Current Ratio); See GuruFocus, Dominion Resources, © 2004-2017, GuruFocus.com, LLC, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/wacc/D/Weighted%2BAverage%2BCost%2BOf%2BCapital%2B%2528WACC %2529/Dominion%2BResources%2BInc (includes Weighted Average Cost of Capital, Book Value, and Return on Equity). iv See Dominion, History, © 2016, p. 1, https://www.dom.com/corporate/about-us/history. v See Mergent Online; also see Business Data Codes, NAIC 221121 Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control, https://businessdatacodes.com/naics/code-221121-electric-bulk-power-transmission-and-control. vi See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc. Jan. 25, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D/profile?p=D. vii See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Holders, Yahoo! Finance, Inc., Oct. 25, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D/holders?p=D. viii See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources Inc., Stock Report, NASDAQ Report, © 2016 EDGAR®, Dec. 30, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/stock-report. ix See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Holders, Yahoo! Finance, Inc., Oct. 25, 2016, p. 2-3, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D/holders?p=D. x See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc. Oct. 19, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D?p=D. xi See Quinn, Peter D., CFA, Dominion Resources, Inc.—D:‘D is for Downgrade as More Capital is Committed to Chase Elusive EPS growth, Summary Profile, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Feb. 8, 2016, p. 1. xii See Investopedia, Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), © 2016, Investopedia LLC, p. 1, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalexpenditure.asp. xiii Investopedia, Underweight, © 2016, Investopedia LLC, p. 1, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underweight.asp. xiv See Quinn, Peter D., CFA, Dominion Resources, Inc.—D: Raising Relative Value Ratings on Dominion Resources, Summary Profile, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, April 7, 2016, p. 1. xv See Quinn, Peter D., CFA, Dominion Resources, Inc.—D:‘D is for Downgrade as More Capital is Committed to Chase Elusive EPS growth, Summary Profile, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Feb. 8, 2016, p. 11. xvi Id. at p. 11. xvii See Insidercow.com, Dominion (D), Insider Transactions—Profit from Insider Trading, visited on Jan. 1, 2017, p. 1, http://insidercow.com/. xviii See Dominion Inc., Dominion Virginia Power Makes Significant Progress, Restores 70% of Customers Impacted by Hurricane Matthew, Dominion Media Inc., Corporate News Release, Oct. 10, 2016, p. 1, https://www.dom.com/corporate/news/news-releases/137179. xix See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc. Oct. 24, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D?p=D. xx See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc. Oct. 24, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D?p=D. xxi See Gandel, Steven, Stock Markets Are Starting to Freak Out about a Donald Trump Victory, Fortune Magazine, Finance, Election 2016, © 2017 Time, Inc., p. 1, http://fortune.com/2016/11/08/dow-futures-mexican- peso-election-trump-clinton/.
  • 18. 18 xxii See Washington Business Journal, Year in Review 2016: Trump election catches D.C. by surprise, Dec 29, 2016, 5:00am EST, © 2017 Business Journals, p. 1, http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2016/12/29/year- in-review-2016-trump-election-catches-d-c-by.html. xxiii See Philips, Matthew, Clean Power is Too Hot for Even Trump to Cool—‘Fears of a Negative Impact of Trump are Really Overblown,’ MarketWatch, Nov. 16, 2016, BloombergBusinessweek, © 2017 Bloomberg, LP, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-17/clean-power-is-too-hot-for-even-trump-to-cool. xxiv See UST BAC ISO, Bank of America, U.S. Trust, Investment Strategy Overview—A Bridge to the Other Side, October 2016, p.1; See Philips, Matthew, Clean Power is Too Hot for Even Trump to Cool—‘Fears of a Negative Impact of Trump are Really Overblown,’ MarketWatch, Nov. 16, 2016, BloombergBusinessweek, © 2017 Bloomberg, LP, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-17/clean-power-is-too-hot-for-even-trump-to- cool. xxv See Yahoo! Finance, Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc., Nov. 14, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D?p=D#eyJtdWx0aUNvbG9yTGluZSI6ZmFsc2UsImJvbGxpbmdlclVwcGVyQ 29sb3IiOiIjZTIwMDgxIiwiYm9sbGluZ2VyTG93ZXJDb2xvciI6IiM5NTUyZmYiLCJtZmlMaW5lQ29sb3IiOiIj NDVlM2ZmIiwibWFjZERpdmVyZ2VuY2VDb2xvciI6IiNmZjdiMTIiLCJtYWNkTWFjZENvbG9yIjoiIzc4N2Q 4MiIsIm1hY2RTaWduYWxDb2xvciI6IiMwMDAwMDAiLCJyc2lMaW5lQ29sb3IiOiIjZmZiNzAwIiwic3RvY2 hLTGluZUNvbG9yIjoiI2ZmYjcwMCIsInN0b2NoRExpbmVDb2xvciI6IiM0NWUzZmYiLCJyYW5nZSI6Im1he CIsImFsbG93Q2hhcnRTdGFja2luZyI6dHJ1ZX0%3D. xxvi See Druskoff, Mark, Watt, Chad, Oil and Gas Industry Buoyed by Trump Election, Forbes Business, Nov. 11, 2016, p. 1, http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2016/11/11/oil-and-gas-industry-buoyed-by-trump- election/#5f1cc6146d00. xxvii See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc., Dec. 30, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D?p=D. xxviii See Wall Street Journal, Dow Surpasses 20,000, Jan. 25, 2017, http://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/markets- real-time-stocks-bonds-commodities-currencies-01-23; See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)— Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc., Jan. 25, 2017, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D?p=D. xxix See Kohl, Keith, The Bakken Sees an Increase in Natural Gas Production—Is Flaring the Only Solution?, Nov. 20, 2015, Energy and Capital, p. 1, http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/the-bakken-sees-an-increase- in-natural-gas-production/5215; See Bakken News, Bakken Shale, Ked Interests, LLC © 2009-2017, p. 1-2; See Moffett, Michael, H., Inkpen, Andrew, Delta Airlines and the Trainer Refinery, ThunderBird School of Global Management, Scholarly Journal, 2012, p. 13. xxx The Bakken Oil Blog, The Million Dollar Way—Another Bakken Refinery?, Dec. 13, 2016, p. 2, http://themilliondollarway.blogspot.com/2016/12/another-bakken-refinery-brent.html. xxxi Nemec, Richard, XTO Proves Unconventional Growth Machine for Exxon Mobile, Pipeline & Gas Journal, Mar. 2015, Vol. 242, No.3, p. 1, https://pgjonline.com/2015/03/16/xto-proves-unconventional-growth-machine- for-exxonmobil/. xxxii See Baker, Peter, Davenport, Coral, Trump Revives Keystone Pipeline Rejected by Obama, New York Times, Politics, Jan. 24, 2017, p. 3, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/keystone-dakota-pipeline- trump.html. xxxiii See Torry, Harriet, Fed Raises Rates for First Time in 2016, Anticipates 3 Increases in 2017, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 15, 2016, 12:51 A.M., Wall Street Journal, © 2017 Dow Jones & Company, p. 1, http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-raises-rates-for-first-time-in-2016-anticipates-3-increases-in-2017-1481742086. xxxiv See W. David Ellrich, CPA/ABV, ASA, CFE, CVA, CFF, Karyl H Neal, CPA/PFS, Utility Bulls, Moore, Ellrich, & Neal, P.A., Certified Public Accountants, 2017, p. 1, http://mencpa.com/utility-bulls/. xxxv See Winning Investing.com, Rising Interests: Good or Bad for Dividend Stocks, Winning Investing, May 15, 2015, p. 2, http://www.winninginvesting.com/interest_rates.htm. xxxvi http://seekingalpha.com/article/3749866-bullish-case-dominion-resources xxxvii See McNabb, David E., Public Utilities: Management Challenge for the 21st Century, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, © David E. Mc Nabb, 2005, p. 134. xxxviii See W. David Ellrich, CPA/ABV, ASA, CFE, CVA, CFF, Karyl H Neal, CPA/PFS, Utility Bulls, Moore, Ellrich, & Neal, P.A., Certified Public Accountants, 2017, p. 1, http://mencpa.com/utility-bulls/; See Seeking
  • 19. 19 Alpha, A Bullish Case for Dominion Resources, Dec. 11, 2015, © 2017 Seeking Alpha, p. 3, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3749866-bullish-case-dominion-resources. xxxix See Dominion, Company Profile, Dominion Resources, Inc., © 2016, p. 1, https://www.dom.com/corporate/about-us/company-profile. xl See Durbin, Neil, J., Oliver, Tracy A., Dominion East Ohio Helps Customers Stay Warm This Winter, Dominion, Inc., News Releases, Oct. 18, 2016, p. 3, https://www.dom.com/residential/dominion- hope/news/news-releases/137183; See Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) Channel, D Description—Dominion Resources, Inc., ETF Channel, © 2009—2016, https://www.etfchannel.com/symbol/d/. xli See Dominion, Questar, Dominion-Questar Combination Receives Wyoming Public Service Commission Approval; Companies Expect to Close on Merger September 16, Acquire Media, Sept. 14, 2016, p. 1, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/STR/3086162729x0x908243/aa9f39f2-36be-4cca-b6d6- 839a8de74f1c/STR_News_2016_9_14_General.pdf. xlii See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc. Oct. 19, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D/profile?p=D; See J3sg, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Main View, Ticker Lookup, Company Profile, p. 1, Oct. 19, 2016, http://j3sg.com/Reports/Stock- Insider/Generate.php?DV=yes&tickerLookUp=D&Submit232=GO#. xliii See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources, Inc. Stock Research Analyst Summary, Zacks Investment Research, NASDAQ, Dec. 9, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/analyst-research. xliv See MarketWatch, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D), Jan. 25, 2016, © 2017 MarketWatch, p. 1, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/d. xlv See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24, 2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/. xlvi See Wells Fargo, Dominion Resources—Equity Research, © 2017 Wells Fargo, Securities, LLC, Jan. 13, 2017, p. 1, file:///C:/Users/Michael/AppData/Local/Temp/dominion%20resources%20research%20WF%20%2013jan17- 1.pdf. xlvii See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24, 2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/. xlviii See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24, 2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/. xlix See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24, 2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/; See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources, Inc. Stock Research Analyst Summary, Zacks Investment Research, NASDAQ, Dec. 9, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/analyst-research. l See Kruger, Vincent, Dominion Resources: Analyzing Stock and Growth Prospects in 2017, Part I of V, Jan. 5, 2017, Market Realist, p. 3-4, http://marketrealist.com/2017/01/chart-indicators-short-interest-dominion- hint/?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=feed&yptr=yahoo. li See Rutt, Scott, Seems Like This Bull Can Take Any Hit: Cramer’s ‘Mad Money’ Recap (Wednesday 1/4/17), TheStreet, Jan. 4, 2017, © 1996-2017 TheStreet, Inc., p. 4, https://www.thestreet.com/story/13942716/1/seems- like-this-bull-can-take-any-hit-cramer-s-mad-money-recap-wednesday-1-4-17.html. lii Seeking Alpha, Why Should Dominion Resources Be the Pick on Further Weakness?, Oct. 10, 2016, © 2017 Seeking Alpha, p. 1, http://seekingalpha.com/article/4011126-dominion-resources-pick-weakness. liii See Zacks Investment Research, Zacks Equity Research Report for D—Dominion Resources, Inc., Jan. 18, 2017, © 2017 Zacks Investment Research, p. 3, https://www.zacks.com/zer/report/D?t=D&ticker=D. liv See Id.at 3. lv See Id.at 3. lvi See Edwards, John, The Three Best Dividends Stocks in the Utility Sector, (DUK, FE), Oct. 28, 2015, © 2017, Investopedia, LLC, p. 3, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/102815/3-best-dividend-stocks-utility- sector.asp. lvii See Market Mad House, Dominion Resources are Utilities Still a Value Investment, Oct. 22, 2016, © 2017 Market Mad House, p. 4, http://marketmadhouse.com/dominion-resources-utilities-still-value-investment/. lviii See Id. at 2.
  • 20. 20 lix See Carver, John, Carver, Miram, Basic Principles of Policy Governance, The Carver Guide Series on Effective Board Governance, No. 1, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996, p. 1; See Investopedia, LLC, Corporate Governance, 2016, p. 1, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporategovernance.asp. lx See Besley & Brigham, Essentials of Managerial Finance, 14th Edition, Thomson South-Western, 2008, 2005, p 17. lxi See Yahoo! Finance, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Summary, Yahoo! Finance, Inc. Oct. 19, 2016, p. 1, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/D/profile?p=D. lxii See Id. at 1; see also Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), ISS Governance QuickScore—Methodology, © 2016, p.1, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/quickscore/#. lxiii See Id. at p.1; see also Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), ISS Governance QuickScore— Methodology, © 2016, p.1, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/quickscore/#. lxiv See Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), ISS Governance QuickScore—Methodology, © 2016, p.1, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/iss-analytics/quickscore/#. lxv See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24, 2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/. lxvi See Guru Focus, Dominion Resources, Inc. EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/NYSE:D/EVEBITDA/Dominion-Resources- Inc. lxvii See Guru Focus, American Electric Company Power, Inc. (AEP) EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/NYSE:AEP/EVEBITDA/American-Electric-Power-Co-Inc. lxviii See Guru Focus, DTE Energy, Co. EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/NYSE:DTE/EVEBITDA/DTE-Energy-Co. lxix See New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business, Enterprise Value Multiples by Sector, Jan. 2017, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/vebitda.html. lxx See Zacks Investment Research, Utility Electric Power, © 2017 Zacks Investment Research, p. 1-2, https://www.zacks.com/stocks/industry-rank/industry/utility-electric-power-193; See Zacks Investment Research, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D), Jan. 25, 2017, p.1-2, https://www.zacks.com/stock/quote/D?q=D (except numbers individually cited in chart by the immediately following endnote). lxxi See Guru Focus, Dominion Resources, Inc. EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/NYSE:D/EVEBITDA/Dominion-Resources- Inc. lxxii See Guru Focus, National Grid, PLC., EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/OTCPK:NGGTF/EV%252FEBITDA/National%2BGrid%2BPLC. lxxiii See Guru Focus, Exelon, Corp (EXC), EV/EBITDA (As of Today), Jan. 25, 2017, © 2004-2017, Guru Focus.com, LLC, p. 1, http://www.gurufocus.com/term/ev2ebitda/EXC/EV%252FEBITDA/Exelon%2BCorp. lxxiv See New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business, Enterprise Value Multiples by Sector, Jan. 2017, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/vebitda.html. lxxv See Zacks Investment Research, Zacks Equity Research Report for D—Dominion Resources, Inc., Jan. 18, 2017, © 2017 Zacks Investment Research, p. 6, https://www.zacks.com/zer/report/D?t=D&ticker=D. lxxvi Davis, Mark, The 8 Most Volatile Sectors, July 6, 2012, © 2017 Investopedia, LLC, http://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0712/the-8-most-volatile-sectors.aspx. lxxvii See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources, Inc. Stock Research Analyst Summary, Zacks Investment Research, NASDAQ, Dec. 9, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/analyst-research. lxxviii See Insidercow.com, Dominion (D), Insider Transactions—Profit from Insider Trading, visited on Jan. 1, 2017, p. 1, http://insidercow.com/. lxxix See Richard Koch, “The 80/20 Principle: The Secret to Achieving More With Less,” 2008, Crown Business, a division of Random House, p. 213. lxxx See TheStreet, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D), © 1996-2017 TheStreet, Inc., Jan. 25, 2017, p. 1, https://www.thestreet.com/quote/D.html. lxxxi CSI Market, Inc., D Sales vs. Its Competitors Q 3, Jan. 25, 2017 © 2017 CSI Market, Inc., p. 1-2, http://csimarket.com/stocks/compet_glance.php?code=D.
  • 21. 21 lxxxii See McClure, Ben, How Return on Equity Can Help You Find Profitable Stocks, Aug. 11, 2014, 6.M., E.T., © Investopedia, LLC, p. 4, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental/03/100103.asp?lgl=bt1tn-no-widget. lxxxiii Investopedia, Market Capitalization, © 2017, Investopedia, LLC, p. 1-2, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp. lxxxiv See Bloomberg, L.P., Natural Gas (NA) Regulated Integrated Utilities Value, Analyst Curated (BI), Jan. 24, 2017, © 2017 Bloomberg Finance L.P., https://www.bloomberg.com/. lxxxv See Morningstar, Dominion Resources, Inc. (D)—Valuation Multiples Top Competitors & Peers, © 2017 Morningstar, Inc., Jan. 25, 2017, p. 1-3, http://financials.morningstar.com/competitors/industry-peer.action?t=D. lxxxvi See FitchRatings, Fitch Upgrade Dominion Resources’ Remarketed Junior Sub Notes Rating to ‘BBB,’” May 18, 2016, p. 3-4, https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/1004719. lxxxvii See Id. at 4. lxxxviii See NASDAQ, Dominion Resources Inc., Stock Report, NASDAQ Report, © 2016 EDGAR®, Dec. 30, 2016, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/d/stock-report. lxxxix See Dominion Resources, Inc., Investor Relations Reference Book—Dominion and Question to Combine, Questar Corporation Overview, Dominion Resources, May 2016, p. 99, 103-104, file:///C:/Users/Michael/AppData/Local/Temp/Investor%20Relations%20Reference%20Book- May%202016%20(FINAL)%20(1).pdf. xc Bacque, Peter, Dominion Virginia Power Launching $2 Billion to Underground Outage-Prone Power Lines, Richmond Times-Dispatch, © 2017 BH Media Group, Inc., Blox Content Management System, TownNews.com, p. 1-2, http://www.richmond.com/business/local/article_008d25a4-a78c-5811-a336-e76554f8f494.html. xci See Dominion Resources, Inc., Investor Relations Reference Book—Dominion and Question to Combine, Questar Corporation Overview, Dominion Resources, May 2016, p. 18-21, file:///C:/Users/Michael/AppData/Local/Temp/Investor%20Relations%20Reference%20Book- May%202016%20(FINAL)%20(1).pdf. xcii See Quinn, Peter D., CFA, Dominion Resources, Inc.—D: Raising Relative Value Ratings on Dominion Resources, Summary Profile, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, April 7, 2016, p. 7. xciii See Westerfield, Ross, Jordan, Jaffe, Corporate Finance 11th Edition, McGraw Hill Education, 2016, p. 406. xciv See Quinn, Peter D., CFA, Dominion Resources, Inc.—D:‘D is for Downgrade as More Capital is Committed to Chase Elusive EPS growth, Summary Profile, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Feb. 8, 2016, p. 9. xcv See Madura, Jeff, Financial Markets and Institutions, 11th Edition, © 2015, 2012, Cengage Learning, p. 50. xcvi See Chin, Brian, Allan, Stuart A. , Dominion Resources—Cove Point LNG Field Trip Notes, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Mar. 20 2016, p. 2; see Seabury, Chris, How Interest Rates Affect The U.S. Markets, Mar. 17, 2016, © 2016, Investopedia LLC, p. 1, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/stocks/09/how-interest- rates-affect-markets.asp xcvii Scott, Robert, Returns of Utility Stocks with High and Low Implied Volatility, Market Realist, Oct. 20, 2016, 9:58 A.M. EDT, p. 2, http://marketrealist.com/2016/10/returns-utility-stocks-high-low-implied-volatility- 12/?utm_source=market-watch- headline&utm_medium=feed&utm_content=main_permalink&utm_campaign=returns-utility-stocks-high-low- implied-volatility-12. xcviii See Investopedia, Implied Volatility - IV, © 2016, Investopedia LLC, p. 1, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/iv.asp. xcix U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Submittal Letter for Joyce Loving, Feb. 11, 2016, p. 1-2, Dec. 29, 2015, p. 3-4, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2016/joyceloving021116-14a8.pdf. c Farrell, Thomas, F., II, Dominion CEO Letter to Investors—2015 Summary Annual Report, 2015, p.9, https://www.dom.com/library/domcom/pdfs/investors/annual-reports/dom-annual-2015/ceo-letter.pdf?la=en ci See Su, Yifeng, Kauffman, Graham, McVey, Scott, Li, Tianning, Porter’s five forces analysis, Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business, PowerPoint, 2014, Slide 10, https://fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/9163/SP14%20-%20Utilities%20Sector%20Presentation.pdf. cii See Morningstar financials for Income Statement, Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement, http://financials.morningstar.com/income-statement/is.html?t=D&region=USA&culture=en_US. ciii See Id. civ See Id.