The document provides summaries of several Supreme Court cases related to civil liberties and equal protection under the 14th Amendment. It summarizes the facts, issues, holdings, reasoning, decisions, dissents, and significance of cases including Lochner v. New York, U.S. v. Carolene Products, Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Lawrence v. Texas, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Brown v. Board of Education. The summaries concisely outline the essential details and outcomes of the landmark cases.

1. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
Second Set of Case Briefs
Lochner v. NY, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
FACTS: NY passed a bill that prevented bakers from having their employees work ten hours a
day or sixty hours a week.
ISSUES: Is the NY statute, which restricts hours of bakers, constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment “right to contract” under the due process clause?
HELD: No, 5-4
REASONING: J. Peckham: The states have authority to pass laws that they feel will achieve the
goals of responsibility, state interest, health, safety, well-being, and morals but there is no
reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of a person or the right of free contract. There
is no basis to believe that bakers are not equal in intelligence or capacity to men in other
occupation or trades. Bakers are able to assert their rights and care for themselves without
intervention by the state. The limit of police powers by the legislator has been reached and
passed in this case.
“We do not believe in the soundness of the views which uphold this law. [The] act is not, within
any fair meaning of individuals, both employers and employés, to make contracts regarding labor
upon such terms as they may think best, or which they may agree upon with the other parties to
such contracts” (Sullivan, Gunther, 381).
There is no connection between the amount of hours a baker works and the cleanliness or
healthful quality of the bread made by the baker.
DECISION: The NY statute is not constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
DISSENT: J. Harlan with [J. White and J. Day concurring] dissenting: The bill was a reasonable
police action. It is a general rule that labor in excess of sixty hours a week may endanger the
health of those doing the labor. Professor Hirt in his treatise on the “Disease of Workers” said:
“The labor of the bakers is among the hardest and most laborious imaginable, because it has to
be performed under conditions injurious to the health of those engaged in it”. The work of bakers
requires long hours in a hot workshop, meeting the demand of the public. Another writer
claimed: “The constant inhaling of flour dust causes inflammation of the lungs and bronchial
tubes. The eyes also suffer through this [dust]. The long hours of toil to which all bakers are
subjected produce rheumatism, cramps, and swollen legs” (Sullivan, Gunther, 383).
J. Holmes: The word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent
the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
would admit that the statute would infringe upon fundamental principles as understood by the
traditions of our people and law. A reasonable man would find that the statute was necessary for
proper health. It is general regulations of the hours of work. The discussion of inequality is
unnecessary.

2. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
SIGNIFICANCE: The court eventually repudiated Lochner and related decisions it helped
produce. The case is viewed as inappropriate judicial intervention.
U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, (1938)
FACTS: A 1923 Act of Congress banned the interstate shipment of “filled milk” (milk that has
skim milk and non-milk fats added) as an “adulterated article of food” whose sale was a fraud. A
manufacturer who was indicted challenged the law.
ISSUE: Is the federal statute prohibiting filled milk additives and interstate sale and shipment
constitutional under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment?
HELD: Yes.
REASONING: J. Stone: Challenging the rational basis of economic legislation is a difficult task.
The decision concerning regulating or prohibiting filled milk should be left to Congress.
J. Stone provides the famous Footnote Four in which he provides a three part criteria regarding
what levels of scrutiny should be used: “There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment”. The three levels
of scrutiny outlined by J. Stone are 1) rational basis: rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, goal, or purpose, 2) intermediate scrutiny: there is an essential and compelling state
interest, and 3) heighted/strict scrutiny: the case involves the Bill of Rights, fundamental rights,
liberty, or privacy. The case involves the political process. The case involves discrete and insular
minorities (based on religion, race, ethnicity, national origin, and parentage). Strict scrutiny is
applied when legislation violated a provision of the Constitution, distorts the political process, or
discriminates against minorities.
DECISION: Court upheld the act.
DISSENT: None
SIGNIFICANCE: Court would no longer substitute its views on economic policy over
Congress’. This case helped to introduce the minimum “rational basis” standard that governs due
process review of economic legislation. J. Stone recited the famous “footnote 4” in this case, in
which he distinguished cases warranting deference from those in which greater scrutiny was
necessary. Judicial intervention is more appropriate when political processes may not be trusted
to be even out winners and losers over time. Judicial review reinforces democracy by clearing
out advantage and disadvantage in the political processes.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
FACTS: Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law
prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life.
ISSUE: Does the U.S. Constitution support a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy and have
an abortion under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?

3. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
HELD: Yes. (7-2)
REASONING: J. Blackmun: The woman’s right to an abortion falls under the right to privacy,
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution doesn’t explicitly mention the right to
privacy, but the Court has recognized a right of personal privacy or a guarantee of zones of
privacy. The right to privacy has some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, education, and child rearing. The right to privacy is broad
enough to extend to a woman’s decision of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. If that
right was denied, the detriment to a woman’s well-being would be obvious, physical and
mentally.
A person in the Constitution is always defined postnatally. If the fetus was considered a person,
as argued by Texas, than their right to life would outweigh the mother’s right to privacy. The
“compelling” point concerning the fetus is viability. During the first stage of the first trimester, a
woman’s decision is wholly between her and her doctor. During the last stage of the first
trimester, the State may regulate abortions in interest of the health of the mother.
J. Stewart concurring: The Griswold decision can be rationally understood as that the
Connecticut statute invaded liberty. The court recognizes “the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person…”
DECISION: The Constitution supports a woman’s right to an abortion.
DISSENT: J. White [with J. Rehnquist] dissenting: There is no constitutional basis for the right
to privacy. The court just created that right without much authority or reason. The judgment is an
“improvident and extravagant” exercise of judicial review.
J. Rehnquist: The right of privacy is not involved in this case. A medical abortion is not private
in the ordinary usage of the word. The court may have confused privacy with liberty. However,
liberty is not guaranteed against deprivation, but only against deprivation without the due process
of law. Texas had a valid state objective.
SIGNIFICANCE: The decision left the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as
the period of the pregnancy lengthens.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
FACTS: The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989.
Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior
to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows
for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she
notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by
several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except
for the husband notification requirement.
ISSUE: 1. Is the Pennsylvania law constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the right to privacy? 2. Is Roe v. Wade upheld?

4. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
HELD: Yes (5-4)
REASONING: The essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed. Protecting a woman’s right to
an abortion derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth amendment. A woman’s
personal liberty is at stake. Roe has never been proven “unworkable”.
The undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling state interest with women’s
protected liberties. A statute chosen by the State to further interest in the potential life must
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it. The decision of Roe was upheld.
There are millions of women who are victims of physical and psychological abuse by their
husbands. The requirement to notify a husband is likely to prevent a significant number of
women from obtaining an abortion. Notifying the husband is an undue burden. Only one
provision violates a woman’s right to privacy-the provision in which a woman must notify her
husband.
J. Stevens concurring: The State may express a preference for normal childbirth and may take
steps to ensure a woman’s choice is thoughtful and informed.
J. Rehnquist with [J. Scalia, J. Thomas] concurring: Abortion involves the “purposeful
termination of potential life” and one cannot ignore that the woman is not isolated in her
pregnancy-the fetus and father are involved as well.
DECISION: Most Pennsylvania provisions were upheld.
DISSENT: J. Stevens: Decisional autonomy must limit the State’s power to inject a woman’s
most personal decisions with state views.
J. Blackmun: By restricting the right of an abortion the State conscripts women’s bodies into its
service. Application of strict scrutiny results in the invalidation of all the challenged provisions.
J. Rehnquist with [J. Scalia, J. Thomas] dissenting: The court is not applying the same principles
as Roe. Abortion regulations should be subject to strict scrutiny.
J. Scalia with [Chief Justice Rehnquist, J. White, and J. Thomas] dissenting: When applying the
rational basis test, the Pennsylvania statute should be upheld in its entirety. It is not reasoned
judgment that supports the court’s decision but rather personal predilection. Roe didn’t resolve
the issue of abortion. It only made the controversy worse by bringing it to a national level. The
court should ask two questions: 1. Was Roe correctly decided? 2. Has Roe succeeded in
providing a settled body of law?
SIGNIFICANCE: For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the
validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation
has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability."
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)

5. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
FACTS: In response to a reported weapons disturbance, Houston police entered Lawrence’s
home and saw him and another adult man, Garner, engaging in homosexual acts. Lawrence and
Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse, violating the Texas statute that
forbids two persons of the same sex from engaging in certain sexual practices. The State Court of
Appeals held that the statute was constitutional and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.
ISSUE: 1. Do the criminal convictions of Lawrence and Garner violate their liberty and privacy
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 2. Is Bower v. Hardwick
overturned?
HELD: 1. Yes. 2. Yes (5-4)
REASONING: The Court used the rational basis standard in this case.
J. Kennedy: The Texas statute criminalizing certain homosexual acts violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to liberty under the due process clause provided
Lawrence and Garner with the right to engage in homosexual acts without intervention by the
government (Similar to the liberty definition that was applied in Planned Parenthood v. Casey).
There was no legitimate state interest to justify the intrusion into the private lives of the citizens.
Because of the definition of liberty, the state interest becomes more problematic.
Furthermore, the statute had been applied in order to secure traditional family values. Using
Griswold (marital right to privacy), Eisenstadt (right to privacy), and Roe (right to privacy and
an abortion), the court held that the statute does not apply to these men who are single, without
families, and simply choosing who they want to have intercourse with.
The court had viewed Bowers v. Hardwick too narrowly.
DECISION: The criminal convictions of Lawrence and Garner were not constitutional and
violated their right to privacy and liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
DISSENT: J. Scalia: There is no absolute right to liberty under the Due Process Clause and the
government can take away liberty as long as they have due process. The Due Process Clause
only protects fundamental rights. There is no fundamental right to sodomy.
The statute was created on moral grounds and viewing the statute at a rational basis, all statutes
forbidding actions seen as immoral such as incest and adultery, would be overturned.
J. Thomas: Cannot find a right to privacy or liberty in the Bill of Rights that J. Kennedy is
describing.
SIGNIFICANCE: When the Supreme Court struck down the sodomy law in Texas, they
effectively invalidated similar laws in every other state.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)

6. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
FACTS: A Louisiana law required “equal but separate accommodations” for “white” and
“colored” railroad passengers. Plessy challenged this law, alleging that he was seven-eighths
Caucasian and one-eighth African American. Plessy challenged that he was entitled to every
right of the white race. Plessy was arrested for refusing to leave a coach seat that was for whites.
ISSUES: Does the Louisiana law, which separates passengers in coach cars by race, violate the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protections Clause and the Thirteenth Amendment?
HELD: No (7-1; J. Brewer was recused).
REASONING: J. Brown: The object of the Fourteenth Amendment was to enforce absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but it cannot enforce unwanted mingling between races
nor can it abolish distinctions based upon color. Laws that require the separation of races does
not necessarily imply inferiority of either race. Laws that separate the races are recognized as
within competency of state legislatures in the exercise of police powers.
The law does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment because there is no servitude. This case is
based off of the Slaughterhouse Cases. This case concerns social equality and political equality
rational, not state citizenship.
DECISION: The Louisiana law is constitutional.
DISSENT: J. Harlan: “[I] deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to
the race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved…[every one] knows that
[the law] had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches [assigned] to white persons.”
(Sullivan, Gunther, 503). The Constitution should be color-blind and therefore there should be no
separation of races.
SIGNIFICANCE: The ruling of Plessy was viewed as vulnerable in the context of education and
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Justice Thurgood Marshall, challenged officially mandated
segregation-particularly concerning education. Brown v. Board of Education would effectively
silence the ruling of Plessy in regards to public education.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
FACTS: This case is a consolidation of multiple cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia,
and Delaware. In each case, an African American minor sought to obtain admission to the public
schools of their community on a non-segregated basis. In each instance, the minor had been
denied admission to the schools attend by white children under laws that required permitted
segregation. In most instances, the courts denied relief, relying on the “separate but equal”
doctrine announced in Plessy. The plaintiffs’ claim that the segregated public schools are not
equal and cannot be made equal, thus violating their rights to equal protection of the laws.
ISSUES: 1. Are the “separate but equal” state laws in public education constitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 2. Is Plessy v. Ferguson overturned?
HELD: 1. No 2. Yes.

7. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
REASONING: J Warren: Education is important to democratic society, as shown by U.S.
compulsory school attendance laws and great expenditures on education. Education is required in
basic public responsibilities and serving in the military. Education is used to teach children good
citizenship, cultural values, and professional training. Segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race deprives children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities. To separate children of similar age and qualification solely on the basis of race,
creates a feeling of inferiority and “may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone”. It was found in the Kansas case that separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting a status of inferiority to the minority group. That sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn, thus hindering their education. Separate can never be equal.
DECISION: The “separate but equal” doctrine is unconstitutional when applied to public
education.
DISSENT: None.
SIGNIFICANCE: In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) the court ruled that racial
segregation in the District of Columbia schools violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
Soon after Brown, the Court found that legally mandated segregation in public facilities was
unconstitutional in contexts other than education.
This was one of the first cases in which the courts used sociological and psychological studies in
making their decision.
Parents v. Seattle School District. 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
FACTS: The Seattle school district classified children as white and nonwhite. The Jefferson
County school district classified students as black or “other”. In Seattle, the racial classification
is used to determine slots in oversubscribed high schools. In Jefferson County, the classification
is used to make certain elementary school assignments and to rule on transfer requests. Both
schools use a student’s race to determine what school that student should attend in order to
maintain a racial balance based on a predetermined range (which was based on the racial
composition of the entire district).
Seattle School District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted
to the popular schools. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more
than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population
(approximately 40% white and 60% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. At a
particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which
race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal.

8. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing
that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A
federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
ISSUES: Do Seattle school district’s racial “tiebreakers” violate the Equal Protections Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD: Yes (5-4)
REASONING: The court applied a “strict scrutiny” framework in the interest of diversity in
higher education, upheld in Grutter. Each student should be looked at as an individual, not a
member of a racial grouping. However, the court noted that the present cases were not governed
by Grutter.
Seattle school district claimed that its use of race helped to reduce racial concentration in schools
and to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns didn’t prevent nonwhite students from
having access to the most desirable schools. However, the court ruled that the racial
classifications were not narrowly used for the goal of diversity. The plans were used for racial
balance; demographic goals, which the courts ruled as illegitimate.
The courts further find the racial classifications illegitimate because the school district could
have used other means at obtaining their goal.
J. Kennedy: The use of racial categorization by the school district was unconstitutional but
public schools may sometimes consider race to ensure equal educational opportunities.
DECISION: The Seattle school district’s usage of racial “tiebreakers” is unconstitutional.
DISSENT: J. Stevens: The Chief Justice fails to note that only African Americans struggled to
attend schools that they pleased. No white children struggled to attend black schools.
J. Breyer: These cases are controlled by Grutter, the existence of a compelling interest in these
cases “follows a fortiori” from Grutter, and accusing us of overruling that case.
The other means for achieving greater racial diversity in schools are unconstitutional if the racial
classifications at issue cannot survive strict scrutiny.
J. Breyer [with J. Stevens, J. Souter, and J. Ginsburg]: The Constitution permits local
communities to adopt desegregation plans even where it does not require them to do so. “The
plurality plays inadequate attention to this law, to past opinions’ rationale, their language, and
the contexts…it distorts precedent, it misapplies the relevant constitutional principles…it
undermines Brown’s promise of integrated primary and secondary education” (Sullivan,
Gunther, 573).
No case has ever held that the test of strict scrutiny means that all racial classifications must be
treated the same.

9. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
The school board’s use of race-conscious criteria passes the strictest “tailoring” test. The criteria
constitutes only one part of plans that depend primarily on nonracial criteria. There is a great
interest in student choice. Race is a factor in only a fraction of student’s non-merit based
assignments.
SIGNIFICANCE: In Brown, racial classifications were not allowed in order to segregate, but it
was not mentioned whether or not classifications could be used to integrate. It was ruled that
Brown would be interpreted as barring any use of race to classify or differential treatment based
on race.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
FACTS: The United States brought suit against the Virginia and the Virginia Military Institute
(VMI), challenging that the school’s male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional because
it violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. A district court ruled in favor of
the VMI. The Fourth Circuit Court reversed the ruling on appeal. In response to the reversal,
Virginia proposed the creation of Virginia’s Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL). The
Fourth Circuit Court ruled that although there is a difference in prestige, the parallel institute
offers “substantively comparable” educational opportunities. The United States appealed to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Does Virginia’s creation of the VWIL satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD: No (7-1; J. Thomas recused himself because his son was attending the VMI)
REASONING: The Court used intermediate scrutiny to decide on the case due to the case
involving discrimination based on gender.
J. Ginsburg: Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment by having a male-only admissions at
the VMI because the male-only admissions did not create a more diverse educational
environment. Women should not be denied full citizen stature just because they are women.
The VWIL does not offer women the same benefits as the VMI offers men, because the VMIL
lacks the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses, facilities, financial opportunities, and
alumni status and connections that the VMI offers. Virginia deliberately did not make VWIL a
military institute. VWIL students do not experience the life of the “barracks” that were crucial to
the VMI experience.
The Fourth Circuit Court’s usage of “substantive comparability” was a displacement of the
court’s more exacting standard, in which all gender classifications were subject to heightened
scrutiny. “Inherent differences” are not cause for artificial constraints on an individual’s
opportunity. Those classifications could create or perpetuate social, legal, and economic
inferiority of women.
J. Rehnquist, concurring: The educational opportunity diversity only benefitted one sex-males.
The problem is that VWIL did not provide female students with substantively comparable

10. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
opportunities. Virginia was not forced to choose between starting from scratch and creating an
institution for women and men, or admitting women into the VMI. It wasn’t the exclusion of
women that made Virginia violate the Equal Protection Clause, but rather it was the maintenance
of an all-men school without providing a comparable institution for women. The VMI should
have either admitted women or there should have been the creation of a VMI clone.
DECISION: The VMI male-only admissions is unconstitutional and the VWIL does not satisfy
the Fourteenth Amendment.
DISSENT: J. Scalia: The tradition of having government-funded military schools for men is as
well rooted in the traditions of the United States as is only sending men into combat. It is
reasonable for those traditions to be voted out by the people, but for those traditions to be ruled
unconstitutional is not law but rather politics-smuggled-into-law. The reversion of single-sex
education across the nation is ordered by the Court instead of by democratic processes.
Intermediate scrutiny has never required a least-restrictive-means analysis, but only a
“substantial relation” between the classification and state interest. There is no support for the
notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates to characteristics that are true in
every instance. The case should be held to a rational-basis review instead of strict scrutiny: “It is
hard to consider women a ‘discrete and insular minority’ unable to employ the ‘political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon’, when they constitute a majority of the electorate
(Sullivan, Gunther, 604).
A state’s decision to maintain within its system one school that provides the adversative method
is “substantially related” to its goal of good education. There should be no debate in the judiciary
over “how much” VMI should be required to change if it admitted women and whether or not
that would constitute “too much” change.
SIGNIFICANCE: All single-sex schools are unconstitutional unless they give the opposite sex a
genuine chance to attend such school. However, J. Ginsburg does deny this by suggesting that a
state might run single-sex schools as part of a state program designed “evenhandedly to support
diverse educational opportunities”.
San Antonio Independent School Dist. V. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
FACTS: In addition to state funding, the San Antonio Independent School District, along with all
other Texas public schools, relied on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. The San
Antonio Independent School Dist. claimed that the funding by property taxes underprivileged
students in poor districts because their schools lacked the property tax base that other schools
benefited from. The reliance on property taxes was said to create inter-district disparities.
ISSUE: Does the usage of property taxes for funding of public schools in Texas violate the Equal
Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
HELD: No (5-4).
REASONING: The court refused to view the case in high scrutiny because there is not a
constitutional right to education and the financial system of public schools in Texas did not

11. Mikaela Haley
MC 378
December 3, 2015
systematically discriminate against all poor people in Texas. Furthermore, other states have
similar financial systems for public schools. The final reasoning is that the Equal Protections
Clause does not guarantee absolute equality or exact equal advantages.
First, the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. Second,
lack of personal resources does not result in the absolute deprivation of a desired benefit. Third,
discrimination may be found without regard to individual income characteristics of district
residents. However, the system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines doesn’t have
any of the traditional indications of unequal treatment: there is no history of purposeful unequal
treatment, political powerlessness, and the class does not need extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.
J. Stewart, concurring: In refusing to invalidate the Texas system of financing its public schools,
the Court applies the basic principles of equal protection.
DECISION: The financial system for public schools in Texas does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment and is constitutional.
DISSENT: J. White with [J. Douglas, J. Brennan] dissenting: For districts with a low per-pupil
real estate tax base, the Texas system fails to extend a realistic choice to parents because the
property tax is practically and legally unavailable. The state should have to show that the means
chosen to effectuate a permissible goal are rationally related.
J. Marshall with [J. Douglas]: The Court wants equal protection cases to fall into neat categories
with dictate the appropriate standard of review. The Court has applied a spectrum of standards in
reviewing discrimination that allegedly violates equal protection. The Court cannot solely
depend on what is written in the Constitution, but rather also focus on the importance of
interests. The Court should have a stronger concern with the existence of discriminatory state
treatment in this case because of the importance of education. An absolute deprivation of a
meaningful opportunity to enjoy a benefit is not required in a case involving wealth
classification. There have been cases in the past in which there was not an absolute deprivation
before the case was subjected to strict scrutiny.
SIGNIFICANCE: Here, the Court defines the standards in which cases should be viewed in
regards to equal protection violations.