The IEC 61511 / ISA 84 Approach to Functional Safety - ChemInnovations 2010
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IEC 61511 and ISA 84, the modern functional safety standards for the process industries, are based on the concept of a safety instrumented function (SIF). Considering safety functions independently from each other isn't all that new, but taking a SIF-based approach to functional safety lifecycle management provides exceptional benefits in the analysis, implementation, and operation phases of a safety instrumented system. The IEC 61511 approach enables more practical safety lifecycle management, ensuring that just the right amount of technology, complexity, and effort is applied where it is needed. The result of this kind of approach is optimal safety reliability, reduced total lifecycle cost, and better protection against systematic failures that can disable even the most well designed SIL 3 rated safety instrumented system.
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The IEC 61511 / ISA 84 Approach to Functional Safety - ChemInnovations 2010
- 1. The IEC 61511 / ISA 84 Approach to Functional Safety Mike Boudreaux DeltaV SIS Brand Manager
- 3. Increasing ROI drives your process safety needs
- 4. Occupational safety Mechanical Integrity Structural Design FallPrevention Inherently Safer Design Policies & Procedures Facility Siting Ergonomics Work Schedules Functional Safety Safety Audits Personal Protective Equipment Emergency Response Employee Training Risk Assessment s Total Recordables Management Of Change
- 5. Personal safety Process safety Mechanical Integrity Structural Design FallPrevention Inherently Safer Design Policies & Procedures Facility Siting Ergonomics Work Schedules Functional Safety Safety Audits Personal Protective Equipment Emergency Response Employee Training Risk Assessment s Total Recordables Management Of Change
- 6. Process safety Mechanical Integrity Inherently Safer Design Policies & Procedures Facility Siting Safety Audits Functional Safety Emergency Response Employee Training Risk Assessment s Management Of Change
- 7. Process safety Mechanical Integrity Inherently Safer Design Policies & Procedures Facility Siting Safety Audits Functional Safety Functional Safety Emergency Response Employee Training Risk Assessment s Management Of Change
- 8. Functional safety PFDavg SRS RRF IEC 61511 FMEDA SIS IEC 61508 BPCS PHA HAZOP SIL LOPA SIF
- 11. SIF #1 SIF #2
- 12. Source: Exida Safety and Critical Control Systems in Process and Machine Automation July 2007
- 14. PFDSIF1 = PFDPT-101 +PFDlogic solver+ PFDFV-101 Logic solver SIF #1 PT-101 FV-101
Notes de l'éditeur
- Just so that we are all clear on the type of safety we are talking about today. We are talking about process safety management, which is not the same as personal safety. There are certainly areas where the two overlap, but they need to be monitored and evaluated separately.With process safety management, we are focusing on the PROCESS – reactor temperatures, column pressures, or anything that would cause a process upset. We are not focusing on occupational issues, such as trips and falls. Personnel safety is a concern in ANY workplace environment.In a processing environment, neither process or personal safety should be looked at from a subjective or intuitive manner. Special, objective consideration is required in any processing plant.
- Just so that we are all clear on the type of safety we are talking about today. We are talking about process safety management, which is not the same as personal safety. There are certainly areas where the two overlap, but they need to be monitored and evaluated separately.With process safety management, we are focusing on the PROCESS – reactor temperatures, column pressures, or anything that would cause a process upset. We are not focusing on occupational issues, such as trips and falls. Personnel safety is a concern in ANY workplace environment.In a processing environment, neither process or personal safety should be looked at from a subjective or intuitive manner. Special, objective consideration is required in any processing plant.
- Process safety isn’t concerned with the numbers on boards at plant entrances – “x” days of no injuries/lost time. Process safety encompasses many areas – management of change, mechanical integrity, and functional safety, among other things. Today we will mostly discuss functional safety. Functional safety is the correct functioning of equipment, where failures lead to serious consequences. This includes ensuring that safety-related systems will provide necessary risk reduction needed to achieve safety.
- Process safety isn’t concerned with the numbers on boards at plant entrances – “x” days of no injuries/lost time. Process safety encompasses many areas – management of change, mechanical integrity, and functional safety, among other things. Today we will mostly discuss functional safety. Functional safety is the correct functioning of equipment, where failures lead to serious consequences. This includes ensuring that safety-related systems will provide necessary risk reduction needed to achieve safety.
- Process safety isn’t concerned with the numbers on boards at plant entrances – “x” days of no injuries/lost time. Process safety encompasses many areas – management of change, mechanical integrity, and functional safety, among other things. Today we will mostly discuss functional safety. Functional safety is the correct functioning of equipment, where failures lead to serious consequences. This includes ensuring that safety-related systems will provide necessary risk reduction needed to achieve safety.
- Exida conducted a study of its SIF Design Database which includes records of nearly 10,000 SIF designs done by or reviewed by Exida. The majority of safety functions are SIL 1, followed by SIL 2, then SIL 3 functions and a few SIL 4 functions. This relationship is to be expected bearing in mind the capital and operational cost of implementing higher integrity functions in programmable systems. Most end users seek to reduce SIL 2, 3, and 4 functions to an absolute minimum by process alteration where possible or additional layers of protection that are non-programmable in nature.