The document discusses NASA's inability to recreate key technologies needed for a manned mission to the Moon, despite the success of the Apollo program in the 1960s-70s. Specifically, NASA admits it cannot recreate the ablative heat shield material that was used for the Apollo Command Module and protected astronauts during re-entry. NASA also lacks data on radiation levels beyond low Earth orbit, including on the lunar surface, though Apollo astronauts spent many hours there. The document questions how NASA could have lost this critical information after the Apollo program, given its importance for future Moon and Mars missions.

1. IISS TTHHEERREE AANNYY HHOOPPEE FFOORR
AA MMOOOONN BBAASSEE??
ince NASA's Constellation Program (CxP), intended to return humans
to the Moon by 2020, was cancelled in 2010, there has been no
shortage of professional views as to what should happen next.
Nevertheless, development work on systems to fly beyond low Earth
S
orbit (LEO) has continued without interruption, with the main target
remaining the same: to resurrect technologies that were allegedly available
back in the late 1960s.
So, the key aspects of the current strategy defined in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 are unsurprising: to develop a heavy-launch vehicle
and a module for the crew, capable of the safe return from space trips beyond
LEO. Doesn't this simply mean a rocket analogous to the Saturn V launch
vehicle and a capsule similar to the Apollo Command Module (CM)?
However, the CxP plan to return to the Moon was not the first of its kind.
An historical review (Arch. Study, 2005) pointed to a number of National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) task forces which, since at
least 1989, had been assembled periodically in order to formulate the next
viable Moon mission.
A permanent base on the Moon had seemed to be the most logical and
attractive goal, bearing in mind the apparent success of the Apollo program.
Had the planned road maps of the early 1990s been realised within a span of
some 15 years, in all probability a functioning inhabited outpost would have
been developed on the Moon by now.
The most recent of the human spaceflight projects, the CxP again planned
at last to get to the Moon. Until its cancellation in 2010, the project had
achieved remarkable progress in planning, design and early development at a
cost of around US$10 billion. Yet, on 15 April 2010, President Obama—
speaking to scientists, astronauts and policymakers—finally denounced the
CxP. Instead of a program to return to the Moon, he outlined the plan for
NASA: "By the mid-2030s, I believe we can send humans to orbit Mars and
return them safely to Earth," the President said. "And a landing on Mars will
follow. And I expect to be around to see it." (Pres. Speech, 2010)
Obviously, this totally new strategy means no landings, either on the Moon
or on Mars, for at least some 20 years from 2010. So then, what is the major
problem with landing on the Moon? What does it really mean in terms of
technology and logistical challenges to repeat a feat which, according to the
record, was confidently completed many times, more than 40 years ago?
The answer can be found in recent US government and NASA documents.
Any such mission is a complex chain of essential operations, all of which have
to be accomplished safely. It is sufficient for one or two links in the chain to
be unreliable to make a Moon return deadly dangerous, and the mission
becomes absolutely impossible when just one link is incomplete. Such links
were actually acknowledged by NASA.
NASA documents
on the now-defunct
Constellation
Program for a return
to the Moon by 2020
reveal startling
evidence that the
agency is still actually
unable to send a
manned mission
to the Moon.
It’s as if nothing has
been learned from
the Apollo missions,
and, until recently,
criticism was taboo.
by Phil Kouts
© June 2014
Email:
philkuts@gmail.com
AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2014 www.nexusmagazine.com NEXUS • 37

2. Heat Shield of the Command Module
One crucial link in any mission to the Moon requires that
the return capsule be equipped with an effective and
reliable heat shield. In particular, it was literally the vital
element in the construction of each Apollo CM. This
essential protection was necessary for re-entry into the
Earth's atmosphere on lunar return. The CM hits and
enters the Earth's atmosphere at the re-entry speed of 11.2
kilometres per second (escape velocity value).
Development of such a high-specification shield must
have been a significant scientific and technological
challenge—especially in the mid-1960s—due to the
complex technical requirements.
According to the chronology, the first successful use of
the Apollo heat shield with a crew on board the CM was in
December 1968 during the return of Apollo 8 from the
journey around the Moon. After that, all Apollo missions
reportedly completed perfect landings and no problem has
ever been highlighted or discussed.
However, the Architecture Study for the CxP reveals that
NASA now does have a problem with the thermal
protection material: "A Thermal Protection System (TPS)
requires materials specifically designed to manage
aerothermal heating (heat flux, dynamic pressure)
experienced during hypersonic entry, for both nominal and
abort scenarios… Only ablators can meet maximum
requirements; they are designed to sacrifice mass under
extreme heating efficiently and reliably… The Apollo
ablative TPS (AVCOAT–5061) no longer exists.
Qualification of new or replacement materials will require
extensive analysis and testing." (Arch. Study, 2005, p. 629)
The essential requirement of a CM returning to Earth
with its crew is to protect the module against enormous
heat at deceleration from the high re-entry speed to a
descent speed appropriate for parachutes to be deployed.
At entry into the atmosphere, the protective material has
to withstand around 2,700 °C compared to the lower
temperature of approximately 1,600 °C at which the Space
Shuttle's shield operates. (NASA News, 2006)
This subject has remained in the background for over 40
years but is now revealed as an outstanding problem.
Worse still, it is perhaps a problem that has never been
resolved satisfactorily. In a 2008 report by the US
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the admission is
even more startling than the one made three years earlier:
"[A]ccording to the Orion program executive the Orion
Project originally intended to use the heat shield from the
Apollo program as a fallback technology for the Orion
thermal protection system, but was unable to recreate the
Apollo material." (GAO, 2008, p. 6) The report clarifies:
"Furthermore, heat shield design features required by the
Orion, namely the size, have never been proven and must
be developed." (GAO, 2008, p. 11)
The importance of a reliable and effective heat shield
cannot be overstated. The availability of a proper heat
shield was absolutely critical for the safe return of all the
Apollo crews. NASA's admission that the agency cannot
now recreate the thermal shield of a return module is
absolutely astounding. Such an admission could only be
compared to an inconceivable statement that, for example,
American military officials admit that after using armoured
steel in their tanks during World War II, some 40 years later
they don't have the technology at hand to develop
armoured steel and have great difficulty in reproducing
such steel despite the previous experience during the war.
The GAO report concludes: "With respect to Orion's
thermal protection system, facilities available from the
Apollo era for testing large-scale heat shields no longer
exist." (GAO, 2008, p. 14)
Eighteen months later, possibly to soften the shocking
revelation regarding the absence of an
effective heat shield made in its first
report, the GAO provides clarification:
"NASA is using an ablative material
derived from the substance used in the
Apollo program. After some
difficulties, NASA was successful in
recreating the material. Because it
uses a framework with many
honeycomb-shaped cells, each of
which must be individually filled
without voids or imperfections, it may
be difficult to repeatedly manufacture
to consistent standards.
According to program officials,
during the Apollo program the cells
were filled by hand. The contractor
plans to automate the process for the
Orion Thermal Protection System, but
this capability is still being
developed." (GAO, 2009, p. 11) Does
this help to convince the public that
Apollo 14 Command Module, allegedly returned from the Moon
and now housed at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida. (Source: Phil Kouts)
38 • NEXUS www.nexusmagazine.com AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2014

3. the problem is only one of small operations versus large
operations and thus has been resolved?
As recently as the end of 2012, it was announced that the
Orion capsule is to be tested for a medium (around 8.9
kilometres per second) re-entry speed at expected
temperatures of up to 2,200 °C. (Orion Factsheet, 2012)
This approach is entirely reasonable if NASA intends to
investigate re-entry thermal conditions step by step,
having had no preliminary experience. Again, it is evident
that there is no reliance whatsoever on the claimed
accomplishments of the Apollo program.
Re-entry into the Earth’s Atmosphere
Another crucial link in the successful chain of operations
is the choice of landing trajectory. The re-entry profile in
particular determines critical requirements for the thermal
shield. According to NASA, the Apollo systems performed
a "direct entry", i.e., that which is along the simplest,
shortest trajectory. But this choice carries with it the
penalty of maximum atmosphere
resistance—resulting in maxi-mum
heat for the landing
capsule and maximum gravi-tational
deceleration overload for
…by mentioning
“a wide range of latitudes”,
the modern NASA research
the crew in the module. Another
technique known as "skip entry"
seems now to be preferred for
returning crew modules from the
Moon. A skip entry means
entering the Earth's atmosphere
with a longer gliding path and a
soft bouncing on the Earth's
atmosphere, which allows the
landing capsule to experience less heat and, at the same
time, far less gravitational overload.
NASA has reviewed trajectories for returning to Earth
from the Moon and concludes that compared to those
used during Apollo, the new concept should be
implemented: "…it is recommended that NASA utilize
skip-entry guidance on the lunar return trajectories. The
skip-entry lunar return technique provides an approach for
returning crew to a single…landing site anytime during a
lunar month. The Apollo-style direct-entry technique
requires water or land recovery over a wide range of
latitudes." (Arch. Study, 2005, p. 39)
A wide range of latitudes would normally mean a few
degrees on the globe, which in turn would mean a large
territory a few hundred kilometres across, which is in line
with theoretical estimates for direct entry. Strangely
enough, to say that Apollo-style direct entry requires a
large territory entirely contradicts the historical records
regarding the Apollo CM splashdowns that were regularly
accomplished within a short distance from the recovery
aircraft carriers. Typical splashdown miss distances of just
a few kilometres were recorded for each Apollo mission
recovery—which should make the current recovery teams
very envious, as they presently pick up astronauts
returning from the International Space Station (ISS) in
territories dozens of kilometres across. As a matter of fact,
by mentioning "a wide range of latitudes", the modern
NASA research teams denounced the declared
achievement of the Apollo program in using the direct-entry
technique. Today, NASA teams actually have to
develop a precise landing technique which was apparently
available in the late 1960s.
It is worthwhile noting that in the period of
approximately three years since late 2009—the time of the
Augustine Study—to the end of 2012, the developments
with the Orion capsule were focused on its completion for
trips to and safe return from the ISS, which, of course, is
only stationed in LEO where the capsule would not
experience the same extreme conditions as would be the
case with flights returning from the Moon.
Radiation beyond Low Earth Orbit
Regarding the radiation limits for travelling beyond LEO:
"NASA relies on external
guidance from the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) and
the National Council on
Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP) for estab-lishing
dose limits. Due to the
lack of data and knowledge, the
NAS and NCRP recom-mended
that radiation limits for
exploration missions could not
be determined until new science
data and knowledge [were]
obtained." (Arch. Study, 2005, p.
teams denounced the
declared achievement of the
Apollo program in using the
direct-entry technique.
109)
The next year, in swift response to NASA's request, the
NCRP produced a report with a title to puzzle an
unprepared reader: "Information Needed to Make
Radiation Protection Recommendations for Space
Missions Beyond Low-Earth Orbit". (NCRP, 2006) By this,
the NCRP admits that there is no substantial information
available on cosmic radiation beyond LEO, including data
on lunar surface radiation, despite the alleged
achievements of Apollo.
The Augustine Committee quotes another report, this
time from the National Research Council (NRC, 2008),
which largely confirms the problem: "Lack of knowledge
about the biological effects of and responses to space
radiation is the single most important factor limiting the
prediction of radiation risk associated with human space
exploration." (Augustine, 2009, p. 100)
The National Academy of Sciences needed some raw
information just to be able to start working on those
recommendations. Of course, some data should have
been readily available to the American scientific
community over the 40 years since the Apollo program.
Common sense tells us that information regarding
radiation effects on the Moon, if such information exists at
AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2014 www.nexusmagazine.com NEXUS • 39

4. all, should be available within NASA, but from the
committee's report it is clear that NASA does not have it,
either. This is an incredible omission because if the Apollo
crews were indeed on the lunar surface, the agency
definitely should have the relevant extra-vehicular
radiation data. Where is this data? Especially significant
would surely be data from the Apollo 15, 16 and 17
missions.
According to the mission reports, the six astronauts on
these three missions each spent from 18 to 20 hours on the
surface during three exits (extra-vehicular activities, EVAs),
under the direct radiation from the Sun and other cosmic
sources, in their spacesuits—without any additional
shielding. Moreover, some EVAs occurred at the time of
elevated solar activity, potentially bringing excessive solar
flares or particle events and resulting radiation to the crew.
It is notable that more than 40 years
later, there is no overt indication that
the Apollo astronauts ever experienced
any residual effects from radiation
exposure.
In their late 70s and early 80s, the
astronauts seemingly continue to lead
normal lives. Neil Armstrong passed
away in 2012 at the respectable age of
82, due to causes apparently unrelated
to radiation effects. This is a fantastic
outcome of the Apollo program—
provided that it really was accomplished
in 1969–72. Yet, strangely enough, there
is little indication that NASA has
ever paid any attention to this
remarkable biomedical fact which
is a direct scientific outcome of the
Apollo program. This is important
self-evident information, and NASA
should have started talking about
this exciting finding: that no special
medical and protective precautions against
walking and working on the Moon are
required.
On the contrary, NASA is silent
on the matter and, as shown above,
has asked for help on a subject when it should be in full
possession of the prime information and be the proud
leader in this research. It is also noteworthy that in its
mass media releases, NASA regularly reminds its
audiences about Apollo 11, where astronauts were on the
lunar surface for only two hours, while it does not usually
talk about circumstances of the Apollo 12 and 14 EVAs to
such a degree and is remarkably silent on Apollo missions
15 to 17 which would be crucial evidence in favour of
harmless trips to the Moon.
Regarding radiation effects on humans, the Augustine
Committee concludes: "These radiation effects are
insufficiently understood and remain a major
physiological and engineering uncertainty in any human
exploration program beyond low-Earth orbit." (Augustine,
2009, p. 100) The committee doesn't speak specifically
about potential radiation problems on the lunar surface
itself. Nor is the radiation danger during landing of crews
on the Moon in the Apollo missions considered to any
extent. Could it be that the decision not to mention Apollo
was based not on the fact that the committee limited itself
to studies carried out in LEO but precisely because there
is no medical data on effects on human health beyond
LEO? In fact, there is no connection or reference at all to
the legendary Moon missions regarding the radiation
problem in the quoted NASA reports (i.e., Arch. Study,
2005, and Augustine, 2009).
Landing On and Taking Off from the Lunar Surface
While considering optimal strategies for travelling to the
Moon and Mars, NASA admits that
there could be technical problems
when actually landing on and thereafter
taking off from the lunar surface. The
Augustine Committee considers an
option to delay the Moon landing as
more viable, and contemplates that
"[a]t least initially, astronauts would
not travel into the deep gravity wells of
the lunar and Martian surface, deferring
the cost of developing human landing
and surface systems" (Augustine, 2009,
p. 15)—thus also avoiding issues
concerning radiation exposure during
EVA.
Nevertheless, when giving
preference to a combined strategy
where landing on the Moon is
indefinitely delayed, the
committee admits the difficulties
of developing the landing
technologies.
Again, why not rely on the
experience apparently gained from
the Apollo program? And why is a
technical aspect which was so
successfully handled some 40
…NASA regularly
reminds its
audiences about
Apollo 11…
and is remarkably
silent on Apollo
missions 15 to 17
which would be
crucial evidence
in favour of
harmless trips
to the Moon.
years ago now labelled as a "deep gravity well", implying
that it is a struggle to get out of the lunar or Martian
environments?
Although the Augustine Committee talks about gravity
on the Moon and on Mars at the same time, one may note
that the gravity forces on the surfaces of these two space
bodies are different. Let's state them relative to our own
on the Earth, in percentages: then the gravity on Mars is
37 per cent of Earth's, and the Moon's gravity is 16.6 per
cent or just one-sixth of Earth's. Obviously, it must be far
easier to take off from the Moon.
So, one would expect NASA to discuss the comparatively
greater challenge of takeoff from Mars, yet the agency
places both at the same level of difficulty, which seems
40 • NEXUS www.nexusmagazine.com AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2014

5. illogical. In 1969, gravity wasn't a problem for takeoffs from
the Moon—but for some reason by 2010 it had become a
very serious problem.
The Augustine Committee expands on objectives set out
in 2005 as broadly as one can imagine today: "The
missions would go to places humans have never been to,
escaping from the Earth/Moon system, visiting near-Earth
objects, flying by Mars, thereby continuously engaging
public interest. Explorers would initially avoid traveling to
the bottom of the relatively deep gravity wells of the
surface of the Moon and Mars, but would learn to work
with robotic probes on the planetary surface." (Augustine,
2009, p. 43)
The initial intention of the CxP was to complete a
satisfactory return to the Moon that could be seen as the
first step in this new, broadly brushed range of programs.
However, now the time frame and scope have become
entirely uncertain.
The findings of the Augustine Committee regarding lunar
exploration demonstrate that the connection to the data
from Apollo systems available in
the 1960s, i.e., human landing
and surface systems as well as
the ascent capabilities of Apollo,
has been deliberately
sidelined—which implies that all
the data from Apollo is of little
value to the actual requirements
of space exploration, which takes
us to that ascent vehicle: the
Saturn V rocket.
The Heavy-Launch Rocket
At the outset of the CxP in
2005, NASA put forward this
recommendation: "Adopt and pursue a Shuttle-derived
architecture as the next-generation launch system for
crewed flights into LEO and for 125-mT-class cargo flights
for exploration beyond Earth's orbit. After thorough
analysis of multiple …options for crew and cargo
transportation, Shuttle-derived options were found to have
significant advantages with respect to cost, schedule,
safety, and reliability." (Arch. Study, 2005, p. 47)
Despite these advantages, the Space Shuttle system as a
key candidate had a fundamental flaw: limited payload
capacity. It could hardly serve as a heavy-lift vehicle for a
Moon mission. Indeed, the Saturn V allegedly used to take
up to LEO a payload of approximately 120 tons, while
Space Shuttle systems are limited to payloads of around
100 tons or so, including the orbiter. The redesign of these
systems presents a completely new task (see below).
It is not surprising that NASA has continued to examine
options for the suitability of various powerful rockets for
travelling to the Moon and beyond. It would seem logical
that the development of this next generation of launch
rockets would take into account the achievements of the
Saturn V system deployed during Apollo.
• First-Stage Engines (F-1)
The success of the Apollo program was largely based on
the performance of the Saturn V rocket with its five massive
F-1 engines in the first stage, which were claimed to be the
most powerful rocket engines ever built. However, in
NASA's comprehensive, 750-page Architecture Study, the
F-1 engine is neither considered as a fall-back option nor
analysed as a prototype for further development. It is only
once vaguely mentioned in this detailed review of NASA's
capabilities in rocket science and technology. (Arch. Study,
2005, p. 467)
Instead, four years into the CxP, NASA had made no clear
decision regarding what the next heavy-lift launch vehicle
should be based upon. By mid-2009, the Augustine
Committee was still trying to choose between the newly
suggested "Ares I + Ares V architecture; …a Shuttle-derived
vehicle; and a 'super-heavy' launcher derived from
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle…heritage".
(Augustine, 2009, p. 64) The latter were vehicles of
medium capacity, routinely used by NASA in recent
unmanned missions. The Ares
rockets were part of the CxP. Here
again, the Augustine Committee
mentions neither the Saturn V
nor the F-1 engines.
Furthermore, the GAO points
to an issue identified during the
early study and modelling of a
new Ares I crew launch vehicle:
"Current modeling indicates that
thrust oscillation within the first
stage causes unacceptable
structural vibrations. There is a
possibility that the thrust
oscillation frequency and
Instead, four years into
the CxP, NASA had made
no clear decision regarding
what the next heavy-lift
launch vehicle should
be based upon.
magnitude may be outside the design limits of the Ares design
requirements [emphasis added]." Then, the GAO continues:
"A NASA focus team studied this issue and has proposed
options for mitigation including incorporating vibration
absorbers into the design of the first stage and redesigning
portions of the Orion Vehicle to isolate the crew from the
vibration… Failure to completely understand the flight
characteristics of the modified booster could create a risk
of hardware failure and loss of vehicle control." (GAO,
2008, p. 10)
This statement has an historical aspect. The same
problem—i.e., structural vibration in the body of the
rocket, caused by the vibration of the thrust chambers of
the first-stage engines—was found at the second-ever trial
of the Saturn V after its unmanned launch on 4 April 1968,
known as Apollo 6. The so-called "pogo" vibrations were
found to be so large that they were recognised as a threat
to the health and survival of the crew and to the integrity
of the payload, including the Lunar Module (LM). Even at
the time it was admitted: "Had there been men on board
Apollo 6, the crew probably would have aborted the
mission during the pogo, when they would have been so
AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2014 www.nexusmagazine.com NEXUS • 41

6. violently banged around that they couldn't have operated
the spacecraft." (Apollo, 1989, p. 314)
However, without any further test launches since the
problematic trial in April, in December 1968 the Saturn V,
according to NASA reports, successfully took Apollo 8 to fly
around the Moon with a human crew. Much later, during
the third unmanned launch of the Saturn V with Skylab on
board, the vibrational problem returned. During the
launch on 14 May 1973, the Skylab station was heavily
damaged due to the severe vibrations of the first stage of
the rocket. One solar panel was torn away from the station
body and severely dented it as a result. For some period of
time, because of the damage, Skylab was treated as lost.
Yet it begs the question: how did the Saturn V manage
to run perfectly from 1968 through to 1972 and then, some
six months after the end of the Apollo
missions, succumb to the same
problem that it had at its birth? For it
was between the second and the third
unmanned launches of the Saturn V
that all the apparently successful
missions to the Moon occurred.
These historical events could help us
to understand the recent decision-making
processes in NASA during the
development of a heavy-launch vehicle.
While not relying on Apollo's best
technology, NASA has struggled to
choose the design of a large launch
rocket. It faces immense engine-vibration
problems similar to those
Yet it begs the
question: how
did the Saturn V
manage to run
perfectly from 1968
through to 1972
and then, some six
months after
the end of the
Apollo missions,
succumb to the
same problem that
it had at its birth?
that occurred during at least two
unmanned Saturn V launches.
In mid-2009, some 18 months
after its first comment on
vibrations identified in the first
stage, the GAO admitted at the
time of the Augustine Committee
report that NASA still had
vibrational problems with Ares I:
"Another issue related to vibration
is vibroacoustics—the pressure of
the acoustic waves—produced by
the firing of the Ares I first stage and the rocket's
acceleration through the atmosphere—which may cause
unacceptable structural vibrations throughout Ares I and
Orion. According to agency officials, NASA is still
determining how these vibrations and acoustic
environments may affect the vehicles." (GAO, 2009, p. 13)
The Augustine Committee expresses similar concerns
about the Ares I rocket, without suggesting any viable
solution: "…NASA determined that the original plan to
use the Space Shuttle main engines on the Ares I upper
stage would be too costly… But the replacement engine
had less thrust and inferior fuel economy, so the first-stage
solid rockets had to be modified to provide more total
impulse. This in turn contributed to a vibration
phenomenon, the correction of which has yet to be fully
demonstrated." (Augustine, 2009, p. 111)
To sum up, a four-year period of research and design has
resulted in identification of the key problems analogous to
those experienced with the Saturn V unmanned missions.
Soon, the Ares rocket development was cancelled. The
vibration problem of Apollo 6 allegedly had been solved by
December 1968, since, for the Apollo 8 launch vehicle, this
supposition was made: "The new helium prevalve cavity
pressurization system will be flying on the S-IC for the first
time. In this system, cavities in the liquid oxygen prevalves
are filled with helium to create accumulators or 'shock
absorbers' to damp out oscillations. This system was
installed to prevent excessive longitudinal oscillations
experienced in the Apollo 6 flight." (Ap-8 PK, 1968, p. 47)
If this oscillation issue truly had been
settled, then one must forcibly
conclude that this fix was withheld at
the time of the Skylab accident and to
this day is not considered a viable
solution for future space travel. So, the
observation remains that, once again,
since there is no reliance on the Apollo
experiences in this regard, all allegedly
successful Saturn V launches for the
nine manned Apollo missions are
questionable.
• Second-Stage Engines (J-2X)
Whatever the first stage of the
heavy-lift vehicle would be, for the
second stage a hydrogen engine, J-
2X, had confidently been selected.
A recommended rocket stage for
departure from Earth's orbit will
also require J-2X. This means the
development of a modified engine
as a derivative from the J-2 upper-stage
engine used in the
Apollo–Saturn system.
Along with the F-1 engine, the J-2
engine was the basis of the Apollo
success. The engine had a thrust
that could not be delivered by any other means of
comparable size and weight, and it was essential, first, to
bring the payload into LEO and then to launch the
Command/Service Module with Lunar Module to the
Moon. After the Apollo missions, the last time that the J-2
engine was used was for the launch of a Saturn 1B rocket
in 1975 for a space rendezvous with the Soyuz craft in LEO
(the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project).
At the beginning of the CxP, NASA was determined to
modify the J-2, although the agency admitted that there
were problems: "The use of a J-2S engine for an Earth
Departure Stage (EDS) is an area of high risk because a J-2S
Continued on page 82
42 • NEXUS www.nexusmagazine.com AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2014

7. Is There Any Hope for a Moon Base?
engine has never been flown. The J-2S
(J-2 simplified) was designed to
replace the Saturn vehicle upper stage
J-2 engines… Thus, the estimated
time of 4 years for qualification,
fabrication, and testing of the engine
poses a significant risk to the
program." (Arch. Study, 2005, p. 8)
After the analysis and design work
had been underway for some three to
four years, the GAO then made a
provisional suggestion of a required
time frame and intensity for this
redevelopment: "The development
schedule for the J-2X is aggressive,
allowing less than 7 years from
development start to first flight, and
highly concurrent." (GAO, 2008, p. 12)
If the engine had indeed been
reliably used some 40 years ago, why
would it now take—at the current rate
of progress in technology—a massive
seven years for its redevelopment?
And why was the redevelopment,
which is going to be concurrent, raised
as a troubling aspect? Naturally, NASA
should have relied on its experience
with the Apollo systems on similar,
concurrent development works.
The GAO reaches an astounding
conclusion on the J-2X upper-stage
engine: "Although the J-2X is based on
the J-2 and J-2S engines used on the
Saturn-V…the number of planned
changes is such that, according to
NASA review boards, the effort
essentially represents a new engine
development." (GAO, 2008, p. 10)
How does this conclusion compare
with the whole Apollo spacecraft
development, which was completed in
the mid-1960s within seven years and
was indeed new and concurrent with
several other critical developments—
all completed for the first time?
The construction of a heavy-launch
rocket as the key part of the CxP was
eventually stopped by 2010. The crew
vehicle, Ares I, was tried in an
unmanned flight only once, in October
2009, and it was already clear at the
time that it had no future. There was
no reliance on the Saturn V's key
elements such as the powerful F-1
engine of the first stage, and there was
very little reliance on the J-2 engine of
the second stage.
In the CxP, the new Moon rocket
appeared to be based on new
developments unrelated to the Saturn
V. Moreover, the legendary F-1 engine
is not even mentioned in modern
NASA documents. It is as if it had
never existed. While NASA doesn't
have a suitable heavy launcher, it
implies by this omission that it doesn't
have confidence in the Apollo
technological capability, either.
Conclusion
In April 2008, the GAO saw the key
technical elements of the Apollo Space
Program as a fall-back option to the
system under development. However,
quite possibly it was also becoming
clear over time that supportive
solutions were not always available
from NASA's experience and expertise.
Whatever might be the real reasons
behind this lack of will to rely upon
Apollo data for matters lunar, by mid-
2009 the US government had come to
realise the impossibility of completing
the Constellation Program within the
initially allocated time frame of 15
years.
The GAO notes that it has reported
on "areas of technical challenge in the
past, including thrust oscillation,
thermal protection system…and J-2X
nozzle extension". The GAO continues:
"In addition to these challenges, our
recent work has highlighted other
technical challenges, including Orion
mass control, vibroacoustics, lift-off
drift, launch abort system, and
meeting safety requirements." (GAO,
2009, p. 10)
The GAO has identified multiple
technical risks for both the launching
rocket and the Orion development
and, as a result, for the current mission
to the Moon. Many problems
identified in 2005–09 are surprisingly
similar to those which would have
been encountered and, of course,
solved in order for the legendary
Apollo program to be successful.
The viability of the old program was
inevitably questioned inside NASA
when the new one was started. If there
wasn't much expertise to inherit from
the Apollo program, then the question
as to whether such a program could
have been completed 40 years ago is
now highlighted in a major way.
NASA still faces technical challenges
which were seemingly resolved some
40 years ago. The overall message of
the latest NASA reports is that the
technology for journeying to the Moon
is not available. Neither is a launching
rocket, nor even a module for the safe
transportation of a crew and return to
Earth.
Departure from the Moon's surface,
which wasn't a problem during the
Apollo era, is now a problem due to
the perceived difficulties in getting out
of the so-called deep gravity well.
Furthermore, NASA admits that the
agency doesn't have sufficient
understanding of radiation beyond
LEO. If just one crucial link in a Moon
visitation project is missing, the whole
program becomes impossible. One
such link is, certainly, the heat shield of
the returning module which is still to
be developed. Without an effective
and reliable shield, any manned lunar
missions would be one way only—
incapable of returning.
It was recently admitted by Tom
Young, a retired Lockheed Martin
executive, that NASA is on "a declining
trajectory". Asteroids and Lagrange
points "can be steps" but do not
"inspire", while there are only a few
"practical" destinations: the Earth's
moon, the moons of Mars, and the
planet Mars itself. (Young, 2013) So,
an idea to develop an inhabitable
lunar outpost, cherished initially (Arch.
Study, 2005, p. 56), still stands.
In light of the above and many recent
findings, to identify honestly the key
problems and to clear the way forward
to their pragmatic solution, wouldn't it
be more productive to recognise finally
that the Apollo manned missions to
the Moon, allegedly completed four
decades ago, did not happen? ∞
Continued from page 42
Continued on page 83
82 • NEXUS www.nexusmagazine.com AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2014