1. Coastal and inland fisheries: old
challenges and new
opportunities
Sloans Chimatiro
Senior Fisheries Advisor, NEPAD Agency,
Johannesburg, South Africa
Presented at the Hotel Victoria, Pointe aux
Piments, Mauritius, 23 April 2012

2. Outline of the presentation
1. Features of the Small Island States
2. Vulnerability of Small Island States
3. Importance of fisheries in SIDS
4. How can SIDS optimise the wealth-
generating potential of fisheries?
5. Lessons from best practices
6. Conclusion

3. Key Features of Small Island Developing
States
1. The United Nations currently classifies 52 countries and
territories as Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
2. Forty-three of SIDS are found in the Caribbean and the
Pacific regions.
3. SIDS are a diverse group of countries with ≥ 50 million
inhabitants
4. The group comprises countries that are relatively rich
and those that relatively poor
5. SIDS are extremely dependent on the sea and its living
marine resources for their existence.

4. Small Island States :Vulnerability
1. small size;
2. remoteness;
3. vulnerability to external (demand and supply-side)
shocks;
4. narrow resource base; and
5. exposure to global environmental challenges (sea level
rise, destruction of coral reefs critical to food security
and tourism)
6. waste pollution and acidification of the oceans and
resultant loss of biodiversity

5. Small Island States :Vulnerability to climate
change
1. Many people in SIDS live in the low elevation coastal
zone (LECZ) (coast area of ≤ 10 metres above sea level).
2. LECZ are vulnerable to sea-level rise, storm surges,
floods and other climate change-induced hazards.
3. Overall impact of climate change is being felt via: water
resources availability, agriculture and food security, and
the protection of coastal zones
4. Destruction of coral reefs critical to food security and
tourism)

6. Small Island States :Vulnerability to trade
imbalances
1. SIDS are economically vulnerable due to their remoteness and smallness
(resulting in logistical costs)
2. Susceptibility to natural disasters, & fragile ecology,
3. Limited institutional capacity (in part due to limited critical mass),
4. Limited ability to diversify,
5. Strong dependence on a narrow range of exports, and high import content
(especially strategic items with volatile prices: food and fuel)
6. Rapid rise in their debt burden (due to the lack of economies of scale, high
transport costs, low trade capacities and increasing trade deficits)
7. More recently, decreasing workers’ remittances (due to global economic
downturn)
8. SIDS are disadvantaged in the negotiation of bilateral agreements because
they lacked a collective bargaining position as well as information on the
market value of their (fish) resource

7. International Logistics Performance Index
(LPI): Comparison with some of the SIDS
LP I Ra nk C o u ntry LPI
28 S o u t h A f r ic a 3 .4 6
58 S e ne g a l 2 .8 6
S a o To m e & 2 .8 6 ( 2 0 0 7 )
66 P r ia n dpae
Ug nc i 2 .8 2
78 B a ha ma s 2 .7 5
12 0 C omoros 2 .4 5
13 5 S o lo m o n 2 .3 1
14 4 I si jl i n d s
F a 2 .2 4
14 9 G u in e a 2 . 10
Source: World Bank 2010s a u
B is
LPI compares transport costs, quality of infrastructure (e.g., roads, ports, etc), tracking and tracing of
consignments, and timeliness of delivery;

8. Importance of fisheries to SIDS
According to the UN –Department of Economic &
Social Affairs (2010):
2. In some SIDS fisheries account for ≥ 50% of
exports (UN 2010)
3. Subsistence fishing supplies 50-90% of animal
protein diet of people in rural areas and
remote islands
4. In Pacific tuna fisheries contributes ≥10% of
GDP

9. SIDS and the Extent of their EEZ
EEZ of African ISDS
EEZ of Caribbean ISDS

10. Country and Size of EEZ
Country Population EEZ (km2)
Cape Verde 240,000 800,561km2
Comoros 794,683 163,752km2
Madagascar 21.9 million 1,198,722km2
Mauritius 1,303,717 1.9million km2
Seychelles 87,463 1,374,000 km²
Sao Tome & 200,000 165,364 km2
Principe

11. Country and Fish production/Consumption
C o u ntr F is h Expo Per F i s h /A n i
y P ro d u c ti rts c a p it a ma l
o n ( to ns ) ( to ns s u p p ly P r o t e in
C ape 18 , 3 2 8 14,524
) 11.6
(kg) 11.7
(%)
Ve rd e
C omor 16,000 0 19.8 56.3
o sa d a g
M 15 9 , 0 3 5 44,776 7.4 19.6
asc ar
M a u r i t i 8,476 132,554 22.8 18.4
ue
S s yc h 66,239 63,471 61.0 40.6
e lo
S la e s 4,150 6 26.5 49.3
To m e
& Yearbook (2009)
FAO
P r in c i
pe

12. Challenges of fisheries in the SIDS
1. Fish as an export commodity exerts pressure on the
resources with potential of overfishing
2. Knowledge of the level of stocks might be lacking resulting in
poor management plans
3. Poor knowledge of economic underpinning of the fisheries
resources results in rent dissipation
4. Poor governance mechanism which is manifested in Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
5. Unfavourable trade mechanisms which leads to loss of value
and wealth
6. Wealth loss through Foreign Fishing Agreements (FFA),
(assess agreements are provided for under UNCLOS)

13. Impact of governance structure on IUU Fishing
Country Catch value Average IUU as IUU value
calculated from Governance proportion of US$
FAO Score# estimated million
statistics (2003) total
US$ million catch
These figures are from country case studies
Namibia 532 0.347 0.0% 0
Mozambique 215 -0.393 15.0% 38
Kenya 15 -0.735 20.0% 4
Seychelles 137 -0.148 5.2% 8
These figures are extrapolated using the case studies above (one parameter model)
Morocco 734 -0.189 7.5% 59
Mauritania 193 -0.209 8.1% 17
Senegal 423 -0.176 7.1% 32
Cape Verde 11 0.353 0.0% 0
Guinea-Bissau 13 -0.872 29.1% 5
Cameroon 37 -0.868 28.9% 15
Equatorial Guinea 2 -1.148 37.8% 1
Sao Tome & Principe 4 -0.323 11.7% 0
South Africa 626 0.431 0.0% 0
Madagascar 247 -0.121 5.3% 14
Comoros 22 -0.827 27.6% 8
Tanzania 91 -0.451 15.7% 17
Eritrea 13 -0.977 32.4% 6
Mauritius 18 0.659 0.0% 0
Source: MGRA.2005.

14. Wealth-loss in the value chain
Fig 1. Share of value of Nile Perch from Tanzania

15. Wealth loss in the value chain
Fig 2. Share of value of Moroccan anchovy sold in Italy

16. How are SIDS losing potential wealth of their fisheries
Resources?
1. In general, according to an EU study (IFREMER 1999), Financial
payments (compensation) for Fisheries Access Agreements to
developing countries ranges between 2 and 17% (average 2.6%) of
the catch value
2. MRAG (2012) estimate that the EU is paying between 11–13% of
the market value of tuna;.
3. In comparison, Japan and Korea pay approximately 6% of the
market value of their tuna catch under agreements in the Pacific
Ocean (MRAG 2012).
4. The US pays approximately 22% of the catch value (Mwikya 2006).
5. Compared with other natural resources such as minerals, forestry
and crude oil (usually 30%) and also bearing in mind that
investment in fishing is much less compared to mining

17. 300 1400
Total Community & shipowner
Average world price (€/tonne)
contribution (€/tonne) 250 1200
1000
200
800
150
600
100
400
50 200
0 0
88
90
94
96
00
02
84
86
92
98
04
06
19
19
19
19
20
20
19
19
19
19
20
20
Total Community and shipowner contributions (€/tonne)
Average world price for whole frozen skipjack and yellowfin (€/tonne)
Figure 3 Comparison of the total community and ship owner contribution for tuna (€/tonne) with
the world market price for whole tuna (skipjack and yellow fin) (€/tonne) (Source (MRAG 2012)

18. Why are Fisheries Resources “Wealth”?
– What do we mean by wealth? In economic terms,
wealth is the value of assets owned by a person or
community.
– Africa’s fish resources represent renewable natural
capital capable of generating substantial amounts
of wealth over time and into the future
– Therefore, well-managed fisheries can produce
significant economic returns – resource rent
(surplus value or profitability) and be part of a
portfolio of wealth-producing assets, and
contribute to economic growth and welfare

19. Wealth Generation Potential of African Fisheries
Initial economic valuation undertaken by the NEPAD Agency and
endorsed by the Conference of African Ministers of Fisheries &
Aquaculture (CAMFA) is as follows:
–Africa’s fisheries as a whole has the first sale value of about US$ 4,861
million per year
–Well-managed fisheries can produce annual resource rents
(Profitability) between 30% and 70% of the first sale value.
–Our estimate used a conservative rule of thumb of 40% of turnover,
to give potential annual fish resource rent generation for Africa is
about US $2 billion.
–However, capitalising this annual value at a discount rate of 9% gives
an estimate of the wealth value of US$22 billion.

20. Fisheries Opportunities for SIDS
– Demand for fish is rising globally, including Africa (rising middle-class)
– The fisheries constraints of SIDS were first recognized by the 15th
Session of COFI in 1983 (Special Problems of the SIDS in the
Management and Development of Fisheries under the New Regime of
the Oceans)
– The special case of SIDS within the context of sustainable development
was first formally recognized by the UN (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in
1992.
– More awareness among SIDS (and trading partners) of the need for
good fisheries governance
– International agreements provide for better management of fisheries
resources (UNCLOS 1982 including the right to exploit EEZs; FAO Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) and the UN Agreement on
Straddling and Highly Migratory Stocks (1995)

21. Fisheries Opportunities for SIDS
1. Collaborative regional management of fisheries (e.g. Tuna RMFOs,
ICCAT in the Atlantic, IOTC in the Indian Ocean and WCPTC and
IATTC in combination with the Forum Fisheries Association in the
Pacific
2. The Global Island Partnership (GLISPA) (launched in 2006) is a
global entity working to help islands around the world conserve
and sustainably utilize their invaluable natural resources

22. Options for better returns
1. Fishing should contribution toward Sustainable
Exploitation (MEY vs. MSY)
2. The need to improve knowledge of the fishery (better
data collection and analysis)
3. Good governance aimed at elimination of IUU Fishing
4. Support integration of the national fisheries sector into
the global economy (e.g. Via Joint Ventures rather than
FFA). Good examples are Namibia
5. To realize the massive wealth-generating potential, it is
important to create an enabling environment that
provides fishers with incentives and confidence to invest
in the fish resource itself

23. Estimation of rent using octopus
Mauritania fisheries
OPTION 1: keep 10 boats and
reduce f à fMSY
CA=$119m
MSY 34.000t
CT
Price Rent =$26m
$3.500/t 26.600t
Revenu, Coût, Rendement
$93m RT
Cost =$93m
Surplus
effort 31%
Effort de pêche
100

24. Estimation of rent using octopus Mauritania
fisheries
OPTION 2: Reducing f by reducing the
number of boats
Price CA=$119m
$3.500/t MSY 34.000t
CT
Cost/
boat
Revenu, Coût, Rendement
$0,93m Rent=$54m RT
Surplus
effort 31%
Cost=$65m
70
Effort de pêche
100

25. Best Practices among SIDS
1. Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fisheries capture ~2.4
million tons annually
2. The fishery is managed by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (WCPFC)
3. Pacific Island Countries (PICs) maintain the sovereign right of coastal States
to determine catches within their EEZs
4. WCPFC develops measures for the high seas
5. Eight PICs have organized as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA;
Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau,
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu).
6. The PNA are managing the WCPO purse seine fishery, maximizing economic
returns from their members’ coastal resources and developing their
domestic industries and economies.
7. Vessel Day Schemes (VDS) are used, resulting in revenues from fishing access
fees to comprise over 40% of some of the PNA members’ GDP.

26. Where are Best Practices?
• A Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) for controlling purse seine tuna fishing
effort within the national waters of eight members of the Parties to
the Nauru Agreement was implemented in December 2007.
• While originally conceived as a mechanism to control fishing effort,
the VDS has the capacity to complement and possibly replace
historical bilateral access agreements through creation of an
economic instrument capable of optimising rents from foreign fishing
by defining, selling and trading a limited supply of harvesting rights
owned by coastal States (MRAG 2012).
• To supplement the VDS, the PNA adopted further conservation and
management measures for foreign fishing vessels in 2008 which
included 100% purse seine observer coverage, a three-month closure
of FAD fishing, and prohibition of fishing by PNA-licensed vessels in
high seas pockets.

27. Conclusion and way forward
1. Increases awareness amongst key policy makers of the true value
of the fish resources
2. Can create an enabling environment that provides fishers with
incentives and confidence to invest in and manage the fish
resources
3. Develops practical strategies that can help realise wealth
generation potential of fish resources
4. Strategies for adaptation to climate change (NAPAS) should
include fisheries
5. SIDS should adopt collective bargaining position on international
negotiations
6. SIDS should share information on the market value of their fish
resource
7. SIDS should be more integrated into the mainland economies in
order to tap into regional markets