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Security as a New Metric for Your
Business, Product and Development
Lifecycle
by Nazar Tymoshyk, SoftServe, Ph.D., CEH
OWASP Chapter Lviv запрошує на останню зустріч групи OWASP Ukraine
цього року. Проведіть чудові 2 дні у Львові з найкращими Security
спеціалістами України.
Реєстрація у: https://goo.gl/5hdvPH
http://owasp-lviv.blogspot.com/
Тематика:
• Безпека Веб і Мобільних аплікацій
• Взлом REST і JavaScript базованих
аплікацій
• Розслідування взломів
• Reverse-Engineering
• Розвод, кідалово і маніпуляція
свідомістю юзерів
• Хмарна і безхмарна безпека
• Фізичний взлом + Escape Quest
14 листопада 2015, субота, Львів, вул. Садова 2А
Львівка кава, кавярні і пиво, круте
товариство, нові знайомства, воркшопи,
знання на халяву – все це чекає на вас у
нашому затишному місті!
OWASP Ukraine
2015
Security meetup у Львові
Physical Hacking
Escape quest
OWASP Ukraine 2015
Lviv meetup, November 14, 2015
Elite HACKERS
Industry Experts
The most interesting Security event of Ukraine
Hands on Labs
Collaboration
Competition
Powered by
Security as a metric
Total served: 24
Completed: 10
Internal: 3
Lost: 14
Win rate: 67%
H1 2014
Total served: 26
Completed: 12
Internal: 3
Lost: 14
Win rate: 46%
H1 2015
Updated business model allow us to generate more revenue
from same amount of opportunities
Agenda
Business
Products
Your imaginary
Questions
Developers
BUSINESS
A rough year in 2012
A more challenging year - 2013
• Akamai reports that 2013 attack
traffic is averaging over 86% above
normal.
• This report shows April 30 attack
traffic is 117.53% higher than the
42% increase seen in 2012
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/wor
WHY your clients NEED Security
Industry
Compliance
Government
Regulation
Business
availability
Capitalization
Statistic of Breaches
Customer
requirement
Previous bad
experience
Consequences of Security FAILURE
Trust
Money
Data
stolen
Time
to recover
Penalties
for incident
Customers
Reputation
Super user
Subscriptions
Your
very sad
client
Penalty tool
We were hacked
because of YOU!
If your Cloud server is hacked….
PRODUCT
Simple ROI of Product security
Connected Cars are part of
smart
houses
smart
TVs
smart
watches
smart
phones
smart
cars
smart
fridges
????
Typical Security Report delivered by competitor
How security is linked to development
Than start process of re-Coding, re-Building, re-Testing, re-Auditing
3rd party or internal audit
Tone of
security
defects
BACK to re-Coding, re-Building, re-Testing, re-Auditing
Design Build Test Production
GENERIC APPROACH FOR SECURITY
security
requirements / risk
and threat analysis
coding guidelines
/code reviews/
static analysis
security testing /
dynamic analysis
vulnerability
scanning / WAF
Reactive ApproachProactive Approach
Secure SDLC
How it should look like
With proper Security Program number of
security defects should decrease from phase
to phase
Automated
security
Tests
CI
integrated
Manual
Security/penetration
Testing
OWASP methodology
Secure
Coding
trainings
Regular
Vulnerability
Scans
Minimize the costs of the
Security related issues
Avoid repetitive security
issues
Avoid inconsistent level of
the security
Determine activities that
pay back faster during
current state of the project
Remember I'm offering you the truth. Nothing More.
To do Security or not to Do
QA Engineer Security expert
In functional and performance testing, the
expected results are documented before the
test begins, and the quality assurance team
looks at how well the expected results match
the actual results
In security testing, security analysts team is
concerned only with unexpected results and
testing for the unknown and looking for
weaknesses. They are EXPERTS.
VS.
Our app code
need to be verified
for Security
PM and SoftServe
Demonstrate excellence
Competitiveadvantage
Reporting
for 2 security experts
Report with findings
Fix it! Non compliant?Good boys!
Security
Center of Excellence
Request
App
verification
PM
• Explain security defect and
severity
• Fix identified security defects
• Train developers and QA
• Transfer checklists and guides
GreatAchievement
Scenario 1.
PM worried about security on
project.
Code micro-assessment.
Re-check
Monitor
Next page
How to present to client
and earn more $$$ ?
• Scan sources with Tools
• Filtering False Positive
• Compile report
• Review architecture
• Dynamic test
• Rate risks
Delivery Director/PM
Oh Rashid,
Who wrote it?
We have found
some security
issues with your
legacy code
Indian team. Our
security experts can
perform comprehensive
Security Assessment
And then our dev team
will fix identified defects
as it put other projects
under risk
Ok, do it. How
much should it
cost?
Only $XX.XXX
for Security
AssessmentDeal!
Do it ASAP.
1 2
34
Report sample
DEVELOPMENT
Risks are for managers, not developers
PEOPLE
always
bypass
restriction
if possible
Keep in mind this when
you design security
• Focus on functional requirements
• Know about:
– OWASP Top 10
– 1 threat (DEADLINE fail)
• Implement Requirements as they can
• Testing it’s for QA job
«I know when I’m writing code I’m not
thinking about evil, I’m just trying to think about functionality» (с)
Scott Hanselman
Developer & Security
Why code analysis do not
resolve a problem?
Many of the CWE vulnerability types,
are design issues, or business logic
issues.
Application security testing tools are
being sold as a solution to the problem of
insecure software.
Mobile banking app from Pakistan
What is wrong?
Recommended error messages by OWASP
Incorrect Response Examples
"Login for User foo: invalid password"
"Login failed, invalid user ID"
"Login failed; account disabled"
"Login failed; this user is not active"
Correct Response Example
"Login failed; Invalid userID or password"
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet
What is wrong on next stage of Login process?
Critical Business Logic bypass
There was possibility to get personal info
(promo code, email, password etc.) of
subscription which is not related to currently
logged User using
Critical Business Logic bypass
There was possibility to make changes to
personal info of subscription (email, password,
name e.g.) using User.updateSubscription
method even in case appropriate user is not
logged in
Critical Business Logic bypass
• There is possibility to convert any standalone
subscriptions to managed no matter whether
appropriate user is logged in or not using
User.setSubscriptionToManaged function
(you can make any user to pay for paid
features of your subscriptions)
Critical Business Logic bypass
There was possibility to delete
subscriptions/credit card which are not related to
currently logged user using
User.deleteSubscription/deleteCredit Card
function
Browser exploitation framework
Social Engineering
SQL-Injections to win a Trip
Dumped admin password hashes
Simple SOAP request
fuzzing allow collecting
information about existent
system users, their emails,
VIN, Last access time, user
ID and other confidential,
user/car related
information
Broken Session management
Why so simple?
Story about Hybrid Mobile
Development in India
Reversing Java/iOS application
this app feature
Reversing Java / iOS
application this app feature
WEAK Cryptography
v
Was cleaned up by Vendor
Team
REMOVED CODE APPEARS AGAIN IN
APPSTORE APP
v
Appear Again in App
from AppStore
HARDCODED CREDENTIALS
v
v
v
Severity: Critical (C )/P1
Business impact: Medium (M)/P3
BACKEND SECURITY
v
v
Severity: Critical (C )/P1
Business impact: Critical (C )/P1
WEAK PASSWORDS
Severity: Critical (C )/P1
Business impact: Critical (C )/P1
DEVELOPER TEAM FACEPALM
v
ENCRYPTION PASSWORD AFTER
APPSTORE RELEASE
vv
v
v
v
v
SENSITIVE FILE ARTIFACTS
v
Severity: Low (L)/P4.
Business impact: No business impact
v v
All Apps are considered safe until proven
guilty by a security review
Financial
Institution
SENSITIVE CLIENT INFORMATION
AS A CONSEQUENCE – CUSTOMERS TRUST COULD BE LOST.
Customers database dump
defaults and sample files
Forgotten Files on server
Upload Java shell and take server under control
Are your
product
Popular?
You are Next Target
How to PROTECT?
Security Frameworks
Right Security Requirements
Penetration Testing
Code Scan and Review
Security Trainings
Threat Modelling
Dedicated Security Expert
OWASP.org
Add Security into your PROCESS
Security
THANK YOU
67
Contact me:
skype: root_nt
email: root.nt@gmail.com
Join OWASP:
http://owasp-lviv.blogspot.com/
FEEDBACK &
QUESTIONS
Home Work

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Security as a new metric for Business, Product and Development Lifecycle

  • 1. Security as a New Metric for Your Business, Product and Development Lifecycle by Nazar Tymoshyk, SoftServe, Ph.D., CEH
  • 2. OWASP Chapter Lviv запрошує на останню зустріч групи OWASP Ukraine цього року. Проведіть чудові 2 дні у Львові з найкращими Security спеціалістами України. Реєстрація у: https://goo.gl/5hdvPH http://owasp-lviv.blogspot.com/ Тематика: • Безпека Веб і Мобільних аплікацій • Взлом REST і JavaScript базованих аплікацій • Розслідування взломів • Reverse-Engineering • Розвод, кідалово і маніпуляція свідомістю юзерів • Хмарна і безхмарна безпека • Фізичний взлом + Escape Quest 14 листопада 2015, субота, Львів, вул. Садова 2А Львівка кава, кавярні і пиво, круте товариство, нові знайомства, воркшопи, знання на халяву – все це чекає на вас у нашому затишному місті! OWASP Ukraine 2015 Security meetup у Львові
  • 3. Physical Hacking Escape quest OWASP Ukraine 2015 Lviv meetup, November 14, 2015 Elite HACKERS Industry Experts The most interesting Security event of Ukraine Hands on Labs Collaboration Competition Powered by
  • 4. Security as a metric Total served: 24 Completed: 10 Internal: 3 Lost: 14 Win rate: 67% H1 2014 Total served: 26 Completed: 12 Internal: 3 Lost: 14 Win rate: 46% H1 2015 Updated business model allow us to generate more revenue from same amount of opportunities
  • 7. A rough year in 2012
  • 8. A more challenging year - 2013 • Akamai reports that 2013 attack traffic is averaging over 86% above normal. • This report shows April 30 attack traffic is 117.53% higher than the 42% increase seen in 2012
  • 10.
  • 11.
  • 12. WHY your clients NEED Security Industry Compliance Government Regulation Business availability Capitalization Statistic of Breaches Customer requirement Previous bad experience
  • 13. Consequences of Security FAILURE Trust Money Data stolen Time to recover Penalties for incident Customers Reputation
  • 14. Super user Subscriptions Your very sad client Penalty tool We were hacked because of YOU!
  • 15. If your Cloud server is hacked….
  • 17. Simple ROI of Product security
  • 18. Connected Cars are part of smart houses smart TVs smart watches smart phones smart cars smart fridges ????
  • 19. Typical Security Report delivered by competitor
  • 20. How security is linked to development Than start process of re-Coding, re-Building, re-Testing, re-Auditing 3rd party or internal audit Tone of security defects BACK to re-Coding, re-Building, re-Testing, re-Auditing
  • 21. Design Build Test Production GENERIC APPROACH FOR SECURITY security requirements / risk and threat analysis coding guidelines /code reviews/ static analysis security testing / dynamic analysis vulnerability scanning / WAF Reactive ApproachProactive Approach Secure SDLC
  • 22. How it should look like With proper Security Program number of security defects should decrease from phase to phase Automated security Tests CI integrated Manual Security/penetration Testing OWASP methodology Secure Coding trainings Regular Vulnerability Scans Minimize the costs of the Security related issues Avoid repetitive security issues Avoid inconsistent level of the security Determine activities that pay back faster during current state of the project
  • 23.
  • 24. Remember I'm offering you the truth. Nothing More. To do Security or not to Do
  • 25. QA Engineer Security expert In functional and performance testing, the expected results are documented before the test begins, and the quality assurance team looks at how well the expected results match the actual results In security testing, security analysts team is concerned only with unexpected results and testing for the unknown and looking for weaknesses. They are EXPERTS. VS.
  • 26. Our app code need to be verified for Security PM and SoftServe Demonstrate excellence Competitiveadvantage Reporting for 2 security experts Report with findings Fix it! Non compliant?Good boys! Security Center of Excellence Request App verification PM • Explain security defect and severity • Fix identified security defects • Train developers and QA • Transfer checklists and guides GreatAchievement Scenario 1. PM worried about security on project. Code micro-assessment. Re-check Monitor Next page How to present to client and earn more $$$ ? • Scan sources with Tools • Filtering False Positive • Compile report • Review architecture • Dynamic test • Rate risks Delivery Director/PM
  • 27. Oh Rashid, Who wrote it? We have found some security issues with your legacy code Indian team. Our security experts can perform comprehensive Security Assessment And then our dev team will fix identified defects as it put other projects under risk Ok, do it. How much should it cost? Only $XX.XXX for Security AssessmentDeal! Do it ASAP. 1 2 34
  • 30. Risks are for managers, not developers
  • 31. PEOPLE always bypass restriction if possible Keep in mind this when you design security
  • 32. • Focus on functional requirements • Know about: – OWASP Top 10 – 1 threat (DEADLINE fail) • Implement Requirements as they can • Testing it’s for QA job «I know when I’m writing code I’m not thinking about evil, I’m just trying to think about functionality» (с) Scott Hanselman Developer & Security
  • 33. Why code analysis do not resolve a problem? Many of the CWE vulnerability types, are design issues, or business logic issues. Application security testing tools are being sold as a solution to the problem of insecure software.
  • 34. Mobile banking app from Pakistan
  • 36. Recommended error messages by OWASP Incorrect Response Examples "Login for User foo: invalid password" "Login failed, invalid user ID" "Login failed; account disabled" "Login failed; this user is not active" Correct Response Example "Login failed; Invalid userID or password" https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet
  • 37. What is wrong on next stage of Login process?
  • 38. Critical Business Logic bypass There was possibility to get personal info (promo code, email, password etc.) of subscription which is not related to currently logged User using
  • 39. Critical Business Logic bypass There was possibility to make changes to personal info of subscription (email, password, name e.g.) using User.updateSubscription method even in case appropriate user is not logged in
  • 40. Critical Business Logic bypass • There is possibility to convert any standalone subscriptions to managed no matter whether appropriate user is logged in or not using User.setSubscriptionToManaged function (you can make any user to pay for paid features of your subscriptions)
  • 41. Critical Business Logic bypass There was possibility to delete subscriptions/credit card which are not related to currently logged user using User.deleteSubscription/deleteCredit Card function
  • 44. SQL-Injections to win a Trip Dumped admin password hashes
  • 45. Simple SOAP request fuzzing allow collecting information about existent system users, their emails, VIN, Last access time, user ID and other confidential, user/car related information Broken Session management
  • 47. Story about Hybrid Mobile Development in India
  • 48. Reversing Java/iOS application this app feature Reversing Java / iOS application this app feature
  • 49. WEAK Cryptography v Was cleaned up by Vendor Team
  • 50. REMOVED CODE APPEARS AGAIN IN APPSTORE APP v Appear Again in App from AppStore
  • 51. HARDCODED CREDENTIALS v v v Severity: Critical (C )/P1 Business impact: Medium (M)/P3
  • 52. BACKEND SECURITY v v Severity: Critical (C )/P1 Business impact: Critical (C )/P1
  • 53. WEAK PASSWORDS Severity: Critical (C )/P1 Business impact: Critical (C )/P1
  • 56. SENSITIVE FILE ARTIFACTS v Severity: Low (L)/P4. Business impact: No business impact v v
  • 57. All Apps are considered safe until proven guilty by a security review Financial Institution
  • 58. SENSITIVE CLIENT INFORMATION AS A CONSEQUENCE – CUSTOMERS TRUST COULD BE LOST.
  • 62. Upload Java shell and take server under control
  • 64. How to PROTECT? Security Frameworks Right Security Requirements Penetration Testing Code Scan and Review Security Trainings Threat Modelling Dedicated Security Expert OWASP.org
  • 65. Add Security into your PROCESS
  • 67. THANK YOU 67 Contact me: skype: root_nt email: root.nt@gmail.com Join OWASP: http://owasp-lviv.blogspot.com/ FEEDBACK & QUESTIONS

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. майндмапа дала зрозуміти які сценарії і як використовувати щоб приносити бенефіти на існуючих проектах сценарії бабло інволвмент виконавці часові фрейми усування конкурентів вирішення ряду бізнес проблем наприклад усунення конкурентів