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How the Dynamic Duo of
Vault and Puppet Tame SSL Certificates
Nick Maludy
@NickMaludy
github.com/nmaludy
Engineer, Husband, Dad
Self Signed Verification Flow
Server
Client
App/Browser
CA
public
Web Server
priv
pub
2. Pub Key
1. Hello
3. Verify PUB KEY
DOESN’T
MATCH
CA
NO TRUST!
Proper SSL Verification Flow
Server
Client
App/Browser
CA
public
Web Server
priv
pub
2. Pub Key
1. Hello
3. Verify PUB KEY
MATCHES
ONE OF
THE CAs
TRUSTED!
PKI Old School
Root CA
Linux Windows
Root Root
Public Private Public Private
Apache / Nginx IIS
CSR CSR
Public Public
CSR CSR
Manually
Copy
Manually
Copy
Sign Sign
Manually
Copy
Manually
Copy
Manually
Copy
Client Client
Root Root
Root
Villains
•Painful signed certs
•Oprah – self signed certs for everyone
•No trust
•Disable validation
•MITM Attacks
•Renewal and Expiration
•Security tickets
Call For Help
•Security
• Centrally signed with CA
• Validation enabled
• Strong ciphers
•DevOps
• Auto renewal
• Cross-platform
• Integrated with services
•Configuration Management
•Distribution
•encore/vault module
•vault_cert {}
•github.com/EncoreTechnologies/puppet-vault
Justice
HashiCorp Vault Puppet
•PKI Secrets Engine
•REST API
PKI with Vault + Puppet (vault_cert)
Root CA
Vault CA
Puppet Server
Root Vault
Sign Intermediate CA
Copy
Copy
Copy
Linux Windows
Root Vault Root Vault
Public Private Public Private
Apache / Nginx IIS
Client
Root Vault
Client
Root Vault
Check
Expiration
Check
Revocation
Revoke old Create New
Write to
filesystem
Bounce
service
vault_cert run
vault_cert { ‘synapse’:
cert_dir => '/etc/pki/tls/certs’
priv_key_dir => '/etc/pki/tls/private’
notify => Service[‘nginx’],
}
nginx::resource::server { ‘synapse’:
ssl_port => 443,
ssl => true,
ssl_cert => '/etc/pki/tls/certs/synapse.crt',
ssl_key => '/etc/pki/tls/private/ synapse.key’,
}
Linux
Linux
Public Private
Nginx
Vault CA
CSR
Cert & Key
Write to
Filesystem
Reload
Service
Puppet 101
Windows problem
• Certs in cert store have a path
• Cert:LocalMachineMy<UNIQUE-THUMBPRINT>
• Cert:LocalMachineMyABC1234
• Thumbprints are unique
• Thumbprints = hash of cert content
• Services bind to cert path
• relies on Thumbprint
vault_cert { ‘chocolatey’:
cert_dir => 'Cert:LocalMachineMy’
notify => Service[‘iis’],
}
iis_binding { ‘chocolatey’:
binding_info => {
certificatestore => ‘Cert:LocalMachineMy’
certificatehash => WHAT DO I PUT HERE????,
},
}
Windows Manifest
PROBLEM: Puppet can’t output data from a resource
Windows solution – Use a function!
• Functions run on the server
• Function calls Vault API
• Embed certificate in Catalog
• Path to certificate is known at compile time
$cert_output = vault::cert(...args...)
vault_cert { ‘chocolatey’:
cert => $cert_output['cert’],
priv_key => $cert_output['priv_key’],
}
iis_binding { ‘chocolatey’:
binding_info => {
certificatehash => $cert_output['thumbprint'],
},
}
Windows solution Vault CA
Windows
Public Private
IIS
2. CSR
4. Embed in Catalog
7. Write to
Cert Store
Puppet Server
1. Facts
3. Cert & Key
5. Catalog
6. Agent
8. Bind and reload IIS
Windows “machine cert”
profile
class profile::machine_cert {
$data = vault::cert(args)
vault_cert { $trusted['certname’]:
cert => $data['cert’],
priv_key => $data['priv_key’],
}
}
#########################
class { ‘winrm’:
certificate_hash => $profile::machine_cert::data['thumbprint'],
}
iis_binding { ‘chocolatey’:
binding_info => {
certificatehash => $profile::machine_cert::data['thumbprint’],
}
}
CA Cert Manifest Linux
class profile::ca (Hash $certs) {
class { 'trusted_ca': }
create_resources('trusted_ca::ca’, $certs)
}
profile::ca::certs:
vault.domain.tld:
content: |
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
xxx
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Hiera (YAML Config Data)
Puppet Server
Root Vault
Linux
Root Vault
puppet/trusted_ca
1. Facts
2. Compile
3. Hiera
4. Catalog
5. Apply
6. Write to Filesystem
CA Certs on Windows
file { 'C:/ProgramData/Puppetlabs/ca_certs':
ensure => directory,
}
# root certs go into Cert:/LocalMachine/Root
$certs.each |$name, $data| {
file { "C:/ProgramData/Puppetlabs/ca_certs/${name}.crt":
ensure => file,
content => $data['content'],
}
$cert_details = vault::cert_details($data['content'])
sslcertificate { "${name}.crt":
location => 'C:ProgramDataPuppetlabsca_certs',
thumbprint => $cert_details['thumbprint'],
store_dir => 'Root',
interstore => true,
}
Puppet Master
Root Vault
Windows
Root Vault
puppet/sslcertificate
3. Catalog
1. Facts
2. Compile
5. Write to Cert Store
4. Agent
Vault + Puppet = Dynamic Duo
•Every server has a cert (500+)
•CA distributed Cross Platform
•Services bound to certs
•Certs auto-renew (30d)
•Services auto-refreshed
•Validation enabled
Future
•DevOps for HPC
•GPU Algorithms
•C++
•Heavily Optimized Software
Thanks!
@NickMaludy
github.com/nmaludy
github.com/EncoreTechnologies/puppet-vault

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Hashitalks 2021 - How the Dynamic Duo of Vault and Puppet Tame SSL Certificates

  • 1. How the Dynamic Duo of Vault and Puppet Tame SSL Certificates
  • 3. Self Signed Verification Flow Server Client App/Browser CA public Web Server priv pub 2. Pub Key 1. Hello 3. Verify PUB KEY DOESN’T MATCH CA NO TRUST!
  • 4. Proper SSL Verification Flow Server Client App/Browser CA public Web Server priv pub 2. Pub Key 1. Hello 3. Verify PUB KEY MATCHES ONE OF THE CAs TRUSTED!
  • 5. PKI Old School Root CA Linux Windows Root Root Public Private Public Private Apache / Nginx IIS CSR CSR Public Public CSR CSR Manually Copy Manually Copy Sign Sign Manually Copy Manually Copy Manually Copy Client Client Root Root Root
  • 6. Villains •Painful signed certs •Oprah – self signed certs for everyone •No trust •Disable validation •MITM Attacks •Renewal and Expiration •Security tickets
  • 7. Call For Help •Security • Centrally signed with CA • Validation enabled • Strong ciphers •DevOps • Auto renewal • Cross-platform • Integrated with services
  • 8. •Configuration Management •Distribution •encore/vault module •vault_cert {} •github.com/EncoreTechnologies/puppet-vault Justice HashiCorp Vault Puppet •PKI Secrets Engine •REST API
  • 9. PKI with Vault + Puppet (vault_cert) Root CA Vault CA Puppet Server Root Vault Sign Intermediate CA Copy Copy Copy Linux Windows Root Vault Root Vault Public Private Public Private Apache / Nginx IIS Client Root Vault Client Root Vault
  • 10. Check Expiration Check Revocation Revoke old Create New Write to filesystem Bounce service vault_cert run
  • 11. vault_cert { ‘synapse’: cert_dir => '/etc/pki/tls/certs’ priv_key_dir => '/etc/pki/tls/private’ notify => Service[‘nginx’], } nginx::resource::server { ‘synapse’: ssl_port => 443, ssl => true, ssl_cert => '/etc/pki/tls/certs/synapse.crt', ssl_key => '/etc/pki/tls/private/ synapse.key’, } Linux Linux Public Private Nginx Vault CA CSR Cert & Key Write to Filesystem Reload Service
  • 13. Windows problem • Certs in cert store have a path • Cert:LocalMachineMy<UNIQUE-THUMBPRINT> • Cert:LocalMachineMyABC1234 • Thumbprints are unique • Thumbprints = hash of cert content • Services bind to cert path • relies on Thumbprint
  • 14. vault_cert { ‘chocolatey’: cert_dir => 'Cert:LocalMachineMy’ notify => Service[‘iis’], } iis_binding { ‘chocolatey’: binding_info => { certificatestore => ‘Cert:LocalMachineMy’ certificatehash => WHAT DO I PUT HERE????, }, } Windows Manifest PROBLEM: Puppet can’t output data from a resource
  • 15. Windows solution – Use a function! • Functions run on the server • Function calls Vault API • Embed certificate in Catalog • Path to certificate is known at compile time
  • 16. $cert_output = vault::cert(...args...) vault_cert { ‘chocolatey’: cert => $cert_output['cert’], priv_key => $cert_output['priv_key’], } iis_binding { ‘chocolatey’: binding_info => { certificatehash => $cert_output['thumbprint'], }, } Windows solution Vault CA Windows Public Private IIS 2. CSR 4. Embed in Catalog 7. Write to Cert Store Puppet Server 1. Facts 3. Cert & Key 5. Catalog 6. Agent 8. Bind and reload IIS
  • 17. Windows “machine cert” profile class profile::machine_cert { $data = vault::cert(args) vault_cert { $trusted['certname’]: cert => $data['cert’], priv_key => $data['priv_key’], } } ######################### class { ‘winrm’: certificate_hash => $profile::machine_cert::data['thumbprint'], } iis_binding { ‘chocolatey’: binding_info => { certificatehash => $profile::machine_cert::data['thumbprint’], } }
  • 18. CA Cert Manifest Linux class profile::ca (Hash $certs) { class { 'trusted_ca': } create_resources('trusted_ca::ca’, $certs) } profile::ca::certs: vault.domain.tld: content: | -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- xxx -----END CERTIFICATE----- Hiera (YAML Config Data) Puppet Server Root Vault Linux Root Vault puppet/trusted_ca 1. Facts 2. Compile 3. Hiera 4. Catalog 5. Apply 6. Write to Filesystem
  • 19. CA Certs on Windows file { 'C:/ProgramData/Puppetlabs/ca_certs': ensure => directory, } # root certs go into Cert:/LocalMachine/Root $certs.each |$name, $data| { file { "C:/ProgramData/Puppetlabs/ca_certs/${name}.crt": ensure => file, content => $data['content'], } $cert_details = vault::cert_details($data['content']) sslcertificate { "${name}.crt": location => 'C:ProgramDataPuppetlabsca_certs', thumbprint => $cert_details['thumbprint'], store_dir => 'Root', interstore => true, } Puppet Master Root Vault Windows Root Vault puppet/sslcertificate 3. Catalog 1. Facts 2. Compile 5. Write to Cert Store 4. Agent
  • 20. Vault + Puppet = Dynamic Duo •Every server has a cert (500+) •CA distributed Cross Platform •Services bound to certs •Certs auto-renew (30d) •Services auto-refreshed •Validation enabled
  • 21. Future •DevOps for HPC •GPU Algorithms •C++ •Heavily Optimized Software

Notes de l'éditeur

  1. Show lock link
  2. - Landscape? - Ohio in middle of the Brown Field - - Windows - 2008 - 2012 - 2016 - Linux - RHEL 6 & 7 - Ubuntu 14.04, 16.04, 18.04
  3. - Parts - CA Cert - Server public / private keys - Signing infrastructure
  4. - Security - More often (weekly) - Faster (1 day or less) - Reports of available patches - - DevOps - HA groups - Customizable workflows - Cross-platform - Windows Update + Chocolatey
  5. - Built on bolt - - Open source for community - - Eat our own dogfood - - Forge
  6. - Parts - CA Cert - Server public / private keys - Signing infrastructure
  7. - Available updates - Create snapshot - Pre - app shutdowns - Update - Post - Reboot - Delete snapshot
  8. - Inventory YAML on the left - - Result on the right - - Puts data into a array - - Sorted by patching order - - If multiple inventory groups with same patching_order, result in one group - - Allows inventory to be defined by different dimension, say application
  9. - Show screenshot of cert paths in powershell
  10. - Show screenshot of cert paths in powershell
  11. - Inventory YAML on the left - - Result on the right - - Puts data into a array - - Sorted by patching order - - If multiple inventory groups with same patching_order, result in one group - - Allows inventory to be defined by different dimension, say application
  12. - Windows - Choco upagrade all : EASY - Special snowflake windows update - Scheduled task - RHEL - yum update - Ubuntu - apt-get dist-upgrade
  13. - Opinionated workflow - - Uses all of the components we just talked about - - Customizable / pluggable - vars - dynamic dispatch - - Super easy way to get started - - Fully expect people to make their own workflows
  14. - Opinionated workflow - - Uses all of the components we just talked about - - Customizable / pluggable - vars - dynamic dispatch - - Super easy way to get started - - Fully expect people to make their own workflows
  15. - Opinionated workflow - - Uses all of the components we just talked about - - Customizable / pluggable - vars - dynamic dispatch - - Super easy way to get started - - Fully expect people to make their own workflows
  16. - Opinionated workflow - - Uses all of the components we just talked about - - Customizable / pluggable - vars - dynamic dispatch - - Super easy way to get started - - Fully expect people to make their own workflows
  17. - 500+ Vms - 6x internal and customer environments - - 1 engineer - < 1 day - - Every week - dev = latest - prod = dev from week before
  18. - Monitoring - SolarWinds - Prometheus - - Reporting - - Notifications - email - Slack - - ServiceNow change integration - - Inventory from Satellite, WSUS, AD, IPA, Vmware, ServiceNow - - More workflows - Network patching - Vmware patching
  19. - Thanks! - - Build a patching community - - Twitter, github - - Puppet slack #puppetize-pdx