Resilience Capabilities Programme
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Resilience Capabilities Programme
- 1. Resilience Capabilities Programme Civil Contingencies Secretariat
- 2. 2 Resilience Capabilities Programme Before The resilience capabilities survey was conducted every 2 years and provided a long and detailed assessment of individual capabilities. Purpose The UK continually aims to improve the way it prepares for, responds to and recovers from civil emergencies. The Resilience Capabilities Programme (RCP) aims to understand and develop our ability to respond to civil emergencies, by assessing the of the risks in the National Risk Assessment. Now CCS has developed a unique methodology designed to assess those same capabilities, but in a way that is comparable across government and local area; it provides a more holistic, multi-capability view of response. What is the Resilience Capabilities Programme?
- 3. 3 Resilience Capabilities Programme The capabilities required to respond to the risks assessed in the RCP Health Technical Facilitators Services
- 4. The seven elements Plans & Procedures Personnel Infrastructure Equipment & Supplies Legislation & Doctrine Information Training & Exercising these establish the framework that guide responders and others during an emergency. describes who is needed (e.g. vets, doctors, police) and how many to respond to a crisis. Are there enough trained people? acquisition, development, management and disposal of buildings, land, utilities, and other structures needed during an emergency. these include expendable and non-expendable items needed during an emergency (e.g. vehicles, body bags, etc.) provides the foundations to deliver a response. Includes laws, concepts, terminology, principles and ways of working. data, information and knowledge needed during an emergency (e.g. wind direction in a flooding event) – and the means to share it. the means to practice, develop and validate plans to deliver effectively during an emergency.
- 5. Methodology 5 Resilience Capabilities Programme 1 2 3 Capability owners then take part in Resilience Capability Mapping interviews; they are asked questions about each capability to build a picture of current performance The RCP takes a representative sample of risks from the NSRA and maps which capabilities are called upon by each risk scenario Each capability is assessed in terms of seven elements 4 Each capability owner is asked the same set of simple, comparable questions about each of the seven elements
- 6. 6 Resilience Capabilities Programme OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
- 7. 7 Resilience Capabilities Programme Red is the ‘worst’ rating. It does not mean failure, it just means worse than orange. Purple is next and reflects uncertainty in the data. With further data, this may turn into red, orange or green. Orange is in the middle. Green is the ‘best’ rating. It does not mean good, it just means better than orange The colour coding system 1. A colour coding system underpins the RCP methodology. 2. The data behind each element, capability and risk determines their overall colour. 3. These are relative indicators and do not have an absolute definition.
- 8. 8 Resilience Capabilities Programme CAP6 Risk XYZ
- 9. 9 Resilience Capabilities Programme CAP6 Risk XYZ “How would you rate the capability element’s effectiveness?” Big capability gap Small capability gap Good enough “How would you rate your confidence in that assessment?” Internal opinion Independent opinion Objective assessment, quality assured Objective assessment, not quality assured “How would you rate the importance of this capability element?” Not important Important Critical
- 10. 10 Resilience Capabilities Programme CAP6 Risk XYZ The following logic is used to determine the colour or outcome of each element.
- 11. 11 Resilience Capabilities Programme CAP6 Risk XYZ The information from the seven elements is then aggregated in order to determine the capability outcome.
- 12. 12 Resilience Capabilities Programme CAP6 Risk XYZ The information from the capabilities is then aggregated to define the overall risk rating
- 13. Capability ratings across full range of risks within the RCP (Toy Data) 13 Large Capability Gap Small Capability Gap Unknown Good Enough
- 14. Examples (Toy Data) 32 27 26 26 23 20 4 Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 244 180 179 156 137 115 22 Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 166 42 34 13 12 12 9 Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Frequency of critical capability elements – across all RCP capability assessments Frequency of large capability gaps for capability elements – across all RCP capability assessments Frequency of not important capability elements – across all RCP capability assessments 14 Resilience Capabilities Programme
- 15. Benefits 15 Resilience Capabilities Programme Assesses capabilities in a more comparable way, allowing a picture of relative performance to be built up Identifies gaps in capabilities – during a response, the framework is useful to predict which elements of the response may require more support or attention Provides an evidence base to highlight areas that may need more resource The RCP provides us with a common framework that…
Notes de l'éditeur
- The Resilience Capabilities Programme aims to understand and develop HMG’s ability to respond to civil emergencies using the common consequences of the National Resilience Planning Assumptions. By providing insights to the relative strength of capabilities within a risk scenario and suggesting areas for investment to improve capabilities. The programme is intended to shift away from long, detailed assessments of individual capabilities towards providing a more holistic multi capability view.
- Rather than assessing our capability to respond to every risk in the NRA, the RCP takes a dip sample of risks, including every red risk (the highest priority risks); and at least one risk feeding into each planning assumption (the generic consequences of risks). Each risk draws upon a different subset of response capabilities. The dip sample ensures that, having assessed our ability to respond to those risks, every capability will have been adequately probed.
- It takes about 20 minutes (max.) to map a single capability to a single risk Each During the interviews, we asked capability owners about the capabilities required to respond to key national risks, breaking each capability down into seven elements: Plans & Procedures: these establish the framework that guide responders and others during an emergency. Personnel: describes who is needed (e.g. vets, doctors, police) and how many to respond to a crisis. Are there enough trained people? Infrastructure: the acquisition, development, management and disposal of buildings, land, utilities, and other structures that are needed during an emergency. Equipment & Supplies: these include expendable and non-expendable items needed during an emergency (e.g. vehicles, body bags, etc.) Legislation & Doctrine: provides the foundations to deliver a response. Includes laws, concepts, terminology, principles and ways of working. Information: the data, information and knowledge requirements needed during an emergency (e.g. wind direction in a flooding event) – and the means to share it. Training & Exercising: the means to practice, develop and validate plans to deliver effectively during an emergency. They were asked for: judgements/assessments of each element confidence in assessments, the importance of that element for the overall capability, and to what extent the capability varies (for example, from region to region). All lead government departments were asked the same set of simple, comparable questions about response capabilities. Whilst the standardised questions and answers compromises detail, crucially it preserves comparability allowing a picture of relative performance to be built up (which is the crux of the programme). Chooses to ask “do you have enough people?” rather than “how many people do you have?”
- Every capability is comprised of the same 7 elements The same 3 questions are asked to all capability owners. The data from these three questions is then combined to produce a colour for each element. If there is a big capability gap for something that is critically important, then it should aggregate to red.
- Every capability is comprised of the same 7 elements The same 3 questions are asked to all capability owners. The data from these three questions is then combined to produce a colour for each element. If there is a big capability gap for something that is critically important, then it should aggregate to red.
- The data from the seven elements is then combined to determine the capability outcome.
- Every layer of data is then aggregated into a RCP sunburst diagrams. This preserves transparency and allows the reader to zoom in and out, tracing the reasoning behind the aggregated results. The inner three layers are coloured according to the aggregation decision trees. The outer layer details the capability element inputs. It is important that these are not red/amber/green as this would instantly imply a value judgement that is not valid. Instead of colours, we have opted for the length of the bar to indicate the different values with some limited colour indicators for leading practice and unknowns The elements are aggregated to give a capability score the capabilities are then aggregated together to provide a summary for the risk.
- We can also use the software to build many other different reports, for example: Capability ratings across the full range of risks within the RCP.
- Being able to delve into the data and visualise it in different ways allows you to spot trends that may not have been spotted before and potentially
- In parallel with Yellowhammer and following the interviews we have worked with software developers to develop a visualisation tool to enable us to present the information we have gathered. The software enables the answers to be aggregated in a standardised way, using decision trees agreed by resilience professionals across government, to produce an overall colour outcome for the capability within that risk scenario. The capabilities are then aggregated together to provide a summary for the risk. Red, purple (reflects uncertainty in the data), orange and green. These are relative indicators and do not have an absolute definition. Red does not mean failure - it means worse than orange. Green does not mean good, it means better than orange. Purples, with further data, may turn into red, orange or green. As a community we have decided that if one of the seven elements of a capability is red, the capability as a whole must be red the same logic is true for capabilities and risks. These judgements reflect the resilience community’s appetite for risk and can be changed as that appetite matures or shifts. Critically, if the aggregation decision trees are changed for one capability, they must be changed for all capabilities in order to preserve comparability.