Balancing school choice and equity - an international perspective based on PISA
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Many countries are struggling to reconcile greater flexibility in school choice with the need to ensure quality, equity and coherence in their school systems. This report provides an international perspective on issues related to school choice, especially how certain aspects of school-choice policies may be associated with sorting students into different schools. A key question fuelling the school-choice debate is whether greater competition among schools results in more sorting of students by ability or socio-economic status. At the macro level, school segregation can deprive children of opportunities to learn, play and communicate with other children from different social, cultural and ethnic backgrounds, which can, in turn, threaten social cohesion. The report draws a comprehensive picture of school segregation, using a variety of indicators in order to account for the diversity of the processes by which students are allocated to schools.
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Balancing school choice and equity - an international perspective based on PISA
- 1. Balancing School Choice and Equity: An International Perspective based on PISA
- 2. Singapore Japan EstoniaChinese Tapei Finland Macao (China) CanadaViet Nam Hong Kong (China)B-S-J-G (China) KoreaNew ZealandSlovenia Australia United KingdomGermany Netherlands Switzerland Ireland Belgium DenmarkPolandPortugal NorwayUnited StatesAustriaFrance Sweden Czech Rep. Spain Latvia Russia Luxembourg Italy Hungary LithuaniaCroatia Iceland IsraelMalta Slovak Rep. Greece Chile Bulgaria United Arab EmiratesUruguay Romania Moldova Turkey Trinidad and Tobago ThailandCosta Rica QatarColombia Mexico MontenegroJordan Indonesia Brazil Peru Lebanon Tunisia FYROM Kosovo Algeria Dominican Rep. (332) 350 400 450 500 550 Meanscienceperformance Higherperfomance Learning outcomes and equity in PISA (Science, 2015) Some countries combine excellence with equity More equityMore equity High performance High equity Low performance Low equity Low performance High equity High performance Low equity
- 3. Who decides? Percentage of decisions taken at each level of government in public lower secondary education (2017) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Netherlands CzechRepublic England(UK) Latvia Flemishcomm.… Iceland Estonia Australia NewZealand Slovenia Scotland(UK) Chile Austria Ireland SlovakRepublic Lithuania EU23average Sweden OECDaverage Italy Hungary Denmark Frenchcomm.… RussianFederation Japan Israel Germany Luxembourg Mexico UnitedStates Canada Korea Portugal Norway France Spain Switzerland Greece Turkey Finland School Local Regional or Sub-regional Central or State Multiple levels%
- 4. -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 Resources Curriculum Disciplinarypolicies Assessmentpolicies Admissionspolicies Resources Curriculum Disciplinarypolicies Assessmentpolicies Admissionspolicies Resources Curriculum Disciplinarypolicies Assessmentpolicies Admissionspolicies Resources Curriculum Disciplinarypolicies Assessmentpolicies Admissionspolicies Resources Curriculum Disciplinarypolicies Assessmentpolicies Admissionspolicies School principal Teachers School governing board Local or regional education authority National education authority Higher science Lower science performanc e PISA Figure II.4.8Source: OECD, PISA 2015 Database. Correlations between the responsibilities for school governance and learning outcomes
- 5. Variation in performance between and within schools Figure I.6.11 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80 Netherlands114 B-S-J-G(China)119 Bulgaria115 Hungary104 TrinidadandTobago98 Belgium112 Slovenia101 Germany110 SlovakRepublic109 Malta154 UnitedArabEmirates110 Austria106 Israel126 Lebanon91 CzechRepublic101 Qatar109 Japan97 Switzerland110 Singapore120 Italy93 ChineseTaipei111 Luxembourg112 Turkey70 Brazil89 Croatia89 Greece94 Chile83 Lithuania92 OECDaverage100 Uruguay84 CABA(Argentina)82 Romania70 VietNam65 Korea101 Australia117 UnitedKingdom111 Peru66 Colombia72 Thailand69 HongKong(China)72 FYROM80 Portugal94 DominicanRepublic59 Indonesia52 Georgia92 Jordan79 NewZealand121 UnitedStates108 Montenegro81 Tunisia47 Sweden117 Mexico57 Albania69 Kosovo57 Macao(China)74 Algeria54 Estonia88 Moldova83 CostaRica55 Russia76 Canada95 Poland92 Denmark91 Latvia75 Ireland88 Spain86 Norway103 Finland103 Iceland93 Between-school variation Within-school variation Total variation as a proportion of the OECD average OECD average 69% OECD average 30% %
- 6. Do public or private schools do better? It depends
- 7. PISA performance in public and private schools (science) -100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 Turkey Singapore VietNam Japan Tunisia Italy ChineseTaipei Thailand Greece Switzerland CzechRepublic UnitedStates Estonia Uruguay France Austria CABA(Argentina) Kosovo Mexico HongKong(China) Indonesia Luxembourg Sweden Hungary Malta DominicanRepublic Latvia OECDaverage B-S-J-G(China) Portugal Slovenia Spain UnitedKingdom SlovakRepublic Norway Australia Croatia Denmark Peru Jordan CostaRica Colombia Chile Netherlands Korea NewZealand Canada Lithuania Ireland Georgia TrinidadandTobago FYROM Germany Finland Lebanon Belgium Poland Brazil UnitedArabEmirates Qatar Score-pointdifference Before accounting for socio-economic status After accounting for socio-economic status Figure II.4.14 Students in private schools perform better Students in public schools perform better
- 8. PISA performance in public and private schools (science) -100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 Turkey Singapore VietNam Japan Tunisia Italy ChineseTaipei Thailand Greece Switzerland CzechRepublic UnitedStates Estonia Uruguay France Austria CABA(Argentina) Kosovo Mexico HongKong(China) Indonesia Luxembourg Sweden Hungary Malta DominicanRepublic Latvia OECDaverage B-S-J-G(China) Portugal Slovenia Spain UnitedKingdom SlovakRepublic Norway Australia Croatia Denmark Peru Jordan CostaRica Colombia Chile Netherlands Korea NewZealand Canada Lithuania Ireland Georgia TrinidadandTobago FYROM Germany Finland Lebanon Belgium Poland Brazil UnitedArabEmirates Qatar Score-pointdifference Before accounting for socio-economic background_NS After accounting for socio-economic status Figure II.4.14 Students in private schools perform better Students in public schools perform better
- 10. Differences in educational resources between advantaged and disadvantaged schools Figure I.6.14 -3 -2 -2 -1 -1 0 1 1 CABA(Argentina) Mexico Peru Macao(China) UnitedArabEmirates Lebanon Jordan Colombia Brazil Indonesia Turkey Spain DominicanRepublic Georgia Uruguay Thailand B-S-J-G(China) Australia Japan Chile Luxembourg Russia Portugal Malta Italy NewZealand Croatia Ireland Algeria Norway Israel Denmark Sweden UnitedStates Moldova Belgium Slovenia OECDaverage Hungary ChineseTaipei VietNam CzechRepublic Singapore Tunisia Greece TrinidadandTobago Canada Romania Qatar Montenegro Kosovo Netherlands Korea Finland Switzerland Germany HongKong(China) Austria FYROM Poland Albania Bulgaria SlovakRepublic Lithuania Estonia Iceland CostaRica UnitedKingdom Latvia Meanindexdifferencebetweenadvantaged anddisadvantagedschools Index of shortage of educational material Index of shortage of educational staff Disadvantaged schools have more resources than advantaged schools Disadvantaged schools have fewer resources than advantaged schools
- 11. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Singapore HongKong(China) Indonesia Macao(China) ChineseTaipei Belgium Australia Latvia NewZealand UnitedKingdom Netherlands Korea Japan UnitedArabEmirates Thailand Bulgaria Mexico Ireland Colombia SlovakRepublic CzechRepublic Denmark Chile Spain Germany VietNam Canada CostaRica Estonia Peru Croatia Turkey Israel Portugal OECDaverage Hungary Russia UnitedStates Slovenia Qatar Luxembourg Lithuania Romania Brazil Jordan Poland Sweden Greece Tunisia Albania France Austria Italy Uruguay Iceland Finland Montenegro Switzerland Norway % Percentage of students in schools that compete with at least one other local school In PISA 2012, most school principals reported that they compete with a least one other school for enrolment… Figure 2.2
- 12. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Hong Kong (China) Macao (China) Belgium Korea Mexico Chile Germany Croatia Portugal Hungary Italy % Schools in which principals reported school competition Schools in which at least 75% of the parents reported school competition … but in many cases parents perceived less competition between schools Figure 2.3
- 13. School-choice policies and education outcomes Equity and performance Private vs public Enrolment practices School-choice policies School selective practices Residential segregation Academic and social segregation Education outcomes School competition Access to the best schools Peer effects Contextual effects
- 14. Table 2.1Countries assign students to schools in very different ways PISA 2009 (Part 1/2) Austria Belgium(Fl.) Belgium(Fr.) Chile CzechRepublic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Latvia Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands NewZealand Norway Poland Portugal SlovakRepublic Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland UnitedStates Initial assignment based on geographical area schools Families are given a general right to enrol in any traditional public school they wish Choice of other public schools is restricted to the district or municipality Choice of other public schools is restricted by region Families must apply to enrol in a public school other than the one assigned to their child(ren) There is free choice of other public schools if there are places available OECD Yes No
- 15. Table 2.1Countries assign students to schools in very different ways PISA 2009 (Part 1/2) Argentina Brazil Bulgaria Colombia Croatia HongKong(China) Lithuania Macao(China) Montenegro Peru Qatar Singapore ChineseTaipei Thailand Initial assignment based on geographical area schools Families are given a general right to enrol in any traditional public school they wish Choice of other public schools is restricted to the district or municipality Choice of other public schools is restricted by region Families must apply to enrol in a public school other than the one assigned to their child(ren) There is free choice of other public schools if there are places available Partners Yes No
- 16. Figure 2.4 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Poland Switzerland Greece Norway Canada Finland Russia UnitedStates Portugal Spain UnitedKingdom Germany NewZealand Albania Australia Thailand Sweden Denmark Israel Iceland OECDaverage-29 OECDaverage-28 Luxembourg Indonesia Brazil Ireland Austria Latvia CzechRepublic Korea Romania Hungary Japan Bulgaria Netherlands Mexico Peru Chile HongKong(China) Belgium 2000 2009 2015% Percentage of students enrolled in schools in which residence is always considered for admission School admissions based on residence
- 17. [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CEL… [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] UK [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] R² = 0.08 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Dissimilarityindexfordisadvantagedstudents Residence as an admission criterion (%) OECD average Social segregation amongst schools is negatively related to school enrolment based on residence Figure 4.4 More schools rely on residence-based criteria for enrolment OECD average Moresegregation–disadvantagedstudents
- 18. Figure 2.5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 HongKong(China) Japan Thailand Hungary Bulgaria Luxembourg Austria Netherlands Indonesia Albania Mexico Switzerland CzechRepublic Romania Israel Germany Korea OECDaverage-26 OECDaverage-27 NewZealand Portugal Canada UnitedStates Latvia Belgium Brazil Ireland Peru UnitedKingdom Chile Russia Poland Denmark Greece Finland Spain 2000 2009 2015% Percentage of students enrolled in schools in which academic performance (including placement tests) is always considered for admission School admissions based on academic performance
- 19. Selection of students based on academic criteria is more prevalent in private schools than in public schools Figure 2.6 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 HongKong(China) Japan Thailand Singapore Hungary Kosovo VietNam Turkey Netherlands Austria Luxembourg Lebanon Indonesia NorthMacedonia TrinidadandTobago Tunisia Switzerland Mexico Albania SlovakRepublic CzechRepublic Italy UnitedArabEmirates ChineseTaipei Korea Germany CostaRica Malta Colombia B-S-J-G(China) OECDaverage Qatar Australia NewZealand Slovenia Latvia Ireland Portugal France Georgia Lithuania UnitedStates Estonia Canada DominicanRepublic Jordan Uruguay Brazil Chile UnitedKingdom Poland CABA(Argentina) Peru Denmark Norway Spain Greece Finland Academic performance as an admissions criterion in public schools Academic performance as an admissions criterion in private schools% Percentage of students enrolled in schools in which academic performance (including placement tests) is always considered for admission
- 20. In most countries, social segregation is more prevalent amongst private than public schools… Figure 4.2 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 Tunisia Portugal Mexico Colombia Poland Indonesia Italy Thailand Chile B-S-J-G(China) CABA(Argentina) Jordan Turkey Luxembourg CzechRepublic Estonia Georgia Singapore Peru Hungary Brazil Austria France OECDaverage Spain SlovakRepublic DominicanRepublic Lebanon UnitedArabEmirates CostaRica Uruguay Lithuania UnitedKingdom Australia Kosovo Japan ChineseTaipei Latvia Qatar NewZealand UnitedStates Korea Croatia HongKong(China) Greece Canada Switzerland TrinidadandTobago Ireland Norway VietNam Germany Netherlands Denmark Finland Malta Slovenia NorthMacedonia Social segregation in private schools Social segregation in public schools No-diversity index Moresegregation
- 21. …but the segregation observed between public and private schools does not contribute much to the overall level of segregation Figure 4.1 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 Peru CABA(Argentina) Indonesia Mexico Chile Colombia B-S-J-G(China) Lebanon CostaRica Hungary CzechRepublic Australia VietNam Uruguay Georgia Brazil Thailand Spain Tunisia SlovakRepublic Latvia Lithuania DominicanRepublic Slovenia Austria Portugal UnitedStates Germany Singapore OECDaverage Estonia Jordan Italy UnitedKingdom France UnitedArabEmirates Greece Luxembourg Netherlands Turkey HongKong(China) NewZealand Japan Korea ChineseTaipei Poland Denmark Canada Switzerland Croatia Ireland Malta TrinidadandTobago Qatar Norway NorthMacedonia Finland Kosovo No-diversity index Social segregation observed between public and private schools Social segregation induced by private schools Social segregation induced by public schools Decomposition of the no-diversity index based on the contributions of public and private schools Moresegregation
- 22. 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Peru Hungary B-S-J-G(China) Bulgaria CABA(Argentina) Chile Slovenia Singapore CzechRepublic Mexico Belgium Indonesia SlovakRepublic Romania Uruguay Colombia Netherlands Luxembourg Israel Lebanon¹ Japan Germany Austria CostaRica Lithuania TrinidadandTobago Italy UnitedArabEmirates ChineseTaipei Thailand Tunisia Switzerland Turkey Croatia Georgia VietNam Greece Moldova OECDaverage Brazil DominicanRepublic France¹ Australia Qatar Malta HongKong(China) Portugal Korea Latvia Russia Montenegro NorthMacedonia UnitedKingdom NewZealand Spain UnitedStates Poland Estonia Kosovo¹ Canada Jordan Sweden Ireland Denmark Macao(China) Finland Algeria¹ Iceland Norway Index Isolation of disadvantaged students from national high achievers in reading Depending on the school system, disadvantaged students tend to be less likely to attend classes with high achievers Figure 3.4 Disadvantagedstudentsmoreoften inschoolswithfewhighachievers
- 23. [CELLRANGE] [CE… [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELL… [CEL… [CELLRANGE] [CE… [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CEL… [CELLRANGE] [CELLRAN GE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE ] [CELLRANGE] [CELLRANGE] R² = 0.44 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 051015202530 Variation in reading performance explained by students’ socio-economic status (%) In 2015, countries and economies where schools were less socially diverse had also less-equitable education systems Figure 5.2 Moresegregation Greater equity
- 24. 3 4 34 Square school choice with equity Financial incentives for schools Assistance for disadvantaged parents Manage/ consolidate school network Formula- based approaches to school financing Admission policies, controlled choice Foster collaboration /pairing among schools Engaging parents and stakeholders
- 25. Some conclusions
- 26. Focus on framework conditions and implementation • School choice neither assures nor undermines the quality of education. • It is the framework conditions under which school choice and school vouchers operate, and how such instruments are implemented, that seem to matter most. Ensure that choice is real, relevant and meaningful • School choice will only generate the anticipated benefits when the choice is real, relevant and meaningful. Create a level playing field for all providers to enter the system • When private schools are part of a “functionally public” system, they should have the capacity to offer a similar range of options for courses as public schools do and receive a commensurate level of public funding. • When expanding school choice and vouchers for private schools, policies should also ensure that public schools are granted greater autonomy. Some conclusions
- 27. Ensure that all schools that receive public funds meet their public obligations • As universities and hospitals already do, private schools that accept public funding should be obliged to maintain the “public good” in return for that support. Ensure that all parents can exercise their right to choose a school of their preference • Sometimes school choice policies fail because parents limited ability to exercise their right to choose. • Schools, public and private alike, should invest in developing their relationships with parents and local communities in order to help parents make informed decisions. Some conclusions
- 28. Provide the checks and balances that prevent choice from leading to more inequity and segregation • Regulating the conditions under which schools develop access and selection policies. Work to make education systems more demand-sensitive • School choice is only one way through which parents and local communities can have a greater impact on, and voice in, education. • School choice works more effectively in a participatory and inclusive climate. • School autonomy, the professionalisation of teachers and school leaders, and student participation increase as parents are granted greater choice of schools. • The benefits of school choice will only materialise in an environment where parents, students, external stakeholders and the local community can participate in the school and have their voices heard and appreciated. Some conclusions
- 29. Find out more about our work at www.oecd.org/edu – All publications – The complete PISA micro-level database Email: Andreas.Schleicher@OECD.org Twitter: SchleicherOECD Wechat: AndreasSchleicher Thank you
Notes de l'éditeur
- 1. In Algeria, France, Kosovo and Lebanon, the proportion of 15-year-old students in modal grade schools is lower than 80% (see Table B.3), and one should interpret with caution the comparison with other countries.